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Abstract 
This thesis provides an analysis of the proposed currency union of the fifteen countries 
of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The study attempts to 
answer the following questions: (1) is ECOWAS an optimum currency area? In other 
words, are ECOWAS countries good candidates for a currency union? (2) are the 
ECOWAS countries ready for an independent currency union? And (3) are the 
economic benefits to the ECOWAS countries justifiable for a currency union?  
To address these research questions we applied the framework of the Optimum currency 
area theory pioneered by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). To 
investigate the impact of currency union and exchange rate volatility on intra-ECOWAS 
trade we estimate the augmented version of the gravity model of international trade 
using panel data over the period 1980-2012. After controlling for zero trade we found 
that currency union has a negative and non-significant impact on exports and imports 
and negative and significant impact on total trade. Whatever trade measure we use, both 
before and after controlling for zero trade, there is no evidence to support the trade 
creation argument of currency union in the decades of WAEMU existence.  We found 
the effect of exchange rate volatility to be negative and significant on exports, imports 
and total trade before controlling for zero trade but the effect on all the three trade 
measures becomes statistically insignificant after the control for zero trade. We carried 
out perturbations with different exchange rate volatility measures and found our results 
to be insensitive and robust in all cases. We also found that while ECOWAS countries 
trade extensively with the rest of the world, trade with each other is very low. With a 
cluster analysis methodology we found a high degree of heterogeneity in ECOWAS 
countries’ macroeconomic characteristics especially those that are not members of the 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). While the eight WAEMU 
countries clustered together, the others are in fragmented clusters indicating the degree 
of dissimilarity. These findings are robust even with the use of alternative 
agglomerative methods of merging the countries.   
We conclude from our findings that ECOWAS is not an optimum currency area and that 
the countries are not good candidates for a currency union which makes them at this 
stage not ready for a full-fledged currency union. The thesis provides no evidence that 
the level of trade within ECOWAS justifies the formation of a currency union.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The African continent has a long history of economic integration dating back to 1963 
when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed. Understanding the African 
plan is vital for a better understanding of the rationale for sub-regional economic 
integration proposals. Since independence in the late 1950s and the early 1960s African 
countries have always favoured economic and political integration as a means to 
achieve higher growth and development, accelerate poverty reduction and enhance 
national security (Asante, 2007; Ojo, 2001). These aspirations led to the formation of 
the OAU whose stated objectives are 
‘to rid  the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid; 
to promote unity and solidarity among African States; to coordinate and  intensify 
cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and  
territorial integrity of Member States and to promote international cooperation 
within the  framework of the United Nations.’(AU web site) 
In 1991, the 27
th
 summit of the OAU established in Abuja, Nigeria, the African 
Economic Community (AEC) in order to consolidate the progress of economic 
integration at the sub regional level and also to enable the continent to better face the 
challenges posed by the evolving trends in the global economy. AEC is the economic 
wing of the OAU and its operation rests on Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as 
pillars. Article 44 of the 1991 Abuja Treaty requires the establishment of a number of 
protocols requiring member states, within a time table to be determined by the OAU, to 
harmonise their monetary, financial and payment policies, and boost intra-community 
trade in goods, services as well as enhance monetary cooperation among member states. 
The strategy of the AEC involves the formation of regional trading blocs, intensification 
of globalisation and liberalisation. This process is enshrined in the African Monetary 
Cooperation Programme (AMCP) managed by the Association of African Central 
Banks (AACB). The objectives of the AMCP involve the “adoption of collective policy 
measures to achieve a harmonized monetary system and common management 
institutions. It envisages the harmonization of the monetary cooperation programs of the 
various sub-regional groupings as building blocks with the ultimate aim of evolving a 
single monetary zone by the year 2021 with a common currency and a common Central 
Bank at the continental level” (AACB, 2002).  
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The lack of progress in the achievement of the objectives of the OAU and the growing 
challenges in the global economy led to the realisation of the need for a total adjustment 
of the continent’s organisation for more effective and lasting solutions to the African 
problems. This consensus led to the Sirte Declaration and the Constitutive Act of the 
AU that led to the creation of the African Union (AU) in 2000. With similar objectives 
to the OAU, the AU’s slight change of focus is the reorientation towards African 
integration.  
After the transformation of the OAU into the AU, there was a call for the strengthening 
of existing RECs as the pillars of the African integration programme, and the 
establishment of new ones where they do not exist. Virtually every African country 
belongs to one or more of the regional economic groupings on the continent and these 
include: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (COMESA), Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Economic 
Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS), to name a few (more details in chapter 2). Most of these RECs have 
duplicating and overlapping membership and mandates and also they are very poorly 
funded (Asante, 2007).  
Following the formation of the OAU in 1963, West African countries established the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in May 1975. The 
ECOWAS mission is to promote economic integration in all fields of economic activity, 
particularly industry, transport, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and 
financial issues, social and cultural matters. In 1987, ECOWAS adopted a programme 
of monetary cooperation as a means to facilitate regional trade and cross-border 
transactions and achieve regional currency convertibility (Ojo, 2001). Following the 
African reorientation towards economic integration as seen in the change from OAU to 
AU in 1991, the ECOWAS (the community) treaty was revised in 1993. The aims of the 
Community, as stated in Article 3 of its revised treaty are to promote co-operation and 
integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order 
to raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic 
stability, foster relations among Member States and contribute to the progress and 
development of the African Continent.  
An offshoot of the African Monetary Cooperation Programme is the ECOWAS 
monetary cooperation programme (EMCP) which outlined the integration programme 
for the West African sub region and is monitored by West African Monetary Agency 
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(WAMA).  A two track approach was established for ECOWAS monetary union with 
the ultimate aim of introducing the ECOWAS single currency in 2020. Track 1 is the 
already established monetary union WAEMU with its single currency (CFA franc) 
pegged to the euro and supported by France. This monetary zone is made up of eight 
countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and 
Togo. All are former French colonies except Guinea Bissau. A second monetary zone, 
the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), was established by the other countries 
mainly English speaking: Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the 
Gambia with Cape Verde given the option to join either of the two zones. WAMZ 
single currency, the ECO, was to come into existence in 2003 but due to lack of 
convergence it was postponed to 2005 and again to 2009. In 2009 not only WAMZ 
countries but almost all the other ECOWAS countries failed to meet the ECOWAS 
convergence criteria (see chapter 2) for the introduction of the single currency. This led 
to another postponement with the new date of January 2015. Another convergence 
failure of the countries made the target date of 2015 impossible. The lack of progress on 
the ECOWAS single currency programme finally resulted to the decision to abandon 
the two track approach and adopt a single track approach as reflected in the 2014 
ECOWAS annual report “on the bid to accelerate progress towards the realisation of the 
ECOWAS single currency by 2020, the single track approach for the monetary 
integration programme was adopted… and the revision of the roadmap for the 
ECOWAS single currency” (ECOWAS, 2014:14). 
The above background has given us not only an understanding of the motivation for the 
proposed ECOWAS single currency and the economic integration events in the African 
continent but also gave an indication of the lack of progress in achieving integration 
objectives despite the growing number of bilateral and multilateral economic and 
political treaties in Africa. Many commentators have pointed out the disappointing 
performance of the continent in the enhancement of the process of regional integration 
due to many problems encountered by the regional integration blocks. Among the most 
important of these problems are: the political instability and bad governance that have 
plagued many of the countries; the weakness of the national economies and their 
insufficient diversification; the absence of reliable roads, telecommunications and 
energy infrastructure; the insufficient political will exhibited by some member States; 
the bad economic policies in certain cases; the multiplicity of organisations for regional 
integration with the same objectives; the irregularity in the payment of financial 
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contributions to the budgets of the institutions; the failure to involve the civil society, 
the private sector and mass movements in the process of integration; the defective 
nature of the integrational machinery in certain cases (Ezenwe, 1994; ECOWAS 
website; Masson and Patillo, 2005; Mistry, 2000; Ojo, 2001). 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: the next section gives a brief outline of 
the OCA theory and the research questions, objectives and rationale of the thesis and 
section 1.3 provides the organisation of the thesis and a summary of the contents of 
each chapter with methodology and findings where appropriate. Throughout this thesis 
the phrases ‘currency union’ and ‘monetary union’ are used interchangeably but they 
mean the same thing.     
1.2 Research questions, objectives and study rationale 
Since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s countries were left 
with the crucial decision on which exchange rate regime to adopt- floating exchange 
rates, fixed exchange rates or managed floating exchange rates. The choice between free 
floating and fixing of exchange rates remained an intense academic debate in the 
literature. It is argued that higher exchange rate volatility that may result from a floating 
exchange rate regime leads to higher cost for risk-averse traders and to less foreign 
trade. The literature on this proposition is inconclusive. A collective approach to 
managing exchange rates is the formation of monetary union by a number of countries. 
The successful launch of the euro in 1999 is the most recent example of currency union 
that may have increased the motivation for other regions to follow. The argument is that 
currency union removes exchange rate volatility that is the source of risk and therefore 
should increase trade between its members. This argument gained empirical support 
from the seminal paper of Rose (2000a) where he found that currency union increases 
trade for its members by 300% as compared to non-members. Rose’s paper triggers the 
debate on the impact of currency union on trade and since then a number of empirical 
studies has been undertaken with varying results. However abandoning a national 
currency for a single currency with others is not free of cost. The economic cost, argued, 
of this decision is the loss of monetary autonomy as monetary policy decisions will be 
vested in the hands of the common central bank.  
Mundell (1961) put forward his celebrated OCA theory which emphasises the 
importance of factor mobility (labour and capital), wage flexibility and the absence of 
asymmetric macroeconomic shocks. His theory was subsequently extended by 
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McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). Since this theoretical development the OCA 
became enormously influential as the organising framework for the analysis in most 
empirical work involving currency union and trade.  
In the background of this chapter, section 1.1, we present at length the developments in 
economic integration in Africa and in particular ECOWAS, the focus of this thesis. A 
proposal to abandon national currencies by fifteen countries is a fundamental economic 
decision that should not be left to chance. The failure of ECOWAS countries to 
converge on a number of occasions has led to several postponements of the 
commencement of the single currency. It has also led to the most recent shift, by the 
ECOWAS authorities, from a two track to a single track approach to speed up the 
adoption of a single currency by the target date of 2020. These developments provide 
relevance and strengthened the case for a study on the ECOWAS single currency 
proposal. This study therefore investigates into two research questions: 
1. Is ECOWAS an optimum currency area? In other words, are ECOWAS countries 
good candidates to form a currency union? 
2. Are the economic benefits to the ECOWAS countries justifiable for a currency 
union?  
To answer these research questions the thesis considered the following research 
objectives: 
I. Examine the extent of intra-regional trade flows in ECOWAS and the potential for 
increase in trade 
II. Assess the impact of currency union and exchange rate volatility on intra-ECOWAS 
bilateral trade flows and 
III. Examine the degree of similarity of ECOWAS countries’ macroeconomic 
characteristics and determine their level of convergence. 
1.2.1 Contribution of the study to the literature 
Ever since the seminal paper of Rose (2000a), where he found that countries in a 
currency union trade three times more than those not in a currency union, a number of 
studies have been conducted on this topic with diverse results, some closely but slightly 
lower than Rose’s figure of 300% but others significantly lower. One of the features of 
the early studies on currency union is that they constitute a large number of countries 
drawn from different parts of the world with different economic structures and great 
diversity in terms of their development. For instance Rose used a sample of 186 
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countries selected globally for the period 1970-1990 and Glick and Rose (2002) used a 
sample size of 217 countries, also globally, for the period 1948-1997. Glick and Rose 
found that countries joining currency union doubled their trade and those leaving 
currency unions halved their trade and this was economically and statistically 
significant. Both of these early studies sample included all the 15 ECOWAS countries 
except Cape Verde in the case of Rose (2000a). Subsequent studies also included either 
all or almost all of these countries. Other studies are based entirely on other continents 
not including ECOWAS; example Europe has attracted a number of empirical studies in 
the area of currency union. This is not surprising given the long history of European 
integration and Europe now been an established currency union.   
There is an important policy question for regional integration blocs especially 
ECOWAS that is of interest to this thesis.  The question is should the findings of a large 
and statistically significant positive impact of currency union on trade from Rose and 
other global sample studies be taken as a justification to form a single currency in 
different regions such as the ECOWAS proposal? Perhaps the size and statistical 
significance from those studies may have come from the bigger and developed nations, 
with extensive trade relations, in the sample without which the results may have been 
otherwise. Vicarelli and de Nardis (2003) in their study focussing mainly on the Euro 
countries also argued in a similar line and they described the Rose sample as large and 
heterogeneous. What is also commonly commented on in the literature about these 
global samples is that some of the countries included are small and poor and this 
comment seems relevant for most, if not all, the ECOWAS countries. On this same 
issue Danny Quah in his critique of Rose’s paper commented that  
‘the partition between subgroups, the first not having single currency 
characteristics and the second having them, is frighteningly skewed: less than 1% 
of the total sample is in the single currency group. Researchers have discarded 
subsamples larger than that in the pursuit of statistical robustness. Yet, it is what 
provides the author with the strong results that he has.’ 
From the above discussion one would consider it to be a serious policy mistake if 
ECOWAS single currency is to come into existence without conducting the study 
focussing specifically on the 15 ECOWAS countries to see whether the global sample 
studies’ findings are applicable in ECOWAS. After all, the ECOWAS proposal is not 
for a global monetary union but a monetary union for its fifteen member states and 
therefore we argued that a generalisation of global studies with their global conclusions 
could ignore the idiosyncrasies of other nations especially at regional levels. In this 
context, this thesis with specific focus on ECOWAS will make a contribution that will 
7 
 
be of interest to academics, policy makers and many other stakeholders. The thesis 
contribution is justified in a number of ways. First, it is specifically focused on 
ECOWAS, a region that is planning to move towards monetary union with less specific 
attention from the literature. Second, unlike many studies, as mentioned in the global 
samples above, the sample split, in this thesis, between currency union (53%) and non-
currency union (47%) is well balanced, thus the robustness of the results could not be 
questioned on the basis of skewed sample. Finally, the application of different 
methodologies such as panel data and cluster analysis supported by comparative data 
analysis with consistent findings, is to the best of my knowledge, the first of its kind for 
ECOWAS. Panel data accounts for heterogeneity in the trading pairs which addresses 
the potential biasness of some of the earlier studies. 
1.3 The structure and contents of the thesis 
Chapter 2 described the general background of the African integration agenda since the 
establishment of the OAU after independence of most countries. The motivation for the 
formation of the OAU, its aims and objectives and its subsequent transformation into 
African Union which outlines the six stage road map for the establishment of the 
African single currency. The chapter then narrows down its attention to ECOWAS with 
a detailed description and discussion of its aims, objectives, integration plan and its 
implementation with particular emphasis on free trade, customs union, free movement 
of goods, persons and capital and the obstacles that the trade liberalisation programme 
has encountered. The contents of this chapter fed into the analysis and discussion of our 
results within the framework of the OCA in chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the historical and macroeconomic 
characteristics of the fifteen ECOWAS countries. The rationale of the chapter is that an 
understanding of the economic characteristics of these countries aids our understanding 
of the results and enhances our engagement in their interpretation. The chapter covers 
key areas including GDP and GDP growth, the composition of ECOWAS GDP and 
population by country and for each country the components of GDP (primary, 
secondary and tertiary), unemployment/underemployment, political instability and 
colonial links. The chapter uncovered many key common characteristics of ECOWAS 
countries that have important implications for the OCA literature discussed in chapter 4 
and our analysis in chapters 5, 6 and 7. These characteristics include: major dependent 
in the primary sector mainly dominated by agriculture, lack of diversification of 
economic activities as indicated by the overreliance on one or few commodities for 
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exports, low manufacturing sector, poor and inadequate infrastructures (roads, energy, 
and manufacturing), high unemployment and underemployment especially for the 
youth, and political instability. We also found in this chapter that ECOWAS is 
dominated by one country, Nigeria, with 70% of the GDP and 53% of the population. 
Chapter 4 outlines and discusses the literature on the OCA which forms the basis for the 
analysis in this thesis. The chapter examines the OCA theory criteria (factor mobility: 
labour and capital, wage flexibility, trade openness, product diversification and inflation 
similarity) and political criteria: fiscal transfers and solidarity versus nationalism. It 
further gave account of the contentious debates in the literature on the link between 
monetary union and political union, the endogeneity of the OCA criteria and the critics’ 
response to the OCA theory. The final sections of the chapter are devoted on the 
benefits and other costs of monetary union and the empirical literature on the impact of 
currency union and exchange rate volatility on bilateral trade following the pioneering 
work of Rose (2000a) and Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) respectively.  
Recognising one of the limitations of the OCA theory such as the lack of cut-off points 
for its criteria, chapter 5 opens up the analysis of the thesis by applying the OCA criteria 
on ECOWAS countries by using an already established currency union, the euro, as a 
benchmark for our analysis. The aim of the chapter is to assess the suitability of 
ECOWAS countries for currency union in light of the framework of the OCA with the 
euro as a comparator. We considered the seven OCA and political criteria discussed in 
chapter 4. We found that ECOWAS countries have not done well in any of the criteria 
under consideration which means by definition of the OCA theory, they are not good 
candidates to form a currency union. 
Chapter 6 continues the analysis started in chapter 5. We attempt to answer two 
important questions in this chapter. First, do currency unions have any impact on 
bilateral trade in ECOWAS? Secondly do exchange rate volatility (ERV) has an impact 
on ECOWAS bilateral trade? These two research questions, especially the first one, play 
a very important role in determining whether there are any benefits to be derived from 
the proposed single currency in ECOWAS. To address these questions we applied an 
augmented gravity equation of international trade using panel data methodology over 
the period 1980 to 2012. We used pooled OLS (OLS), and fixed effects (FE) estimators 
to provide estimates for the full period (1980-2012). We estimate the gravity model in 
both triple and double index forms. We carried out perturbations with alternative 
exchange rate measures to check the robustness of our results. The fixed effects model 
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revealed that the existing single currency arrangement in ECOWAS (the WAEMU) has 
a negative and insignificant impact on exports and imports, negative and significant 
effect on total trade after controlling for zero trade. With the FE estimator, before 
accounting for zero trade, we found the exchange rate volatility to be negative and 
significant on exports, imports and total trade but the effect on all the three trade 
measures becomes statistically insignificant after controlling for zero trade. These 
findings are robust with the different perturbations used in the analysis.   
In chapter 5 we examined the ECOWAS countries with comparative data analysis with 
the euro as a benchmark. In chapter 7 we further this analysis with cluster analysis 
methodology. The aim of the analysis in this chapter is to assess whether ECOWAS 
countries are similar in terms of their macroeconomic characteristics. We used eight 
variables in grouping the countries: Synchronisation in the business cycle, trade 
openness, terms of trade synchronisation, convergence of inflation, volatility in the real 
exchange rate, government/fiscal balance, debt servicing requirement, and current 
account balance. We applied a hierarchical clustering technique with the agglomerative 
algorithm with the highest cophenetic correlation coefficient to merge the countries into 
groups. The results revealed a high degree of dissimilarities among ECOWAS countries 
especially within WAMZ. We find the eight WAEMU countries to exhibit high degree 
of similarities and belong to the same cluster in almost all our clustering results. On the 
other hand, WAMZ countries are very heterogeneous making them fragmented into 
different clusters and hardly to find most of these countries in the same cluster with 
WAEMU countries. We found our results to be robust in different perturbations.  
Chapter 8 summarises the findings of our study after a brief background on economic 
integration in ECOWAS and theory and methodology. The chapter concludes the thesis 
in section 8.3.2 and provides policy implications and suggestion for further research in 
the last two sections. 
1.4 Conclusions 
We draw two conclusions based on our findings. Firstly, the existing trade flows within 
ECOWAS countries are inadequate to yield economic benefits that could justify the 
formation of a currency union. Secondly, ECOWAS is not an optimum currency area 
which means that the fifteen countries together do not exhibit the characteristics that 
should qualify them to be good candidates for the formation of a currency union.   
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Chapter 2 Developments in African Economic Cooperation and 
Integration 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter gave the background on the development of Africa’s long history of 
economic cooperation with its aims, objectives and institutional setting. The 
complexities arising from the multiplicity of structural arrangement are also outlined. 
The final sections looked at ECOWAS trade liberalisation programme since its 
formation in 1975 covering free trade arrangement, customs union, capital mobility, free 
movement of persons and the implementation problems encountered.  
2.2 Background  
Since the era of independence of African countries, African leaders have been working 
together towards the unity and integration of the continent. A number of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements have been signed, see appendix A.1, with the hope of bringing 
African nations to the common goal and objectives of integration. The initial initiative 
of the African leaders’ effort saw the formation of the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) in 1963 whose main objectives were: 
‘to rid  the continent of the remaining vestiges of colonization and apartheid; 
to promote unity and solidarity among African States; to coordinate and  intensify 
cooperation for development; to safeguard the sovereignty and  
territorial integrity of Member States and to promote international cooperation 
within the  framework of the United Nations.’(AU web site1, accessed July 2015) 
Despite the growing number of bilateral and multilateral economic and political treaties 
in Africa many commentators have pointed out the disappointing performance of the 
continent in the enhancement of the process of regional integration due to many 
problems encountered by the regional integration blocks. Among the most important of 
these problems are: the political instability and bad governance that have plagued many 
of the countries; the weakness of the national economies and their insufficient 
diversification; the absence of reliable roads, telecommunications and energy 
infrastructure; the insufficient political will exhibited by some member States; the bad 
                                                 
1 http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell  
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economic policies in certain cases; the multiplicity of organisations for regional 
integration with the same objectives; the irregularity in the payment of financial 
contributions to the budgets of the institutions; the failure to involve the civil society, 
the private sector and mass movements in the process of integration; the defective 
nature of the integrational machinery in certain cases (Masson and Patillo, 2005; Mistry, 
2000).  
The overriding objective of the African economic integration is to overcome the 
economic disadvantages of small size of the African countries, low per capita incomes, 
spares populations and narrow resource bases, and of making possible a higher rate of 
economic growth and development (Asante, 2007). The author further commented that 
regional integration is not only desirable but also necessary if Africa is to reduce 
poverty, to industrialise, develop intra-regional trade, strengthen capacities to benefit 
from globalisation, reduce her vulnerability to fluctuating overseas markets, mobilise 
and maximise scarce resources of capital and skills, and finally forge the way to 
effective African unity, both political and economic. However, the failure of the African 
integration efforts is in no way closer to addressing the economic challenges facing the 
continent such as the payment of heavy external debts, development financing, regional 
and continental integration, industrialisation and economic and political governance 
(Kouassi, 2007). To enable Africa to find effective and lasting solutions to these 
problems, African leaders realised the need for a total adjustment of the continent’s 
organisation. This consensus led to the Sirte Declaration and the Constitutive Act of the 
AU (appendix A.1) that led to the creation of the African union in 2000. To enable the 
AU to achieve its objectives the African Heads of State and Government adopted, in 
2001, the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) programme. 
The vision of the African Union is to have 
‘An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and 
representing a dynamic force in global arena.’ 
The main difference between the AU and its predecessor, OAU, is the shift from 
supporting liberalisation movements in the erstwhile African territories under 
colonialism and apartheid to Africa’s development and integration. In order to achieve 
its vision, the AU’s main objectives which are similar to those of the OAU in many 
areas include: African unity and solidarity; political and socio-economic integration of 
Africa; peace, security, and stability; sustainable development; integration of African 
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economies; raise the living standards of African peoples; coordinate and harmonize the 
policies between the existing and future RECs for the gradual attainment of the 
objectives of the union. In order to achieve the integration of Africa as stated in the AU 
vision, African leaders in 1991, signed the treaty of the African Economic Community 
(AEC) (appendix A.1) which is the economic wing of the AU. The AEC is the 
framework for Africa’s Economic and monetary integration and this is discussed in the 
next section. 
2.3 African Economic Community (AEC) 
In June 1991, the 27
th
 summit of the OAU established in Abuja, Nigeria the African 
Economic Community (AEC) in order to consolidate the progress of economic 
integration at the sub regional level and also to enable the continent to better face the 
challenges posed by the evolving trends in the global economy. Article 44 of the 1991 
Abuja Treaty provided that ‘in accordance with relevant protocols, member states shall 
within a time table to be determined by the OAU, harmonise their monetary, financial 
and payment policies, and boost intra-community trade in goods, services as well as 
enhance monetary cooperation among member states.’ The AEC strategy involves the 
formation of regional trading blocs, intensification of globalisation and liberalisation. 
This process is enshrined in the African Monetary Cooperation Programme (AMCP) 
managed by the Association of African Central Banks (AACB) which meets once a year 
to review developments on the AMCP. The objectives of the AMCP involve the 
“adoption of collective policy measures to achieve a harmonized monetary system and 
common management institution. It envisages the harmonization of the monetary 
cooperation programmes of the various sub-regional groupings as building blocks with 
the ultimate aim of evolving a single monetary zone by the year 2021 with a common 
currency and a common Central Bank at the continental level” (AACB, 2002)  
Given the importance of macroeconomic convergence, the measures to achieve the 
objective of the African Monetary Cooperation Programme would include, the 
adjustment of exchange rate of member countries to their equilibrium levels, eventual 
liberalization of current and capital account transactions, adoption of harmonized 
exchange rate system, harmonization of ceiling on Central Banks’ credit to government 
in order to ensure fiscal policy harmonization and the adoption of market-oriented 
approach to the conduct of monetary policy.  
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The ultimate objective of this process of gradual regional and sub-regional integration is 
the creation of a single monetary zone for Africa by 2021. The rationale of the gradual 
regional and sub-regional integration programme is that if the sub-regional monetary 
arrangements are effective and efficient, then the AMCP would be as effective as the 
sub-regional monetary cooperation groupings and vice-versa. The AEC stipulated six 
stages through which the AMCP should pass before the formation of the African 
Monetary Union outlined in the next section. 
2.3.1 The six stages of the African Economic and Monetary Integration 
The African Monetary Union is intended to be established in stage six. The requirement 
is that a minimum of 51% of the countries in the various sub-regions will have to fulfil 
the convergence criteria before the creation of the African Monetary Union.  
Stage I (Year 2002-2003) 
I. Establishment of Sub-regional Committees of the AACB where they do not exist 
and revitalization of existing Committees. 
II. Adoption by each Sub-region of formal monetary integration programme. 
Stage II (Year 2004 - 2008) 
I. Harmonization and coordination of macroeconomic and monetary policies as 
Well as concepts. 
II. Gradual interconnection of payments and clearing system. 
III. Promotion of African banking networks. 
IV. Promotion of sub-regional and regional stock exchanges. 
V. Strengthening and harmonization of banking and financial supervision. 
VI. Observance of the following macro-economic indicators by year 2008: 
a. Budget deficit/GDP ratio not exceeding 5 per cent. 
b. Central Bank credits to government not exceeding 10 per cent of previous year’s 
tax revenue. 
c. Single digit Inflation rate. 
d. External reserves/import cover of at least 3 months. 
Stage III (Year 2009 - 2012) 
Observance of the following macroeconomic indicators by year 2012 
14 
 
 
 
I. Budget deficit/GDP ratio not exceeding 3 per cent by 2012. 
II. Elimination of Central Bank credit to government. 
III. Inflation rate of less than 5 per cent. 
IV. External reserves/imports cover of equal or greater than 6 months. 
Stage IV (Year 2013-2015) 
Assessment of macroeconomic performance and negotiation for the establishment of a 
common Central Bank (Year 2015).  At this stage: 
I. Countries would be required to consolidate achievements made at the third 
stage. The activities under this stage would include: 
a. Inflation rate of less than 3 per cent. 
b. Continued observance of macroeconomic indicators of convergence. 
c. The macroeconomic indicators of each country/sub-region would be Assessed 
against the convergence criteria. A comparative analysis would be made 
thereafter to the Convergence Council. 
d. Commissioning of a study on the establishment of an African Exchange Rate 
Mechanism. 
Stage V (Year 2016-2020) 
Finalization of arrangements required for the launching of the African Monetary Union 
(2016 - 2020). This is the completion stage before the take-off of the common Central 
Bank. The following activities are expected to be undertaken: 
I. Preparation of institutional, administrative and legal framework for setting up 
the common Central Bank and currency of the African Monetary Union. 
II. Adoption of the institutional, administrative and legal framework for the setting 
up of the common Central Bank and currency of the African Monetary Union. 
III. Review of commissioned study on the African Exchange Rate Mechanism and 
operationalization of Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
IV. Appointment of key officers of the Common Central Bank. 
V. Preparation for the introduction of a common currency. 
VI. Recruitment of staff of the Bank. 
VII. Mid-term assessment of country performance. 
VIII. Final assessment of countries’ performance against convergence criteria. 
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Stage VI (Year 2021) 
The stage involves the introduction and circulation of the common African currency 
(2021) and a transitional period during which sub-regional monetary institutions would 
operate alongside the African Central Bank. 
2.4 Regional Economic Communities (RECs) 
The operation of AEC, relies on the regional economic communities (RECs) as its 
pillars. There are many, 14 according to Asante, regional economic communities 
established for the African integration. Most of these integration schemes have 
duplicating and overlapping membership and mandates and also they are very poorly 
funded (Asante, 2007). The RECs, taken from different sources, are listed below and 
some of these are described in this section. 
I. Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 
II. Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) 
III. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
IV. Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) 
V. East African Community (EAC) 
VI. Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 
VII. Economic Community of Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL) 
VIII. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
IX. Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) 
X. Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) 
XI. Mano River Union (MRU) 
XII. Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) 
XIII. Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
XIV. West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
XV. West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) 
2.4.1 Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
SADC was established in a Treaty of Heads of member states in August 1992 in 
Windhoek (Namibia). The treaty was a transformation of its predecessor, the Southern 
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) which was established in the 
Lusaka (Zambia) Declaration in April 1980. The transformation of SADCC to SADC 
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followed the end of the struggle against colonialism in the region with a shift to 
economic integration. As at October 2012 the membership of SADC, comprised of 15 
countries (see appendix A.2).  The SADC Mission is 
"To promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic 
development through efficient productive systems, deeper co-operation and 
integration, good governance, and durable peace and security, so that the region 
emerges as a competitive and effective player in international relations and the 
world economy" (SADC, 1992). 
Some of the objectives of SADC (Article 5 of the treaty) include: sustainable and 
equitable economic growth; poverty alleviation; enhance the standard and quality of life 
of the people of Southern Africa through regional integration; common political values; 
self-sustaining development; utilisation of resources of the Region; combat HIV/AIDS 
or other deadly and communicable diseases. 
2.4.2 Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
The idea of the establishment of COMESA was given impetus by the economic 
commission for Africa (ECA) who convened a meeting of the newly independent states 
of the two regions, in 1965, to consider the proposal for the creation of a system for the 
promotion of sub-regional economic integration. The first initiative to this call saw the 
signing of a treaty in Lusaka on 21
st
 December 1981 to establish the preferential trade 
agreement (PTA). The treaty came into force on 30
th
 September 1982. The aim of the 
PTA was to take advantage of large market size, to share the region’s common heritage 
and destiny and to allow greater social and economic co-operation with the ultimate 
objective of creating an economic community. The plan was to gradually upgrade the 
PTA over a ten-year period to a common market until the community had been 
established. The transformation of the PTA to a common market took place on 5
th
 
November 1993 when the treaty that established the common market for eastern and 
southern Africa (COMESA) was signed in Kampala (Uganda) which came into force on 
8
th
 December 1994 after its ratification in Lilongwe (Malawi). Both the formation of the 
PTA and its subsequent transformation to a common market are consistent with the 
objectives of the African integration agenda stated in the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) 
and the Final Act of Lagos (FAL) of the OAU. The membership of COMESA is shown 
in appendix A.2 and its vision is to  
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“be a fully integrated, internationally competitive regional economic community 
with high standards of living for all its people ready to merge into an African 
Economic Community”  
and the mission is to 
 “Endeavour to achieve sustainable economic and social progress in all Member 
States through increased co-operation and integration in all fields of development 
particularly in trade, customs and monetary affairs, transport, communication 
and information, technology, industry and energy, gender, agriculture, 
environment and natural resources”, the Secretariat was guided to develop its 
specific Mission Statement as follows: “To provide excellent technical services to 
COMESA in order to facilitate the region’s sustained development through 
economic integration” (COMESA, 1992). 
Some of the aims and objectives of COMESA, as in Article 3 of the Treaty include: 
sustainable growth and development; joint development in all fields of economic 
activity; joint adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to raise the 
standard of living of its peoples; peace, security and stability; contribute towards the 
realisation of the objectives of the AEC. 
2.4.3 East African Community (EAC) 
The EAC has an evolutionary history as it has gone through successive regional 
integration arrangements ranging from co-operation and finally to community. It all 
started in 1917 when Kenya and Uganda formed a customs union which was later 
joined in 1927 by the then Tanganyika. Since then the co-operation, in the region, has 
taken different forms: The East African High Commission (1948-1961); the East 
African Common Services Organisation (1961-1967); the East African Community 
(1967-1977) and the East African Co-operation (1993-2000). In 1984 the former 
members of EAC signed an agreement for the division of its assets and liabilities 
following it dissolution in 1977 although the agreement made a provision for future 
cooperation. On the 30
th
 November 1993 the three member states, after series of 
meetings, signed an agreement for the establishment of the Permanent Tripartite 
Commission for East African Co-operation. The secretariat of the commission was 
launched at the Headquarter Arusha (Tanzania) marking the commencement of full 
operation of East African Co-operation. The need to consolidate regional co-operation 
motivated members toward the preparation of a treaty for the establishment of East 
African Community (EAC) which was signed in Arusha on 30
th
 November 1999. The 
treaty became effective on 7
th
 July 2000. The EAC established a customs union in its 
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March 2004 protocol which became operational in January 2005. Rwanda and Burundi 
joined the EAC in July 2007 and the EAC common market was created in November 
2009. Article 5 of the EAC treaty states the objectives of the community as: 
“to develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening co-
operation among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural 
fields, research and technology, defence, security and legal and judicial affairs, 
for their mutual benefit. In pursuance of these objectives the members states agree 
to establish among themselves and in accordance with the provisions of the 
Treaty, a Customs Union, a Common Market , subsequently a Monetary Union 
and ultimately a Political Federation in order to strengthen and regulate the 
industrial, commercial, infrastructural, cultural, social, political and other 
relations of the member states to the end that there shall be accelerated, 
harmonious and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic 
activities, the benefit of which shall be equitably shared” (EAC, 1999). 
2.4.4 COMESA-EAC-SADC (CES)  
The COMESA-EAC-SADC (CES) Tripartite Arrangement was launched in October 
2008 which represents a further step in the regional integration agenda. The idea started 
in 2006 when the CES Tripartite Arrangement was created to assist in the process of 
harmonising programmes and policies within and between the three Regional Economic 
Communities of COMESA, EAC and SADC and to advance the establishment of the 
African Economic Community.   
The three main pillars of the Tripartite strategy, as contained in the Vision and Strategy 
document that was endorsed at the second Tripartite Summit in June 2011 are Market 
Integration, Infrastructure Development and Industrial Development. The launch of the 
CES is an attempt not only to address the problem of multiple memberships (see figure 
2.1) but also to facilitate the collaboration of the RECs and subsequent merger into one 
REC.  According to the African Development Bank Group (2011), CES Tripartite 
Arrangement covers 26 countries accounting for 56% of the population and 58% of the 
combined GDP of Africa in 2008. The key provisions of the CES Tripartite 
arrangement include: (i) establishing CES tripartite Free Trade Agreement to promote 
deeper trade integration; (ii) developing joint infrastructure programmes, financing and 
implementation; (iii) designing joint programmes for agricultural development and food 
security; (iv) developing programmes to enhance the movement of business persons, 
labour and services across the region; (v) harmonising legal and institutional 
19 
 
 
 
framework; and (vi) preparing common regional positions and strategies in multilateral 
and international trade negotiations.  
Figure 2.1   Southern and East African Integration blocs 
 
Source: (ADB, 2011:4)   
2.4.5 The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) 
CEN-SAD was founded in 1998 following the Conference of Leaders and Heads of 
States held in Tripoli. The treaty on the creation of the community was initially signed 
by five countries. Since then, its membership has expanded to 23 members (see 
appendix A.2). CEN-SAD is a framework for integration and complementarity. It 
intends to work, together with the other regional economic communities and the 
Organization of African Unity, to strengthen peace, security and stability and achieve 
global economic and social development. CEN-SAD was established to achieve the 
following objectives:  
I. Establishment of a comprehensive economic union based on a strategy 
implemented in accordance with a developmental plan that would be integrated 
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in the national development plans of the member states. It includes investment in 
the agricultural, industrial, social, cultural and energy fields.  
II. Elimination of all obstacles impeding the unity of its member states through 
adopting measures that would guarantee the following:  
 Facilitating the free movement of individuals, capital and meeting the interest of 
member states citizens.  
 Freedom of residence, work, ownership and economic activity.  
 Freedom of the movement of national goods, merchandise and services.  
 Encouragement of foreign trade through drawing up and implementing an 
investment policy for member states.  
 Enhancement and improvement of land, air and sea transportation and 
telecommunications among member states through the implementation of joint 
projects.  
 Consent of the community member states to give the citizens of member states 
the same rights and privileges provided for in the constitution of each member 
state.  
 Coordination of pedagogical and educational systems at the various educational 
levels, and in the cultural, scientific and technical fields 
2.5 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
In May 1975, fifteen sub-Saharan African countries formed ECOWAS as a regional 
organisation. Its mission is to promote economic integration in all fields of economic 
activity, particularly industry, transport, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, 
monetary and financial issues, social and cultural matters. The vision of the founders of 
ECOWAS was born out of the realisation that the domestic markets of the member 
States taken individually were, as a result of their smallness, far from being competitive 
in a world environment marked by the existence of large trade blocs. ECOWAS’s 
actions to achieve its objectives include: suppression of customs duties and equivalent 
taxes, establishment of a common external tariff, harmonisation of economic and 
financial policies, creation of a monetary zone.  
The aims of the Community, as stated in Article 3 of ECOWAS revised treaty (1993), 
are to promote co-operation and integration, leading to the establishment of an 
economic union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples, and 
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to maintain and enhance economic stability, foster relations among Member States and 
contribute to the progress and development of the African Continent. To achieve these 
aims ECOWAS sets out a number of objectives as follows: 
1. The harmonisation and co-ordination of national policies and the promotion of 
integration programmes, projects and activities, particularly in food, agriculture and 
natural resources, industry, transports and communication, energy, trade, money and 
finance, taxation, economic reform policies, human resources, education, 
information, culture, science, technology, services, health, tourism, legal matters. 
2. The harmonisation and coordination of policies for the protection of the 
environment. 
3. The promotion of the establishment of joint product enterprises. 
4. The establishment of common markets through: 
I. The liberalisation of trade by the abolition, among member states, of customs 
duties levied on imports and exports, and the abolition, among member states, of 
non-tariff barriers in order to establish a free trade area at the community level. 
II. The adoption of a common external tariff and a common trade policy vis-à-vis 
third countries. 
III. The removal, between member states, of obstacles to the free movement of 
persons, goods, service, and capital, and to the right of residence and 
establishment. 
5. The establishment of an economic union through the adoption of common policies 
in the economic, financial, social, and cultural sectors, and the creation of a 
monetary union. 
6. The adoption of measures for the integration of the private sectors, particularly the 
creation of an enabling environment to promote small and medium scale enterprises. 
7. The promotion of balanced development of the region, paying attention to the 
special problems of each member state particularly those of landlocked and small 
island member states 
8. The encouragement and strengthening of relations and the promotion of the flow of 
information particularly among rural populations, women and youths organisations 
and socio-professional organisations such as associations of the media, business 
men and women, workers, and trade unions. 
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9. The adoption of a community population policy which takes into account the need 
for a balance between demographic factors and socioeconomic development 
10. The establishment of a fund for cooperation, compensation and development. 
2.5.1 ECOWAS Monetary Cooperation Programme (EMCP) 
The ECMP reflects on the African Monetary Cooperation Programme which is design 
to achieve the sub regional integration in West Africa. The ECOWAS integration 
programme outlined in the ECMP is monitored by the West African Monetary Agency 
(WAMA). It requires member states to fulfil the convergence criteria shown in 
appendix A.3. Macroeconomic performance of ECOWAS in meeting the convergence 
criteria is disappointing leading to series of postponements of the single currency 
project with the most recent date of 2020. Several reasons have been mentioned as 
responsible for this, some of which have already been mentioned in the general African 
problems above. In addition to that Adedeji (2002) commented that overconcentration 
on the choice of institutions needed for integration rather than actually building of the 
community has tended to weaken the effectiveness of regional integration arrangement 
(RIA) and their relevance. He cited the ECOWAS Executive Secretary in his silver 
jubilee interim report (2000): 
“instead of asking with whom, in what context and under what conditions 
integration might be possible, attention has rather been on the institutions to be 
established and the measures to be promoted. Giving priority to identifying 
institutional arrangements completely diverts attention from the vital tasks of 
determining socio-economic objectives and setting priorities.” 
It is also argued that the overlapping sub-regional economic cooperation; ECOWAS, 
WAEMU, CEMAC, MRU, NCG and WAMZ; as shown in figure 2.2 is another 
obstacle to the ECOWAS integration effort. Currently eight of the fifteen ECOWAS 
countries, mainly French speaking, are in a monetary union known as WAEMU with 
the CFA as its single currency. Other six countries in the CFA are in Central Africa and 
have a separate monetary union known as CEMAC as in figure 2.2. The two linked 
CFA currency unions, WAEMU and CEMAC, are both pegged to the Euro and 
supported by France but with different central banks. The six CEMAC countries fall 
outside the scope of this thesis. In the two track approach to the ECOWAS single 
currency the other six ECOWAS countries- Nigeria, Ghana, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia and Guinea- are expected to form a second monetary zone known as WAMZ 
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with ECO as its proposed currency. Cape Verde was given the option to join either of 
the two monetary zones although up to date it has not done so.  
After series of postponements from 2005 to 2009 then 2015 due to lack of convergence 
the ECO has not been able to exist. Overall plan was to have the two monetary zones 
running side by side and by 2020 they are merged into one to form the ECOWAS single 
currency. The lack of progress in meeting convergence criteria which is holding back 
the single currency project has led to Heads of State and Government in their 2007 
Abuja summit to call for a review of the current two track approach with the aim of 
replacing it with a single fast-track approach. In response to this call, 
WAMA/ECOWAS joint secretariat convened a meeting in Freetown, July 2007. During 
that meeting WAMA presented a paper with three options recommended for the way 
forward to the single currency. These options are outlined in the next section. 
Figure 2.2   ECOWAS’s overlapping Integration blocs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Note: B.Faso=Burkina Faso, C.d’Ivoire=Cote d’Ivoire 
 Source: Author’s construction 
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WAEMU blocks, WAMA was not optimistic that the realisation of the ECOWAS single 
currency project was feasible within the time frame in current two track proposal. In 
view of the need to fast track the monetary cooperation programme and also of the fact 
that some countries have met the basic criteria, WAMA presented a paper 
recommending three options each of which to be implemented by 2010. 
OPTION 1: Creating the ECOWAS monetary union on the basis of prescribed 
eligibility quantitative and qualitative convergence criteria: Under this option each of 
the fifteen member states are expected to join the proposed Monetary Union as separate 
states based on prescribed eligibility criteria with no preferential treatment to any 
member state. This option is based on the assumption that the second monetary zone 
(WAMZ) project will continue, with all its programmes, until 2009 but without the need 
to establish the West African Central Bank (WACB) and the introduction of the WAMZ 
single currency (the ECO). It was further emphasised that the feasibility of this option 
largely depends on the successes achieved under the current two-stage approach. A 
further recommendation for this option was that countries should put measures in place 
to sustain the achievements already made on the convergence process which may 
include the harmonisation of the diverse macroeconomic convergence criteria, 
strengthening the quality of multilateral surveillance, introduction of sanctions to curtail 
non-compliance with the prescribed benchmarks and the immediate establishment of the 
community central bank.   
OPTION 2: Creating the ECOWAS monetary union by political fiat with no prior 
preconditions. This option suggests an instant monetary unification of all ECOWAS 
countries with effect from a mutually agreed date to be specified by the political and 
monetary authorities. The option is based on the argument that the formation of a 
monetary union is basically a political decision on the recognition of geographical and 
cultural interdependence, commonality of political destiny and the need for solidarity 
among countries. The implication of this option is that macroeconomic convergence and 
policy harmonisation will be considered ex-post rather than ex-ante. This option has 
some support in the endogeneity literature where it is empirically found that countries in 
a monetary union are likely to converge more than before they enter the monetary union 
and also post monetary union is more likely to make business cycle synchronous than 
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the pre-monetary union (Rose, 1998). However this argument has empirical opposition 
(Krugman, 1993). There will be more on this argument later in chapter 4. 
The WAMA report acknowledged that whilst this option has the advantage of being the 
easiest way forward to unification within the shortest possible time, its technical 
feasibility appears doubtful due to the divergent economic fundamentals between 
countries and instances of macroeconomic instability that cannot support the 
sustainability and credibility of the proposed single currency. 
OPTION 3: Creating the ECOWAS monetary union through accession by the non-
WAEMU zone countries to the existing WAEMU. This option involves the ECOWAS 
Heads of State to agree for members of the non-CFA zone countries to join WAEMU. 
Although it is a political decision the eligibility for accession by member states should 
be based on macroeconomic, legal and other considerations. The central bank of any 
country that adopts the CFA (WAEMU) will be transformed into a branch of BCEAO 
(the WAEMU central bank). The argument of this option is that WAEMU has the 
requisite technical ability to serve as the nucleus for an ECOWAS wide monetary union 
and also provides the certainty for macroeconomic stability for new entrants due to the 
price stability observed in WAEMU and the efficient monetary policy of (BCEAO). It 
is also argued that this approach has relatively insignificant costs of transition to 
ECOWAS monetary union compared to the situation where regional union were to be 
designed from scratch. However the potential problem highlighted in the report is the 
monetary policy links of the BCEAO and the French Treasury and the general 
conception that BCEAO and the CFA are accessories of the French colonial system in 
Africa.  
Despite all these developments, the ECOWAS single currency project has suffered 
another disappointing date. The launch of the ECO proposed for January 2015 has not 
materialised. The most recent decision taking in July 2014 by the Heads of State is that 
the WAMZ single currency programme under the two-track approach has been merged 
with the ECOWAS wide single currency programme to form a single track to the 
ECOWAS single currency to be launched in 2020. This decision is reflected in the 
executive summary of the ECOWAS 2014 annual report which states 
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“On the bid to accelerate progress towards the realisation of the ECOWAS single 
currency by 2020, the single track approach for the monetary integration 
programme was adopted leading to the rationalisation of the macroeconomic 
convergence criteria and the revision of the roadmap for the ECOWAS single 
currency (ECOWAS, 2014:14).” 
2.6 ECOWAS liberalisation of Trade and Migration 
We stated the aims and objectives of ECOWAS in section 2.5. We noticed the emphasis 
on integration and the formation of economic union and raising the living standards of 
the people. To achieve these, one of its objectives as we have also seen is the 
establishment of a common market through the channels of trade liberalisation, 
common trade policy and common external tariffs, removal of obstacles to the mobility 
of persons. This section discusses these important areas of the ECOWAS Treaty.    
2.6.1 Free movement of goods and Customs Union 
Economic development, poverty reduction and self-reliance are fundamental in the 
ECOWAS cooperation agenda. One of the channels of achieving this aim is trade. Since 
its formation in 1975, ECOWAS has made several moves to foster the intra-regional 
trade. Trade liberalisation is paramount in article 2 of the May 1975 treaty and article 3 
of the July 1993 ECOWAS revised treaty. As already stated in the revised treaty one of 
the objectives of achieving the ECOWAS aim is to establish a common market through 
the liberalisation of trade. This involved the abolition of customs duties on both imports 
and exports, the removal of all non-tariff barriers in order to establish a free trade area at 
the community level, the adoption of a common external tariff and a common trade 
policy and the removal of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services 
and capital. On trade liberalisation, article 12 of the 28 May 1975 ECOWAS treaty 
states 
“There shall be progressively established in the course of a transitional period of 
fifteen (15) years from the definitive entry into force of this treaty,…a customs 
union among the members. Within this union, customs duties or other charges 
with equivalent effect on imports shall be eliminated. Quota, quantitative or like 
restrictions or prohibitions and administrative obstacles to trade among the 
member states shall also be removed. Furthermore, a common customs tariff in 
respect of all goods imported into the member states from third countries shall be 
established and maintained.”   
The first stage (1975-77) of implementation of the trade liberalisation scheme was the 
collation of information about customs duty. Stage 2 (1977-85) was the reduction and 
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elimination of import duties. A common external tariff was expected to be established 
by 1990 and duties on imports from third countries were to be eliminated. This was, 
however, never achieved due to the lack of agreement by member states on a trade 
liberalisation scheme or to establish a common external tariff due to the differences in 
the individual country tariff preferences and those of the Francophone countries (Okolo, 
1988). ECOWAS attempted to overcome this problem in 2000 (Bamako summit) by 
adopting the UEMOA common external tariff structure comprising the rates of (0%, 
5%, 10%, and 20%) which are lower than the tariff rates charged in some of the member 
states on some of their products Kufuor (2006:118). This adoption enabled the 
standardisation of customs forms, procedures and processes of member states. 
Supporting evidence on the failure of the trade liberalisation scheme could also be 
deduced from the wording of the same trade liberalisation objective in the 1993 
ECOWAS revised treaty appears to suggest that success in the area of free trade and 
customs unions to lead to a common market has not been achieved. Article 35 (on trade 
liberalisation) of the ECOWAS 1993 revised treaty states 
“There shall be progressively established in the course of a period of ten (10) 
years effective from 1 January, 1990… a customs union among the member 
states…” 
The trade liberalisation clause has not change in the revised treaty except for the target 
date of achieving the common market from 15 to 10 years at a time when we should 
have expected the market to be in full operation. 
2.6.2 Compensation for loss of revenue 
Realising the potential loss of revenue resulting from the application of the trade 
liberalisation provision of the treaty the community made a provision for compensation 
for such loss of revenue. For this purpose article 21 of the revised treaty established a 
fund for cooperation, compensation and development establishment, status and 
functions. Article 25 of the May 1975 ECOWAS and article 48 of the revised treaty 
(1993) requires the council of ministers, to determine the appropriate compensation to 
be paid to a member of state which has suffered loss of import duties as a result of the 
application of the provision of the treaty. The formula used for this purpose, as stated in 
supplementary protocol (A/P2/1/03) is 
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𝐶𝑅𝐿 = (𝐶𝑑𝑒 + 𝑆𝑡𝑟)𝑉𝑐𝑖𝑓  
 Where 
CRL  = Customs revenue lost 
Cde = customs duty and taxes of equivalent effect 
Str = Statistical taxation rate 
Vcif = CIF value of product 
The protocol excludes compensation for loss of revenue from internal taxes on locally 
produced goods and imports from within the community. Article 6 of the protocol 
stipulated the amount payable as compensation on a decreasing scale as in table 2.1.  
Table 2.1   ECOWAS revenue loss compensation policy 
A/P2/1/03 A/SP1/12/03 
100% of loss incurred in 2002 
80% of loss incurred in 2003 
60% of loss incurred in 2004 
30% of loss incurred in 2005 
0% of loss incurred with effect 
     from 1 January 2006 
100% of loss incurred in 2004 
80% of loss incurred in 2005 
60% of loss incurred in 2006 
30% of loss incurred in 2007 
0% of loss incurred with effect from 1 
January 2008 
The above protocol (left) was amended in another protocol of A/SP1/12/03 (right) in 
which the same compensation calculation above was extended from 2004 to 2008. 
 Despite this compensation policy in place its implementation was actually problematic 
as reported by the ECOWAS executive secretary in his 2000 report. The problem of the 
implementation of the compensation policy is caused by the ECOWAS lack of own 
fund to pay compensation due to the affected member states. This caused the reluctance 
of member states to accord preferential tariffs for the fear of not receiving the expected 
compensation. ECOWAS decision following this problem was that UEAMOA should 
retain its system of reducing level of compensation until its expiry date of 2006 and 
ECOWAS should also adopt a reducing level of compensation along the same lines as 
UEMOA, with an expiry date of 2008 as shown above. 
2.6.3  Free movement of persons 
Article 27 of the ECOWAS Treaty (1975) provide for the citizens of member States to 
be given free entry into any community states without the need to hold a visa or 
residence permit. To effectively implement this article the member States of ECOWAS 
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signed a protocol in Dakar on 29
th
 May 1979 relating to free movement of persons, 
residence and establishment. According to article 2 of this protocol the community 
citizens have the right to enter, reside and establish in the territory of member states. A 
maximum transition period of 15 years was stipulated from the date of this protocol for 
all barriers to be removed. The May 1979 protocol stipulated (article 2, paragraph 3) 
three phases for the accomplishment of the right of entry, residence and establishment 
as follows: 
Phase I: Right of entry and abolition of visa (5
th
 June 1980- 4
th
 June 1985) 
Phase II: Right of residence (4
th
 June 1985- 4
th
 June 1990) 
Phase III: Right of establishment (4
th
 June 1990 - ) 
In phase I community citizens visiting another community state requires no visa if the 
visit is within 90 days but require the holding of valid travel document and international 
health certificate. However an application for permission to extend visit beyond the 90 
days limit was required. On the 6 July 1985 another protocol A/DEC. 2/7/85 was signed 
relating to the establishment of ECOWAS travel certificate for member states. The 
travel certificate was established to be used and recognised for travelling within 
ECOWAS without the need to hold national passports.  
On the expiration of the deadline for Phase I another supplementary protocol on the 
second phase (right of residence) was signed in Abuja on 1 July 1986. Article 3 of this 
protocol states the right of residence to include the right: 
I. To apply for jobs effectively offered 
II. To travel for this purpose, freely, in the territory of the community 
III. To reside in one of the member states in order to take up employment in 
accordance with the law of the states 
IV. To live in the territory of member states after having held employment there. 
In Phase II citizens of the community who are admitted in another states without visa 
but desire to reside in that territory are obliged to obtain an ECOWAS residence card or 
residence permit (article 5). However the application for a residence card is governed by 
the rules and regulations of individual member states.  
Phase III (right of establishment) of the free movement of persons, right of residence 
and establishment was enacted in a supplementary protocol (A/SP 2/5/90) signed in 
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Banjul on 29 May 1990. This phase marks the completion of ECOWAS effort to 
establish a uniform implementation of its objective on free movement of persons, 
goods, services, within the community. The May 1990 protocol gave ECOWAS citizens 
the right to settle or establish in another member state and have access to economic 
activities and setting up enterprises under the same conditions as the national of the 
particular state of residence. While this protocol discourages discrimination between 
nationals and non-nationals of ECOWAS citizens, paragraph 2 of article 2 allows such a 
practice by member states for a given specific activity, although such should be 
justified. The protocol further states that other member states shall not be bound to 
accord non-discriminatory treatment to nationals and companies of the state concerned.  
2.6.4  Free movement of capital 
The transformation of the ECOWAS cooperation programme is reflected in its revised 
treaty of 24 July 1993. The key additional emphasis in the revised treaty is the 
integration of ECOWAS following the continent wide economic integration agenda in 
the treaty that established the AU. To promote the integration and formation of 
ECOWAS monetary union the importance of integrating the monetary and financial 
sector was brought on board. This is seen in articles 51 and 53 of the ECOWAS revised 
treaty which required member states to 
I. Harmonise their monetary, financial and payment policies, 
II. Facilitate the liberalisation of intra-regional payments transactions, 
III. Promote the role of the commercial banks in intra-community trade financing, 
IV. Improve the multilateral system for clearing of payments transactions between 
member states 
V. Take necessary measures to promote the activities of WAMA so as to ensure 
convertibility of currencies and creation of a single currency zone. 
VI. Establish a common central bank and a common currency zone. 
The revised treaty also set up a capital issues committee whose duties are to: 
I. Ensure the uninterrupted flow of capital within ECOWAS through 
 The removal of controls on the transfer of capital among the member states in 
accordance with a set time table 
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 The encouragement of the establishment of national and regional stock 
exchanges 
 The integration of capital markets and stock exchanges 
II. Ensure that nationals of member states are given the opportunity of acquiring 
stocks, shares and other securities or otherwise of investing in enterprises in the 
territories of other member states 
III. Establish machinery for the wide dissemination in the member states of stock 
exchange quotations of each member state. 
IV. Ensure appropriate system for the regulation of the capital market to ensure its 
proper functioning and protection of investors. 
2.6.5 Sanctions for non-fulfilment of obligations 
The revised ECOWAS treaty made provision in article 77 for the imposition of 
sanctions on member states failing to fulfil its obligations to the community. At the 
decision of the authority the sanctions may include: 
I. Suspension of new community loans or assistance, 
II. Suspension of disbursement on on-going community projects or assistance 
programmes’ 
III. Exclusion from presenting candidates for community posts 
IV. Suspension from voting 
V. Suspension from participating in the activities of the community 
The decision to sanction a member is based on the circumstances surrounding the non-
fulfilment failure and the supporting evidence.  
2.7 Progress and obstacles on Trade liberalisation 
Despite the continuous attempts by the ECOWAS authority to progressively eliminate 
all forms of trade barriers in order to establish a free trade area, customs union and then 
a common market with the hope of a balanced and enhanced growth in the region 
through larger and competitive market the achievements of the community has fallen far 
below expectations (Okolo, 1988). The failure of ECOWAS in its aspiration to foster 
intra-regional trade has been associated with a number of obstacles ranging from the sub 
regional factors, international and domestic forces acting interactively. The first 
obstacle, as already mentioned earlier, is members’ disagreement on a trade 
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liberalisation scheme and the diversity of tariff preferences in the region. The removal 
of non-tariff barriers was initially left at the discretion of member states which may 
have contributed to the failure of meeting the May 1985 target for their complete 
elimination. Okolo (1988) classified the obstacles to ECOWAS trade liberalisation 
agenda into five categories which we discussed in the next few sections. 
2.7.1 The nature of West African economies 
In this grouping Okolo (1988) raised among other things the unequal distribution of 
ECOWAS population and GDP which are mainly dominated by Nigeria and also the 
fact that West Africa is a region of poverty and economic underdevelopment. The 
second obstacle under this category is that the economic activities of the region heavily 
relied on primary production. Exports of all ECOWAS countries are dominated by 
agriculture and/or extractive industries. The contribution of the manufacturing sector to 
total output is very small. The similarity in the endowment of natural resources made 
the ECOWAS countries competitive in the world market rather than being 
complementary. For instance gem and industrial diamonds are found in Sierra Leone, 
Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Mauritania, and many other countries. Agricultural produce 
such as cocoa beans, groundnuts, palm kernels, wood and wood products, pineapples 
etc are common in most West African countries. Due to this primary produce 
dependency ECOWAS intra-regional trade is dominated mainly by food items, 
handicrafts and petroleum and petroleum products from Nigeria (the world sixth largest 
oil producer) and few other countries. The nature of the ECOWAS economies is such 
that trade at the horizontal level is limited leaving trade pattern of these countries to 
vertically interact with mainly industrialised countries making it impossible to gain 
from comparative advantage. The problem is compounded by the affiliation of 
ECOWAS member states with the EU where they are accorded preferential treatment on 
duties, hence diverting their trade attention from the sub-region to those countries where 
they feel can derive greater benefit. 
2.7.2 Transport and communication facilities 
Inadequate transport and communications facilities in and among member states, in the 
form of road, rail, sea or air, are considered one of the obstacles to ECOWAS intra-
regional trade. There are few trans-West African ways linking ECOWAS countries. The 
available roads are mostly in deplorable conditions with bumps, slippery, muddy 
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depending on the season of the year and sometimes even breakdowns of trucks causing 
undue delay in shipment of goods. The road conditions create risk of shipping 
perishable items, mainly food and therefore discourage intra-regional trade.  
Even if the roads are available another related problem is the lack of vehicles to move 
goods from one country to another. It is also evident in table 2.2 that the number of 
check points existing in highways may act as another hindrance on the free and speedy 
movement of goods and people. The delays at these checkpoints and the extortion of 
money from travellers and drivers may act as a disincentive to cross border trading.  
Table 2.2   Checkpoints along intra-ECOWAS Highways 
High Ways Distance (KM) Checkpoints 
Check points 
posts/100km 
Lagos-Abidjan 992 69 7 
Cotonou-Niamey 1036 34 3 
Lome-Ouagadouou 989 34 4 
Accra- Ouagadouou 972 15 2 
Abidjan-Ouagadouou 1122 37 3 
Niamey-Ouagadouou 529 20 4 
Source (McDonald, 2005)      
2.7.3 Currency problems 
The multiplicity of currencies in ECOWAS is also said to be a problem to intra-regional 
trade. There are many but weak currencies in the region most of which are not 
convertible to each other except those that are pegged to outside currencies e.g. Liberian 
dollar and the CFA. The multiplicity of currencies also create the exchange rate risk and 
uncertainty, a problem that is usually associated with the persistent of underground 
trading in the form of cross border smuggling expanding unrecorded trade which is 
usually argued to be substantial. In ECOWAS, smugglers usually purchase locally 
manufacture goods at discounted black market rate and smuggle the goods to countries 
whose currency is convertible. They then use the sales proceeds to buy goods in that 
country and smuggled them back to their country thus creating an environment in which 
local manufacturers may not be able to compete. The existence of smuggling activities 
thus prevents the official exports of goods for which demand exists. Smuggling of this 
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type was said to have benefited stronger currency countries with external peg such as 
the CFA and Liberia dollar.  
2.7.4 Competition from other sub-regional economic unions 
The existence of sub-regional intergovernmental organisations such as the Mano River 
Union (MRU) and WAEMU who also has free trade and customs union objectives 
made the ECOWAS trade liberalisation scheme more problematic. 
2.7.5 Legal and administrative problems 
Lack of members’ commitment to comply with the ECOWAS treaties and protocols 
especially those relating to trade liberalisation have been mentioned as one of the 
impediments to the success of the liberalisation scheme. In some cases questionnaires 
sent to member states for data collection to assess the impact of trade liberalisation by 
the ECOWAS secretariat are not really responded to and even follow up reminders 
made no difference. Added to the administrative bottle necks are the complication 
arising from the implementation of the regional mechanism for approval procedures for 
industrial products which are increasingly cumbersome and time consuming. The 
community’s requirements for a certificate of origin and an exports declaration form for 
goods originating from the community, particularly unprocessed goods, worsened the 
problem of compliance to the scheme (McDonald, 2005). 
2.7.6 Loss of Revenue from tariff collection 
Elimination of trade barriers in countries that are mostly dependent on tariff revenue as 
sources of government revenue complicates the inter-temporal trade-off between the 
long term benefits that trade liberalisation may bring and the immediate benefits of 
tariff collection. There is a high adjustment costs involved through loss of revenue from 
tariffs and in the absence of a credible and sustainable compensation scheme 
compliance with removal of trade barriers cannot be guaranteed. As already mention 
earlier due to lack of its own fund ECOWAS compensation scheme was not effectively 
operational hence hindering compliance by member states. 
2.8 Progress and obstacles on liberalisation of labour mobility  
Facilitating free movement of goods, services, capital and persons is paramount on the 
ECOWAS agenda. The steps taken by ECOWAS to realise this objective since its 
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formation in 1975 have already been discussed above. We have already described the 
obstacles to trade liberalisation and this section focuses on the obstacles on the free 
movement of persons in the community.   
2.8.1 Economic booms and burst 
In highly diverse economies like ECOWAS a boom in one country attracts migrants, 
especially those from poorer countries. For instance the oil boom in Nigeria in the late 
1970s and early 1980s saw a number of job seeking immigrants from neighbouring 
countries to Nigeria. The oil boom was followed by a rapid decline in Nigeria’s 
economy which led to a fall in living and working conditions, currency devaluation, 
high inflation, wage freeze and other related economic and social problems. In 1983 and 
mid 1985 the deteriorating economic situation in Nigeria left the Government with no 
option but to revoke Articles 4 and 27 of the ECOWAS  protocol, on the free movement 
of persons, to expel 0.9-1.3 million illegal immigrants, most of whom were Ghanaians 
(Adepoju, 2002). The ratification of the second phase of the ECOWAS protocol on the 
right of residence, which came into effect in July 1986 coincided at the time when 
Nigeria was implementing the structural adjustment programme. In June 1985, Nigeria 
expelled another 0.2 million illegal immigrants due to the deepening crisis. This 
development especially from Nigeria, the dominant player who should be a role model, 
was against the spirit of the regional integration agenda that was envisaged by the 
founders of ECOWAS. 
2.8.2 Gender specific problem 
For several reasons, in West Africa, men migrate much more than women. When 
women migrate they are more affected by gender specific problems. A number of 
problems handicapped female migration: low level of education, the balance between 
child bearing and career and the separation from their children, who may be left behind 
to be taken care of by close relatives.   
2.8.3 Conflict, Political instability and ideological differences 
The African continent has experienced a number of conflicts, both internal and external, 
over the years. The political instability and insecurity caused by this is also a trigger for 
most of the migration in ECOWAS. For example the war in Liberia in 1990 made 
Liberians to seek refuge in Neighbouring countries in Sierra Leone, Guinea. In 1992 the 
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war spilled over to Sierra Leone which led to Sierra Leoneans and Liberians migrating 
to many countries within ECOWAS and some outside ECOWAS. Migration was 
compounded when there was conflict slipover from Liberia and Sierra Leone to Guinea. 
The first post-independence leaders of Africa had the spirit of uniting African nations 
that were divided with borders during colonial rule. Liberal immigration policies were 
implemented especially by those countries with endowed natural resources but have a 
small labour force, as the case in Cote d’Ivoire. The Ivorian first post-independence 
leader encouraged immigrants from poor neighbouring countries like Burkina Faso, 
Liberia, Nigeria, and Senegal to work in their plantations. By 1995 about 29% of the 
country’s population were foreigners. However, recent development has seen a shift to 
anti-immigrant sentiment which sometimes caused violent tension between the host 
citizens and other ECOWAS citizens as a result of economic competition which in turn 
lead to rebellion against the government, hence stimulating further political instability 
and insecurity (Adepoju, 2002). In war affected countries, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cote 
d’Ivoire, immigrants are blamed to support rebel activities by joining as combatants 
leading to protraction of the conflict with more casualties and economic decline. Mass 
influx of migrants either as refugees or job seekers may have contributed to some 
ECOWAS countries to introduce discriminatory practices by introducing laws that 
restrict foreigners, including even ECOWAS citizens, from taking part in certain 
economic activities.  
“The failure of the ECOWAS liberalisation scheme can also be seen in a number 
of expulsion and deportations  both before and after the ratification of the 
Protocols on  free movement of persons, right of residence and establishment: 
Sierra Leone (1968), Cote d’Ivoire (1958, 1964, 1999), Ghana (1969), Chad 
(1979), Senegal (1967, 1990), Guinea (1968), Nigeria (1983, 1985), Liberia 
(1983), Benin (1998)” (Adepoju, 2002 :12).  
The refusal of the call by OAU for ECOWAS member states to respect border 
demarcations made during colonial rule in order to avoid potential conflict is also 
another obstacle to the protocol on free movement of persons. Incidence of expulsion of 
ECOWAS citizens resulting from border dispute has been reported in the case of 
Senegal and Mauritania, Ghana and Togo. The colonial era left behind three partitions 
of West Africa: Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone. They all have different 
official languages in addition to a number of local languages, different legal system and 
therefore different ideologies. In addition to this there are also different religions 
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practiced in different countries. The existence of these multiple groupings creates 
another barrier to migration. 
2.9 Summary of the chapter 
This chapter described the general background of the African integration since the 
establishment of the OAU after independence of most countries. The motivation for the 
transformation of the OAU to AU with their respective aims and objectives especially 
the establishment of regional integration blocs (RECs) and the six stages approach to 
the African single currency by 2021. The chapter covers in more detail ECOWAS, the 
focus of this thesis: Historical background, aims and objectives, Integration plan and 
implementation- free trade, customs union, free movement of goods, persons and capital 
and obstacles encountered by the trade liberalisation. Several issues raised in this 
chapter especially those regarding free movement of persons, capital and goods have 
implications to the OCA theory that is covered in chapter 4 and the comparative 
analysis in chapter 5 and empirical analysis in chapters 6 and 7.  
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Chapter 3 Background and Economic characteristics of ECOWAS 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed description of the historical and macroeconomic 
characteristics of the fifteen ECOWAS countries. An understanding of this chapter is 
vital as it feeds into the analysis and discussion of our results in subsequent chapters. 
The chapter covers many key areas including GDP and GDP growth, the composition of 
ECOWAS GDP and population by country and for each country the components of 
GDP (primary, secondary and tertiary), unemployment/underemployment, political 
instability and colonial links. For the GDP by sector we considered data for 2006 -2014 
with three year average computed (appendices A.5 and A.6). Some of the common 
characteristics of these countries that emerged from the chapter include: major 
dependent on primary sector mainly dominated by agriculture, lack of diversification of 
economic activities, overreliance on one or few commodities for export, low 
manufacturing sector, poor and inadequate infrastructures (roads, energy, and 
manufacturing), high unemployment and underemployment especially for the youth, 
and political instability. Another important finding from the chapter, which may have a 
serious implication for currency union, is that the region is dominated by one country, 
Nigeria with 70% of the GDP and 53% of the population. In all these tables the blank 
cells indicate no data available and the mean is calculated excluding those cells.  
3.2 Benin 
Benin gained independence from France in 1960. Since then the country’s population 
has grown by 327%, from 2,419,644 in 1960 to 10,323,474 in 2013. The country is 
located in a land area of 110,620 Sq Km. According to the African development Bank 
strategy paper (2012-2016), Benin economy is dominated by agriculture and services. 
This is supported by figures in appendices A.5 and A.6. Agriculture employs 50% of the 
labour force. The primary sector is not modernised and not diversified. Among other 
things, the ADB strategy paper mentioned that the sector is heavily dominated by a 
single product, cotton, and constrained by climatic factors, lack of water management 
infrastructure and inadequate and poor feeder roads to transport produce from the farm 
to the market. As a result of these factors the primary sector with 50% of the country’s 
workforce is incapable of generating a significant rise in income for this major portion 
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of the population. The small industrial sector is inadequately developed with more focus 
on import substitution and agricultural processing.  
The tertiary sector employs 40% of the labour force and, apart from port activities; it is 
dominated by informal sector activities mainly trade and re-exporting activities with 
neighbouring Nigeria. This trade is said to be motivated by the trade restriction policies 
of Nigeria on certain items, such as cereals and second-hand clothes in order to boost 
local production. The Nigerian economic policy and the low custom duties in Benin 
provided the re-exporting opportunity of the restricted commodities by Benin traders 
especially through the informal channels. Petroleum trade through smuggling also takes 
place between Benin and Nigeria and it is mentioned that over 80% of Benin’s 
petroleum product consumption is smuggled from Nigeria through adulterated fuel, 
called ‘kpayo’ (ADB strategy paper 2012-2016). The report also mentioned Benin’s 
vulnerability to a change in economic policy in Nigeria. For instance Nigeria’s removal 
of tariff restrictions on the re-exported items automatically eliminated Benin’s tariff 
advantage. The removal of subsidies on fuel by Nigeria also triggered an increase in 
price of fuel in Benin by over 100% which resulted to a 3.3 inflation points and 0.4% 
lost growth. In terms of economic performance the indicators in Table 3.1 shows mixed 
results, although it is more toward the negative side. The country experienced a negative 
growth in GDP and GDP per capita of 4.9% and 7.1% respectively in 1975. Since then 
GDP growth has been positive up to 2011 although at a fluctuating rate. The per capita 
GDP also shows positive fluctuating growth although it is negative in 2004 and 2005. 
Overall the average growth in GDP from 2001-2011 is 3.9%. The country has reported 
a deficit trade balance since 1975 up to 2011 as shown by the negative net export as a 
percentage of GDP in table 3.1.  
This indicates a consistent dependence on imports. The current account balance as a 
percentage of GDP has also been consistently negative since 1975 to 2010 with an 
average of 7.1%. This implies that the capital account balance is also either negative 
(deficit) or if at all positive it is insufficient to outweigh the negative trade balance. 
A deficit in the capital account balance indicates that the country’s capital inflow 
exceeds the outflow. The external debt performance has improved from the high of 
86.3% of GDP in 1985 to only 18.6% in 2010. Inflation record is low and since 2001 it 
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has always been below the ECOWAS 5% convergence criteria with the exception of 
2005 and 2008 where it was 5.4% and 7.9% respectively.     
 Table 3.1   Country economic indicators – Benin  
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  Ex DS INF  EXR  
1975 -4.9 213 -7.1 14.5 33.4 -18.9 -7.9       214 
1985 7.5 253 4.6 23.7 36.6 -13.0 -3.7   86.3   449 
2001 5.0 353 1.8 15.2 27.9 -12.7 -3.2 0.7 61.5 4.0 733 
2002 4.5 405 1.2 13.5 27.5 -13.9 -5.6 -0.1 56.8 2.5 697 
2003 3.9 497 0.6 13.7 26.5 -12.8 -9.3 -1.8 41.4 1.5 581 
2004 3.1 547 -0.1 13.3 26.1 -12.7 -7.1 0.9 39.5 0.9 528 
2005 2.9 562 -0.3 13.5 26.1 -12.6 -5.3 -0.6 35.9 5.4 527 
2006 4.1 602 1.0 11.4 22.7 -11.3 -4.6 0.2 13.5 3.8 523 
2007 4.6 684 1.5 16.2 31.6 -15.3 -9.6   13.8 1.3 479 
2008 5.1 800 2.0 15.2 28.8 -13.6 -8.0 -0.3 13.7 7.9 448 
2009 3.8 766 0.8 14.0 28.5 -14.5 -9.9 -4.5 16.3 2.2 472 
2010 3.0 741 0.1 14.3 28.0   -8.1 -1.0 18.6 2.3 495 
2011 3.1 802 0.3 14.9 28.2 -13.3       2.7 472 
Mean 3.92 614 0.8 14.1 27.4 -13.3 -7.1 -0.7 31.1 3.1 541 
Notes: GDPR = GDP growth (annual%), PGDP = Per capita GDP, PGDPR = GDP per capita growth 
(annual %), EXP = Export as % of GDP, IMP = Import as % of GDP, E-I = EXP – IMP, CAB = Current 
account balance as % of GDP, Cash surplus/deficit as % of GDP, Ex DS = External debt stocks as % of 
GDP, INF = Inflation, EXR = Official exchange rate (local currency unit/US$)2 
Source: World Bank- World Development Indicators (WDI) 
According to African economic outlook (2012) both youth and adult unemployment and 
underemployment are a great concern in Benin. With few jobs available, employers are 
reluctant to employ new entrants to the labour market and also training is not adapted to 
the needs of the labour market. Due to inadequate funding the programme introduced in 
2006 to fight against youth unemployment yielded mixed outcomes.  
3.3 Burkina Faso 
Burkina Faso was one of the French colonies and a member of the WAEMU with the 
CFA as its national currency. The country gained independence in 1960 at a time when 
its population was 4,881,947 with a GDP per capita of US$68. From 1960 to 2013, the 
country’s population has grown by 247%. The land area of Burkina Faso is 273,600 sq 
km. It has a low manufacturing sector accounting for 11.7% of its GDP in 2006. This 
sector has shown no improvement over the years as indicated by the decline to only 
9.3% and 5.1% in 2011 and 2014 respectively (appendices A.5 and A.6, figure 3.3). The 
                                                 
2 All the variable definitions and data source in this table apply for tables 3.2 to 3.15 
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primary sector, which is dominated by Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting plays a 
significant role in the economy. The primary sector constitutes 40% of GDP in 2006 
with an increase to 42.8% in 2014 with a three year average of 43.6%. Mining and 
quarrying has a very minimal contribution to this sector. Agriculture is dominated by 
very few products such as gold and cotton (African Economic Outlook 2012). In 
addition to lack of good road network for accessibility to markets the sector is also 
periodically hit by adverse distribution of rainfall. According to the African 
development outlook report the primary sector, especially mining, was badly affected 
by floods in 2009 and 2010. The tertiary sector, about the same size as the primary 
sector comprised 48.5% of GDP in 2006 with a shrink to 42.6% in 2011 and increase to 
52.2% in 2014.  
Table 3.2   Country economic indicators – Burkina Faso  
 
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  
Ex 
DS INF  EXR  
1975 3.0 146 0.8 7.3 30.2 -22.8 -5.8     18.8 214 
1985 8.5 190 5.8 9.9 31.0 -21.1 -4.1   33.0 6.9 449 
2001 6.6 222 3.7 9.2 23.1 -13.9 -10.3   53.1 5.0 733 
2002 4.7 253 1.7 8.8 21.2 -12.4 -9.1 -4.5 46.8 2.2 697 
2003 8.0 319 5.0 8.8 21.7 -12.9 -8.6 -2.0 40.5 2.0 581 
2004 4.6 370 1.6 10.7 24.3 -13.5 -10.4 -4.2 38.9 -0.4 528 
2005 8.7 385 5.5 9.9 25.5 -15.5 -11.6 -5.4 36.5 6.4 527 
2006 6.8 400 3.7 11.4 26.5 -15.1 -9.3 -5.9 19.2 2.3 523 
2007 3.6 449 0.6       -8.3 -5.4 21.5 -0.2 479 
2008 5.8 538 2.7       -11.5 -4.0 20.0 10.7 448 
2009 3.0 522 -0.1       -4.6 -4.7 21.8 2.6 472 
2010 7.9 536 4.7         -4.6 23.3 -0.8 495 
2011 4.2 600 1.1         -2.4   2.8 472 
Mean 5.81 418 2.8 9.8 23.7 -13.9 -9.3 -4.3 32.2 3.0 541 
Burkina Faso is the sixth largest economy in ECOWAS constituting on average 1.95% 
of the region GDP (figure 3.1). Up to 2011 its GDP has gained a maximum growth of 
8.7% in 2005 with the lowest of 3% in 2009. The growth rate in per capita GDP 
followed a similar pattern as that of the GDP growth with each having a standard 
deviation of 1.9%. The country’s per capita GDP in almost all the years since 2001 to 
2011 falls short of that of ECOWAS, SSA and even WAEMU.  
The country’s trade position has never achieved a surplus since 1960 to 2006 as 
indicated by the negative net exports as a percentage of GDP for those years (table 3.2) 
which is an indication of dependence on imports. Similarly the current account balance 
has also been consistently in deficit which may also imply the performance in the 
capital balance is negative. The fiscal balance measured by CSD, in table 3.2, is also 
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persistently negative. External debt stock is on the decline and since 2001 inflation 
performance has been within the 5% ECOWAS convergence requirement with the 
exception of 2005 and 2008 where it was 6.4% and 10.7% respectively. 
According to the African economic outlook Burkina Faso’s labour force is made up of 
mainly poor people in rural areas and unskilled young people with the main constraint 
of low productivity. There is a gap between training and employers’ needs. The main 
problems in the labour market are underemployment, poor skill levels, and low wages 
especially in the rural areas. These factors contributed to the continued poverty of the 
workers. 
Figure 3.1   ECOWAS GDP 15 year average  
 
Note3: period covered-1975, 1985, 2001-2013 
  
                                                 
3 Data source for figures 3.1 and 3.2 is World Development Indicators. Period covered is the same for 
both figures 
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Figure 3.2   ECOWAS Population 15 year average  
 
 
3.4 Cape Verde 
By the fifteen years average of GDP figures, Cape Verde is the twelfth largest economy 
of ECOWAS. The country gained independence from Portugal in 1975. Its population 
has grown by 137% from 1960 (210,933) to 2013 (498,897). Cape Verde is a small and 
fragmented group of ten islands located in a land area of 4,030 km
2
, see appendix A.4. 
The country’s national currency is the Escudo which is pegged to the Euro. It is the only 
ECOWAS country so far reported to have a social protection system that covers old age, 
disability and deaths and also one of the few African countries likely to attain all eight 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
The economy is dominated by the tertiary sector with 83.4% and 84.9% of GDP 
respectively for 2006 and 2011 with no significant change in 2014. Its lack of land, as 
an island, is reflected on its small primary sector (12.9%, 11.9% and 9.8% for 2006, 
2011 and 2014 respectively). The secondary sector (manufacturing) is very small with 
only 3.7% and 3.4% of GDP for 2006 and 2011 respectively. In 2014 the figure stands 
at 6.5% but in all years it is limited to only light manufacturing. 
 
 
 
 
4
4
 
Figure 3.3   ECOWAS GDP by sector (% of GDP) 2006-2014 
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Table 3.3   Country economic indicators – Cape Verde   
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  
Ex 
DS INF  EXR  
1975           0.0         26 
1985 8.6 419 6.7 22.6 79.2 -56.5 -6.5   68.9 5.4 92 
2001 6.1 1265 4.3 29.8 62.4 -32.5 -9.9   61.4 3.3 123 
2002 5.3 1372 3.5 32.5 68.5 -36.0 -11.5   62.3 1.9 117 
2003 4.7 1769 3.0 31.4 67.4 -36.0 -11.1   54.1 1.2 98 
2004 4.3 1980 2.8 32.0 69.6 -37.6 -14.1   50.1 -1.9 89 
2005 6.5 2055 5.1 37.8 66.6 -28.8 -4.2 -2.9 49.0 0.4 89 
2006 10.1 2316 8.9 45.1 72.7 -27.6 -7.5 -1.9 47.2 5.4 88 
2007 8.6 2756 7.6 42.8 77.8 -34.9 -14.9 2.1 43.5 4.4 81 
2008 6.2 3204 5.3 45.3 78.4 -33.0 -13.2 2.5 40.0 6.8 75 
2009 3.7 3256 2.8 35.6 67.9 -32.3 -15.5 -3.7 44.2 1.0 79 
2010 5.2 3345 4.3 38.6 67.1 -28.5 -13.0   51.7 2.1 83 
2011 5.0 3798 4.1 42.2 72.6 -30.3 -16.0     4.5 79 
Mean 5.99 2,465 4.7 37.6 70.1 -32.5 -11.9 -0.8 50.4 2.6 91 
The country experienced positive economic growth in GDP since 1985 with the highest 
of 10.1% in 2006 (table 3.3) Its GDP per capita has increased significantly from $419 in 
1985 to $3,798 in 2011 which may be partly explained by the small size of the 
population relative to other ECOWAS countries. However the trade balance, measured 
by net export as a percentage of GDP, is significantly in deficit which shows high 
dependence on imports. Whilst the current balance is also always in deficit it relative 
small size compared to the trade balance seems to suggest that the country’s capital 
account balance is in surplus, partly outweighing the negative trade balance. The fiscal 
balance (CSD) for the few years shown in table 3.3 is mainly negative except 2007 and 
2008 when the economy recorded surpluses. External debt stock is high since 1985 and 
gradually reducing but at a very low rate. Inflation record, apart from 2008 (6.8%) and 
2006 (5.4%), is always within the 5% ECOWAS target. According to the African 
Economic outlook, Cape Verde’s development is fundamentally constrained by a 
number of factors such as small population size (small market), fragmentation of its 
territory, a dry Sahel climate, poor natural endowments and heavy reliance on the 
external sector, especially for financial aid and remittances. The economy faces a high 
level of unemployment rate, particularly among the young who made up over 50% of 
work force (AEO). 
3.5 Cote d’Ivoire  
Cote d’Ivoire is the largest economy in WAEMU but third largest in ECOWAS after 
Ghana with only about 7% of ECOWAS GDP (figure 3.1). The country gained 
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independence from France in 1960 at the time when its population was 3,638,385. Its 
population growth form 1960-2013 is 458%, the largest in ECOWAS. It is located in a 
land area of 318,000 km
2
.  
Table 3.4   Country economic indicators – Cote d’Ivoire  
 
Cote d’Ivoire economy is a service dominated sector. As seen in appendices A.5 and 
A.6 the tertiary sector contributes 52.3 and 51.2% of GDP for 2006 and 2011 
respectively and no major difference in 2014. The industrial sector (secondary) 
contributes 16.4% to the GDP in 2006 but declined to 12.8% in 2011 and increased to 
15% in 2014. According to the AEO (2012) the declined in the manufacturing sector 
was due to the instability caused by the post-election crisis that resulted to stoppage in 
production, the looting of production plants, especially food processing, and the input 
supply problems due to embargo imposed by the EU. The primary sector is the second 
largest contributor to GDP with 31.3% in 2006 which has increased to 35.9% in 2011 
and down to 33.3 in 2014. Although this sector increased in 2011 the exportable 
agricultural products were adversely affected due to the abandonment of plantations as a 
result of insecurity, difficulties to transport produce, lack of storage facilities resulting 
to damage to produce. Overall, the wait-and-see approach adopted by all economic 
agents during the crisis inflicts damages to the economy. Unemployment is also a 
problem in Cote d’Ivoire especially the youth. The problems of employment include the 
lack of skills needed by employers and poor employment prospecting system (AEO 
2012). 
Cote d’Ivoire’s GDP growth in 1975 was 8.3% and 4.5% in 1985. However, since 2000 
the country’s economic performance has been disappointing with even negative growth 
in 2002 and 2003 (table 3.4). This could be a clear negative impact of the 1999 civil 
Year GDPR PGDP PGDPR EXP  IMP E-I CAB  CSD Ex DS INF EXR 
1975 8.3 575 3.4 36.7 36.6 0.1 -9.7 11.4 214
1985 4.5 665 0.5 46.8 32.4 14.4 1.0 138.4 1.9 449
2001 0.0 624 -1.9 41.8 33.5 8.4 -0.6 109.9 4.3 733
2002 -1.4 669 -3.1 50.0 33.4 16.6 6.7 102.5 3.1 697
2003 -1.6 787 -3.1 45.8 34.9 10.9 2.1 -2.5 88.6 3.3 581
2004 1.8 873 0.2 48.6 39.4 9.2 1.6 -1.7 85.3 1.4 528
2005 1.3 908 -0.4 51.1 43.6 7.5 0.2 -6.7 72.8 3.9 527
2006 0.7 948 -1.0 52.7 42.4 10.3 2.8 -1.1 73.5 2.5 523
2007 1.7 1062 0.0 47.8 41.9 5.9 -0.7 -0.7 70.0 1.9 479
2008 2.3 1233 0.5 46.5 38.8 7.7 1.9 -0.3 53.7 6.3 448
2009 3.7 1191 1.8 42.2 34.1 8.1 7.0 0.9 50.8 1.0 472
2010 2.4 1161 0.4 40.6 36.1 4.6 2.0 -1.6 49.9 1.7 495
2011 -4.7 1195 -6.7 43.7 40.6 3.2 4.9 472
Mean 0.56 968 -1.2 46.4 38.1 8.4 2.3 -1.7 75.7 3.1
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conflict. GDP growth picks up slightly in 2008-10 and lost in 2011, a year with negative 
growth of 4.7%. The impact of the 1999 and 2011 crises are even worse in the per 
capita GDP as shown by the negative growth most of the years since 2000. Despite 
these problems the country consistently reported a surplus in its trade balance showing a 
stronger export sector. The peak of the surplus was in 2002 with net export as 
percentage of GDP of 16.6%, though it has been on the decline since 2001. In 2011 the 
surplus stood at 3.2% (the lowest since 2001). The country has favourable current 
account balances for all the years since 2001 with the exception of 2001 and 2007. 
Fiscal balance is negative from 2003-2010 though not at a significant level. There is a 
significant reduction in the external debts stock from the high of 138.4% of GDP in 
1985 to the lowest of 49.9% in 2010. Inflation performance has been within the 
ECOWAS 5% convergence criterion with the exception of 2008 (6.3%). However the 
2011 inflation rate of 4.9% is a threat to the threshold. 
3.6 The Gambia 
Gambia, with a land area of 10,000 km
2
, became independent from Britain in 1965 
(appendix A.4). In 1960 the country’s population was 372,625. This has grown to 
1,849,285 in 2013 which is 396%. From the British pound the country now has the 
Dalasi as its national currency. It is the fourteenth largest economy in ECOWAS with a 
very small share of ECOWAS GDP (0.25%) and 0.54% of the total population.  
Table 3.5   Country economic indicators – Gambia 
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  
Ex 
DS INF  EXR  
1975 12.4 214 8.9 44.7 43.6 1.1       25.9 2 
1985 -0.8 294 -5.1 43.9 53.9 -10.1 3.4   108.6 18.3 4 
2001 5.8 515 2.7 21.8 25.1 -3.3     71.0 4.5 16 
2002 -3.3 420 -6.1 27.2 32.5 -5.3     99.7 8.6 20 
2003 6.9 344 3.7 31.1 37.8 -6.7 0.5   130.5 17.0 29 
2004 7.1 396 3.9 34.2 48.8 -14.5 -5.2   116.3 14.2 30 
2005 -0.9 415 -3.8 32.8 49.6 -16.8 -7.0   105.7 4.8 29 
2006 1.1 423 -1.7 33.8 47.2 -13.4 -10.0   108.4 2.1 28 
2007 3.6 502 0.8 28.9 42.1 -13.2 -7.3   86.6 5.4 25 
2008 5.7 590 2.8 23.5 39.9 -16.4 1.1   37.8 4.5 22 
2009 6.4 536 3.6 25.3 41.7 -16.4 7.0   51.0 4.6 27 
2010 6.5 551 3.7 23.5 42.1 -18.6 5.9   49.4 5.0 28 
2011 -4.3 506 -6.9 28.9 47.2 -18.3 7.5     4.8 29 
Mean 3.15 472 0.2 28.3 41.3 -13.0 -0.8 
 
85.7 6.9 26 
The tertiary sector dominates the economy with a contribution to GDP of 67.1 and 
66.6% in 2006 and 2013 respectively. Tourism, re-export and transit trade are the key 
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growth drivers of the Gambia economy and these are supported by bilateral preferential 
trade policies and a relatively efficient port infrastructure (AEO 2012). However the 
building of better infrastructures by other countries and the harmonisation of trade 
policies in the ECOWAS region are gradually eroding Gambia’s comparative advantage 
in re-exporting and transit trade. The industrial sector is very small and uncompetitive, 
accounting for 7.5% of the GDP in 2006 with a decline to 6.0% in 2013. This sector 
focuses mainly on the domestic market and is constrained by limited skills and 
technology that can add value. The industrial sector also suffers from lack of investment 
in physical infrastructure such as roads and soft infrastructure such as trade facilitation, 
lack of coordination and support from government (AEO 2012). The primary sector, the 
second largest sector of the Gambian economy is not without problems. This sector is 
agriculturally dominated and relied heavily on a single product, groundnut, which 
accounts for 60% of domestically produced exports. Out of the 30.6% contribution to 
GDP by the primary sector in 2011, only 1.8% came from mining and quarrying and the 
rest from Agriculture. According to AEO 2012, over 70% of the country’s labour force 
is employed in the agricultural sector and produces about 50% of the country’s food 
supplies. The small mining component of the primary sector is confined to carrying out 
geological surveys, investigations and explorations in order to establish the potential for 
mineral resources and plan for their exploitation. 
The country’s economic growth, measured by the GDP (table 3.5) is very volatile, 
exhibiting a steady growth only in 2006-2010 and slides into a negative growth of  
-4.3% in 2011. The annual growth in per capita GDP mirrored the GDP growth rate. 
With the exception of 1975, which shows a small surplus of 1.1% of GDP, the trade 
balance is on the deficit all the years and on the rise indicating increasing dependence 
on imports with a weak export base. The current account balance shows a surplus from 
2008-2011 despite the negative trade balance which may imply that the capital account 
balance is favourable for those years and outweigh the negative trade balance. No data 
on the fiscal balance but the external debts stock indicator shows a decline from year to 
year with an outstanding balance of 49.4% in 2010. Inflation rate was high in the early 
2000s but since 2005 the rate converged to the ECOWAS 5% target with a narrow miss 
only in 2007, the start of the global financial crisis. The currency has been weakening. 
In 2001 the exchange rate was 16 dalasi to US$1 and in 2011 it has depreciated to 
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D29/US$1. Like other ECOWAS countries, youth unemployment is a problem in the 
Gambia and is estimated to be over 40%, according to AEO (2012). 
3.7 Ghana  
Ghana is the second largest economy, after Nigeria, in both WAMZ and ECOWAS with 
a share of 7.5% of ECOWAS GDP. The country gained independence from Britain in 
1957 and Located in a land area of 227,540 km
2. The country’s population has grown 
by 284% from 6,742,107 in 1960 to 25,904,598 in 2013.  
Table 3.6   Country economic indicators – Ghana  
 
Ghana Economy is tertiary sector driven followed by the primary sector. The tertiary 
sector contributes 56.5% and 63.7% to GDP in 2006 and 2014 respectively. The 
primary sector accounted for 33.2% (Agriculture 30.4%) and 30.2% (Agriculture 
20.7%) of GDP in 2006 and 2014 respectively. The decline in the agricultural sector 
between 2006 and 2014 is due to a sharp decline in reforestation activities, which led to 
a contraction of the forestry and logging subsector (AEO 2012) and also a gradual shift 
to mining. Agriculture locally produced less than 30% of raw material demand for agro-
based industries and the major agricultural produce include: industrial crops, starchy 
staples, cereals, legumes, fruits and vegetables, livestock and fish (AFDB web site). 
Cocoa is the largest agricultural export earner for the country. The mining sector in 
Ghana is only 2.8% in 2006 but has increased to 9.5% of GDP in 2014. Ghana is a 
major gold producer and exporter constituting over 90% of the country’s mineral 
exports (strategy paper 2012). The country’s other natural resources include diamonds, 
manganese ore, limestone, silica and bauxite. This sector employs a very small 
proportion (0.69%) of the labour force and it is dominated by foreign investors. With 
Year GDPR PGDP PGDPR EXP  IMP E-I CAB  CSD Ex DS INF EXR 
1975 -12.4 283 -14.5 19.4 18.4 0.9 0.6 29.8 0
1985 5.1 350 1.7 10.7 13.6 -2.9 -3.0 49.8 10.3 0
2001 4.0 271 1.5 45.2 64.8 -19.6 -8.0 -6.5 119.3 32.9 1
2002 4.5 307 2.0 42.6 54.9 -12.3 -1.7 -5.0 112.9 14.8 1
2003 5.2 370 2.7 40.7 56.6 -15.9 1.3 -3.6 99.2 26.7 1
2004 5.6 421 3.1 39.3 60.4 -21.1 -6.6 -1.4 79.5 12.6 1
2005 5.9 496 3.4 36.4 61.7 -25.3 -10.3 -1.4 63.2 15.1 1
2006 6.4 921 3.9 25.2 40.7 -15.5 -5.2 -4.2 16.3 10.9 1
2007 6.5 1090 3.9 24.5 40.8 -16.3 -9.6 -4.7 19.6 10.7 1
2008 8.4 1226 5.9 25.0 44.5 -19.5 -11.7 -5.9 18.9 16.5 1
2009 4.0 1090 1.5 29.3 42.3 -13.0 -7.3 -5.6 24.4 19.3 1
2010 8.0 1319 5.5 29.4 41.2 -11.8 -8.5 -7.2 26.0 10.7 1
2011 14.4 1570 11.8 38.0 51.1 -13.1 -8.9 8.7 2
Mean 6.63 826 4.1 34.2 50.8 -16.7 -7.0 -4.6 57.9 16.3 1
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the commencement of oil production in 2010, crude oil exports is now Ghana’s second 
largest export earner after gold. It is predicted that oil export income will soon overtake 
gold export. Due to lack of local skills most of the highly specialised and high paying 
jobs are undertaken by non-Ghanaians, a gap that the government is trying to address. 
The challenges faced by the mining sector include illegal mining operations known as 
‘galamsey’, artisan mining on company concession, irregular and increasing cost of 
electricity supply and most recently high tax rates (AFDB websit). The secondary sector 
(industry) contributes 10.2% of GDP in 2006 and this declined to 6.2% in 2014. This 
decline in the manufacturing sector is explained by intensified import competition, 
which eroded the competitiveness of local manufacturing companies, high utility prices, 
low research and development expenditure, high cost of inputs and raw materials, 
increases in tax rates and removal of tax holidays (AFDB). Unemployment is still a 
problem in Ghana especially for the youth (15-24 years). For this age group 
unemployment is reported to be 25.6% which is twice for the age group 25-44 years. 
Ghana exhibited a steady economic growth since 2001 with the exception of 2009 when 
it plummeted from 8.4% (2008) to 4.0% which may be linked to the global economic 
crisis (table 3.6). The lost growth was quickly regained in 2010 (8.0%) and even a much 
stronger growth of 14.4 in 2011. The crude oil production may have contributed to this 
strong growth. The country’s per capita GDP in 1975 was US$283 which has grown to 
US$1,319 in 2010. This represents a 366% growth which is above the sub-Saharan 
African growth of 226.9% for the same period. The trade balance as shown by the net 
export as percentage of GDP, table 3.6, has been consistently in deficit with no surplus 
recorded except for 1975 (0.9%). Fiscal balance is also in deficit for all years shown. 
The external debt stock is slowing down from its 2001 high of 119.3% of GDP to its 
lowest in 2006 (16.3%) with a gradual increase after that year. Prior to 2007 the 
country’s national currency, the Cedi, was one of the fasted depreciating currencies in 
Africa but the central bank of Ghana mechanically fixed this problem. On the 25/11/06, 
the Governor of the Bank of Ghana, in an annual bankers’ dinner, announced the 
redenomination of the Cedi. The move was said to address the imposed burden and cost 
of high note regime on the economy and relieve Ghanians from the burden of carrying 
large amount of notes in black polythene bags for everyday transactions (Bawumia, 
2010). The new currency, named the ‘Ghana Cedi and Ghana Pesiwa), was introduced 
on 01/07/07. The whole exercise was the elimination of four zeros and the printing and 
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circulation of the new currency. Ghana has a high inflation record with a peak of 32.9% 
in 2001. Since 2001 the country has only been able to achieve a single digit inflation of 
8.7% in 2011 which is still well above the 5% inflation requirement for the ECOWAS 
single currency.   
3.8 Guinea 
Guinea is located in a land area of 254,720 km
2
. The country gained independence from 
France in 1958. As former French colony, Guinea was a member of the WAEMU but 
left the currency union and continued with its own currency, the Guinea Franc. It is the 
8
th
 largest economy in ECOWAS with 1.5% of total GDP and the third largest in 
WAMZ, after Ghana. In 1960 the country’s population was 3,540,756 and increased to 
11,745,189 in 2013 representing a growth rate of 232%. The primary and tertiary 
sectors dominate the economy with a contribution to GDP of 47.6 and 34.9% for 2006 
and 2014 respectively by the former and 46.1 and 56.6% by the latter in the same 
period. In 2006 Agriculture and mining made equal contribution to GDP of 23.8% each. 
The primary sector declines in 2011 and 2014 with a shift from mining and quarrying 
(17.5%) to agriculture (26%) in 2011. This gap is narrowed in 2014. This sector 
employs more than 80% of the country’s labour force (AEO 2012). Guinea is rich in 
natural resources but its economic development is constrained by infrastructural gap, 
especially in the energy and transport sectors (ADB 2012-16). According to the ADB, 
energy sector generated only 40% of the country’s demand and it has the lowest road 
density (2.8 km/100 km
2
 in 2010) in the sub-region. A further obstacle to economic 
development, especially agriculture, is the lack of modern road network which made it 
impossible for agricultural produce to reach the market. The country’s natural 
endowment has not been utilised. For instance ADB strategy report (2012-16) 
mentioned that Guinea has an estimated potential of 27,000 m
3
 per capital per year and 
is ranked as one of the countries with the most water in the world and the source of 
many rivers or tributaries which makes it West Africa’s Water Tower. The country is 
also exceptionally rich in minerals. Guinea has one third of world bauxite reserves 
(estimated at 25 billion m
3
) and also major reserves of iron ore, (4 billion tonnes), gold, 
diamonds, uranium and other minerals (ADB 2012-16). Due to lack of infrastructure, 
the country exports about 95% of its bauxite unprocessed leaving the country with the 
lowest alumina/bauxite ratio among the major exporters of bauxite. Another constrain to 
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guinea’s economic development affecting all sectors is its low level of human resources. 
For instance the mining sector’s qualified labour requirement has to be met mainly from 
neighbouring countries. The government planned an educational system and vocational 
reform. The secondary sector is relatively small with some amount of processing of 
bauxite to alumina but capacity building is significantly needed in this area. The tertiary 
sector is dominated by wholesale and retail trade and general government services. 
Unemployment and underemployment is high, estimated at 30% for the youth. The high 
unemployment is explained by the socialist winding up policy of 1985 when 50% of the 
civil service staffing was cutback and mass privatisation with the closure of 300 state 
owned enterprises. The private sector expected to fill this gap is still incapacitated due 
to the non-conducive business environment. As a result the informal sector continues to 
be the main provider of employment. 
The rate of economic growth of Guinea is low and very volatile, the per capita GDP is 
low (table 3.7).The trade balance and current account balance are always in deficit and 
even increasing with high level of external stock of debts from 103.6% of GDP in 2001 
and still standing at 61.7% in 2010. Inflation is at sky rocket level with a peak of 34.7% 
in 2006 and in 2011 21.4% far away from meeting the ECOWAS 5% requirement for 
single currency. The currency continuously depreciates from 21 Guinea franc in 1975 to 
6,658 per US$ in 2011. 
Table 3.7   Country economic indicators – Guinea  
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  
Ex 
DS INF  EXR  
1975                     21 
1985                     24 
2001 3.7 334 2.1 28.6 30.0 -1.4 -2.1   103.6   1951 
2002 5.2 343 3.5 26.5 29.0 -2.5 -6.8   105.2 6.1 1976 
2003 1.2 394 -0.4 26.0 25.2 0.8 -5.4   92.3 12.9 1985 
2004 2.3 412 0.7 24.6 25.8 -1.2 -4.4   85.5 27.6 2244 
2005 3.0 325 1.3 34.8 35.1 -0.3 -5.5   98.7 31.4 3644 
2006 2.5 307 0.7 40.6 42.6 -2.0 -7.8   108.0 34.7 5149 
2007 1.8 449 -0.1 28.8 36.4 -7.7 -10.8   74.7 22.8 4198 
2008 4.9 395 2.9 34.9 40.1 -5.1 -11.6   81.9 18.4 4602 
2009 -0.3 427 -2.3 26.5 30.8 -4.3 -9.7   70.0 4.7 4801 
2010 1.9 474 -0.3 28.4 36.5 -8.2 -6.9   61.7 15.5 5726 
2011 3.9 498 1.5 30.3 48.2 -17.9 -22.8     21.4 6658 
Mean 2.74 396 0.9 30.0 34.5 -4.5 -8.5   88.1 19.5 3,903 
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3.9 Guinea Bissau 
 Guinea Bissau is the smallest country in ECOWAS in GDP terms (0.23%). It is also the 
smallest economy in WAEMU. The country gained independence from Portugal in 
1974 though it was announced in 1973 and has a land area of 28,120 km
2. The country’s 
population in 2013 was 1,704,255 compared to 593,289 in 1960, a growth rate of 187%. 
Agriculture provides 65% of jobs in the country but it heavily relied on one export 
commodity, cashew nuts, which accounted for 90% of exports in 2011 (81% in 
2008/09) due to exceptional harvest resulting from good rain fall. 
Table 3.8   Country economic indicators – Guinea Bissau 
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  Ex DS INF  EXR  
1975 7.8 157 4.0 5.2 25.9 -20.8           
1985 4.2 156 2.3 9.8 57.7 -48.0 -52.7   222.0   2 
2001 0.2 157 -1.7 28.6 63.0 -34.3 -5.6   453.0 3.3 733 
2002 -7.1 158 -8.9 29.8 51.2 -21.4 -0.6   478.2 3.3 697 
2003 -0.6 361 -2.5       -0.1   223.3 -3.5 581 
2004 2.2 390 0.2       2.7   211.3 0.9 528 
2005 3.5 419 1.4       -1.8   176.8 3.3 527 
2006 2.1 415 0.1       -6.9   179.1 2.0 523 
2007 3.2 485 1.1       -4.4   156.3 4.6 479 
2008 3.2 583 1.1       -3.4   128.2 10.5 448 
2009 3.0 562 0.9       -5.7   133.9 -1.7 472 
2010 3.5 551 1.3       -8.5   131.0 2.5 495 
2011 5.3 629 3.1             5.0 472 
Mean 1.68 428 -0.3 29.2 57.1 -27.9 -3.4   227.1 2.8 541 
Other agricultural activities include forestry, fishing and livestock, peanuts, cotton, fruit 
(mangoes, bananas, pineapple etc.), vegetables and tubers (cassava and sweet potatoes). 
Repeated interference by the military into politics constrained the effort to diversify the 
economy. It compromises part of the gains arising from the economic upturn that began 
in 2007. This also hinders the democratic process, contributes to political instability and 
could even call into question the reforms envisaged in the framework of National 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (NPRSP) (AEO 2012). For instance a planned 
military reform by one of the presidential candidates in the 2012 led to the military to 
stage a coup d’état in between the first and the second round of elections which threw 
the country into turmoil. According to AEO (2012) there is no proper system of 
counting the unemployed in Guinea Bissau but the available statistics suggest this to be 
30% for the age group under 30 years. This jobless situation is said to be as a result of 
political instability, fragility of the economy, and the absence of job creation in the 
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public sector. The tertiary sector is dominated by wholesale and retail and general 
government services. 
The country’s economic growth is stagnant from a deep decline of 7.1% in 2002 to a 
flat growth of around 3% although a small improvement in 2011. GDP per capita is 
very small and its growth rate mirrors the GDP growth. From 2003-2011 no statistics 
available for trade balance but prior to that the trade deficit as a percentage of GDP is 
high. The country has a persistent current account deficit but no figures for the fiscal 
balance. The country’s external debt situation is bad with 478.2% of GDP in 2002 
(peak) to 131% in 2010. The country appears to face inflationary pressures and seems to 
struggle to stay within the 3% WAEMU requirement and sometimes even the 5% 
ECOWAS convergence target as indicated in table 3.8. 
3.10 Liberia 
Liberia is the thirteenth largest economy of ECOWAS with a share of 0.33% of its GDP 
and 1.29% of the total population. The country gained independence from America on 
26/7/1847. The land area of Liberia is 96,320 km
2
. It experienced a population growth 
rate of 285% from 1960 (1,115,736) to 2013 (4,294,077). Liberia’s economy is heavily 
dominated by the primary sector with a contribution to GDP of 69.4% and 73.3% in 
2006 and 2011 respectively. 
The figure for primary sector share fell to 47.7% in 2013. A share of agriculture, 
forestry, fishing and hunting for the same period is 68.6% and 72% but significantly 
declined to 35.3% in 2013.  Despite this proportion of agricultural sector the country 
still imports most of its rice, the main staple food, to meet local demand which makes 
social conditions vulnerable to international price fluctuations (AEO 2012). Forestry 
and rubber production are high components of agriculture and these were supported in 
2011 by international prices and new companies engaging in logging operations. 
Rubber, timber, palm-oil, and food production are the growth drivers of the economy. 
However fluctuating rainfall and poor feeder roads network to transport farm produce to 
the market are serious obstacles to this sector. The secondary sector is 6.7% and 7.3% 
of GDP for 2006 and 2013 respectively and this is expected to grow in the future due to 
the expansion in the mining of iron-ore. Apart from the expected future increase in this 
sector due to the processing of iron-ore, the current manufacturing activities are mainly 
in beverages, cement, and consumer goods. 
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Table 3.9   Country economic indicators – Liberia  
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  Ex DS INF  EXR  
1975 -3.5 348 -6.2 69.9 64.4 5.5         1 
1985 -0.8 385 -2.3 54.9 47.6 7.3 6.6   146.9   1 
2001 22.1 175 18.3 28.6 29.5 -0.9     581.1   49 
2002 31.9 179 29.4 35.7 29.8 5.9     605.8 14.2 62 
2003 -32.8 135 -33.7 91.5 38.7 52.8     875.7 10.3 59 
2004 -5.1 151 -6.8 26.5 67.4 -40.9 -34.2   815.5 7.8 55 
2005 9.5 170 6.4 23.8 76.3 -52.4 -33.9 0.0 719.1 10.8 57 
2006 9.8 182 5.4 30.8 142.7 -111.9 -28.6 0.1 681.1 7.3 58 
2007 15.7 213 10.2 32.4 121.4 -89.0 -30.2 0.1 503.6 11.4 61 
2008 10.5 233 5.1 34.4 144.6 -110.3 -41.6 0.0 367.7 17.5 63 
2009 13.8 301 8.5 15.3 76.4 -61.2 -24.0   143.3 7.4 68 
2010 10.9 324 6.5 19.1 82.1 -63.0 -32.1   17.6 7.3 71 
2011 9.4 374 5.9 27.5 93.3 -65.8 -48.9     8.5 72 
Mean 8.70 222 5.0 33.2 82.0 -48.8 -34.2 0.0 531.1 10.3 61 
The sector is constrained by insufficient public electricity supply, shortage of skilled 
labour, and high cost of inputs. The tertiary sector is said to be supported mainly by 
expatriate, including the UN mission in Liberia (UNMIL).  Economic development of 
Liberia is constrained by several factors: political instability from the civil war and the 
boycott of the second round of the 2011 presidential elections, difficult business 
environment, poor energy infrastructure and transport, more so in rural areas, mismatch 
of workers’ skills and employers’ demand, low literacy rate, inadequate port facilities 
and lack of pave roads, high cost of energy, three times the West African average (AEO 
2012). Donor contributions and remittances from Liberians living abroad are all boosts 
to the economy which creates another potential for external shock. 
The country’s economic growth, though improving in the recent years seems very 
fragile with the highest annual GDP growth of 31.9% in 2002 and lowest of -32.8% in 
2003 (table 3.9). Per capita GDP is low and its growth rate has mixed results. In fact the 
situation in 1985 (US$385) is better than the current level of US$374 in 2011. The trade 
balance is largely in deficit with highest net export of -111.9% of GDP in 2006 and still 
standing at -65.8% in 2011. The current account balance shows no better condition 
although it appears to be relatively in lower deficit than the trade balance suggesting 
some form of cancellation from the capital account balance. The country was highly 
indebted up to 2009. In 2003 the external debt stock as a percentage of GDP was 
875.7% and this figure now stands at only 17.6% in 2010. Inflation rate, in most times, 
is in double digits with the exception of 2010 and 2011 although it is still above the 5% 
ECOWAS target. The Liberian dollar has depreciated over the years from a 1:1 with 
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US$ in the sixties to the eighties to 72:1 in 2011. According to the AEO 2012 the poor 
inflation performance is explained by the high international food and fuel prices and 
limited domestic supplies due to low production and difficulty of farm produce reaching 
the consumers. Unemployment and underemployment are both a concern in the country 
especially for the youth and programmes intended to overcome this problem yielded 
below expectation results.  
Table 3.10  Country economic indicators – Mali 
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  Ex DS INF  EXR  
1975 11.6 126 9.6 9.7 29.3 -19.6 -7.4       214 
1985 -11.4 164 -12.9 16.8 44.0 -27.2 -16.0   110.8   449 
2001 12.1 226 8.8 33.3 50.3 -17.0 -11.8 -4.2 108.7 5.2 733 
2002 4.2 279 1.0 31.9 39.2 -7.3 -4.5 -4.2 82.9 5.0 697 
2003 7.4 352 4.2 26.4 37.4 -10.9 -6.2 -1.4 70.0 -1.3 581 
2004 2.2 382 -1.0 25.4 37.8 -12.4 -8.4 -3.0 67.0 -3.1 528 
2005 6.1 403 2.8 25.6 37.3 -11.7 -8.3 -2.5 60.3 6.4 527 
2006 5.3 432 2.1 32.1 40.2 -8.1 -3.7 32.1 27.1 1.5 523 
2007 4.3 510 1.1 26.2 35.6 -9.4 -8.1 -4.7 25.5 1.4 479 
2008 5.0 604 1.8       -12.2 -1.7 23.2 9.2 448 
2009 4.5 601 1.3       -7.3 -2.1 23.1 2.2 472 
2010 5.8 613 2.6       -12.6 -2.5 24.7 1.1 495 
2011 2.7 669 -0.3             2.9 472 
Mean 5.41 461 2.2 28.7 39.7 -11.0 -8.3 0.6 51.3 2.8 541 
3.11 Mali 
Mali gained independence from France in 1960 and it is the country with the second 
largest land area in ECOWAS (1,220,190 km
2
) and the sixth largest economy in GDP 
terms with 2.31%. Unlike Guinea, Mali left WAEMU but returned and stayed 
permanently in the currency union. Since 1960 the population has grown from 
5,247,877 to 15,301,650 (192%) in 2013. The primary sector is dominated by 
agriculture in all years (Appendices A.5 and A.6). It has a sizeable mining sector which 
has decreased from 8.3% in 2006 to 5.9% in 2014. The secondary sector is the smallest 
and has experienced the highest decline from 9% in 2006 to 5.6% in 2014. Agricultural 
production includes cotton, rice, and livestock farming. Livestock farming alone 
employs 30% of the workforce. This sector is vulnerable to shortage of rainfall and its 
uneven distribution in time and places. The war in Libya, the post-election crisis in Cote 
d’Ivoire, rising oil and food prices and the military coup that led to the outbreak of 
violence in the country in early 2012 are all obstacles to this sector.  The manufacturing 
sector is mainly textile and food processing. Trade, the largest component of the service 
sector, is strongly supported by private consumption of households. The major source of 
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household income is remittances from Malians living abroad. The current political 
turmoil is a serious setback to Mali’s economic development. The government effort to 
combat poverty through vocational training and job creation programmes is not yielding 
the desired results. The Mali economy is declining, though, at a slow rate as shown by 
the GDP growth rate in table 3.10. Per capita GDP is low and its growth is also on the 
decline. Both the trade and current account balances are in deficit for all the years 
shown in table 3.10. The fiscal balance is in deficit except for 2006 where it reported a 
large surplus of 32.1% of GDP. The external debt stock has significantly declined and 
stood at 24.7% in 2010. The inflation record is in most times within the WAEMU 3% 
requirement but many times this target is missed and sometimes even the 5% ECOWAS 
expected target.   
3.12  Niger 
Niger is a member of WAEMU and gained independence from France in 1960. The 
country is located in a land area of 1,266,700 km
2
 and has a population of 3,249,965 
and 17,831,270 in 1960 and 2013 respectively. This represents a growth rate of 449%, 
second to Cote d’Ivoire. Niger is the ninth largest economy in ECOWAS with a share of 
1.48% of its GDP and in terms of population size it is the fifth largest with 5.08% of the 
total. The primary sector is the largest of the country’s economic activity with a 
contribution to GDP of 48.5 and 50.9% for 2006 and 2013 respectively. This is closely 
followed by the tertiary sector which represents 45.7% and 42.8% of GDP for the same 
period. The secondary sector is relatively very small representing only 5.8 and 6.4% of 
GDP for the same period. Agriculture constitutes the largest part of the primary sector 
with 46.2% of GDP in 2006 although there was a small decline to 40.7% in 2013. This 
is due to bad weather and little rain fall which sometimes causes drought and in 2011 it 
created a cereal deficit of 692,000 tonnes. The sector is also affected by political crises 
in neighbouring countries: Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Libya.  For every three years the 
country experiences food crisis at least once due to drought and recently to flooding that 
resulted to the destruction of infrastructure, arable land, and fall in production and 
ultimately famine (country strategy paper 2012-14). 
Economic activity was also disturbed by the military coup in February 2010 until 2011 
when constitutional rule was brought back. Mining activities are mainly on oil and 
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uranium and this sector is to expand in the future with the current development of 
building new oil refinery and new uranium mine. 
The manufacturing sector, like other ECOWAS countries, is affected by lack of skilled 
labour, high cost of inputs and delay in reconstructing the electricity sector. There is 
little job creation in Niger due to low economic activities especially in the industrial 
sector and because of this the demand for jobs is not very high. According to AEO 
2012, 40% of young first-time job seekers still have inadequate qualifications. 
Economic growth, measured by the GDP growth rate is very volatile with no clear 
pattern (table 3.11). The highest GDP per capita achieved is US$374 in 2011. This is 
very low relative to the world standard and even in SSA and ECOWAS. 
Table 3.11  Country economic indicators – Niger 
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  
Ex 
DS INF  EXR  
1975 -2.8 207 -5.6 19.2 31.0 -11.7 1.1     9.1 214 
1985 7.7 214 4.8 20.7 32.8 -12.1 -4.4   84.9 -0.9 449 
2001 7.1 172 3.5 16.9 24.6 -7.7 -4.7   83.2 4.0 733 
2002 3. 0 185 -0.5 15.2 24.1 -8.9 -7.6   85.0 2.6 697 
2003 5.3 225 1.7 16.0 25.2 -9.2 -8.0   77.8 -1.6 581 
2004 0.1 243 -3.3 16.1 26.0 -10.0 -7.6   66.0 0.3 528 
2005 4.5 262 0.9 15.0 24.2 -9.2 -9.1 -1.9 59.2 7.8 527 
2006 5.8 271 2.1       -8.6 40.4 22.7 0.0 523 
2007 3.4 308 -0.2       -8.2 -0.9 26.8 0.1 479 
2008 8.7 372 4.9       -12.1   18.7 11.3 448 
2009 -0.9 351 -4.4       -25.1   21.0 4.3 472 
2010 8.0 349 4.2           20.8 0.8 495 
2011 2.3 374 -1.2             2.9 472 
Mean 4.30 283 0.7 15.9 24.8 -9.0 -10.1 12.5 48.1 3.0 541 
The country runs a persistent deficit in trade and current account balances indicating 
poor performance in both the goods and capital flow sectors. There is a high external 
debt burden but this is slowing down continuously and now at its lowest point of 20.8% 
of GDP. According to the country strategy paper, Niger’s improvement in debt position 
is due to debt relief initiative obtained under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) in 2004 and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) in 2006. The 
possible effect of these initiatives is reflected by the significant decline in the debt ratio 
from 59.2% in 2005 to just 22.7% in 2006 (table 3.11). The inflation record 
performance is mixed. The figures show that the country struggles to maintain inflation 
within the 3% criterion of WAEMU and sometimes even the 5% required by the 
ECOWAS convergence criterion. 
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3.13 Nigeria 
Nigeria is the largest and dominant economy in ECOWAS, the second largest in SSA 
and 30
th
 largest in the world (CSP 2013-17). It is the pioneering force behind the 
economic integration in the region. Its share of ECOWAS GDP is 70% (figure 3.1) and 
53% of the total population (figure 3.2). The country gained independence from Britain 
in 1960 and its land area is 910,770 km
2
 with a population of 45,926,253 and 
173,615,345 in 1960 and 2013 respectively. This represents a growth rate of 278%. 
Nigeria’s long term aspiration, as embedded in its vision 20:20, is to become one of the 
top 20 economies in the world.  
The Nigerian Economy is very largely dominated by the primary sector with a 
contribution to GDP of 69.8% and 68.7% for 2006 and 2011 respectively. This has 
fallen to only 34% in 2013. The secondary/manufacturing sector is relatively small with 
only 2.6% and 2.2% of GDP in 2006 and 2011 respectively with an increase to 9.0% in 
2013. 
Table 3.12  Country economic indicators – Nigeria 
 
The tertiary sector represents 27.7% and 29% of GDP in 2006 and 2011 respectively 
with a sharp increase of 56.9% in 2013 thus explaining the fall in primary sector. The 
country’s strong mining sector is reflecting its abundant natural resource endowment. It 
is gifted with many and large amount of natural resources and according to the CSP 
(2013-17) about 34 different minerals across the country including gold, iron ore, coal, 
and limestone; 37.2 billion barrels of proven oil reserves and 187 trillion cubic feet of 
proven natural gas with the possibility of the existence of fertilizer and liquefied gas 
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  
Ex 
DS INF  EXR  
1975 -5.2 426 -7.8 18.3 22.8 -4.5       34.0 1 
1985 9.7 331 7.0 16.1 12.4 3.7 9.2   65.6 7.4 1 
2001 3.1 379 0.6 43.0 32.3 10.7 5.2   64.7 18.9 111 
2002 1.5 455 -0.9 31.9 32.6 -0.7 1.8   51.6 12.9 121 
2003 10.3 508 7.6 42.7 40.4 2.3 5.0   51.2 14.0 129 
2004 10.6 644 7.9 44.0 31.1 12.9 19.2 1.5 43.0 15.0 133 
2005 5.4 803 2.8 46.5 31.0 15.5 32.5 2.5 19.7 17.9 131 
2006 6.2 1015 3.6 42.9 27.7 15.1 25.1 -0.8 5.3 8.2 129 
2007 6.4 1129 3.8 41.0 25.9 15.1 16.7 -2.1 5.1 5.4 126 
2008 6.0 1375 3.4 42.8 31.2 11.6 14.1 -1.7 5.5 11.6 119 
2009 7.0 1091 4.3 35.0 29.7 5.3 8.2   4.6 11.5 149 
2010 8.0 1443 5.3 35.2 29.9 5.3 5.8   3.4 13.7 150 
2011 7.4 1502 4.7 39.6 35.6 4.0 3.6     10.8 155 
Mean 6.53 940 3.9 40.4 31.6 8.8 12.5 -0.1 25.4 12.7 132 
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production. The oil sector is a major growth driver in Nigeria especially when global oil 
prices are high and at the same time it is a source of serious external shock when prices 
are slowing. The small manufacturing sector is mainly cement production and oil 
refining activities. This sector is underutilised and suffered a decline from 54% during 
the 1980s to between 30% and 40% in present time. Resource underutilisation in 
Nigeria is not only a problem in the industrial sector but also in the agricultural sector. 
For instance, although agriculture represents a large proportion of the country’s GDP, 
productivity is however low. According to the CSP (2013-17) Nigeria’s growth rate in 
crop yields increased marginally form 1% in 1961 to only 1.2% in 1961-2008 as 
compared to 0.9% to 2.3% for Indonesia in the same period. The low productivity in 
this sector is due to lack of modernisation and therefore its enhancement and linkage to 
agro based industries will generate more economic growth, employment and reduce 
poverty and ensure the country’s food security. Despite the underperformance of 
Nigeria in the manufacturing sector it still produces a large portion of goods and 
services for the West African region and remains one of the most preferred investment 
destinations in Africa. In terms of GDP Nigeria achieved the highest growth of 10.6% 
in 2004 and since then up to 2011 the growth has been flat in single digit range. The per 
capita GDP growth follows similar pattern. The country has a strong export base as 
reflected in its persistent trade surplus (net export as a percentage of GDP in table 3.12). 
The trade balance is however vulnerable to international oil prices which is influenced 
by the pace of economic growth in its major oil importers such as US (40%) and China 
and also the sovereign debt crisis in the Euro-zone. The current account balance is also 
surplus and even stronger than the trade balance suggesting a good performance in the 
capital account balance. However since 2009 these surplus balances are on a continuous 
decline. The figures available for the fiscal balance show mixed results.    
Nigeria’s economic activities and its economic development are faced with several 
constraints including: (i) poor road condition due to low quality of construction and 
maintenance. It is estimated that 42% of federal roads, 70% of state roads and 90% of 
local government roads are in poor or failed condition (CSP 2013-17), (ii) Inadequate 
market support services, inadequate water management and irrigation infrastructure, 
(iii) Inadequate power supply to meet national demand. For instance out of the current 
demand of 10,000-12,000 megawatts the country only generates 4,000 megawatts 
resulting to heavy reliance on generators by consumers (about 90%), (iv) 
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mismanagement of oil resources (v) dilapidated physical infrastructure due to 
underinvestment, (vi) overdependence in oil and gas industry, (vii) Political instability 
due to persistent military coup and most recently insurgencies from fragmented groups. 
This point is stressed in the CSP (2013-17:1) which comment that ‘…the mobilisation 
of the populace for party politics along ethnic and religious lines poses a major 
challenge to electoral politics in Nigeria.’  
Despite Nigeria’s high economic growth, one of the highest in SSA, unemployment rate 
has increased from 21% in 2010 to 24% in 2011. Regional disparity in unemployment is 
a problem in the country: it ranges from 33% in north-east region to about 8% in Lagos 
State. One-third of the workforce is in the 15-35 year old group but this group 
accounted for almost two-thirds of the unemployed (CSP 2013-17). This is a potential 
source for crime and violence for survival and possible engagement in insurgence 
activities. The possible explanation for the Nigerian unemployment problem despite its 
economic development is that the major growth drivers of the economy, the oil sector 
and consumer demand (in the non-oil sector), are not sufficiently high job creators. The 
oil sector is capital intensive and its potential to create jobs is very limited. 
Consequently Nigeria has suffered from brain drain losing its endowed quality human 
capital now in different professional jobs in different parts of the world. Nigeria’s 
inflation performance for almost all the years in table 3.12, except 2006 and 2007, are in 
double digits and far away from meeting the ECOWAS single currency convergence 
criterion of 5%. 
3.14 Senegal 
Senegal is the second largest economy in WAEMU after Cote d’Ivoire. It is the fourth 
largest economy in ECOWAS with a share of 3.46% of GDP. The country’s population 
is 3,047,804 and 14,133,280 in 1960 and 2013 respectively and represents growth rate 
of 364%. Senegal gained independence from France in 1960 and has a land area of 
910,770 km
2
. The economy is tertiary sector dominance with a share of 69.3% and 
69.7% of GDP for 2006 and 2014 respectively. The primary sector is relatively small 
with 16.2% (2006) and 17.8% (2014) of GDP. This sector is mainly agriculture with 
only a very small component of mining. The country has a relatively large 
manufacturing/secondary sector with a GDP share of about 14.4% in 2006 but fell to 
12.5% in 2014. Agriculture is mainly groundnut, fishing and other food items. The 
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sector is affected by climatic conditions (drought, floods and energy). Meat and fish 
processing contribute significantly to the manufacturing sector. Senegal GDP growth 
rate exhibits a downward volatile trend as seen in table 3.13. Since the highest growth 
rate of 6.7% in 2003 the economy has been declining. The growth rate in per capita 
GDP follows the GDP growth rate but much more volatile with negative values in 2002, 
2006 and 2011. The trade balance and the current account balance are persistently in 
deficit. The external debt stock has declined from 75.2% in 2001 to 28.6% in 2010. 
Inflation rate has been below the 5% ECOWAS target with the exception of 2007 and 
2008. 
Inflation is affected by world market prices especially those of foodstuff and petroleum 
products (CSP 2010-15). According to CSP (2010-15), Senegal’s economic 
development is constrained by a number of factors: unfavourable business environment, 
inadequate control of corruption, malfunction of the justice system, low capital 
endowment and low productivity, long delays in fulfilling tax formalities and high 
factor costs.  
Table 3.13  Country economic indicators – Senegal 
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  Ex DS INF  EXR  
1975 7.5 467 4.5 31.4 35.0 -3.6 -3.8     31.7 214 
1985 3.3 475 0.3 27.8 39.2 -11.4 -12.1   86.4 13.0 449 
2001 4.6 500 1.9 28.7 37.8 -9.0 -5.0 -2.1 75.2 3.1 733 
2002 0.7 532 -2.0 28.5 39.0 -10.4 -5.9   76.7 2.2 697 
2003 6.7 666 3.8 26.6 38.7 -12.1 -6.4   63.7 0.0 581 
2004 5.9 759 3.1 26.4 39.4 -12.9 -6.4   48.6 0.5 528 
2005 5.6 800 2.8 26.9 42.5 -15.6 -7.8   44.0 1.7 527 
2006 2.5 839 -0.2 25.6 43.0 -17.5 -9.2   20.3 2.1 523 
2007 4.9 986 2.1 25.4 47.7 -22.3 -11.6   22.6 5.9 479 
2008 3.7 1136 1.0 26.1 52.4 -26.3 -14.1   21.1 5.8 448 
2009 2.1 1055 -0.6 24.4 43.0 -18.6 -6.7   27.4 -1.1 472 
2010 4.1 1034 1.4 24.8 43.0 -18.2 -4.7   28.6 1.3 495 
2011 2.6 1119 -0.1 24.5 44.2 -19.7       3.4 472 
Mean 3.94 857 1.2 26.2 42.8 -16.6 -7.8 -2.1 42.8 2.3 541 
3.15 Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone gained independence from Britain in 1961. The country has a land area of 
71,620 km
2
 and a population of 2,187,240 and 6,092,075 in 1960 and 2013 respectively 
representing a growth rate of 179%. For both GDP and population size, Sierra Leone is 
the eleventh largest economy of ECOWAS. It has a large primary sector component of 
GDP 58.3% (2006) and 70.7% (2014). This sector is dominated by Agriculture 54.2% 
and 50.5% for 2006 and 2014 respectively. Agriculture employs 70% of the population. 
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Despite the large size of the agricultural sector its contribution to exports is minimal 
since it is mainly subsistence with only small scale commercial projects. The 
opportunities in the Agricultural sectors are not fully utilised due to several constraints: 
low investment, lack of institutional arrangements for agricultural credit, inadequate 
budgetary support, inadequate support for research, poor transportation network and 
facility, inadequate agro-processing facilities and high post-harvest losses (JAS 2009:5).  
Table 3.14  Country economic indicators – Sierra Leone 
 
The mining sector is expected to increase in future due to new iron ore exploration 
following the discovery of 10.5 billion tons of high-grade iron ore deposits. The mining 
sector, like other sectors, is constrained by energy generation and road infrastructure. 
The secondary/manufacturing sector is very small and it is constrained by competition 
from low-cost imports. The manufacturing sector is mainly imports-substituting 
industries and employs only about 2% of the workforce (JAS 2009). The tertiary sector 
is the second largest with a contribution to GDP of 39.2% (2006) and 27.7% (2014). 
Most of the activities in the tertiary sector are informal. The GDP growth of Sierra 
Leone is on the decline with 27.5% in 2002, the period just after the war, to 4.9% in 
2010 and 6% in 2011 (table 3.14). Per capita GDP is relatively very low with the 
highest of US$374 in 2011 and the lowest US$187 in 2001. Both trade and current 
account balances are persistently in deficit and the latter is even worst in 2011. Fiscal 
balance is also in deficit but the external debt position has improved. Inflation is always 
in double digits except 2009 where it was 9.3%. The country’s inflation performance is 
way above the 5% ECOWAS convergent rule. According to the AEO (2012) the 
country’s inflation is driven by international oil and agricultural prices on one hand and 
the depreciating Leone on the other. The country’s national currency is very weak and 
Year GDPR PGDP PGDPR EXP  IMP E-I CAB  CSD Ex DS INF EXR 
1975 1.7 239 -0.3 25.1 34.5 -9.4 1
1985 -5.3 242 -7.7 14.8 16.6 -1.8 0.3 82.6 5
2001 18.2 187 13.8 16.0 34.3 -18.2 -12.1 -9.2 149.5 1986
2002 27.5 208 21.8 17.6 35.9 -18.3 -7.8 -8.3 144.8 -1.3 2099
2003 9.3 210 4.1 23.2 40.8 -17.6 -8.4 -5.6 153.4 11.3 2348
2004 7.5 221 2.7 22.5 33.5 -10.9 -9.0 -2.4 148.5 14.4 2701
2005 7.2 240 3.0 23.6 36.5 -12.9 -8.5 -1.7 141.3 13.1 2890
2006 7.3 267 3.8 24.9 32.5 -7.6 -6.7 -1.8 103.6 7.3 2962
2007 6.4 304 3.5 20.8 27.8 -7.0 -9.6 -1.0 31.5 11.6 2985
2008 5.5 348 3.0 16.3 29.4 -13.0 -11.5 -4.4 31.1 14.8 2982
2009 3.2 323 0.9 16.0 29.0 -13.1 -17.6 -3.2 37.8 9.3 3386
2010 4.9 325 2.7 17.1 29.5 -12.4 -25.8 -6.9 40.7 16.6 3978
2011 6.0 374 3.7 16.3 26.6 -10.3 -50.3 -6.1 16.2 4349
Mean 9.37 273 5.7 19.5 32.3 -12.9 -15.2 -4.6 98.2 11.3
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has depreciated over the years. Youth unemployment of 60% is amongst the highest in 
West Africa.   
3.16  Togo 
Togo gained independence from France in 1960. It has a land area of 54,390 km
2
 and a 
population of 1,577,708 and 6,816,982 in 1960 and 2013 respectively. This represents a 
growth rate of 332%. It is the tenth largest economy in ECOWAS with 0.88% of its 
GDP and 2.1% of its population. 
The primary sector is marginally larger than the tertiary sector. In 2006 the primary 
sector contributed 43.4% of GDP and 50.4% 2014. Cash crops including cotton and 
cocoa, form major components of exports. The secondary sector accounts for 10.2% 
(2006) and 6.7% (2014) of GDP. The tertiary sector- which is mainly wholesale and 
retail and general government services- contributed 46.5% (2006) and 42.8% (2014) of 
GDP. 
Table 3.15  Country economic indicators – Togo 
Year GDPR  PGDP PGDPR EXP   IMP  E-I CAB   CSD  Ex DS INF  EXR  
1975 2.4 259 0.3 43.4 53.7 -10.3 -12.2     18.0 214 
1985 5.6 241 2.0 48.4 57.1 -8.7 -3.6   122.7 -1.8 449 
2001 -1.6 270 -4.3 33.8 48.5 -14.7 -12.7   105.6 3.9 733 
2002 -0.9 292 -3.4 36.5 49.1 -12.6 -9.5   107.4 3.1 697 
2003 5.0 324 2.5 43.4 59.1 -15.7 -9.7   102.3 -1.0 581 
2004 2.1 366 -0.2 38.6 57.9 -19.3 -10.7 -0.3 94.2 0.4 528 
2005 1.2 391 -1.1 40.0 58.7 -18.6 -9.6 -5.7 79.1 6.8 527 
2006 4.1 398 1.8 38.2 56.1 -17.9 -8.0 -3.5 80.7 2.2 523 
2007 2.3 446 0.1 37.9 54.5 -16.6 -8.6 -0.8 77.5 1.0 479 
2008 2.4 548 0.2 35.5 51.9 -16.4 -7.0 0.3 51.4 8.7 448 
2009 3.4 536 1.2 36.7 52.3 -15.6 -5.6 -0.6 51.6 2.0 472 
2010 4.0 530 1.9 39.9 57.0 -17.0 -6.3 0.6 54.1 1.8 495 
Mean 2.18 410 -0.1 38.1 54.5 -16.4 -8.8 -1.4 80.4 2.9 548 
The country’s GDP growth is relatively volatile and GDP per capita is low with similar 
growth pattern to the GDP. Trade and current account balances are persistently in 
deficit. Inflation is within the ECOWAS 5% target except 2005 and 2008. According to 
the CSP (2011-15) the inflationary pressure in 2008 was caused by the food crisis and 
fuel price increases. According to AEO (2012) unemployment affected 21.4% of young 
people in towns and 5.4% in country side while under-employment was highest in rural 
areas with 21.7% compared to 16.15 in towns. Two challenges remained the country’s 
employment problem: population pressure and the gap between labour market needs 
and job seekers’ qualifications.  
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Chapter 4 The OCA theory and the literature on currency union 
4.1 Introduction 
The issue of the choice of currency regime, and in particular whether to adopt a 
common currency in the context of regional integration, has received much attention 
over the past four decades. The successful launch of the euro in 1999 even added 
impetus to other nations and regions to follow it example. Many academic papers have 
been written on monetary and economic integration revolving on the theoretical 
framework of the optimum currency areas (OCA) pioneered by Mundell (1961), 
McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969). Another emphasis on the literature is the costs and 
benefits of currency union. A number of studies have been conducted on the effects of 
currency union and exchange rate volatility on bilateral trade. What is certain about 
these studies is that their findings are inconclusive. 
This chapter illustrates, in section 4.3, the adjustment mechanisms when currency union 
members are faced with shocks and in section 4.4 we outlined and discussed the 
literature on the OCA which forms the basis for the analysis in subsequent chapters. We 
extend the OCA discussion by looking at the debate on currency union and political 
union in section 4.5, the endogeneity argument of OCA in section 4.6 and the criticisms 
of OCA in section 4.7. The chapter also discusses the benefits and costs of currency 
union in sections 4.8 and 4.9 respectively. Finally, we reviewed the empirical literature 
on currency union and exchange rate volatility on trade in sections 4.10 and 4.11 
respectively.  
4.2 Background 
The OCA presents a systematic guide on deciding whether it makes sense for a group of 
countries to abandon their national currencies replacing it with a common currency 
shared with other countries in a monetary union. The theory develops a combination of 
economic and political criteria which recognise that the real economic cost of giving up 
the exchange rate instrument arises in the presence of asymmetric shocks (Baldwin and 
Wyplosz, 2015). Optimum currency areas have been defined in many ways but all 
shared similar and closely related ideas.  
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According to Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969) an optimum currency 
area (OCA) is defined as  
“an area in which factor mobility is sufficiently great, or economic shocks are 
sufficiently common, that there is little need for relative price adjustment between 
different regions within the area.” (Ching and Devereux, 2003:674). 
Another definition by Frankel is  
“countries that are largely integrated with each other, with respect to trade and 
other economic relationships, are mostly likely to constitute an optimum currency 
area. An optimum currency area is a region for which it is optimal to have its own 
currency and its own monetary policy” (Frankel, 1999:14)  
To explain the OCA theory, Mundell used a two country model. To build the OCA 
framework, following Mundell, we assumed two countries called F and A with 
currencies CFA and ECO respectively. We illustrate how the adjustment mechanism 
takes place in (1) in the context of the theory of OCA when the two countries entered 
into a monetary union and (2) in the context of flexible exchange rate when the two 
countries retain their national currencies. We start with initial equilibrium for the two 
countries F and A of EF1 and EA1 respectively in figure 4.1. If for some reasons demand 
shifts from F to A, the demand curve shifts downward from DF1 to DF2 whereas in A the 
demand curve shifts upward from DA1 to DA2. F’s output declines with the possible 
effect of increase in unemployment whereas output in A increases with the possible 
effect of a decline in unemployment.  The two countries are now out of equilibrium and 
faced adjustment problems. F is faced with decline in output and higher unemployment 
and A is faced with a boom in demand with likely effect of upward pressure on its price 
level. The mechanisms that bring these countries back to equilibrium are what we 
examined in the next section.  
4.3 Adjustment mechanisms  
4.3.1 Adjustment mechanism without monetary union 
In the case of each country having monetary autonomy they can use interest and 
exchange rates to stabilise their economies. If the two currencies were freely floating, in 
the case analysed here, F can reduce interest rate to stimulate demand where A can do 
the opposite. The CFA will depreciate and ECO appreciates leading to higher demand 
and lower demand for F and A products respectively. These adjustments alleviate the 
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recession and unemployment in F and reduce the boom in A with each country in new 
equilibrium as shown in figure 4.1. 
In the case of F and A pegging their currencies to another currency the former will 
directly devalue the CFA and the latter revalue the ECO. The result achieved is the 
same as the one already discussed (figure 4.1). An implicit assumption not mentioned 
here is that the two countries involved trades extensively. Figures 4.1-4.3 are adapted 
from Baldwin and Wyplosz (2015) 
Figure 4.1   Asymmetric shocks with and without MU 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
4.3.2 Adjustment mechanism with Monetary Union 
In a monetary union the countries lose their monetary policy independence. A common 
central bank is now in charge of monetary policy. If prices are sticky the two countries 
are permanently left in unfavourable disequilibrium, excess supply in F and excess 
demand in A. In this case there is no short run adjustment solution because both interest 
and exchange rates are frozen and can only be changed by the common central bank. 
The long run solution is that since suppliers in F will not continue holding unsold stock 
for ever, the deeper recession will provide the incentive to gradually cut prices and 
eventually bring the economy to its new equilibrium at point EF2. On the other hand A 
consumers will in the long run gradually accept higher prices to meet their demands. 
The rise in price in A will lower the quantity demanded and induce suppliers to increase 
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the quantity supply. This eventually brings the A economy to its new equilibrium at 
point EA2.  
With sticky prices and wages and the absence of monetary autonomy the adjustment 
process in the case of asymmetric shocks is painful and protracted (depending on the 
nature and size of shock) as residents of F will have to endure unemployment rate for a 
long time whereas residents of A will also have to endure inflationary pressure to an 
extended period of time. This is what the opponents of monetary union (Mundell and 
others) argued to be the main cost of countries abandoning their monetary autonomy in 
place of fixed exchange rate in the form of single currency.  
4.3.3 Asymmetric shocks and the common central bank dilemma 
To further demonstrate the cost involved in joining a monetary union we continue the 
two country model F and A with the assumption of sticky prices in the short run. First 
let us consider a case of symmetric shocks faced by both countries where they are hit by 
an adverse demand for their goods. In the case of these two countries being in a 
monetary union the central bank has a much simpler solution to the problem. A 
depreciation of the common currency in relation to the rest of the world will be an ideal 
policy that will fit the problems of both countries. Baldwin and Wyplosz (2015) even 
argued that if these countries are similar enough then there is no need to change their 
bilateral exchange rate with the rest of the world. The situation becomes complicated for 
the central bank when the two countries are faced with asymmetric shocks. This is 
shown in figure 4.2 where the vertical axis represents the real exchange rate, denoted as 
λ. With both countries having an initial equilibrium of M with a 0 output gap in figure 
4.2 assume F is hit by an adverse demand shock leading to a shift in aggregate demand 
from ADF1 to ADF2. This time F needs a depreciation of its real exchange rate in relation 
to both A with the rest of the world but A needs no change since it is still at the original 
equilibrium, point M. In the absence of a monetary union F will depreciates its nominal 
exchange rate, either through a devaluation or decrease in interest rate, to achieve a real 
exchange rate of λ1 and new equilibrium at point N. In a monetary union the exchange 
rate and interest rate are no longer available to F to remedy its country’s idiosyncratic 
problem and the action to solve this problem is in the hands of the common central bank 
that is there to solve the problems of all member states.  
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Figure 4.2   Asymmetric shocks and the common central bank dilemma 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In response to the above problem the common central bank can intervene with one of 
three options: The first option is to adjust its monetary policy (direct devaluation of the 
common currency or reduce interest rate) to achieve a real exchange rate of λ1. Since F 
and A are in a monetary union the central bank decision also lead to A’s real exchange 
rate to be at λ1. This policy is good for F since it is now in a new equilibrium at point N 
but it is bad for A which now faces excess demand of N1N2 with the potential 
consequence of inflation. The second option is for the central bank not to do anything 
and leave the exchange rate and the interest rate unchanged with the real exchange rate 
remaining at λ0. This action is perfectly good for A who is not affected by the shock and 
still remained at the original equilibrium at point M. It is however bad for F who at λ0 is 
now at a disequilibrium position with excess supply of M1M. The third option is for the 
central bank to adopt an average approach to monetary policy in which case it 
depreciates the nominal exchange rate to achieve an average real exchange rate of λ2, 
which is between λ0 and λ1. According to Baldwin and Wyplosz (2015) this third option 
is also a possibility to happen even if no action is taken by the central bank (option 2). 
According to them if the monetary union has a freely float currency an adverse shock in 
one part of the currency zone will lead to a depreciation of the union currency. The 
depreciation cannot go as far as λ1 but will be between λ0 and λ1 and the position of the 
intermediate exchange rate depends on the relative size of the two countries and how 
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sensitive is their trade to changes in real exchange rate. An average exchange rate 
resulting from the third option above or an intermediate exchange rate resulting from 
the second option will yield very similar results. The effect is that at λ2 (average or 
intermediate) F is left with excess supply Q1Q2 and A faces excess demand of Q1Q2. 
Thus the common central bank response has not been able to solve the problem of F. In 
fact what it has done is to partially solve the recession in F by moving its aggregate 
demand from point M1 to Q1 and moves the A economy from its original equilibrium, 
point M, to a boom disequilibrium at points Q1 (Aggregate supply) and Q2 (aggregate 
demand). In the short run both countries are in disequilibrium with unemployment in F 
and inflationary pressure in A. However disequilibrium will not exists forever and in the 
long run the unemployment in F due to the recession will exert a downward pressure on 
its price level and the overheating A economy will experience an opposite pressure on 
price level. The outcome is that F price level will decline to take the economy to its new 
equilibrium at point N and A price level will increase to take the economy to its original 
equilibrium at point M. This is however a painful and protracted process for both 
countries. 
To summarise the points discussed in this section, when countries in a monetary union 
are faced with asymmetric shocks the common central bank is faced with monetary 
policy dilemma. None of the three possible actions produces an ideal solution for all 
union members. In the two extreme cases its action favours one of its members against 
the interest of the other and this may results to discontent and creates the possibility of 
political tension in the union. An average policy action is still not optimum for any of its 
members. In the best case it’s partially decreased the excess supply in F and at worst it 
creates excess demand in A. The resulting outcome of a recession and disinflation in F 
and boom and inflation in A is what constitutes the costs of operating a monetary union, 
as argued by opponents, when asymmetric shock hits. Is there a solution to this 
problem? The theory of the optimum currency areas seeks to address this problem we 
discuss this later in the chapter. 
4.3.4 Symmetric shocks with asymmetric effects 
We mentioned in the discussion above that in a monetary union the common central 
bank’s dilemma is only when union members are hit with asymmetric shocks. In the 
case of symmetric shocks with similar countries there is no need to depreciate the 
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currency in relation to the world exchange rate and even if it is needed such action will 
remedy the economic problems of the member states. This is an ideal case where there 
is perfect symmetry and perfect economic convergence and all member states react 
exactly the same way to the same shock. It is however argued that no two countries can 
react exactly the same way to the same shock due to differences in socio-economic 
structures such as labour market regulations, and traditions, the relative importance of 
the industrial sectors, the role of the financial and banking sectors, the country’s 
external indebtedness, the ability to strike agreements between firms, trade unions and 
government and so on (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2015:360). For instance an increase in 
world oil price (a symmetric shock) will positively affects oil exporting countries and 
negatively affects oil importing countries even if they are in the same monetary union 
(asymmetric effects). This has important implication for countries that are oil importers 
with different economic and financial structures and borrowing capabilities. 
The conclusion here is that when countries that are significantly different form a 
monetary union the dilemma of the common central bank goes beyond asymmetric 
shocks because symmetric shocks with asymmetric effects equally posed the same 
problems as shown in figures 4.1 and 4.2 above. 
According to the theory of OCA, countries proposing to form a single currency can 
minimise the costs of the loss of monetary autonomy provided they satisfy a number of 
criteria which we discuss in the next section.  
4.4 Theory of optimum currency areas criteria 
4.4.1 Factor mobility 
Mundell (1961) pioneered the OCA theory which was subsequently developed by 
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). According to Mundell there are two mechanisms 
that will achieve automatic equilibrium position when countries are faced with 
asymmetric shocks. The adjustment could be achieved through (1) Wage flexibility and 
(2) mobility of labour. 
4.4.2 Wage flexibility 
 If wages are flexible unemployed workers in F will accept lower wage claim and in A 
excess demand for labour will push the wage rate upward. The adjustment mechanism 
is shown in figure 4.3. If F workers accept the reduction in their wage rate this will 
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increase aggregate supply and hence the supply curve shifts from SF1 to SF2 and the 
increase in wage rate in A will reduce aggregate supply and hence the supply curve 
shifts from SA1 to SA2. The increase in aggregate supply in F will lead to a decrease in 
price, from PF1 to PF2, which makes F products more competitive relative to A which 
will stimulate demand in F. In A the decline in aggregate supply will increase the price 
from PA1 to PA2 making the A products less competitive relative to F product with the 
corresponding effect of reducing demand in A. The adjustment mechanism overall led 
the two countries in new equilibrium positions as shown in figure 4.3. 
Figure 4.3   Automatic adjustment in flexible factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.4.3 Labour mobility   
Labour mobility is the second mechanism that will bring the countries back to 
equilibrium automatically without the need for a decline in wages in F and an increase 
in A. If labour is freely mobile between the two countries the F unemployed workers 
move to A where the demand for labour is in excess. With this movement both the 
unemployment in F and the inflationary wage pressures in A disappear. Apart from the 
labour market disequilibrium (unemployment) in F and the inflation pressure in A, there 
is also the problem of external trade balance in both countries. This problem is also 
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exports where as their purchases of A products will be transformed from A exports into 
extra home demand. The effect of these changes is an increase in F exports and a 
corresponding decrease in A’s exports with the ultimate effect of solving the deficit and 
surplus trade balances in F and A respectively.  
The adjustment mechanism breaks down if despite the unemployment situation in F the 
wages in that country failed to decline and the workers do not move to A. In such a case 
F is stuck in the disequilibrium situation as illustrated in figure 4.1. In A there will still 
be an upward pressure on the wage rate due to the excess demand for labour leading to 
an upward shift in the supply curve as illustrated in figure 4.3. The adjustment to the 
disequilibrium must now come exclusively through increase prices in A making F 
goods more competitive again, leading to an increase in the F aggregate demand and 
hence an upward shift in its demand curve as shown in figure 4.3. Therefore if wages do 
not decline in F and labour do not move from F to A the adjustment to the 
disequilibrium will take the form of inflation in A (De Grauwe, 2014). 
The above discussion means that for the adjustment mechanism to work the conditions 
of wage flexibility and/or labour mobility must be sufficiently satisfied as the two are at 
the root of the optimum currency area. 
4.4.4 Capital mobility/Risk sharing 
Capital mobility is part of what the literature describes as insurance against asymmetric 
shocks in monetary union. This scheme operates more successfully in a situation where 
the financial markets (bond and equity) and the banking sector of member states are 
completely integrated. On the assumption of market integration F residents hold 
securities of firms in A and vice versa. In the event of the negative demand shock in F 
(figure 4.1) firms make losses which will depress the value of securities and hence the 
income of the investors in that country (both F and A). The opposite happens in A. In 
this case since F residents held shares in A they will be able to share part of the profit of 
the market boom in A there by compensating themselves for the loss they sustained in F 
as a result of the negative demand shock. Conversely the A residents also held stocks in 
the depressed F market and therefore will share part of the loss caused by the negative 
demand shock in that country. Thus the reciprocal investments by residents of member 
states serve as insurance when countries are faced with asymmetric shocks. It is implicit 
in this analysis that a well organised and coordinated payment system is important to 
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facilitate a smooth and reliable transfer of income from one member state to another. 
This calls for the integration of the banking sector of member states as stated in the 
assumption above. 
4.4.5 Openness (McKinnon, 1963) 
McKinnon (1963) made his contribution to the optimum currency areas theory as an 
addition to Mundell’s factor mobility criterion. He further developed the optimality idea 
by discussing the influence of openness of the economy. He defined openness as ‘the 
ratio of tradable and non-tradable goods’ and described optimum as ‘a single currency 
area within which monetary-fiscal policy and flexible external exchange rates can be 
used to give the best resolution of three (sometimes conflicting) objectives: (1) the 
maintenance of full employment; (2) the maintenance of balanced international 
payments; (3) the maintenance of a stable internal average price level. The implicit 
assumption in the third objective is that any capitalist economy requires a stable valued 
liquid currency to insure efficient resource allocation. His definition of openness 
requires the assumption that all goods can be classified into two (1) tradable i.e. those 
that can enter into foreign trade- both imports and exports and (2) non-tradable i.e. those 
that do not enter into foreign trade due to infeasibility of transportation. It is also a 
requirement of his definition that exportables must be produced domestically and partly 
exported and the importables also be produced domestically and partly imported. This 
condition seems to bring McKinnon’s openness criterion to Kenen’s diversification. 
Adam Smith’s theory of comparative advantage (specialisation) doesn’t seems to apply 
in any of these two criteria.    
Openness = 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠
𝑁𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠
=
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 (𝑋1)+𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 (𝑋2)
𝑋3
 
According to McKinnon in a balanced trade economy, where imports equal to exports, 
the value of exportables produced need not necessarily be the same as the value of 
importables consumed. What need to be equal in such an economy is total tradable 
goods produced and total tradable goods consumed which he said unambiguously 
equates his tradables to non tradables ratio to production or consumption. The openness 
argument is presented in two cases. Case 1 is open economy where there is a large 
proportion of tradable goods that are domestically consumed (i.e. (X1 + X2) > X3) and 
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case 2 is where the production of non-tradable goods is very large relative to 
importables and exportables (i.e. X3 > (X1 + X2).   
Case 1 argument (More open economy) 
McKinnon’s argument in this case demonstrates how the exchange rate policy works in 
trying to attain external and internal balance in the economy when there are asymmetric 
shocks but keeping the price of non tradables, X3, constant in domestic currency terms. 
When the domestic currency depreciates against trading partners the money prices of 
X1 and X2 will increase relative to X3.  The intended outcome is to increase the 
production of X1 and X2 and decline their consumption. This implies exports will 
increase and imports decline. The argument here is that this effect will be small in an 
economy that is already perfectly or highly opened and as a result the impact of the 
depreciation on the balance of payments is negligible making foreign exchange a less 
useful tool to stabilise the internal balance (price stability) and external balance (balance 
of payments). He argued that contractionary monetary-fiscal policy, for instance 
increase in domestic taxes, will be more effective in stabilising the economy. Any 
change in exchange rate will necessarily be completely off set (if economy is 
completely open) by internal price-level repercussions with no corresponding 
improvement in the trade balance. A depreciation policy in fact is more damaging to the 
internal price stability. The implication of this analysis is that in an economy that is 
already highly open the exchange rate is an ineffective policy for price stability and 
trade balance and therefore losing such an instrument, through a fixed exchange rate or 
currency union, bears no cost to the economy.  
Case 2 argument (Less open economy) 
In the case where the production of non tradables is larger than the tradables, McKinnon 
argued that the best policy is to peg the domestic currency to the body of non-tradable 
goods so as to fix the domestic currency price of X3 and alter the exchange rate (i.e. 
devalue) in order to change the price of the tradables which should subsequently 
improve the trade balance. The decline in prices of X1 and X2 is intended to stimulate 
production of these tradables as compared to the non tradables. With more exports and 
less imports the trade balance should improve but the problem with this policy is that 
due to the small size of the tradables relative to the non tradables the effect on the 
general domestic price index is smaller than in case 1. Any contractionary monetary-
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fiscal policy attempt to reduce domestic demand in order to balance the economy is 
likely to result in high unemployment especially in the non tradable sector. In the worst 
case situation if resources are immobile (both labour and capital) the monetary-fiscal 
policy will not help to improve the trade balance immediately. To actually stimulate 
production in the tradables there is a need to reduce the domestic money prices of the 
non tradables. To achieve this it is necessary to reduce wage costs i.e. domestic money 
prices of X1 and X2, since labour constitutes a major component of X3 but the 
downward rigidity of wages, in a Keynesian sense, poses a difficulty here. The price of 
X1 and X2 is fixed by the external exchange rate system.  
4.4.6 Product diversification (Kenen, 1969) 
Kenen argues that if a country engages in a number of activities, it is also likely to 
export a wide range of products. He agreed that each of the products may be subject to 
disturbances due to changes in external demand or in technology but he argues that if 
the disturbances are independent an effect on one of the products will not necessarily 
lead to a large macroeconomic swings that will affect the entire export array due to the 
law of large numbers. Product diversification therefore provides stability on aggregate 
exports more than non-diversified economies. However for product diversification to 
create the aggregate exports stability, Kenen added that there must be sufficient 
occupational mobility to reabsorb the labour and capital that is made idle in the negative 
disturbances. This mobility is hampered if the products in different industries are not 
very similar and therefore needs different skills such that workers in one industry have 
idiosyncratic skills but the positive side is that due to the independent of the products 
(industries) disturbances in one sector are effectively average out thus leading to a 
stable export overall. On the other hand if the products produce in different industries 
are very similar (say substitutes to each other) with similar production skills 
requirements the degree of factor mobility will be high as skills of workers in the 
disturbed industry are transferrable to those industries with high labour demand. But the 
negative side of this product dependence is that the disturbances do not average out to 
create the stability of exports advocated in the product diversification argument thus the 
law of large numbers is defeated in this case. The dilemma of product diversification, 
occupational labour mobility and export stability is summarised in table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1   Products diversification and export stability 
 Products are 
Occupational 
labour mobility 
Aggregate 
export is 
Exogenous 
shocks 
Diversification Different Low Stable Average out 
Diversification Similar High Unstable 
Not average 
out 
 Source: author’s summary from Kenen (1969) 
Kenen ended with two implied requirements for fixed exchange rates regime. (1) For 
fixed exchange rate to work, countries should be well equipped with potent and 
sophisticated internal policies to be able to overcome the vulnerability on monetary 
shocks represented by a change in money wages relative to import prices as discussed in 
the first point of his argument. (2) Fixed exchange rate countries should also be well 
equipped with a wide range of budgetary policies to deal with, what he described as, 
stubborn pockets of unemployment that will arise from export fluctuations combined 
with an imperfect labour mobility.  
The freezing of the exchange rate and the interest rate (in a monetary union) is likely to 
cause policy constraint in economic stabilisation in the event of external shocks. In his 
conclusion of the paper he made important point that may have serious implication for 
less developed countries.  
‘The principal developed countries should perhaps adhere to the Bretton Woods 
regime, rarely resorting to changes in exchange rates. The less developed 
countries, been less diversified and less well equipped with policy instruments, 
should make more frequent changes or perhaps resort to full flexibility’ (Kenen, 
1969:54).   
4.4.7 Degree of similarity of inflation rates 
The ideal underlying this criterion is that if countries have similar rates of inflation then 
purchasing power parity (PPP) theory suggests that there is no need for exchange rate 
changes and hence a monetary union is more feasible. On the other hand if the countries 
have widely divergent propensities to inflate, then floating exchange rates becomes 
necessary to ensure that the relatively high inflation countries maintain their 
international competitiveness (Pilbeam, 2013). As stated in Pilbeam since a monetary 
union requires common inflation rates, countries with differing preferences with respect 
to any unemployment-inflation trade off will lose from monetary union. Differences in 
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inflation rates cause variations of terms of trade and give rise to persistent or even rising 
current account disequilibrium (Fleming, 1971). 
4.4.8 Fiscal transfers 
The economic rationale of this criterion is that if one country in the union is faced with 
adverse shock it is the interest of the other members to help alleviate the impact of the 
shock. The transfer of payments from the non-affected or positively affected country to 
the adversely affected country will mitigate both the recession in the adverse shock 
country and the boom in the positive shock country. As a result it gives time for the 
shock to disappear, if it is only temporal, or to work its effects through prices if it is 
longer lasting. These forms of fiscal transfers operate like common insurance against 
adverse shocks. The fiscal transfer is affected through the social security system (state 
payments) where tax revenue in the boom country is directed to the one in recession.  
The potential moral hazard problem associated with fiscal transfers is that the 
authorities in the affected economy may not take the necessary steps of wage reduction 
to stabilise the economy as long as revenue keeps coming in from the central pot. 
Likewise the unemployed in the affected area may not move to seek employment to the 
unaffected area where labour demand is high. For fiscal transfer system to work it 
requires a central fiscal authority that coordinates tax collection and disbursements and 
also requires political will of the affected area to act appropriately and the unemployed 
to migrate. This calls for the need for political/fiscal union.  
4.4.9 Homogeneous preferences  
It is argued that apart from the economic criteria proposed by the original contributors 
of the OCA theory by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969) member 
states should also possess homogeneous preferences. For instance Harberler (1970), 
Ingram (1969) and Tower and Willett (1970) stress that it is not so much economic 
characteristics, the similarity of policy attitudes of member countries that is relevant in 
making a group of countries a successful currency area. Policy attitude is an important 
criterion for countries to form an optimum currency area. Economic policies also come 
with trade-offs and countries may have difference preferences to those trade-offs at 
different points in time. When there are differences in preferences for instance some 
members prefer low inflation and other prefer low unemployment then it becomes 
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difficult for a common central bank for such countries to design a monetary policy that 
will satisfy all these countries at the same time. Another possible conflict of preference 
is between exporters, who may prefer a weaker exchange rate to boost their 
international trade competitiveness and importers/consumers who may wish to have a 
strong exchange rate to raise their purchasing power. Such differences cannot be 
resolved through a common central monetary policy and whatever policy stance it takes 
will leave either some or all countries unhappy. Baldwin and Wyplosz (2015) suggested 
that these diversity of preferences can only be dealt with through the respective 
influence of political parties, trade unions and lobbies. The implication of this is that 
countries with weaker economies/government and trade unions are more unlikely to 
receive favourable attention from the common central bank authorities as compared to 
the powerful member states. The possible outcome of this is that, at best there will be 
resentment and at worst the currency union may not survive. This criterion has also 
received wide support in the literature. For instance Tower and Willett state: 
Perhaps of primary importance for a successful currency area with a less than 
perfect internal-adjustment mechanism is that there be a reasonable degree of 
compatibility between the member countries' attitudes toward growth of inflation 
and unemployment and their abilities to "trade off" between these objectives. A 
nation with a low tolerance for [unemployment], . . . and price pressures from 
concentrated industries, would make a poor partner for a country with a low 
tolerance of inflation and high productivity growth, making for a very 
[favourable] "Phillips Curve." (Tower and Willett, 1970:411) 
4.4.10 Solidarity Vs nationalism (S v N) 
The final criterion, like the fourth and the fifth, is more of a political consideration than 
economic. In fact it goes deeper than the previous two. Proponents of the SvN criterion 
argued that the difficulty of the likely fulfilment of the previous five criteria in full 
means no currency area is ever optimum. In the strict sense of the above criteria one 
will even ask the question as to whether individual countries with their respective 
currencies even constitute an optimum currency area. For instance is UK, with the 
pound sterling, an OCA or Nigeria, with the Naira, an OCA?  
To make monetary union successful, the SvN therefore requires countries forming a 
monetary union must have a shared sense of common destiny that outweighs the 
national interest in order to accommodate the differences that will arise when a 
particular member state is hit with shocks. The rationale of the SvN criterion stem from 
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the fact that when countries are faced with shocks, even when they are symmetric, they 
can create political disagreements as to the best possible response to the shock. While 
this is also a common feature of individual countries it is more complex in a monetary 
union with heterogeneous preferences and the case is even worse when those countries 
are hit by asymmetric shocks. Baldwin and Wyplosz (2015:367) mentioned that 
In individual countries, the eventual resolution of such debates is usually accepted 
as the cost of living together- the natural consequence of statehood. The outcome 
is ultimately seen as acceptable because citizens of the same country readily 
accept some degree of solidarity with one another.  
The SvN criterion appears to fail the test in the Euro zone during the current crisis 
where authorities in Greece, Ireland, Italy faced violence strikes against austerity 
packages designed to solve the Euro crisis. If solidarity is a threat at the national level, 
taking the Euro as a current example, will it work at multinational level? This leaves us 
with another question whether our sixth pillar, just discussed, made the OCA theory a 
complete framework to delineate countries into appropriate currency zones. This is 
certainly not and perhaps we need to further explore other criteria especially the 
proponents of political union in a monetary union. This is discussed below. A summary 
of the six criteria of the OCA theory already discussed is shown in the logical flow 
diagram in figure 4.4.    
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Figure 4.4   The logic of the OCA theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
(Source: Baldwin and Wyplosz (2015:380) 
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term survival of a monetary union. There are different schools of thought on this 
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long run without a strong political union among the member states. In other words, in 
the language of Eichengreen (1996), monetary unification necessarily entails political 
integration. According to De Grauwe (2006) this school of thought seems to have 
history on its side because no monetary union that is not embedded in a strong political 
union has ultimately survived. The second school of thought argued that there is no link 
between monetary and political union. This stance according to Eichengreen is the 
position of some British politicians and euro sceptics. In between these two extremes, 
there exist other varying opinions though not significantly different from these two 
arguments. The third school is that political union necessarily entails monetary union. 
This view is very much similar to the first one with the difference only being a matter of 
causation. In his paper Eichengreen (1996) added a fourth point. He argued that the 
relationship between monetary union and political union is contingent. The two 
integration processes can evolve in very different ways only under slightly different 
conditions. According to him if the fiscal freedom of participants is constrained, there 
will be pressure for monetary union to be accompanied by political union. On the other 
hand if the participants are free to formulate their own national fiscal policies then 
monetary union will generate little pressure for political integration. The two extreme 
conditions proposed by Eichengreen are summarised in the diagram below.  
 
           
 
There is support in the literature that political/fiscal federalism is vital for the survival 
and success of any monetary union. For instance Arestis and Sawyer (2011) mentioned 
several advantages of fiscal federalism in their paper. First, a federal fiscal policy 
ensures that a region that is particularly hard hit by a recession will receive fiscal 
assistance rather than having to rely on its own borrowing to operate a budget deficit 
sufficient to contain the worst effect of the recession. The second advantage they 
mentioned is that in a fiscally federated monetary union the strength of the union will 
permit necessary borrowing at more conducive interest rates than a country left by itself.  
Another advantage that they argued will come out of this is that the union will borrow 
in its own currency which will avoid the risk of default on the debt due to the fact that 
the common central bank will be able to create sufficient money to pay any debts. In 
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fact an additional argument against fiscal decentralisation is that if borrowing is done 
nationally and at other currencies other than the union currency it exposes member 
states to foreign exchange risk which in itself is a defeat of one of the main objectives of 
single currency formation. Arestis and Sawyer (2013) also argued that a currency union 
that works coincides with a nation that has a central government and a common 
language but none of these exists for the Euro. This view is also supported by Feldstein 
(1997:60-61) in his statement 
...the fundamental long-term effect of adopting a single currency would be the 
creation of a political union, A European federal state with the responsibility for a 
Europe-wide foreign and security policy as well as for what are now domestic 
economic and social policies...There is no sizable country anywhere in the world 
that does not have its own currency. A national currency is both a symbol of 
sovereignty and the key to the pursuit of an independent monetary and budgetary 
policy. 
On the question of the Euro and the financial crisis Jones (2009) discussed the 
heterogeneous difficulties faced by the euro nations and acknowledges that the closer 
one looks at the problem, the worse it becomes, particularly if the economic data are to 
be believed. The most important to the fiscal federalism argument is Jones’ 
acknowledgement of the fact that the problem of macroeconomic policy coordination 
within the euro zone is unlikely to be solved. According to him fiscal politics is politics 
after all, and all politics is local. The implication of this statement is that as long as the 
euro fiscal decisions remained at national levels fiscal politics will remain local. A 
solution to this problem is political union where the conflicts within national fiscal 
politics will be resolved. 
Based on the above analysis one would argued that the logic of the OCA theory 
illustrated in figure 4.4 above is incomplete and should be extended to include political 
union for a complete theoretical framework that will make currency union more 
optimal. This extension is illustrated in diagram below. 
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The exclusion of political union in the logic of OCA does not only make the economic 
objectives of monetary union unachievable but even the political motive, which most 
times overshadow the economic consideration, not achieved. For instance Tavlas (1993) 
in a brief discussion of the precondition or characteristics of member states to form a 
currency area included similarity of inflation rate, fiscal integration and the political 
factors. Tavlas (1993:667) cited Mintz (1970) who argued that the major and perhaps 
the only real condition for the institution of monetary integration is the political will to 
integrate on the part of the prospective members. This view was empirically supported 
by Cohen (1993). In his study of six currency unions, Cohen, found that the economic 
criteria are dominated by political factors in successful currency areas. His other finding 
is that compliance with commitments is greatest in the presence of either a locally 
dominant state, willing and able to use its influence to sustain monetary cooperation, or 
a broad network of institutional linkages sufficient to make the loss of monetary 
autonomy tolerable to each partner (Cohen, 1993:187). There is also the political union 
support for successful monetary union from Lanyi who argued that: 
A currency union between two monetarily independent and viable states, neither 
of which is willing to be in a subservient position to the other, would be possible 
only in the cases of complete political unification or, where this is not possible, 
the creation of a supranational economic authority (Lanyi, 1969:28) 
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The rationale for the European integration, as advocated by Jean Monnet and his 
contemporaries immediately after World War II, is that a political union of European 
nations is conceived of as a way of reducing the risk of another intra-European war 
among individual European states, (Feldstein, 1997). This means the European 
integration project is more political than economic. However Feldstein argued that any 
European monetary union that subsequently lead to political union will have the 
opposite effect of the European integration rationale. According to him any political 
union that may follow from the monetary union in Europe will be more likely to lead to 
increased conflicts within Europe and between Europe and the United States. The first 
reason for this conflict is that at the beginning member states will have important 
disagreements on the goals and methods of monetary policy. These disagreements will 
be more serious when the business cycle raised unemployment in some countries than 
the others. Political union resolves the disagreement only within euro members thus 
Feldstein second reason for conflict is that between Euro members (or European 
political union) and non-Euro members in Europe. The economic disagreement will 
lead to discontent and distrust among the European nations. This potentially will 
necessitate the move toward political union. At the political union stage Feldstein 
further pointed that there will be conflicts arising from incompatible expectations about 
the sharing of power and substantive disagreements over domestic and international 
policies. President Nicolas Sarkozy’s statement in a debate with students at the 
University of Strasbourg appears to provide evidence for Feldstein pre-euro argument. 
He was cited calling for a two-speed Europe: a ‘federal’ core of the 17 members of the 
euro zone, with a looser ‘confederation’ outer band of the ten non-euro members 
(Charlemagne, 2011). Current political events in Europe seem to provide support on 
Feldstein’s reasons for conflict in Europe. For instance the current crisis in Greece has 
seen conflicts between Greece and Germany. Also the referendum for the UK’s in or 
out of EU was one of the battle grounds in the UK May, 2015 parliamentary elections. 
Without any waste of time the newly elected conservative government start their 
negotiation for EU treaty reform especially on immigration (free mobility) and welfare 
claim. The political tension ahead of this negotiation can be seen in the German 
position:  
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David Cameron’s hopes for an overhaul of Britain’s relationship with the EU 
suffered an early setback yesterday when Germany said the UK’s partners would 
not be rushed into changing the bloc’s treaties to meet its reform demands 
(Spiegel et al., 2015:1-2). 
4.6 The endogeneity of optimum currency areas 
We have discussed the OCA criteria that countries should satisfy before those countries 
can make up an optimal currency area vis-a-vis labour mobility Mundell (1961), 
openness McKinnon (1963) and product diversification Kenen (1969). The endogeneity 
literature addresses the question of whether these criteria are more likely to be satisfied 
ex-post rather than ex-ante. According to Frankel and Rose (1998) the OCA literature 
focuses on the interrelationship between four variables: (1) the extent of trade; (2) the 
similarity of the shocks and cycles; (3) the degree of labour mobility, and (4) the system 
of risk sharing, usually through fiscal transfers. Countries are more suitable for common 
currency if they have greater linkages in these variables.  
The theory predicts that increase in trade integration through reduced trade barriers can 
result in increased industrial specialisation by country and therefore more synchronous 
business cycles resulting from industry-specific shock. On the other hand, increased 
integration may result in more highly correlated business cycles due to common 
demand shocks or intra-industry trade (Frankel and Rose, 1998:1023). It is argued that 
this theoretical ambiguity can be resolve empirically.   
Frankel and Rose (1998) researched on this topic by considering the relationship 
between two of the criteria (the extent of trade and the similarity of the shocks and 
cycles) using a panel of bilateral trade and business cycle data over a period of thirty 
years for twenty industrialised countries. They found a strong positive relationship 
between the degree of bilateral trade intensity and the cross country bilateral correlation 
of business cycle activity. Their findings indicate that closer international trade links 
result in more closely correlated business cycles across countries although they 
mentioned that a number of economists have claimed the opposite. Their conclusion is 
that a country is more likely to satisfy the OCA criteria for entry into a currency union 
ex-post than ex-ante.  
Another study on the endogeneity of OCA argument was conducted by Artis and Zhang 
(1997). They investigate the effects of the ERM on the international business cycle by 
looking at the linkage and synchronisation of the cyclical fluctuation between the 
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countries using Germany and US cycles as bench marks and pre ERM and ERM sub 
periods. They further divide the 15 countries into ERM and non ERM. They found that 
before the formation of the ERM, most countries business cycles was linked to that of 
the US and after it formation the ERM countries shift into the German business cycle. 
They considered the shift specific to the ERM group and do not happen for non ERM 
countries. The authors also cited Mitchell (1927) who also investigated the linkage in 
business cycles and the way in which economic disturbances are transmitted across 
countries. He found a positive correlation of business cycles across countries and this 
tended to rise over time due to the openness of financial markets.  
In another study by Willett et al. (2010) they evaluated the endogeneity of OCA criteria 
within euro zone in three areas: trade flows, business cycle synchronisation, and 
structural reforms to improve labour and product market flexibility. They found a post 
euro increase in both intra trade and business cycle synchronisation which is consistent 
with endogeneity argument. They commented  
There is a danger with such analysis, however. Those who favour a currency 
union, dollarization, or some other form of hard fix may exaggerate the degree of 
endogeneity and some have gone so far as to suggest that almost any currency 
union can become optimal ex post... It is important to recognise that if a country 
is not already close to meeting the OCA criteria then it is not sufficient that 
endogenous responses just go in the right direction (Willett et al., 2010:851-852) 
The endogeneity literature using the methodology like that of Frankel and Rose 
attempts to classify countries into two categories: those that are good candidates for 
common currency and those that should float their currencies independently. This is 
shown in figure 4.5. 
Despite the empirical evidence in support of the endogeneity of the OCA literature 
Krugman (1993) argued on the opposite. Krugman’s argument is that while monetary 
union may intensify trade it might also intensify economic specialisation and could 
therefore make business cycles more heterogeneous. According to him, in the worst 
case, the costs of monetary union would rise faster than the benefits as trade intensifies 
in the post EMU period. Opponents of Krugman’s view argued that his argument is 
rather questionable as it may be absurdly implied from his reasoning that a common 
currency would be most desirable for two countries that otherwise have nothing to do 
with each other  (Basten, 2006). 
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Figure 4.5   Business cycle symmetry and Trade Integration 
 
He argued that another possible reason why monetary union costs may rise faster than 
the benefits as economic integration proceeds is that it may take longer for a region to 
endogenously become an Optimum Currency Area. A rise in costs of monetary union 
faster than the benefits would not imply that monetary union becomes less desirable. 
But Kontolemis and Samiei (2000) seem to provide support for Krugman. They showed 
that greater policy homogeneity could also decrease cycle synchronisation by restricting 
countries’ ability to offset asymmetric shocks. This view is shared by critics of the EU 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Whilst the critics of the SGP accept the need for 
protecting fiscal discipline they argued that the restriction on the fiscal deficit size 
constrained countries’ ability to offset asymmetric shocks through automatic fiscal 
stabilisers. The critics concern, it is argued, is confirmed by the dichotomy between 
strong growth in some EMU member states and slow growth in others. Basten (2006) 
succinctly summarise the endogeneity of the OCA argument in figure 4.6. 
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Figure 4.6   Endogeneity of the OCA (Frankel and Rose v Krugman) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7 Criticisms of the theory of optimum currency area 
The critiques of a common currency like Mundell and others emphasised on the 
differences between countries that are likely to create costs for those countries if they 
are to form a monetary union. In response the critiques of the OCA asked three key 
questions: (1) are the differences between countries important enough to cause any 
concern? (2) Are national monetary policies, including exchange rate, effective in 
correcting for the differences between countries? (3) Do monetary and exchange rate 
policies do more harm than good in the hands of politicians?  
Critics of the OCA argued that none of the OCA criteria  is free from difficulties and 
because of that other considerations must be introduced in order to judge the suitability 
of an exchange rate regime for a given country or region. We discuss these criticisms in 
the following sub-sections.  
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4.7.1 Labour mobility 
The first criticism of labour mobility mentioned by Tavlas (1993), is the uncertainty of 
the environment in which economic agents operate. According to Bertola (1989:95) 
 ‘the more uncertain is the environment, the less should be the willingness of 
national economic agents to undertake adjustment that may ex-post be regretted’.  
Bertola applied uncertainty to Mundell’s factor flexibility by modelling an economic 
agent faced with two choices:  remaining in the current occupation or location or 
moving to another with income uncertainty in both locations and with fixed costs of 
moving. His finding is that to induce the agent to move the expected income differential 
must be greater than the fixed cost of moving by an amount related to the probability 
that the agent may want to reverse the movement in the future. He concluded that the 
higher the uncertainty about future earnings in different locations or sector, the more 
reluctant the individual will be to move. He therefore argued that in a fixed exchange 
rate regime, with stable exchange rates, asymmetric shocks increase income variability 
and therefore reduces labour mobility. On the other hand under flexible exchange rate 
regime factor mobility is higher than in a fixed exchange rate regime because in the 
latter monetary policy works to smooth out the variability in income caused by the 
asymmetric shocks. Branson (1989) argued that Bertola’s findings are based on a 
restricted version of the Mundell-Fleming model which biases the result in favour of 
flexible exchange rate.  
Ishiyama (1975) mentioned another criticism of Mundell’s factor mobility assumption. 
He cited several authors (Lanyi 1969, Scitovsky (1967), Dun (1971 and Corden (1973)) 
who all support the view that in practice it is unlikely that sufficient interregional labour 
mobility can be relied on as a mechanism for adjustment of payments. The fact that 
labour is even reluctant to move within the same country means labour mobility cannot 
be relied on as a substitute for payment adjustment. He cited Corden (1973) on page 
349 who states: 
Can it really be imagined that a UK depressed-area problem could be solved by 
the large-scale migration of British workers to Germany? It is conceivable; when 
Britons are reluctant even to move from Scotland, or Tyneside to the south, 
though the language is almost the same, it takes some imagination to conceive of 
labour mobility solving the central problem of monetary integration.  
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It means that in Mundell’s labour mobility, as a payment adjustment mechanism, people 
will be forced to leave their homes, in an area with reduced demand, and move to far 
distant places with different culture, language, religion and climates with the 
implication of costs and resettlement in the new environment. They concluded that 
labour mobility is an inadequate substitute for more conventional payments adjustment 
instruments- demand management and exchange rate variation. 
4.7.2 McKinnon openness criterion 
The critics of this OCA criterion first point to its implicit assumptions that the principal 
need for payments adjustments arises from microeconomic changes in demand and 
supply and also that price stability prevails in the rest of the world, (Ishiyama, 
1975:352). They argued that if the international economy is unstable, McKinnon’s 
conclusion would have to be completely reversed since external instability will be 
propagated directly to the domestic economy through fixed exchange. Corden (1972) 
argued that the openness criterion applies only to changes in microeconomic demand 
that occur at home but not applicable to macroeconomic shocks that take place abroad. 
According to Corden even if the stability assumption of the external environment holds, 
there is still no guarantee that there will be any positive gain in adopting a fixed 
exchange regime. What is certain to say is that the more open the economy, the less 
costly to maintain fixed exchange rates. He therefore concluded that the openness 
criterion is attractive only if it can be assumed that the external environment is more 
stable than the small open economy in consideration and further strengthened if small 
open economies tend to be financially undisciplined. In such a case any self-imposition 
of fixed exchange rates should lead to sounder economic management. 
4.7.3 Capital mobility and fiscal transfers 
For capital mobility to work it requires the integration of the financial systems in terms 
of both banking and stock markets. Whilst it is a difficult condition to meet it is even 
more problematic for countries with less developed financial system. It is also argued 
that capital mobility without other forms of transfers favours the rich who can afford to 
hold diversified portfolios across nations. The poor and working class who are mostly 
affected by the recession cannot afford to make investment not alone to talk about 
diversification. This casts doubt on the pain relief nature of capital mobility. For fiscal 
transfers or public insurance there is the moral hazard that will make the system less 
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effective and the absence of a fiscal/political union makes it even worst. On the critique 
of the OCA theory Butler (2000) pointed two of the features of the OCA which he 
described as fundamental flaws. First is the failure to distinguish, in a consistent way, 
between short-term nominal rigidities and long-term real rigidities. This failure, he 
argued, led to a serious overestimation of the power of monetary policy, working 
through nominal interest rate, through the credit channel and through changes in the 
nominal exchange rate, to influence real economic behaviour (Butler, 2000:222). The 
second weakness he mentioned is the failure of the OCA literature to properly allow for 
the international mobility of financial capital. This he argued led to the overemphasis on 
the stabilising potential of a market determined nominal exchange rate and a failure to 
recognise its destabilising potential. The result of these two fundamental flaws, he 
commented, continue to distort the analysis and discussion of currency union and other 
exchange rate arrangements. According to him continuing the debate on the merits of 
common currency in this new millennium based on the intellectual apparatus of the 
1960s is not only out of date but is also a misleading guide to policy.  
4.8 The literature on the costs and benefits of currency union 
In this section we consider the benefits that countries derive from the formation of a 
common currency as argued by its proponents which they said has always been down 
played by the OCA literature. The first argument in favour of a common currency 
originates from the purpose of money serving as a unit of account and store of value. 
This argument is seen in the statement: 
...money in its role of medium of exchange is less useful if there are many 
currencies; although the costs of currency conversion are always present, they 
loom exceptionally large under inconvertibility or flexible exchange rates. 
(Indeed, in a hypothetical world in which the number of currencies equalled the 
number of commodities, the usefulness of money in its role of unit of account and 
medium of exchange would disappear, and trade might just as well be conducted 
in terms of pure barter) (Mundell, 1961:662). 
Buiter (1995) also argued that the liquidity or moneyness of a currency increases with 
the increase in the frequency, scale and scope of that currency’s use, as a medium of 
exchange, by others. Such quality of currency increases the probability of economic 
agents being able to dispose of it when they want to at short notice and at little cost. 
This is a sound argument, especially for currencies that are not widely traded beyond 
their borders, since a common currency widens the domain within which it is used as a 
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legal tender and therefore the usefulness of the currency increases with little cost and 
less convenience. 
Several other benefits of monetary union have been documented in the literature and we 
discuss these in the next sub-sections.  
4.8.1 Elimination of transaction costs 
It is argued that membership of a single currency yields benefits of lower transaction 
costs associated with trading goods and services between countries with different 
moneys. The benefit comes from the fact that currency exchange between currency 
union members is eliminated thus leading to cost saving.  Frankel and Rose (1998)  
argued that countries with close international trade links would benefit from a common 
currency and are more likely to be members of an optimum currency area.  However it 
is generally argued that the benefits from transaction costs savings arising from 
currency conversion are small or negligible. The EU Commission’s study report (EU 
Commission, 1990) found that on average across the EMU members there would be 
savings in dealers’ margins of 0.4% of GDP. This was said to be even lower for 
countries with advanced banking systems, for example UK was only 0.1% of GDP. This 
means that as the banking system develops with more and more use of credit cards and 
other forms of payment mechanisms the problem of exchange steadily diminishes in 
importance. According to Minford (2002) the modesty of the savings on transaction 
costs is due to the fact that the vast majority of the transactions go through the banking 
system at zero cost and they merely cancel out the costs of currency conversion and as 
such transaction costs are zero and should not be worried about. However the 
transaction costs savings is also partly offset by the one off change over costs from the 
old currency to the new one. These costs include change of vending machine, the 
accounting systems, menu cost (change of pricing), banks’ high street machines. For 
UK these costs were estimated to be £30 billion in the 1990s (Minford, 2002).   
4.8.2 Elimination of ER uncertainty and lowering interest rates 
Many academic economists argued against floating exchange rate in favour of fixed 
exchange rate (or common currency) due to the fact that the high degree of exchange 
rate (ER) volatility associated with the former creates uncertainty which in turn 
discourages international trade and investment. In addition to the exchange rate risk, 
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which they consider as short term fluctuation, the exchange rate misalignment 
associated with floating exchange rates is likely to be real threat for the prosperity of 
nations, (Mulhearn and Vane, 2005). The supporters of common currency argued that 
the elimination of exchange rate risk is likely to remove trade barrier between union 
members which should promote more trade, increase foreign investment, and reduce 
cost of capital by merging the risky and limited home capital market with a bigger and 
perhaps less risky regional market. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1998) presented two 
arguments against flexible exchange rates from a welfare cost perspective. The first 
argument, which they consider as direct effect, is based on the assumption that 
economic agents prefer a constant value of consumption to uncertainty value that 
fluctuates over time. On this assumption a change in value of the domestic currency, 
appreciation or depreciation causes risk and uncertainty on people’s consumption and 
leisure. This is because when the domestic currency appreciates against the currency of 
the trading partner the domestic goods become more expensive for the foreign buyers 
resulting to a fall in foreign demand. The consequence of this is a fall in output and 
increase in unemployment with the negative effect of lower wages and therefore low 
consumer spending. The second indirect welfare loss argument of exchange rate 
volatility is based on the risk-averse nature of firms. Risk-averse firms protect 
themselves from exchange rate risk through hedging in the forward and other derivative 
markets. Such hedge transactions put risk premium as an extra mark up to cover the 
costs of currency movements when firms set their prices for goods. The consequence of 
this is an increase in price of goods resulting to a negative effect on demand, 
production, and hence consumption taking them to levels that are less than optimal for 
the society as a whole. An additional effect is on investors holding foreign assets. A 
fluctuation in exchange rate causes them to spend time and resources to minimise the 
impact on their wealth.  
Other academics argued that exchange rate risk, today, should no longer pose a serious 
problem on international trade and foreign investment as argued by the common 
currency proponents. The reason is that such risk can be eliminated through hedging 
using forward market and other financial instruments. Some even argued that big 
enough financial intermediaries can diversify foreign exchange risk by pooling a lot of 
independent risks in a large portfolio and in some cases such big financial institutions 
can even ignore moderate currency risk acting as a risk neutral insurer.   
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4.8.3 Provide a credible nominal anchor for monetary policy  
The argument usually put forward by the supporters of single currency is that it 
provides discipline to domestic macroeconomic policy if such discipline is absent in the 
country that operates a floating exchange rate regime. Dornbusch (2001) cited Giavazzi 
et al (1988) as describing the credibility gain arising ‘from tying one’s hands’. 
According to Frankel (1999) when countries have full discretion to set monetary policy 
there is a possibility of inflation bias therefore a central bank that wants to combat 
inflation can commit itself more credibly by fixing the exchange rate or give up its own 
currency altogether. With a credible stable inflation, economic agents setting wages and 
prices will consider inflation to be low in the future because the currency peg or union 
will prevent the central bank from doing so if it wanted to due to the commitment to the 
currency union. Pilbeam (2006) also noted that fixing the exchange rate through a 
common currency prevents the authorities from pursuing reckless macroeconomic 
policies that may lead to devaluation, if they are in a floating regime. Such policy will 
necessitate intervention to defend the currency which may deplete the reserves. With a 
low and stable inflation it is likely to encourage further FDI. In concluding the 
credibility argument Dornbusch (2001:240) noted that ‘...a monetary regime that 
delivers and maintains low inflation, other things equal, will help growth.’  
4.8.4 Enhance international cooperation between members 
The step by step process of moving into a monetary union usually requires a great deal 
of cooperation by member states. For instance the need to liberalise trade through 
removal of barriers and the integration of the goods market and institutions of 
governance also call for closer cooperation. The final stage to monetary union requires 
national economies to relinquish their monetary policy to a common central bank which 
also requires the cooperation and coordination of national central banks and government 
authorities to work harmoniously to achieve regional common goals. For instance 
during the Bretton Woods and the European ERM national governments have to agree 
on measures to undertake when the exchange rate parity comes under pressure. A 
common currency also eliminates the possibility of competitive devaluation and 
therefore enhances regional solidarity rather than economic nationalism that may create 
political tension between countries.   
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The enhanced degree of international cooperation should bring benefits and lead 
to a more stable environment for the conduct of international trade and 
investment, (Pilbeam, 2006:237).  
Although it is argued that If monetary and fiscal policies have no effect on 
employment and output levels as some theorists argue, then there would be no 
benefits to be derived from international coordination of such policies, (Pilbeam, 
2006:360).  
On this subject Arestis and Sawyer (2002) in their paper on whether monetary policy 
affects the real economy suggested that the empirical results point to a relatively weak 
effect on interest rate changes on inflation. It is still argued that international policy 
coordination reduces the uncertainty associated with policy implementation because 
when economies are interdependent the optimal policy of each nation depends on the 
policy actions of others which in turn has the potential to reduce the possibility of 
serious conflict and therefore a more stable environment for international trade to 
flourish.  
4.9 The costs of monetary union 
Apart from the costs associated with the loss of monetary autonomy there are other 
costs which participants in a monetary union have to face whether the OCA criteria are 
satisfied ex-ante or ex-post and this section discusses the literature on this side of the 
argument. 
Dornbusch (2001) identified five of the arguments against currency-board arrangements 
which are of the same implications for currency union. His five arguments include: (1) 
Sovereignty, (2) Loss of seigniorage, (3) Loss of monetary policy, (4) Loss of lender of 
last resort, and (5) fiscal preparedness. Minford (2002)  mentioned three costs of 
monetary union, but one of them, loss of monetary autonomy, is already mentioned 
above. His two additional costs include (1) harmonisation costs associated with 
monetary union, (2) bail-out costs associated with financial problems of member states. 
These costs are discussed below.  
4.9.1 Loss of sovereignty and monetary autonomy 
A national currency is usually taken as a symbol of statehood and therefore national 
sovereignty. The replacement of such currencies by a multistate currency, in a monetary 
union, sees the abandonment of national symbols with pictures of heroes and valuable 
historic memories. This may be seen as the loss of sovereignty by many and may even 
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be an obstacle to gaining public support for common currency in a referendum. The 
main point is that national economies no longer have monetary policy instrument (such 
as interest rate) to respond to any idiosyncratic economic disturbance facing the 
economy. This is considered as a serious cost especially when countries in a monetary 
union face with asymmetric shocks. In such a case the one cap fits all dilemma comes 
into play. For more on this problem see the discussion on the common central bank 
dilemma in the cases of asymmetric and symmetric shocks (section 4.3.3). On a more 
serious note the problem of the loss of sovereignty is exacerbated when the monetary 
union begins to drag the member states into fiscal union and gradually to political 
union. In a fiscal union stage where taxes are centrally collected and disbursed by a 
union central authority national governments will remain vocal in their parliaments but 
the power of sate- printing own money; levying, collecting and distributing tax revenue- 
is no longer with them. The implication of this is that in a highly fiscally federated 
monetary union the power of national governments is influenced and better coordinated 
and therefore a complete and final surrender of national sovereignty is likely to make 
more political sense if not economic sense. Therefore the transition from a strong fiscal 
union to political union, if the two are not even the same, is only a matter of time as we 
are now witnessing in the euro zone. Further on this point Friedman (1953) argued in 
favour of floating exchange rates that it is better to let exchange rate adjust in response 
to shocks to the economy than to fix it and force the adjustment onto other economic 
variables. He argued that a floating exchange rate is a flexible variable that can easily 
rise or fall whereas domestic prices tend to be sticky and therefore are more conducive 
to economic stability.    
4.9.2 Loss of seigniorage  
Countries receive revenues, within their control, from the central bank’s printing and 
issuance of money. This is lost in a monetary union as the printing and issuing of money 
is no longer in the hands of national central banks but now performed by the common 
central bank. This loss could be a critical issue for public finance management. The loss 
of seigniorage revenue raises the question of fiscal preparedness of the monetary union 
member states if such revenue plays a significant role in economic management. The 
inability to pursue an optimal inflation strategy to extract maximum revenue limits 
public sector revenue and forces either spending cuts or recourse to possibly more 
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distortionary forms of taxation (Dornbusch, 2001). There are counter arguments to this 
point. Firstly in a non-monetary union where the central bank is independent and 
separates from the Treasury it is hard to see how a discretionary monetary and exchange 
rate policy can accommodate a bad fiscal situation better than a fixed rate.  Moreover, 
the argument assumes that interest rates are lower under monetary union – which could 
only be the case if there is convergence towards the lower interest rate countries prior to 
the monetary union.   
4.9.3 Loss of lender of last resort 
One of the responsibilities of states is the handling of systemic financial Instability 
when it arises. The state can execute this function through the use of its prerogatives- 
ability to print own currency, power to tax economic agents, the power to declare 
certain of its liabilities as legal tender, the power to pass regulations, and so on. With 
these powers, the state can provide short term liquidity in unlimited amounts and also 
long term resources for restructuring and recapitalisation of bankrupt financial 
institutions in large amounts than any private agent (Butler, 2000). Quantitative easing, 
a language now common with many UK newspaper readers, has been applied in several 
occasions during the financial crisis to rescue the fragile UK financial system from 
outright collapse and stimulate growth in the economy. The Bank of England played the 
role of lender of last resort in the bank run of Northern Rock in the early stage of the 
2007 financial crisis. In a monetary union this vital rescue role of nationally 
independent central banks is lost. Currently in the euro zone the lender of last resort role 
lies nowhere as the European Central Bank (ECB) has no mandate to play that role. To 
highlight the importance of the role of the lender of last resort and therefore its cost 
implication Buiter argued that 
There is no adequate substitute, in the short run, for the ability to create your own 
legal tender in unlimited quantities, either to engage in lender of last resort 
support for individual institutions, or in ‘market operations’ that create liquidity 
for the system as a whole. If the Treasury were to create its own legal tender, it 
would functionally be a central bank (Butler, 2000:220). 
Buiter’s point is supported by Dornbusch (2001) in his comment that the concern of the 
loss of lender of last resort is based on the assumption that the central bank, not the 
Treasury or the world capital market, is the appropriate lender. 
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4.9.4  Harmonisation costs associated with monetary union  
To make a monetary union work effectively and avoid undue instability in the economy 
resulting from loss of monetary independence there is need for OCA criteria to be 
satisfied- greater wage flexibility, labour mobility, centralised or federal budget system. 
These require putting in place taxes and other institutions of governance- such as legal 
system, labour union, banking and financial market integration- at tremendous costs. 
There is also the capital investment need of establishing supranational institutions 
(common central bank, common parliament etc) and the recurrent expenditure of 
running these institutions.  
4.9.5 Bail-out costs associated with financial problems  
The recent developments and experiences in the euro zone debt crisis have provided a 
practical case of this type of cost in a monetary union. Euro zone leaders had to 
intervene to bail out Greece, Ireland, and Portugal during the financial crisis. The 
bailout problem still continues with Greece causing political division in the EU member 
states.  
4.10 Empirical literature on monetary union and trade 
Despite the costs of monetary union discussed in the optimum currency area above, 
empirical findings provide a lot of support for the transaction cost argument presented 
by proponents of single currency. Much of the literature on the benefits of monetary 
union is more concentrated on the international trade effects of common currency. The 
seminal paper of Rose (2000a) triggered the debate on the impact of currency union on 
bilateral trade. In his cross sectional study he found that the trade of two countries with 
the same currency tripled as compared to those with their individual currencies. In 
another study Rose and Engel (2000) also found that members of international currency 
unions not only tend to experience more trade but also  less volatile exchange rates, and 
more synchronized business cycles than do countries with their own currencies. In a 
follow up study with a sample of 200 countries and dependencies Frankel and Rose 
(2002) found that belonging to a currency union/board triples trade with other currency 
union members which still confirms the earlier finding of Rose. Nitsch (2002) replicated 
Rose’s study with the same data and his finding supported the positive effect of 
common currency on bilateral trade. Nitsch commented on Rose’s results that they were 
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an overestimation of the trade effect of common currency. Rose and Van Wincoop 
(2001) conducted research on the same topic and they found that EMU will cause 
European trade to rise by over 50 per cent. They argued that the benefits of trade created 
by currency union may outweigh any costs of forgoing independent monetary policy. In 
a similar study using a sample of 217 countries for the period 1948-1997 with panel 
data methodology Glick and Rose (2002) found that a large number of countries that 
left currency unions during the period of their study experienced economically and 
statistically significant declines in bilateral trade and also a pair of countries that starts 
to use a common currency experiences a near doubling in bilateral trade. The effect is 
far  much smaller in the study of Micco et al. (2003). They used a sample of 22 
developed countries, including 15 of the euro members, over the period 1992-2002. 
They found the effect of the EMU on bilateral trade between member countries to be 
between 4 and 10% when compared to trade between all other pairs of countries and 
between 8 and 16% when compared to trade among non-EMU countries. Their results 
also revealed the absence of trade diversion. A study by Thierry et al. (2009) revealed 
mixed results. They found the prospect for further integration in Southern Africa 
promising though still with many challenges. The finding on the trade side was not very 
positive as they even mentioned that countries with similar colonial ties have not 
maintained strong trade links. Monetary union in West Africa have been found to be 
more beneficial on economic growth but less on bilateral trade within the region 
(Anyanwu, 2003b; Anyanwu, 2003a). In his first paper Anyanwu used the gravity 
model for the period 1990-2000 and concluded that trade within the CFA was less than 
10% and calls for an assessment of the formation of monetary unions that are not linked 
to a major anchor and he suggested the second West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). 
The economic growth result is supported by an earlier study by Wane et al. (1996) who 
found that among the sub-Saharan African countries, membership in the CFA zone has 
led to higher productivity and investment growth. With slightly different results Ajayi 
(2005) found that participation in the CFA monetary union and ECOWAS’ preferential 
trade agreements appear to have improved intraregional trade. Other studies in West 
Africa found that economic growth in WAEMU countries is no superior to the non-
WAEMU countries in ECOWAS.   
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Other studies on the impact of currency union on trade which have provided positive 
result but at varying levels way below the original finding of Rose and others include 
(Serlenga and Shin, 2007; de Souza, 2002; De Sousa, 2012; Serlenga and Shin, 2013). 
A plausible explanation suggested for the positive trade effect of common currency is 
that monetary unions not only introduce a common currency, but also lead to an 
integration of payment and banking systems, and of financial markets in general which 
in turn reduces cost of trading and therefore facilitates trade (De Grauwe, 2014).  
On the economic performance argument Devarajan and De Melo (1987) evaluating 
participation in African Monetary unions for the period 1960-82 found that CFA 
countries grew significantly faster than comparator sub-Saharan African countries. They 
further the analysis by comparing sub period before and after 1973 and the results show 
that the CFA performance as compared to the comparators improved during the 1973-
82 period, which according to them cast further doubt on the claim that the monetary 
union is not functioning adequately.  
The literature on ECOWAS bilateral trade acknowledged the low level of trade within 
the region but possible explanations have not been conclusive. For instance Masson and 
Patillo (2005) concluded that trade among WAMZ countries is much lower than among 
WAEMU countries as shown in table 4.2.  
In an empirical study on ECOWAS Ajayi (2005) found that the CFA monetary union 
and ECOWAS trade liberalisation have increased intraregional trade which according to 
him it is supportive of the plans for continued integration.  
A completely opposite finding from that of Rose and others is the research by Pakko 
and Wall (2001). They replicated Rose’s data to investigate the impact of common 
currency and free trade agreement on bilateral trade. They used gravity model and panel 
data methodology with different perturbations (pooled cross section and fixed effects 
estimation) for five, ten and twenty year’s interval. They found that with pooled cross 
section without controlling for the fixed effects the trade creating effect of currency 
union is very similar to that of Rose i.e. common currency members trade 3.2 times 
more than when they have their separate currencies and for FTA trade is 2.5 times.   
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Table 4.2   ECOWAS Patterns of trade (2002) 
 Exports (% of total exports) Imports (% of total imports) 
ECOWAS   
ECOWAS 11.0 10.1 
European Union 35.1 40.4 
Rest of the world 53.9 49.5 
WAEMU   
WAEMU 12.7 8.9 
WAMZ 7.6 9.7 
European Union 45.1 42.8 
Rest of the world 34.6 38.6 
WAMZ   
WAMZ 3.6 4.6 
WAEMU 4.2 3.4 
European Union 28.0 42.2 
Rest of the world 64.2 49.8 
Source: Masson and Patillo (2005:98)  
With fixed effects model that accounts for individual heterogeneity, they found that 
currency union members trade 69% less than when they have their separate currencies 
(i.e. CU coefficient of -0.378) and for FTA trade is 0.08% less. These results are for the 
five year interval although they were statistically insignificant. The ten and twenty year 
interval results were still found to be trade reducing for currency union members and 
even significant as they increase the intervals. In the ten year intervals, trade for 
currency union members reduced by 45% than the separate currency trade. This led 
them to the conclusion that currency union reduces trade rather than increasing it when 
country-pair fixed effects (heterogeneity) are properly controlled for in the model. 
Another replication of Rose’s data that provides similar findings to that of Pakko and 
Wall is the study by Persson (2001). With Rose’s data, Person used simple non-
parametric matching estimators that allow for systematic selection into currency unions 
as well as non-linear effects of trading costs on trade. He found a much smaller effect of 
currency union on trade ranging from 13 to 65 percent and in fact the estimates are not 
significantly different from zero.  
A study by Fountas and Aristotelous (1999) on the four largest EU economies, 
(Germany, France, Italy and UK) investigated whether the ERM period coincides with 
an increase in intra-EU exports found that the EMS dummy variable is not statistically 
significant for any of the four countries in the sample. They concluded that the creation 
of the ERM has not led to an increase in intra-EU exports either directly or indirectly.  
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4.11 Empirical literature on ER volatility and bilateral trade 
4.11.1 Theoretical background 
The collapse of the Breton Woods system in 1973 led to the demise of the fixed 
exchange rate regime that existed since the post-world war II era. Since then different 
countries adopted different exchange rate regimes ranging from free float, managed 
float, dollarization, pegging to other currency and other forms of currency 
arrangements. Many countries, especially the developed ones adopt the free float system 
of exchange rate. The resulting exchange rate volatility from the floating exchange rate 
system became a great concern to many economic agents especially on the effect of 
such volatility on the volume of international trade. The effect of exchange rate 
volatility on international trade volume is now the subjects of both theoretical and 
empirical investigations. Exchange rate volatility is defined as the risk associated with 
unexpected movements in the exchange rate  (Ozturk, 2006:85). 
The two extreme ends of the emerged exchange rate systems are (1) Free float/flexible 
and (2) fixed. One of the main arguments against the former is that exchange rate 
volatility could have negative effects on trade and investment. It is stated that if 
exchange rate movements are not fully anticipated then an increase in exchange rate 
volatility which increases risk will lead to risk-averse agents to reduce their 
import/export activity (Dell'Ariccia, 1999). This import/export reduction resulting from 
risk-aversion will also lead to agents re-allocating production toward domestic markets. 
This argument against floating exchange rate regime forms the basis for currency 
arrangements, example European monetary union, which will eliminate the uncertainty 
of exchange rate. 
Traditional trade theory suggests that exchange rate volatility would have a depressing 
effect on trade because exporters and/or importers would view it as an increase in the 
uncertainty of profits on their international transactions (Fountas and Aristotelous, 
1999). Empirical results investigating this theoretical proposition are not conclusively 
one sided. There are some empirical evidences in support of the theory, some against 
and others with mixed results. The next section reviews the empirical evidence.   
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4.11.2 Empirical evidence  
 The pioneering study on the effect of exchange rate volatility on international trade was 
made by Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978). In their paper they constructed a theoretical 
model for analysing the impact of exchange risk on trade prices and volumes. They 
tested the model empirically using U.S. and German trade flow for the period 1965-
1975. They found that if traders are risk averse an increase in exchange risk will 
unambiguously reduce the volume of trade whether the risk is born by importers or 
exporters. They also found that the effect of an increase in exchange risk on price of 
traded goods could be in either direction, depending on who bears the risk. Since this 
study, there has been a proliferation of literature on exchange rate volatility and trade 
with no consensus.  
The empirical results on the effect of exchange rate volatility on bilateral trade are 
mixed, ranging from negative and significant, negative but not significant, positive and 
significant, positive and not significant. Medhora (1990) studied the effect of exchange 
rate variability on trade using a similar but slightly different approach from the gravity 
model using the period 1976-1982 and a cross sectional approach. His study included 
only six countries, at that time, of the West African CFA. His finding was that nominal 
exchange rate variability has not measurably hurt the imports of the union and argued 
from this result that membership in the union has not imposed a measurable cost on the 
countries. Medhora left two gaps in his study. The first one he himself mentioned is that 
there is need for similar studies to be undertaken in the future as he observed that the 
higher exchange rate volatility in 1983 and 1984 was becoming an important issue for 
Cote d’Ivoire, Niger and Senegal. The second one not mentioned is that his study was 
only based on six of the WAEMU countries and the number is now 8. This thesis which 
incorporates those two omitted countries plus the seven none WAEMU countries in 
ECOWAS will contribute to closing the gap and more so using a different methodology. 
The second study is that of Anyanwu (2003a) on the effect of monetary union on trade 
and output with the use of gravity model for the period 1990-2000. His findings were 
positive for output but not for trade. He concluded that trade within the CFA was less 
than 10%. Anyanwu posed three areas for further research. First how the introduction of 
monetary union would affect trade and output for individual country-pairs under the 
hypothetical adoption of a monetary union with a specified anchor country? Second to 
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assess the formation of monetary unions that are not linked to a major anchor and 
Anyanwu’s suggestion is the second West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ). The third 
issue suggested by Anyanwu is the use of the evidence that accumulates from the 
experience of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC). As 
mentioned earlier the proponents of common currency argued the positive trade effect 
of monetary union is from the removal of exchange rate risk arising from exchange rate 
volatility. If this argument holds then an inclusion of exchange rate volatility variable as 
one of the regressors in the gravity model in this study will hopefully answer the first 
question posed by Anyanwu. The second issue is also addressed as our sample includes 
WAMZ. The third issue falls outside the scope of this thesis. Therefore closing these 
gaps will contribute not only to knowledge but also to aid policy makers. 
In another African study Onafowora and Owoye (2008) investigate the impact of 
exchange rate volatility on Nigeria’s exports to the United States (its most important 
trading partner) using cointegration and Error Correction Model for the period 1980-
2001. They made three important findings. First increase in real foreign income has a 
significantly positive effect on real exports demand. Second improvement in the terms 
of trade, which they proxy as decline in real exchange rate, improves exports. Lastly 
and most importantly increase in exchange rate volatility negatively affects exports 
demand. Another important finding of this study worthy of mentioning is that the post 
1986 liberalisation and economic reform policies implemented have a significant 
positive impact on Nigeria’s exports demand. Vergil (2002) studied the impact of 
exchange rate volatility on the export flows of Turkey to the United States and its three 
major trading partners in the European Union for the period 1990:1 to 2000:12 using 
cointegration and error-correction models. He found that real exchange rate volatility 
has a significant negative effect on real exports. A similar study was carried out by 
Kumar and Dhawan (1991). They examined the impact of exchange rate volatility on 
Pakistan’s exports to the developed world for the period 1974-85. They found strong 
evidence that Pakistan’s exports were negatively affected by the increased volatility of 
its bilateral exchange rate. What also emerged from their study is that, unlike the case 
for most evidence in developed countries, it is the volatility in nominal rather than real 
exchange rates that is significant. 
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On the impact of growth and investment Bleaney and Greenaway (2001) conducted a 
study on a sample of sub-Saharan African countries, with heavy reliance on export of 
primary commodities, to investigate the effects of terms of trade and real exchange rate 
volatility on investment and growth. They used a panel of 14 Sub-Saharan African 
countries over the period 1980-1995. They found that real exchange rate volatility has a 
significantly negative impact on investment and terms of trade volatility has a negative 
impact on growth which they said is consistent with the evidence from previous studies. 
They however mentioned that the latter finding was not quite convincing. They noted 
from their finding that both growth and investment increase when the terms of trade 
improve and real exchange rate overvaluation is eliminated. Frankel and Wei (1993b) 
conducted a study of 63 countries, using gravity model, to investigate the effect of 
exchange rate uncertainty (defined as standard deviation of the first difference of the 
logarithmic exchange rate) on trade using cross section methodology. Their finding is 
that real exchange rate volatility has a negative effect on trade volume. They found the 
effect larger in 1980 than later in the decade. They also considered the possibility of 
whether stabilisation of exchange rates during the course of the 1980s, under the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism has any significant influence on intra-regional trade. Their 
conclusion on this matter is that there is no indication that exchange rates stabilisation 
in Europe during the ERM in 1980s played any large role in the increase in intra-
regional trade. They do, however, found that the standard deviation of exchange rates 
fell among EFTA countries by about half in the 1980s, and among EC by slightly more. 
In another developed countries study Kenen and Rodrik (1986) examined the impact of 
short-term volatility in real effective exchange rates on the volume of international trade 
using a sample of industrialised nations. They came up with three important findings 
but the one that is most pertinent to this study is that the volatility of real exchange rates 
appears to depress the volume of international trade. Arize (1997) in his G-7 countries’ 
study found that real exchange rate volatility has a significant negative effects on export 
demand in both the short and long-run in each of the G-7 countries. In a cross sectional 
study of 19 developed and 67 developing countries Bahmani-Oskooee and Ltaifa (1992) 
found that exchange rate uncertainty is detrimental to the exports of both developing 
and developed countries. 
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A number of other studies supported the negative impact of exchange rate volatility on 
trade (Arize et al., 2000; Bahmani-Oskooee and Satawatananon, 2012; Chipili, 2013; 
Arize, 1995). In a western European study using panel data and gravity model 
Dell'Ariccia (1999) analyses the effects of exchange rate volatility on bilateral trade 
flows. He found evidence of a small but significant negative effect of exchange rate 
volatility on trade.  
Contrary to the generally pronounced argument that exchange rate volatility negatively 
affects trade Bailey et al. (1986) in their investigation of the big seven (OECD) 
industrial countries during the floating-rate period found that exchange rate volatility 
has not discouraged exports from any of the big seven nations. In a later follow up study 
Bailey et al. (1987) repeated their study on exchange rate volatility on 11 OECD 
countries over the managed-rate and flexible-rate periods. Of the 33 regression 
equations presented they found a positive and significant relationship between exchange 
rate volatility and real exports and only in three cases- one of which was marginal- 
where they found a significant and negative relationship. All the three regressions 
included real exchange rate volatility variables which made them to conclude that 
perhaps it is real exchange rate volatility that matters. The mixed results in their studies 
made them to comment that the state of the empirical evidence is troublesome and that 
perhaps exchange rate volatility affects bilateral trade flows. A study on the US 
economy by Bailey and Tavlas (1988) found no significant effects of exchange rate 
variations on trade and direct investment.  
In an IMF study Clark et al. (2004) found a negative, but not robust, relationship 
between exchange rate volatility and trade which made them to conclude that if 
exchange rate volatility has a negative effect on trade, the effect would appear to be 
fairly small and is by no means a robust, universal finding. Tenreyro (2007) found 
nominal exchange rate variability to have no significant impact on trade flows. The 
results from the study of Khan et al. (2014) are mixed. Their finding revealed the effect 
of exchange rate volatility on Pakistan’s trade is dependent on the currency of invoice 
with its middle-and low-income trading partners. With the US dollar, volatility in 
exchange rate discourages both exports and imports whilst the use of bilateral exchange 
rates valued in domestic currency terms has no effect on both imports and exports. 
Asseery and Peel (1991) studied five developed countries- Australia, Japan, United 
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Kingdom, United States, and West Germany over the period 1972-1987. The author 
found that real exchange rate volatility has a significant impact on exports at least for all 
the countries considered in the sample and that for the great majority of the countries 
the impact is positive.    
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Chapter 5 Comparative Analysis of ECOWAS proposed Currency 
Union 
5.1 Introduction 
The question that member states intending to form or join a monetary union should ask 
themselves is what are the expected costs and benefits of giving up national currency 
and joining the monetary union. In an attempt to answer this question economists used 
the framework of the OCA theory whose literature is already discussed in chapter 4. 
The aim of this chapter is to apply this framework on the fifteen ECOWAS countries in 
order to assess their suitability for currency union. We consider seven criteria: labour 
mobility (Mundell, 1961); trade openness (McKinnon, 1963); product diversification 
(Kenen, 1969); similarity of inflation; fiscal transfers; homogeneous preferences; and 
solidarity v nationalism. Realising the lack of benchmarks of the OCA theory as a 
weakness, our approach is to use the EU12 countries4, already in a monetary union, as a 
comparator and also trends over time to make a judgement on ECOWAS. We found that 
ECOWAS countries failed to satisfy all the seven criteria under consideration leading us 
to the conclusion that the countries are not an optimum currency area and therefore are 
not good candidates for a currency union. In the rest of the chapter we described our 
data and sources with the methodology in section 5.2. In all subsequent sections we 
analysed the seven criteria in turn. 
5.2 Data description and methodology 
The OCA theory that emerged in the 1960s has been extensively used in assessing the 
suitability of countries for monetary union especially in terms of the costs and benefits 
to those countries. Proponents and opponents of the Euro have used this framework pre-
and post-Euro formation. However the problem with the OCA framework is that whilst 
it states the characteristics that candidates’ countries should possessed to be appropriate 
for the monetary union there are no bench marks or cut off points above which a 
country is eligible and below that it is not. To overcome this problem the approach in 
this chapter is to use (1) the trend of variables over time and (2) the EU12 countries as a 
comparator. We do realise the fact that the ECOWAS and EU economies are far apart 
                                                 
4 The EU12 countries include: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom         
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on the development scale but the idea is that the successful launch of the Euro in 1999, 
despite its current problems, appears to provide the impetus for other countries, like 
ECOWAS, to quickly emulate the EU model. The choice of years included in the 
analysis for both EU 12 and ECOWAS took into consideration the occurrence of major 
events in the integration stages. For ECOWAS, 1980 was initially selected but replaced 
with 1981 due to lack of export and import data for Nigeria, the largest economy of 
ECOWAS. This period is considered as a starting point for the analysis because it is 
seven years after the formation of ECOWAS with four years of trade liberalisation. The 
same year for EU 12 corresponds to the three year period after the establishment of the 
European Monetary System (EMS) and European Currency Unit (ECU) and thirteen 
years after customs union completed and establishment of the common external tariff. 
1993 is the period after the two phases of free movement of persons and the two phases 
of trade liberalisation completed. The period also account for the three years after the 
extended ten year period for common external tariff and one year before the CFA crash 
of 1994. For the Euro 1993 is the period after completion of the single market. The 
2005 is the first proposed start date of the ECOWAS currency and this corresponds to 
1999 for the start of the Euro. 1998 for the Euro is therefore the year preceding the 
introduction of the Euro. 2010 and 2011 are considered as post global financial crisis 
periods though still crisis periods for the Euro zone. The reason for considering these 
important dates is that a currency union is only the final destination of a long journey of 
integration that involves stages of removal of trade barriers, customs union and common 
markets. A promising monetary union should have already shown some positive signs 
on the intended economic indicators, such as bilateral trade, since theses preceding 
stages of single currency themselves are intended to facilitate bilateral trade among 
members. If after all this long period of trade liberalisation and economic integration 
member states has not realise positive impact then one will ask the question as to how 
the single currency will achieve those objectives. The next subsections describe the 
variables, data and methods of analysis for the individual OCA criteria.  
5.2.1 Labour Mobility 
Intra-ECOWAS labour mobility data is not readily available from the individual 
ECOWAS countries. Thanks to the new data on bilateral migration released by the 
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World Bank in 2011 available on their web site5. All migration data for this analysis are 
taken from this website. Prior to the Euro the EU was assessed for labour mobility using 
United Sates, which is already an established monetary union, as a comparator (Baldwin 
and Wyplosz, 2012). The result was that intra-states migration in the US was far higher 
than the intra-EU migration and therefore EU was considered as a failure of the labour 
mobility criterion (table 5.4). However the figures used were in absolute terms i.e. the 
number of persons moving from state to state without considering the population size of 
the country of origin. Since EU is already a well-established monetary union this 
analysis uses EU12 as a comparator to assess the ECOWAS case. To overcome the 
limitation mention above the intra-country migration for both ECOWAS and EU12 are 
expressed as percentages of the country’s total population, again taken from the World 
Bank data base. 
5.2.2 Openness  
McKinnon (1963) used the tradable and non-tradable sector classification in his 
definition of openness as we saw in the previous chapter. It is widely accepted that, this 
definition suffers from the difficulty of measurement for empirical work. Most 
empirical work use one of equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 below (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 
2009; Horváth, 2005). Equation 5.1 is a general measure of openness which takes into 
consideration the share of economic activity devoted to international trade. Equations 
5.2 and 5.3 measures openness with specific focus on trade with currency union 
members and more specifically 5.2 reflects on the degree of exposure of union member 
countries to the volatility of the common currency (Blaszkiewicz and Wozniak, 2003). 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 𝑂𝑅 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝐺𝐷𝑃
 𝑂𝑅 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠+𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠
𝐺𝐷𝑃
     (5.1) 
𝑋𝑖𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑊𝐴𝑆+𝑀𝑖𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑊𝐴𝑆
𝑋𝑖+𝑀𝑖
        (5.2) 
𝑋𝑖𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑊𝐴𝑆+𝑀𝑖𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑊𝐴𝑆
𝐺𝐷𝑃
           (5.3) 
Where: 
XiECOWAS is Exports of country i to ECOWAS countries 
Xi is total exports of country i 
                                                 
5 www.worldbank.org/prospects/migrationandremittances  
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MiECOWAS  is imports of country i from ECOWAS countries 
Mi is total imports of country i 
The trade data for both ECOWAS and EU12 countries is taken from the IMF direction 
of trade statistics (DOTS) (IMF, 2013) and the GDP data for both regions are from the 
World Bank World Development Indicators. 
5.3 Labour mobility (Mundell, 1961) 
ECOWAS, like any other African countries, migration is affected by many factors some 
of which are very specific to the circumstances faced by the continent. This section 
applies the theory of the OCA to assess the possibility of labour mobility as an 
adjustment mechanism in the case of asymmetric shocks in ECOWAS. In the strict 
sense of the OCA theory labour mobility is required for employment seeking from 
negatively affected economy to the positively affected one. This means it is about the 
movement of the work (labour) force. The lack of available statistics specifically on this 
type of mobility will render analysis impossible. For this reason we use migration as a 
proxy for labour mobility. Before this analysis we first look at the migration rate and 
causes in Africa in general.  
5.3.1  African migration 
 Statistics on labour mobility in ECOWAS and Africa in general especially intra-Africa 
mobility hardly exist in most of these countries. The approach here is to use migration 
statistics as a proxy to labour so we can benefit from the recently released World Bank 
data on bilateral migration. There is no specific literature on ECOWAS migration but a 
lot on migration is been documented on Africa, hence the reason for including a general 
section on migration in Africa. 
Africa is documented to have a long history of migration. According to Shinn (2008) 
cited in Ratha et al. (2011) an estimate of 140 million of African descent live outside the 
continent although many of these are not emigrants but members of families that have 
lived in destination countries for many generations and may have few ties to Africa. The 
number of those that left African countries in the –recent decades is estimated to 30 
million and out of this 50% lived in the African continent. The bulk of the intra-African 
emigration takes place across neighbouring countries. For West Africa, Ratha et al 
(2011) mentioned that 70% of emigration is within the same sub region as compared to 
113 
 
 
 
66% in Southern Africa and most of these cross-border emigrations predominantly 
reflect common linguistic and historical roots. The authors made important findings 
about African migration that are relevant for this chapter and three of these are 
summarised as follows:  
1. Majority of international migrants from Africa move to other African countries, 
especially from poorer countries, due to lack of the financial resources to travel 
to countries far from the continent and the education and skills required to 
succeed in high income countries’ labour markets. 
2. African migration is heavily influenced by the continent’s history of conflict, 
coups, insurgencies, dictatorships, wars and natural disasters. This led to what 
they described as forced migration. For instance 2.2 million Africans living in 
countries other than their place of birth are recognised as refugees, displaced 
mainly by war or drought and other natural disasters. 
3. Colonial ties are an important determinant on the choice of destination countries 
and half of the African countries reported that the most common destination for 
emigrants is the former coloniser. However the colonial link appears less 
important for highly educated migrants. This finding has implication for 
ECOWAS where there are three colonial links: Francophone, Anglophone and 
Lusophone. 
5.3.2 Intra-ECOWAS migration 
Appendices A.7 and A.8 show the intra-ECOWAS and intra-EU12 migration as a 
percentage of total population respectively. From appendix A.8 EU12 migration ranges 
from the low of 1.5% in 1960 to 4.5% in 2010, an increase of 3.1 percentage points. The 
overall average for 1960-2010 is 3.8%. With the exception of 1960 we can say that on 
average the overall migration for EU12 is 4%. This rate of migration was considered as 
not adequate to satisfy the labour mobility as required by the OCA theory. On country 
basis the country with the most mobile population is Ireland with an overall average of 
16.6% followed by Portugal with only 6.7% and the least mobile countries are France 
with average of 0.9%, Germany and UK 1% each. It appears that the largest economies 
of EU12 are the least mobile. The results for ECOWAS in appendix A.7 revealed on 
average the highest mobility of 6.9% in 1980 and the lowest of 5.6% in 2010. Since 
1980 intra-ECOWAS migration has been on the decline. In fact the 1960 and 1970 
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migration of 6.7% and 6.8% respectively are both better than all the post 1980s 
migration performance. The lack of a continuous and consistent improvement in intra-
ECOWAS migration provides no evidence that the ECOWAS liberalisation- rights of 
entry without visa, rights of residence and rights of establishment- since 1979 through 
the 1980s and to the 1990s is having any positive impact on migration in the sub-region.  
The reason for this argument is that intra-ECOWAS migration in the years before the 
removal of the barriers on movement of persons, 1960 and 1970 is better than the years 
after the implementation of the liberalisation scheme. Whilst the EU12 shows a pattern 
of continuous improvement from 1960 to 2010 as shown by the two extremes in these 
two years, ECOWAS show no more of a declining pattern. Although on average 
migration in ECOWAS is slightly higher than EU12 the trend in EU12 is more 
promising than ECOWAS because not only a continuous increase from 1960 to 2010 
the EU12 has also achieved a greater percentage increase of 3.05 points compared to a 
downward trend in ECOWAS with a marginal increase in percentage points of only 1.3. 
The most mobile country in ECOWAS is Guinea with an overall percentage of 42.8% 
followed by Burkina Faso with 10.8% showing a big gap similar to the EU12. The least 
mobile countries in ECOWAS are Gambia 0.1%, Nigeria 0.2%, Cape Verde 1.1%, 
Sierra Leone 1.4%, Senegal 1.8%. What is also in common between ECOWAS and 
EU12 is that the largest economies move very little within the sub region. Comparing 
the intra-ECOWAS mobility between WAEMU and WAMZ appendix A.7 shows that 
WAEMU countries mobility within the sub region is higher than WAMZ countries. For 
instance in all the years, 1960-2010, the average percentage for WAEMU (3.9, 3.9, 3.6, 
3.8, 3.4 and 3.1) is consistently higher than WAMZ (2.8, 2.9, 3.3, 2.5, 2.6 and 2.5). 
The cross country and time intra-ECOWAS mobility is on average 6.4% appendix A.7 
and EU12 is 3.8% (appendix A.8) a difference of 2.6%. Is this difference significant 
enough to say that ECOWAS countries satisfy the labour mobility criterion? It is a 
small difference to reach that conclusion and no threshold to refute it. Perhaps the best 
way is to consider the peculiar circumstances of explaining the reasons for most of the 
migration in Africa as discussed above. If most of the ECOWAS migration is the force 
migration type due to wars, coups, conflicts as in section 5.3.1 above then the question 
remains as to whether this type of mobility serves the purpose of the OCA theory. 
According to the findings of research discussed above the highly educated with skills 
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required for labour markets in high income countries migrate outside of Africa for 
greener pastures leaving within the sub-region poor, uneducated/less educated, low 
skills within the Africa or ECOWAS borders. For instance the UNHCR Global Trend 
Report 2010 reported 70,089 of Liberians living in other countries are refugees. 60,925 
of these refugees are in neighbouring ECOWAS countries: 24,038 in Cote d’Ivoire, 
11,476 in Ghana, 11,120 in Guinea, 9,030 in Sierra Leone and 5,261 in Nigeria). This 
refugee’s destination statistics seem to support the finding that the poor and less 
educated who cannot afford the cost of travelling far away only move to neighbouring 
countries. In the Liberia case 63% of the 2010 refugees are in three of the countries that 
share border with Liberia (Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone) and Ghana with 
similar figures to these countries shared border with Cote d’Ivoire. Force migration 
especially the uneducated and unskilled persons cannot serve the adjustment mechanism 
purpose as required by the OCA theory. We have already seen in chapter 4 that the 
rationale for labour mobility is to solve the high unemployment problem faced by a 
country hit by a negative demand shock and the inflationary pressures in the country 
with a boom in demand by migrants from the former taking employment in and 
increasing demand in the latter. This increase in demand will also stimulates exports 
from the low demand country and therefore helps to solve both the unemployment and 
low demand problem in that country and at the same time reduce the inflationary 
problem in the country with high demand. We argue that forced or unplanned migration 
due to conflicts, wars, coups etc. or migration of uneducated, unskilled and displaced 
persons as the case for many ECOWAS countries cannot serve the purpose of 
adjustment mechanisms in a monetary union. In fact refugees’ migration can impose a 
substantial burden on host countries by requiring additional public expenditures, putting 
pressures on infrastructure, and contributing to environmental degradation (Ratha et al., 
2011).  We have also pointed out in chapter 2 how influx of refugees from Liberia and 
Sierra Leone caused violence with the citizens in Cote d’Ivoire in the late 1990s due to 
competition for the limited jobs available. In the same chapter we also noted that 
refugees struggling to survive became a source of recruitment of combatants causing 
more political instability and a recession in Nigeria in mid 1980s also evidenced the 
expulsion of ECOWAS citizens from the countries which is against the economic 
rationale of labour mobility. In the case of such adjustment failure, asymmetric shock in 
ECOWAS will leave the low output and high unemployment in the negatively affected 
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country and inflationary pressures in the boom country. A common monetary policy 
that can fix the problems of these two countries at the same time does not exist and 
therefore the common central bank is rendered incapable. A recession in the adversely 
affected country and the boom in the other continue to inflict pain and suffering in these 
countries which opponents of monetary union considered to be the costs rather than 
benefits of countries in a monetary union that failed to satisfy the OCA criteria. 
Although the analysis shows that intra-ECOWAS migration is slightly higher, though 
declining, than EU12 it might not be significant enough and even the possible status and 
quality of migrants cannot support a conclusion that ECOWAS satisfy the labour 
mobility criterion.   
5.4 Openness (McKinnon, 1963) 
5.4.1 General openness (trade with the rest of the world)              
We have already seen in the previous chapter the economic argument of openness made 
by McKinnon. On the one hand an economy that is open in terms of international trade 
can reap benefits from monetary union due to the savings in transaction costs and the 
risks associated with different currencies. On the other hand the degree of openness has 
an impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy due to the pass-through effect of 
changes in nominal exchange rate on domestic prices and wages (Lavrac and Zumer, 
2003). When countries are faced with asymmetric shocks devaluation or appreciation of 
national currency has little or no role, depending on the level of openness, in the 
adjustment mechanism for an open economy and therefore giving up that currency for a 
common currency is costless otherwise it is a cost to the nation. We now examine the 
ECOWAS situation first by looking at appendices A.9 and A.10 which present the 
openness indicators for ECOWAS and EU 12 as defined by equation 5.1.  
From Appendix A.9 Liberia has the highest trade to GDP ratio for all years with a 
maximum of 3,450.1% in 1993 and minimum of 118.9% in 1981. The magnitude of this 
level of openness is accounted for by the import sector which has the maximum import 
to GDP ratio of 3,223.5% in 1993 and the minimum of 56.4% in 1981. When the 
maximum ratios are computed without Liberia (Max-Lib) the maximum trade to GDP 
ratio for all the years considered is 151.5% which is Benin for 2011.With these statistics 
Liberia is therefore an extreme outlier and the analysis will consider the figures without 
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Liberia. Two possible reasons may be responsible for Liberia’s extraordinary trade to 
GDP ratios (especially imports to GDP) both relate to the outbreak of the Liberian civil 
war in 1991. The insecurity caused by the war may have led to the country’s economic 
activities, mainly agriculture, to fall to the extent that the country has to rely on imports 
even food that could be locally produced. The second reason is that the fall in economic 
activities may have a depressing effect on GDP. A fall in in GDP and an increase in 
imports both have an upward pressure on the trade to GDP ratio. What is common to all 
the ECOWAS countries, with the exception of Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria, greater 
proportion of their Trade to GDP ratios are accounted for by the import to GDP ratio. 
This corresponds to the trade balance deficit shown in the economic profile of these 
countries presented in chapter 3.  By this openness measure the least open Economy in 
ECOWAS is Burkina Faso which reported the minimum trade to GDP figures 
consistently for all the years. 
The only country that shows a decline in openness is Niger whose trade to GDP ratio 
falls from 46% in 1981 to 36% in 2011 remaining relatively constant at 33% in between 
those years. Considering the comparator, EU 12 countries trade to GDP figures show 
Belgium with the highest figure of 180.2% in 2011 and consistently Greece has the 
lowest in all the years reported. With Greece being continuously the centre of the on-
going Euro crisis its low degree of openness relative to the rest of the world is 
suggesting, according to the openness criterion, that it is very costly for Greece to 
abandon its national currency and join the single currency which perhaps is the price 
that the country is paying now. This means devaluation of the Drachma could have been 
a useful monetary policy tool for the Greece economy. Italy and Spain are also 
relatively less open as their ratios are mainly in the thirties and forties with France and 
UK following. However, what we can deduce from the ECOWAS and EU 12 trade to 
GDP figures is that, although EU 12 countries are more open than ECOWAS which 
may be due to their difference in economic development, ECOWAS countries are open 
economies and the degree of openness from 1981 to 2011 has improved. In fact some 
ECOWAS economies are even more open than some EU12 economies as shown in 
appendices A.9 and A.10.  
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5.4.2 Intra-ECOWAS openness (GDP measure)  
In this section we assess ECOWAS countries openness in relation to each other in the 
community. First we use the openness measure as defined by equation 5.3 i.e. intra-
ECOWAS trade to GDP ratio. This measure is very similar to the one discussed above 
for Equation 5.1 but the difference is that this measure focused on bilateral trade within 
ECOWAS members rather than total trade with the world.  
 The results of equation 5.3 are presented in appendices A.11 for ECOWAS and A.12 
for EU12. The first thing that is striking from these statistics is that whilst there was an 
ECOWAS catch up in the trade to GDP measure of openness above it is not the case for 
intra-ECOWAS trade ratio. Most ECOWAS countries ratios in all the years are in single 
digit ranging from 0.6-22.5% as compared to the EU12 range of 15.8-128.4% or 15.8-
94.5% without Belgium. In fact if we take Liberia out of the calculation due to its 
abnormal trade to GDP ratio above the highest intra-ECOWAS trade to GDP is 20.9% 
which is 2005 for the Gambia. This is a significant difference in terms of intra-regional 
trade. By this measure Nigeria, the largest economy, has the smallest imports to GDP 
ratio for all the five years and when the total ECOWAS trade to GDP is considered 
Nigeria’s performance is still very marginal ranging from 0.9% in 1981 to 4.3% in 1993 
and since this period Nigeria’s trade with ECOWAS has been on the decline to a value 
of 2.2% in 2011. This means Nigeria is not an open economy when assessed by the 
intra-ECOWAS trade measure of openness. When we consider the comparative 
indicators, EU12, the least open economy is Greece with an intra-EU trade to GDP ratio 
ranging from 15.8% in 2010 to 20.2% in 1998. It is clear from these statistics that even 
the least open economy in EU12 is more open than almost all the ECOWAS economies. 
The data also show that the increase in openness from period to period as shown in 
appendix A.11 is very small for all the countries. Four of the countries- Cape Verde, 
Ghana, Mali and Sierra Leone- reported a decline in the ratio from 1981 to 2011, after a 
period of thirty years of economic cooperation. This suggests that the ECOWAS trade 
liberalisation effort since 1975 seems not to be yielding any positive effect. Unlike the 
ECOWAS countries all the EU12 countries, except Greece and Ireland, reported 
increase in ratio over the period 1993-2011. Ireland shows the highest ratio of 78% in 
1998, the year just before the Euro launch and since then it has been on the decline.  
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What we can conclude in this section is that ECOWAS economies are not open to each 
other and this has implications for monetary union to be discussed after the next section. 
5.4.3 Intra-ECOWAS openness (Total trade measure)  
This section presents the statistics for our third measure of openness as defined by 
equation 5.2 i.e. intra-ECOWAS trade to total trade ratio. The results are shown in 
appendices A.13 and A.14 for ECOWAS and EU12 respectively. This measure of 
openness gives an indication of two things. First the degree of openness within 
ECOWAS and second the degree of exposure to the fluctuation of the common 
currency. If the countries show high ratio it means there is high trade between the 
monetary union countries which means that those countries will derive benefits from 
high savings of transaction costs and foreign exchange risk and uncertainty. A low ratio 
on the other hand suggests that the member countries are not good candidates to form a 
monetary union and any attempt for doing so yields no benefits to those countries but 
only costs. Starting with the EU12, the range of the ratio for the entire six years period 
is 38.5-88% (Spain-Luxembourg) as compared to the ECOWAS range of 0.1-33.2% 
(Guinea Bissau-Togo). The results present another big difference between the levels of 
intra-regional trade between ECOWAS and EU12. Interestingly the minimum ratio of 
38.5% for the EU12 is even much better than the maximum ratio of 33.2% for 
ECOWAS. The results of this ratio show that UK is the least open economy with a ratio 
in the range of 38.5% in 1981 to 55.5% in 2003. This is not surprising as the UK is not a 
member of the Euro. When compared to ECOWAS the least open economy, Guinea 
Bissau it has a range of 0.1% in 1993 to 1.9% in 1981 indicating a decline in its trade 
with ECOWAS members. The ratio of the most open economy in ECOWAS, Burkina 
Faso, ranges from 26.5% in 2011 to 30.5% in 2005 which is another decline in intra-
ECOWAS trade performance. The statistics also suggests that all EU12 countries, 
except Ireland, experienced an increase in intra-regional trade from 1981 to 1993 with a 
similar pattern repeated, except Ireland and Netherlands, from 1993 to 1998.  However 
this trend is reversed after 1998 when most of these countries saw a decline in their 
ratios for 2003, 2010 and 2011 although the decreases are very minimal to be of any 
significant concern. This may mean that the EU trade liberalisation, common market 
and the EMS has yielded more positive results on the regional trade than the period after 
the introduction of the Euro in 1999. On the ECOWAS side the degree of openness, by 
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the intra-regional trade to total trade measure, is not only low for all countries and for 
all years under consideration but also the increase from one period to another is very 
minimal. Nigeria’s intra-ECOWAS openness is very low ranging from 1.4% in 1981 to 
4.9% in 2005 followed by declines in the last two years. Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire, the 
next two largest ECOWAS economy, trade more extensively with ECOWAS than 
Nigeria but still their degree of openness fell far short of the EU12 degree of openness 
to each other. 
5.5 Product diversification (Kenen, 1969)  
Kenen’s contribution to the OCA theory following Mundell and McKinnon has already 
been discussed in section 4.4.6 of chapter 4. Before adding his argument he first pointed 
the inadequacy of Mundell’s  labour mobility criterion that an exodus of labour, through 
migration, from an adversely affected region to the favourably affected one will serve as 
an adjustment mechanism to solve the unemployment, inflationary pressure and trade 
imbalances in the two regions. According to his argument, as seen previously, the 
economic diversification of a country should be a very important component in defining 
the OCA for reasons already discussed. In addition to the aggregate exports stability 
facilitated by product diversification, Lavrac and Zumer (2003) further expanded on 
how product diversification is justifiable for the low or no cost effect of a country losing 
its monetary policy. For instance in a well-diversified monetary union the use of 
monetary policy to offset the imbalances in the segment of the economy hit by an 
adverse shock could have substantial negative repercussions on the rest of the 
economies where the same shock did not occur. This renders a weaker argument for the 
role of an independent monetary policy in combating adverse shocks in a monetary 
union with well-diversified production structure. This argument led to Lavrac and 
Zumer’s statement that ‘in economies producing and exporting only few types of goods 
(e.g. primary goods), changes in nominal exchange rate may temporarily compensate 
for adverse effects and thus help to overcome the shock.’ With this brief recall of the 
main argument and the product diversification rationale as presented in the literature, 
this section will now examine the fifteen ECOWAS countries in an attempt to assess the 
extent to which they are fit for monetary union in accordance with the product 
diversification criterion. For the purpose of this analysis we use appendices A.15 and 
A.16. 
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Appendix A.15 presents each country’s top three exports as a percentage of its total 
exports in column 3 and in column 4 the number of exports that account for 75% of the 
country’s total exports for the period 2009. These statistics give us an indication of the 
export portfolio of each country and therefore the degree of diversification. We can see 
in column 3 that six (40%) of the ECOWAS countries- Burkina Faso (80.8%), Guinea 
(78.1%), Guinea Bissau (92.2%), Liberia (74.7%, Niger (94.3% and Nigeria (93.8%)- 
have 75% or more of their total exports dominated by the top three exports. By the 
average measures we used in chapter 3 these six countries constitute 76.01% of the 
ECOWAS GDP and more importantly Nigeria, the largest economy with 70.12% of 
ECOWAS GDP, is among the top least diversified economies marginally second to 
Niger. A disaggregation of these top three exports figures revealed a lack of good 
spread among the products. For instance out of Nigeria’s 93.8%, a contribution of 
86.3% comes from a single product, oil, as also shown in the fourth column and only 
7.5% contribution comes from liquefied natural gas. The worst case is that of Guinea 
Bissau whose top export (92.2%) is entirely dominated by a single commodity, cashew 
nuts with no form of processing. For Niger its top exports is dominated by two 
commodities, Natural uranium (70.5%) and light oils (23.8%), also supported in the 
fourth column. The situation is very similar for Guinea and Burkina Faso with the top 
exports dominated by Aluminium ores (62.9%) and unprocessed cotton (52.1%) 
respectively. For all the ECOWAS countries from appendix A.15 the contribution of the 
top three exports to total exports ranges from the lowest of 38.3% for Senegal to the 
highest of 94.3% for Niger. What is very common in the export structure of these 
countries is that almost all of them are dominated by a single product. Sierra Leone and 
Senegal have shown exceptionally the highest number of exports accounting for 75% of 
total exports, as shown in column 4, each with 22 and 19 respectively. The question 
remains whether these two countries are really well diversified by this criterion. The 
answer depends on how many of these products and their share in the country’s export 
mix. Senegal and Sierra Leone’s break down of GDP into the three sectors as discussed 
in chapter three from appendices A.5 and A.6 and figure 3.3 provides no evidence 
supporting product diversification. For instance, from appendix A.5, Senegal is 
dominated by the tertiary sector with a contribution to GDP of 69.3% and 66.4% in 
2006 and 2010 respectively. Most, if not all, of the components of this sector are non-
tradable. The country’s agricultural sector is relatively small and the manufacturing 
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sector has a sizable proportion of GDP but is significantly dominated by meat and fish 
processing as already mentioned in chapter 3. The mining sector is also small to have a 
large number of these products. For Sierra Leone, appendices A.5 and A.6 show that the 
economy is agricultural dominance with 58.3% and 63.3% of GDP for 2006 and 2011 
respectively. However this sector, as already mentioned in chapter 3, is mainly 
subsistence and therefore having many of the products in the export mix from this 
sector is doubtful. The manufacturing sector is also small and is mainly import 
substitution industries which again cast doubt on the significance of this sector’s 
contribution to exports. There is also nothing to support that the tertiary sector has any 
exportable components as services are mainly non-tradable and also this sector is 
mainly informal activities. Overall despite the large number of exportable items shown 
by Senegal and Sierra Leone, appendices A.5 and A.6, figure 3.3 provide no evidence 
that these two countries are significantly different from the rest of the ECOWAS 
countries in terms of export diversification. What these tables suggest is that no matter 
how large the number of exportable items in the export mix of the ECOWAS countries 
they come from mainly unprocessed commodities- agriculture and mining with no or 
little industrial activities. 
Taking the argument further by considering appendix A.16 there is also no evidence to 
support that any of the ECOWAS country is really diversified in the context of Kenen’s 
criterion. Food exports as a percentage of merchandise exports- which may be mainly 
agricultural commodities and light agro-based manufacturing- is large for most of the 
ECOWAS countries ranging from highest of 94.3% for Guinea Bissau and the lowest of 
5.4% for Liberia. Liberia’s agricultural sector is mainly cash crops such as forestry 
products and its low food export provides no significant diversification advantages. The 
low level of manufacturing activities in ECOWAS is also shown by the high 
dependence of imports of manufactured merchandise as shown by the manufactures 
exports as percentage of merchandise imports- ranging from 39.1% (Guinea) to 82.3% 
(Nigeria). This again corroborates the evidence on Nigeria’s low level of secondary 
sector (2.6 and 2.2%) in appendices A.5 and A.6. Appendix A.16 also presents evidence 
that the ECOWAS countries add very little value to manufacturing as shown by the 
manufacturing value added as a percentage of GDP ranging from 2.8% (Nigeria) to 
16.8% (Cote D’Ivoire). 
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The findings from this analysis are that none of the ECOWAS countries possess the 
economic structure of product diversification. The other interesting finding from this 
section is that all the countries’ export mix is heavily dependent on commodities from 
the extractive industry- agriculture or mining. As a result any external demand shock on 
primary commodities will not only adversely affect one country but all the ECOWAS 
countries due to their lack of diversification. The only positive thing about this lack of 
diversification as mentioned by Kenen is that occupational mobility on the export 
dependence sector (primary) is high due to the similarity of the production structure and 
less complexity of the manufacturing sector although this does not provide support that 
these countries are good candidates for monetary union. The implications of these 
findings are that if these countries should abandon their national currencies and 
monetary policy independence it will lead to high costs due to the loss of the exchange 
rate and monetary policy instruments to stabilise their economies in the case of 
asymmetric shocks. In the language of Kenen’s conclusion less product diversified 
countries, such as the case for ECOWAS, should not fix their exchange rate through a 
peg or a single currency. 
5.6 Similarity of inflation rates  
Similarity of inflation rates is the fourth economic criterion for the OCA theory. As the 
purchasing power parity theory is based on the law of one price the rationale for 
inflation similarity of monetary union members is that there is no need for changes in 
exchange rate. Also similar inflation rates means a common monetary policy can have 
similar and productive effect on member countries thus reducing the costs arising from 
the loss of autonomy. 
In this analysis we continue to use EU12 as our comparator. We examine the inflation 
rates of the 15 ECOWAS countries and then their subdivision into the two monetary 
zones that exist in the sub-region- WAEMU and WAMZ. The ECOWAS and EU12 
consumer price inflation for 2002-2011 are respectively shown on appendices A.17 and 
A.18. The graphical presentations are shown in figure 5.1 (time series) and figure 5.2 
(scatter plot). The descriptive statistics for WAEMU and WAMZ computed from 
appendix A.17 are shown in table 5.1.  These tables and figures indicate a clear disparity 
of inflation rates between WAEMU and WAMZ countries. WAEMU countries all have 
low and similar inflation rates and consistently for all the ten year period, except 2008 
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(global financial crisis), they maintained their rates below the 5% level which is the 
ECOWAS convergence target as shown in figure 5.1. 
WAEMU inflation pattern for the ten year period is far away from WAMZ and follows 
the EU12 inflation trend closely except for the higher rate of fluctuations in WAEMU 
as compared with EU12 as reflected in the spread and standard deviation in table 5.1. 
WAMZ inflation rate is not only high for the individual countries, mostly in double 
digits, on average for the ten year period it is persistently far above the overall 
ECOWAS average and much higher than WAEMU. This is consistently indicated in the 
descriptive statistics on appendices A.17, table 5.1 and figures 5.1 and 5.2. The scatter 
plot (figure 5.2) shows that all the nine WAEMU countries inflation for the ten year 
average converged with the EU12 rates at the level below the 5%. On the ten year 
average these countries even performed better than Greece. Unlike WAEMU, all the six 
WAMZ countries are distinctively singled out in the scatter plot way above the 5% rate 
with only The Gambia closer at 7.1%. 
Figure 5.1   ECOWAS and EU12 annual inflation rates  
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Figure 5.2   average inflation rates for ECOWAS and EU12 countries 
 
The Gambia has the best inflation record in ECOWAS showing the minimum rate for 
eight of the ten years. Four of the WAMZ countries (Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and 
Ghana) are between the 10-15% band. Guinea has the worst inflation rate performance 
in WAMZ and ECOWAS with an average of 21.3% (appendix A.17 and table 5.1). 
Table 5.1   WAEMU and WAMZ Inflation descriptive statistics 
 WAEMU 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Ave. 
Min 1.9 -3.5 -3.1 0.4 0.0 -0.2 5.8 -1.7 -0.8 2.7 2.2 
Max 5.0 3.3 1.4 7.8 5.4 5.9 11.3 4.3 2.5 5.0 3.0 
Spread 3.1 4.3 1.0 1.0 3.1 4.9 2.6 2.4 0.7 1.5 0.3 
STDEV 0.9 2.1 1.5 2.5 1.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.0 0.9 0.3 
Average 2.9 0.1 -0.1 4.7 2.4 2.3 8.6 1.4 1.4 3.6 2.7 
WAMZ                        
Min 8.6 10.3 7.8 4.8 2.1 5.4 4.5 4.6 5.0 4.8 7.1 
Max 14.8 26.7 15.0 31.4 34.7 22.8 18.4 19.3 16.6 21.4 21.3 
Spread 6.2 16.3 7.2 26.5 32.6 17.5 13.9 14.7 11.6 16.6 14.2 
STDEV 2.8 7.0 3.2 9.9 12.7 6.4 5.2 5.5 4.6 6.0 4.8 
Average 12.6 17.0 12.4 16.0 12.6 11.2 13.9 9.5 11.5 11.7 13.2 
A closer look at the descriptive statistics in table 5.1 also revealed that WAMZ 
countries not only have the higher inflation rates than WAEMU their degree of 
fluctuation, as measured by the standard deviation, is also higher which indicates a lack 
of convergence in inflation.  
The findings from this analysis are that there is a high degree of inflation dissimilarity 
between WAEMU and WAMZ countries in ECOWAS. Secondly the WAEMU 
countries not only have low inflation rates but also their rates are very similar and 
converge at the 5% level and in most cases follow the EU12 pattern. On the other hand 
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the inflation rates of WAMZ countries are far higher than the WAEMU countries and 
also these rates are not even similar within the WAMZ countries themselves.  
The conclusions from these findings are that ECOWAS countries is not an optimum 
currency area by the inflation similarity criterion of the OCA and an attempt to form a 
currency union by these fifteen countries will cost them more than the benefits they will 
derive from the union. The findings also suggest that WAEMU countries, by this 
criterion, are good candidates to be in a monetary union but WAMZ countries are not. 
5.7 Fiscal transfers  
We discussed, in detail, the requirements of the OCA with regard to fiscal transfers in 
section 4.4.8 of chapter 4. In this section we apply those requirements within the context 
of ECOWAS in order to assess whether these fifteen countries have the necessary pre-
requisites of fiscal transfers that will make them fit, in conjunction with other criteria, to 
form a currency union. The key question we are attempting to address here is whether 
ECOWAS countries have a system of income transfers in place that will enable it to 
provide the adjustment mechanism to alleviate the suffering of countries in periods of 
shocks. We apply this criterion from the perspective of insurance which is divided into 
two: (1) public insurance and (2) private insurance. For this section we use the stock 
market information and banking sector of ECOWAS countries reported in tables 5.2 and 
5.3 respectively. 
5.7.1 Public insurance 
This aspect of fiscal transfers as we have seen involves the transfer of income from one 
state to another through the system designed and implemented by member states of the 
currency union such as a centrally coordinated budgetary system that is responsible for 
tax collection and disbursement. From table 5.4 EU 12 countries were assessed as not 
having satisfied the criterion of fiscal transfers due to the non-existence of an EU wide 
centrally coordinated budgetary system for income collection and distribution. The lack 
of fiscal integration which usually comes in the form of fiscal union is considered a 
threat to the success of a currency union. However, policy harmonisation via a fiscal 
union may only work successfully if the members are in a form of political union. The 
more fiscally integrated the countries are the greater their ability to smooth asymmetric 
shocks through fiscal transfers from a low unemployment region to a high 
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unemployment region (Dellas and Tavlas, 2001; Kenen, 1969). The United States was 
considered to rank higher than the EU for labour mobility and in terms of fiscal 
transfers, the presence of the fiscal and political union in the US are said to be some of 
those key features that help the success of the US$ as a single currency for the 50 states.  
Coming back to ECOWAS we ask the question is it better than EU and closer to US in 
terms of fiscal integration? The simple answer is no. The fifteen countries each with 
independent government and independent fiscal authority led us to conclude that 
ECOWAS is no different from the EU and therefore from the OCA perspective a 
currency union for these countries will imply greater costs due to the lack of the shock 
absorbing offered by the fiscal transfers criterion. Although the EU is considered as not 
fulfilling the fiscal transfer criterion we can still argue that it is in a better position than 
ECOWAS for two reasons. First, the EU countries are developed as compared to less 
developed ECOWAS and as such are in a better position financially. The second reason 
is that although there is no centrally coordinated fiscal transfer system in the EU the 
existence of the welfare system in these countries help to some extent to make 
disbursement to needy people in certain circumstances. This is not to say that the 
presence of a welfare system can be a substitute for a fiscal union. In ECOWAS not 
only there is no centrally coordinated fiscal system, there is also no welfare system that 
provides benefit payments to people even in normal times. This lack of welfare system 
in all the ECOWAS countries was also confirmed by the West African Monetary 
Institute (WAMI), in response to a questionnaire sent to them. On the issue of welfare 
system in place to help countries in difficulties the WAMI respondent said (s)he is not 
aware of such a system in any of the ECOWAS countries and further states  
“WAMZ has stabilisation and cooperation fund with an initial capital of US$100 
million temporal short term loans for balance of payments shocks- authorities will 
decide whether to expand the size of the fund and extend its membership to the 
rest of ECOWAS.”   
This fund is only for the six WAMZ countries and not for ECOWAS as a whole. 
Whatever fund that is set up we still cannot say that it is in the strict sense of fiscal 
integration and our conclusion is that ECOWAS is short of the fiscal transfer criterion.  
5.7.2 Private insurance    
The private insurance operates within the framework of the financial system, banking 
and stock market, which facilitates the movement of capital from one region to another. 
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The framework of capital mobility and transfers we discussed in chapter 4 involves the 
selling and buying of securities (equities and bonds) across countries. For this to work 
the countries involved should have active stock market(s) that allow cross listing of 
firms. To assess this condition we report the stock exchanges and banks in ECOWAS in 
tables 5.2 and 5.3 respectively. From table 5.2, three of the ECOWAS countries (The 
Gambia, Guinea and Liberia) have no stock market at all as they are missing from the 
table. Sierra Leone with the most recent stock market established in 2009 is only listed 
with one company and the zero recorded as market capitalisation seems to be a recoding 
error from source. The eight WAEMU countries have one common stock market 
situated in Cote d’Ivoire with a market capitalisation of US$11.7 billion the third largest 
in the region next to Nigerian Stock Exchange (US$90.7 billion) and Ghana (US$30.5 
billion). Cape Verde stock market has a market capitalisation to GDP ratio of 0.05%.  
Apart from some countries not having stock exchange at all, for those with them it is 
very doubtful how many of each country’s securities are held by firms and individuals 
of other ECOWAS countries. Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) indicated that for the 
first three months of trading (year to date) for 2015 60.12% of its transactions are 
foreign and the rest domestic. There is however no indication of how much of the 
foreign transactions are from other ECOWAS countries. What is clear is that there is 
only an ECOWAS plan for the integration of stock markets. This is evidenced by the 
launched of the West African Capital Market Integration Council (WACMIC) on the 18 
January 2013 with the main objective of spearheading the integration of capital markets 
in West Africa and promotes strong relationships among member states 
(www.nse.com.ng). The integration process involves harmonisation of listing and 
trading rules, regulation and practices across the region and clearing and settlement of 
transactions. The WAMI road map is defined in three phases. 
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Table 5.2   Stock Exchanges in ECOWAS 
Exchange 
 
Country 
 
Date 
formed 
 
No of listed 
companies 
 
Market 
capitalisation 
End of year (US$) 
Market 
capitalisation 
(% of GDP) 
BRVM1 
The 8 
WAEMU 
countries 
Sept 
1998 
71 
(as at 2014) 
11,697,116,751 13% 
BDVDCV2 
Cape 
Verde 
Dec 
2005 
4 
(as at 2013) 
89,364,316 0.047% 
Ghana Stock 
Exchange 
Ghana 
July 
1989 
34 
(as at 2012) 
30,460,000,000 99.740% 
Nigerian 
Stock 
Exchange 
Nigeria 1960 
189 
(as at 2014) 
90,677,607,206 11.650% 
Sierra Leone 
Stock 
Exchange 
Sierra 
Leone 
July 
2009 
1 
(as at 2012) 
0 5.480% 
1.  La Bourse regionale des valeurs Mobilieres,  2.  Bolsa De Valores De Cabo 
Verde 
Source: African Securities Exchanges Association (ASEA) available on www.african-
exchanges.org (accessed on 26 April 2015) 
Phase 1: Trading among WACMI members via sponsored access is to commence in Q1 
2014 (Physical phase) 
Phase 2: Introduce ‘membership’ privileges, e.g. electronic membership (Logical 
phase) 
Phase 3: Full integration, i.e. all markets accessible by qualified West African brokers.  
Apart from the lack of time bound for the second and third phases, there is no indication 
that phase 1 has been implemented. The nature of the ECOWAS stock exchanges in 
table 5.2 and the documented but not implemented integration plan could only lead us to 
a reasonable conclusion that the ECOWAS stock markets are not integrated and 
therefore cannot achieve the fiscal transfer advocated in the OCA theory.  
Turning to the banking sector, from table 5.3 there are 220 banks in total in the fifteen 
ECOWAS countries (the left hand side of the table). On the right of the table we show 
banks that have a presence across the ECOWAS countries. Two banks are worth 
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mentioning here. Ecobank which is present in all fifteen ECOWAS countries and Bank 
of Africa (BOA) present in nine of the countries. For banking integration, the number of 
banks is important but not fundamental. Perez et al. (2005) used two key indicators to 
measure banking integration in Europe. (1) the degree of openness to foreign banking 
activity of a particular country which is measured as the ratio of the amount of bank 
assets of a given country that are owned by foreign banks to total banking assets of the 
receiving country. (2) The internationalisation of the banks of a given country measured 
as the ratio of the assets held abroad by banks of a given country to the total banking 
assets of the sending country. When we analysed ECOWAS bilateral trade with the rest 
of the world we found all the countries to be highly open to trade but not within 
ECOWAS countries. It may be a possibility that if these two indicators are applied on 
ECOWAS banks globally we will find them highly integrated but may not be so if they 
are applied only within ECOWAS countries. Again we don’t have the data to compute 
these two indicators for each of the ECOWAS banks in table 5.3. We mirror these two 
indicators by looking at the background of the two most common banks in ECOWAS 
with particular emphasis on their capital composition (liabilities).  
Starting with Ecobank which is a Pan-African bank, it is now present in 36 African 
countries. The bank was established in 1985 and is spearheaded by the Federation of 
West African Chambers of Commerce and Industry with the support of ECOWAS. At 
the time of incorporation its initial capital of US$100 million was raised from 1,500 
individuals and institutions from West African countries. The bank’s largest shareholder 
was the ECOWAS fund for cooperation, compensation and development. The second 
bank, Bank of Africa (BOA), was founded in Mali in 1982 and now present in 17 
African countries, 8 of which are West African countries. Since 2010 through 
acquisition, BMCE bank the second largest private bank in Morocco (North Africa) 
acquired a 55.77% ownership in BOA making it the largest owner of the bank. From the 
brief background of these two banks what we notice is that the two most populous 
ECOWAS banks are dominated each by one institutional investor. The 44.23% minority 
ownership in BOA may perhaps be dominated by other institutional shareholders who 
may be in or out of West African countries. This is a situation that is similar to 
Ecobank.  
131 
 
 
 
Table 5.3   Banks in ECOWAS 
Country 
No of 
banks 
Bank 
Present in 
(no of countries) 
Benin 12 ECOBANK 15 
Burkina Faso 17 Access Bank 5 
Cape Verde 6 Bank of Africa 9 
Cote d’Ivoire 25 Diamond Bank 5 
Ghana 27 United Bank for Africa 5 
Guinea 5 Guaranty Trust Bank 5 
Guinea 
Bissau 
4 Sky Bank 3 
Liberia 9 CITI Bank 3 
Mali 15 First bank/First International 
Bank 
3 
Niger 12 Zenith Bank 3 
Nigeria 24   
Senegal 22   
Sierra Leone 13   
The Gambia 14   
Togo 15   
Total 220   
Source: West African Bankers’ Association (WABA)- available on www.waba-
abao.org (accessed on 26 April 2015) 
If this is the case, which is likely, then we can also say that the ECOWAS banking 
sector cannot be said to be integrated in the strict sense of the OCA requirements. Just 
like the stock market case above we can also conclude that the banking sector in 
ECOWAS lacks the fiscal transfers required of it to be able to provide the smoothing 
mechanism in accordance with the OCA theory.  
The overall conclusion in the fiscal transfer criterion of the OCA is that ECOWAS 
countries seem far from meeting this requirement. The deficiency in this criterion means 
that in the event of asymmetric shocks, ECOWAS countries cannot move income from 
the advantaged to the disadvantaged countries leaving the ECOWAS people with the 
pain of suffering from the shocks. 
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Table 5.4   ECOWAS and EU12 OCA scorecard 
 Satisfied 
Criterion ECOWAS EU* 
Labour mobility No No 
Trade openness No Yes 
Product diversification No Yes 
Inflation similarity No No score 
Fiscal transfers No No 
Homogeneity of preferences No Partly 
Commonality of destiny ? ? 
*the source for the EU 12 information is from  Baldwin and Wyplosz (2015:376). For ECOWAS it is the 
author’s assessment in this chapter. 
5.8 Other criteria 
Apart from the OCA criteria already discussed above, which are more economic, there 
are other criteria as already discussed. These include homogenous preferences and 
solidarity v nationalism (SvN). The latter is more of a political consideration and is far 
from any quantitative measurement. A very controversial question relating to the former 
is whether all countries in the monetary union share similar views about the use of 
monetary policy. Of course the one-size-fit-all monetary policy works well when the 
countries share similar macroeconomic characteristics especially with respect to 
inflation. Our analysis in this chapter and chapter 7 has shown that there is a high 
degree of heterogeneity among ECOWAS countries in their inflation, debt, exchange 
rate volatility and current account balances. We found the WAEMU countries and Cape 
Verde to have very low inflation records as compared to high inflation for the non-
WAEMU countries. Such disparity in economic characteristics is most unlikely to make 
the ECOWAS countries to share common views in monetary policy. 
The political criterion SvN seeks to address the question of how deeply do citizens of a 
monetary union area feel a sense of solidarity. In other words are they willing to give up 
some elements of national sovereignty in the pursuit of common interest? The answer to 
this question is a matter of unfolding reality and actual experience. As a test of this 
criterion in Europe an opinion poll was conducted in 2006 in which respondents were 
asked whether they felt European. The results revealed that 16% said they often ‘felt’ 
that way; 43% said ‘never’; and 38% said ‘sometimes’. The European debt crisis further 
brought the solidarity criterion into question.  
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Box 5.1   The euro debt crisis row between Germany and Greece 
 
 “Greek resentment of pressure from northern creditors led by Berlin is shared in 
other parts of the south, where a single-minded focus on belt tightening rather than 
growth is seen as more likely to worsen the euro zone debt crisis than fix it. 
Even if Athens secures a new 130 billion euro EU-IMF bailout to avoid a chaotic 
default in March, the spat between Germany and Greece appears to have raised 
prospects for more lasting trouble further down the road. 
"I cannot accept Mr Schaeuble insulting my country," Greek President Papoulis said. 
"Who is Mr Schaeuble to insult Greece? Who are the Dutch? Who are the Finnish?" 
"I point out that European taxpayers are showing great solidarity at the moment in 
stabilizing Greece economically and politically for the long term. In exchange we 
ask the Greek side for changes of behaviour and measures to build trust that 
agreements will be met," he said in a television interview.” (German Deputy Finance 
Minister Steffen Kampeter)”6 
For instance two of the authors on European economic integration said  
“The initial reaction to the Greek debt crisis was to extend collective support, 
very explicitly in the name of solidarity. As the crisis deepened, however, 
nationalistic sentiments started to be expressed…the German newspaper Bild 
lambasted Greece as a nation of lazy cheats who should be thrown out of the euro 
on their ear…some Greek… responded by their statements, German politicians 
and German financial institutions play a leading role in a wretched game of 
profiteering at the expense of the Greek people” (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 
2015:374-375).      
Since the Euro debt crisis there has been exchanges especially between Germany and 
Greece and box 5.1 shows extract of these from the Reuters news paper (online). Can 
we infer the euro experience to the ECOWAS proposal? Although two economic areas 
can be similar but not identical we can, however, judge on the basis of different 
scenarios. ECOWAS is not yet in a full monetary union like the Euro but certain events 
we mentioned in chapter 2 and section 5.3.2 of this chapter on labour mobility- 
expulsion of ECOWAS citizens from Nigeria in mid 1980s and clashed between 
Ivoirians and refugees in Cote d’Ivoire- provide us with some bases to say that what is 
happening in the Euro is highly likely to happen in ECOWAS if similar situation is to 
arise. Baldwin and Wyplosz (2015) score of EU on the SvN, known as commonality of 
destiny, criterion is neither a pass nor a fail as seen in table 5.4. As we have argued in 
this section because ECOWAS is still a proposed single currency area but the past 
                                                 
6 Taken from http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/16/greece-germany-idUSL5E8DG4S020120216  
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experience of the region and the Euro area led us to conclude that ECOWAS is not 
likely to achieve an outright pass on this political criterion and as such we give it an 
uncertainty (?) score. 
5.9 Endogeneity of the OCA criteria 
In chapter 4 we discussed the OCA criteria and the endogeneity (section 4.6) literature. 
In this chapter we applied the OCA criteria to assess ECOWAS suitability for monetary 
union and our key finding from the analysis is that ECOWAS countries have not met 
any of the OCA criteria ex-ante thus making them inappropriate for a common 
currency. The Euro countries performed relatively better than ECOWAS as seen in the 
summary in table 5.4. However, the question of whether the euro was and is an optimal 
currency area was unsettled prior to 1999 and still debatable (Gabrisch and Buscher, 
2011; Matthes, 2009). According to the endogeneity literature as argued by Frankel and 
Rose (1998) countries like ECOWAS need not worry about meeting the OCA criteria 
ex-ante but should straight away enter into the single currency and afterwards they will 
become optimal. Willett et al. (2010) found evidence in support of endogeneity for the 
euro but warned on the danger of currency union formation by countries that are far 
from meeting the OCA criteria ex-ante on the hope of meeting them ex-post. Krugman 
(1993) who opposed the endogeneity argument also argued that monetary union costs 
may rise faster than benefits as economic integration proceeds on the grounds of the 
time it will take for a region to become an OCA ex-post.  
The nature of the formation and the long term existence of the CFA franc zone in Africa 
with low inflation record appear to provide support for the endogeneity argument. 
Whether this is the case it is however argued that the CFA countries constitute a puzzle 
from the standpoint of the OCA analysis (Couharde et al., 2013). Couharde et al. (2013) 
investigate the issue of sustainability rather than optimality of currency unions using the 
CFA zone countries and non CFA countries in Africa. Their analysis supports the view 
that the CFA zone is sustainable as real exchange rates tend to revert to their 
equilibrium paths, while in other SSA countries this adjustment process is mainly driven 
by movements in nominal exchange rates. However despite the low inflation rates and 
stable exchange rates of CFA zone relative to its non CFA African counterpart it is 
argued that there are costs associated with this. Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) on the 
trade-offs in the choice between fixed and flexible exchange rate system using SSA 
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sample accept the low inflation advantage of CFA countries over non CFA but their 
results suggest that fixed exchange rates, on the whole, is a bad bargain for the CFA 
member countries. Their results indicate that under output-inflation trade-offs, the 
output costs of maintaining a fixed exchange rate have outweighed the benefits of lower 
inflation. This finding is consistent with that made by Amin (2000). He investigated on 
the factors that have affected growth in the CFA franc countries relative to the non-CFA 
countries. He found the institutional rigidity (see box 5.1) imposed by the monetary and 
exchange rate arrangements to be the most important factor. He argued that the rigidities 
tended to negatively affect other aspects of the economies of the franc zone such as 
long-term growth prospects, poverty reduction or eradication and others. 
Perhaps we can understand the puzzle of the CFA franc zone not by dismissing the 
OCA criteria but by looking at the constraints imposed by France, its monitoring 
involvement and the invisible helping hand that it provides to these countries (see box 
5.1). Unless similar arrangements exist in the proposed ECOWAS currency union in 
order to enforce compliance by members and the economic structure of the ECOWAS 
countries change there is little prospects for these countries to meet the OCA criteria ex-
post. If ECOWAS proposed currency is to be freely floated, then option 3 in section 
2.5.2 should only be adopted after testing the sustainability of the CFA franc zone by 
delinking it from France/euro for a certain period of time as failing to do so could be a 
potential policy mistake.  
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Box 5.1 Monetary and exchange rates arrangements between France and the CFA zone 
             countries 
The core principles of monetary cooperation between France and the African countries of the 
franc zone signed in 1973 include: 
1. Unlimited convertibility guarantee from the French Treasury 
2. Fixed parity with the anchor currency (currently the euro)  
3. free transfers within the area, in principle 
4. Pooling foreign exchange reserves at two levels 
I. the states pool their reserves in each of the two central banks and  
II. in return for the unlimited convertibility guaranteed by France the union central 
banks are obliged to deposit a proportion of their foreign exchange reserves 
(currently 50%, a reduction from 65%) with the French Treasury, on the 
operational account held for each central bank.   
In addition France imposed strict macroeconomic criteria that countries should satisfy at all 
times (see WAEMU column in appendix A.3). Countries not meeting one of the criteria must 
define a programme of corrective measures in consultation with the WAEMU Commission. 
Failing to comply may lead to any of the following sanctions as provided in the treaty:  
1. A press release published by the Council 
2. Removal of positive measures from which a member country may have been benefiting 
3. Recommendation to the West African Development Bank (BOAD) to review its 
interventions in its favour  
4. Suspension of WAEMU assistance  
Source: Bank of France communication directorate (July 2010) “The franc zone” Fact Sheet no 
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Chapter 6 Application of the gravity model to Intra-ECOWAS Trade 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we apply the gravity equation of international trade to estimate the 
impact of currency union and exchange rate volatility on ECOWAS intra-regional trade 
using panel data methodology. Since the seminal paper of Rose (2000a) the issue of 
currency union on trade has attracted the attention of researchers. Most of these studies 
are based on global samples with a large number of heterogeneous countries. Those 
with specific regional focus are mostly on developed countries. This study focuses 
specifically on the 15 West African Countries for the period 1980-2012. We augment 
the gravity model with a number of variables identified in the literature as determinants 
of trade and provide estimates for the full period of our sample.  We estimate our model 
in triple index and double index forms before and after taking into consideration the 
effects of business cycle and globalisation and dynamic effect of trade over time. We 
also controlled for cross sectional dependence (CSD) using Driscoll and Kraay (1998). 
The findings from the analysis are summarised in section 6.8. These findings are robust 
even with different exchange rate volatility measures. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the next section discusses the 
methodology covering the gravity model and its theoretical development, model 
selection and data description, endogeneity and the treatment of zero trade. These 
sections are then followed by the econometric estimates and analysis of the results. 
Section 6.7 presents the results and analysis that account for CSD.  
6.2 Research Methodology 
6.2.1 The gravity model and its theoretical development 
The undisputable consensus in the literature is that the gravity model is one of the most 
successful empirical frameworks in international economics (Anderson, 1979; Anderson 
and Wincoop, 2003; Cheng and Wall, 2004; Micco et al., 2003; Rose, 2000a). In their 
survey on the empirics of international trade, Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) 
commended the gravity model as having provided some of the clearest  and most robust 
empirical findings in economics. It is used in wide areas of inter-regional and 
international flows including labour migration, commuting customers, hospital patients 
and international trade.  The model’s development dates back to Poyhonen (1963), 
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Tinbergen (1962) and explains the flow of international trade between a pair of 
countries as being proportional to their economic mass (national income) and inversely 
proportional to the distance between them. It is analogy drawn from Newton’s 
gravitational attraction between two bodies that the gravitational force (Fij) between two 
objects i and j is directly related to the masses of the objects (Mi and Mj) and inversely 
proportional to the distance between them (Dij), expressed in mathematical terms it is: 
𝐹𝑖𝑗 =
𝑀𝑖𝑀𝑗
𝐷𝑖𝑗
          6.1a 
Translating 6.1a in the gravity model of international trade as defined above and taking 
log the model becomes: 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑗=  𝑙𝑛 (
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗
𝐷𝑖𝑗
)         6.1b 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑗 = 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 − 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗      6.1c 
Yij is trade flow (exports or imports) from country i to country j, GDPi and GDPj is 
gross domestic product of countries i and j, Dij is economic distance between i and j. 
The concept behind the basic gravity model in 6.1c is that the larger the size of the 
countries i and j, as measured by their GDPs, the more trade between them and the 
farther apart they are, as measured by the distance between them, the less trade is 
between them. In other words in the context of international trade flows, the gravity 
model states that the size of the trade flows between two countries is determined by 
supply conditions at the origin, demand conditions at the destination and stimulating or 
restraining forces related to the trade flows between the two countries (Serlenga and 
Shin, 2007). 
Equation 6.1c can be expressed, for empirical work, as follows: 
𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗    6.1d 
The celebrated success of the gravity model is not without short comings. The early 
criticism of the model is that it lacks a theoretical foundation (Anderson and Wincoop, 
2003; Bergstrand, 1985). The implications are that the estimation results are biased due 
to omitted variables and also we cannot carry out a comparative statics exercise even 
though that is the general purpose of estimating the gravity equation. For instance if a 
third country, say k, enters into a bilateral trade agreement with country i, it will change 
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the trade costs between i and k due to lower tariffs. Basic economic theory suggests that 
such an agreement may affects the trade of country j, though not a party to the 
agreement (Shepherd, 2013) and this may be due to the effects of trade creation and 
trade diversion. The gravity model failed to account for these effects as is shown from 
equation 6.1d, 
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑘
=0. This implies a reduction in trade costs on one bilateral route has 
no effect on trade on the other routes in the basic gravity model which is not consistent 
with standard economic theory. In another example of the theoretical failure of the 
gravity model Shepherd (2013) considered the case of an equal decrease in trade costs, 
say a fall in oil price, across all trade routes including both domestic and international 
trade. According to the basic gravity model this will lead to a proportional increases in 
trade across all bilateral routes, including domestic trade even though relative prices 
have not changed. With constant relative prices one would expect that consumption 
patterns will remain constant for a given level of total production (GDP). The bilateral 
trade prediction of the gravity equation in this case is also in conflict with economic 
theory. 
6.2.2 The theoretical foundation of the gravity model 
The limitations of the gravity model outlined in the above criticisms led researchers to 
turn to theory to provide a basis for the gravity model of trade. According to Micco et 
al. (2003), the prediction of the gravity equation is derived from models of trade with 
increasing returns to scale (IRS), and product differentiation, such as that in Helpman 
(1987) and Helpman and Krugman (1985). However earlier theoretical foundation of 
the model dates back to Linnemann (1966), Anderson (1979) and subsequently to 
Anderson and Wincoop (2003). In addition to adding more variables to the model 
Linnmann (1966) moved further to a theoretical justification based on a Walrasian 
general equilibrium system. However the Walrasian model is criticised as having too 
many explanatory variables for each trade flow to be easily reduced to the gravity 
equation. Anderson (1979) assumed Cobb-Douglas preferences combined with 
constant-elasticity of substitution (CES) to provide a theoretical explanation of the 
gravity equation. He also made the Armington assumption that products were 
differentiated by country of origin. Similarly CES preferences was also applied by 
Bergstrand (1985) over Armington differentiated goods to derive a reduced form 
equation for bilateral trade involving price indexes. A subsequent extension of the 
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theoretical foundation of the gravity equation by Bergstrand (1989), Bergstrand (1990), 
Deardorff (1998) retained the CES preference structure but added monopolistic 
competition or Hecksher-Ohlin structure to explain specialisation. Anderson and 
Wincoop (2003) manipulated the CES and introduced trade resistance into the model. 
They derived a model that decomposes trade resistance into three components: (i) the 
bilateral trade barrier between region i and region j, (ii) i’s resistance to trade with all 
regions, and (iii) j’s resistance to trade with all regions. These developments led to the 
designed and augmentation of the gravity model in a variety of was as discussed in the 
next section.  
6.2.3 Panel data and the augmented gravity model 
A number of panel estimation techniques such as pooled OLS (POLS), Fixed Effects 
Model (FEM) and Random Effects Model (REM) have been used in the literature. The 
REM made the assumption that the unobserved individual effects are uncorrelated with 
all the explanatory variables which in most studies is convincingly rejected. The 
absence of this assumption in the FEM has made it the most preferred estimation 
technique as a way of avoiding the potential bias in the results. However, the FEM has 
the problem of eliminating the time invariant variables such as distance border, 
language and landlocked/island. To overcome this problem, Cheng and Wall (2004) 
suggested the use of the OLS to estimate the coefficients of the time invariant variables, 
that are eliminated in the FEM, although this method itself ignores the potential 
correlation between the individual specific variables and the (unobserved) individual 
effects which has the potential to severely bias the results.  
The recent practice in the literature is also to include a time specific variable 𝜃𝑡 in the 
model specification to account for time specific effects which is common to all cross 
section units. It is included to control for the impact of all the individual invariant 
determinants of trade such as the effects of globalisation and business cycle. These 
effects are incorporated by extending the benchmark model to include the fixed time 
dummies in the panel regression (Egger, 2002; Mátyás, 1997; Serlenga and Shin, 2007; 
Serlenga and Shin, 2013). Econometricians have proposed different specifications of the 
gravity model and we devote the rest of this section in discussing these models. First the 
cross section OLS specification as defined in equation 6.2:  
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛽′1𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽′2𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′3𝑡𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽′4𝑡𝑍𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡   6.2 
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For i = 1,…,N, j = 1…, N, i ≠ j, t = 1,…,T, where 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the dependent variable (defined 
as the volume of trade from exporting country i to importer country j at time t), 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 are 
explanatory variables with variation in all the three dimensions (example exchange rates 
between the two currencies of the trading partners i and j), 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝑋𝑗𝑡  are explanatory 
variables with variation in i or j and t (say, GDP or population), 𝑍𝑖𝑗  are explanatory 
variables that do not vary over time but vary in i and j (example distance, language, 
border, landlocked/island), and the disturbance term 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 is assumed to be iid with zero 
mean and constant variance across all i, j, t.   
In this cross section OLS model 𝛼0  and 𝜃𝑡  cannot be separately identified. This 
estimation technique fails to account for heterogeneous characteristics related to 
bilateral trade relationship and as a result it is likely to suffer from heterogeneity bias 
which is addressed by the panel estimation techniques.  
To deal with the heterogeneity bias we turn to the panel estimation techniques which 
can factor the effect of heterogeneity by including country-pair individual effects. First 
the pooled panel data OLS estimation model is specified as:   
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽′1𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽′2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽′4𝑍𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡    6.3 
Equation 6.3 is derived from 6.2 by imposing the restriction that 𝛽𝑗𝑡= β for all t and j = 
1,…4, and 𝜃𝑡=0. Another restriction imposed on this POLS model is that 𝛼𝑖 = 𝛼𝑗 =
𝜃𝑡 = 0 for all i, j and t which is the source of its failure to address the heterogeneity 
problem. As a result although the POLS estimation improved the estimates from that of 
the cross section estimates it still suffers from the bias resulting from the failure to 
account for the heterogeneous characteristics of the trading partners.  
According to Mátyás (1997) the gravity model based on the POLS as specified in 
equation 6.3 above is mis-specified. To address this misspecification problem he 
proposes what he claims to be the proper econometric specification of the gravity model 
which should be in a form of a three way or triple index model as shown in equation 
6.4. 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛽′1𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽′2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽′4𝑍𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡  6.4 
The three dimensions in Matyas model include: the time specific effect(𝜃𝑡), and the 
time invariant exports and imports country specific effects(𝛼𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑗), these two effects 
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are specified as fixed on the assumption that they are unobservable. However, the 
Mátyás (1997) model in 6.4 is also said to suffer from one problem, its failure to 
account for the interactive nature of the bilateral trade effects of the trading partners 
(Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2003). These two authors suggested an extended version of the 
Matyas 1997 model to include the bilateral trade interaction effect that is lacking in that 
model and their specification is as shown in equation 6.5: 
 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗+𝛽′1𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽′2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽′4𝑍𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡 6.5 
Generally, in these type of models the bilateral trade effects of the trading partners 
account for the time invariant historical, geographical, political, cultural and other 
bilateral influences which may affect the partner’s propensity to trade differently from 
the normal trading relation. Controlling for these unobserved influences by including 
bilateral interaction effects in econometric model estimation helps to solve the potential 
problem of biasness resulting from misspecification.  
In addressing the same problem of heterogeneity bias Cheng and Wall (2004) proposed 
a fixed effects model of the form:  
   𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛽′1𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 +  𝛽′2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′3𝑋𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽′4𝑍𝑖𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡  6.6 
In this triple index version of the gravity model the dependent variable is the logarithm 
of real exports of one country to the other country. It is argued in the literature that, in 
practice, the variables that are responsible for the heterogeneity bias are not known 
which makes them difficult to observe and measure. This led to the fixed effects been 
described as the result of ignorance. The solution to this problem suggested by Cheng 
and Wall (2004) is to include a dummy variable for each pair of trading countries which 
may be correlated with both the bilateral trade and the other regressors. Unlike the 
Matyas model in 6.4, the Cheng and Wall model allows the country-pair effects to differ 
accordingly with the direction of trade (i.e. 𝛼𝑖𝑗 ≠ 𝛼𝑗𝑖 ) making 6.4 a special case of 6.6. 
The cross-country restrictions imposed on the country-pair effect in 6.4 is 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖 +
𝛼𝑗. 
Cheng and Wall consider other forms of model specification (e.g. symmetric fixed 
effect and difference fixed effect models) and after subjecting them to a series of tests 
concluded that the FEM 6.6 is the most robust econometric specification of the gravity 
model of international trade (Serlenga and Shin, 2007). The problem with the FEM of 
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eliminating the time invariant variables and the solution in the literature including 
Cheng and Wall suggestion are already discussed above.  
It is also common in the literature to specify the gravity model in a double index form 
rather than the triple index expressed in equation 6.6 above. This form of the model is 
specified as: 
𝑌𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼𝑐 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝛽
′𝑋𝑐𝑡 + 𝛾
′𝑍𝑐 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡,  i = 1,…, N, t = 1,…,N,   6.7 
The index c represents each country-pair ij such that 𝛼𝑐 = 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑗  
In this double index model, the variables in 𝑋𝑐𝑡  , unlike the triple index model, are 
defined as a combination of features of the countries in each trading pair relationship i.e. 
the explanatory variables are expressed as a combination of characteristics of the trading 
partners. This method is used by Egger (2004), Glick and Rose (2002). The dependent 
variable is the logarithm of real total trade (exports + imports).  𝑋𝑐𝑡  includes both those 
variables that vary in all the three dimensions (𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡) and those that vary only with one 
partner of trade and time (𝑋𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑋𝑗𝑡), 𝑍𝑐  (equivalent to 𝑍𝑖𝑗 )  includes all the time 
invariant variables such as distance, common language, common border and land locked 
and/or island dummies. 
6.2.3.1 Fixed effects model (FEM) v Random effects model (REM) 
FEM and REM are two of the mostly use panel data estimation techniques and several 
advantages have been presented for the FEM estimator over REM. Firstly it avoids 
estimation bias that may be caused by misspecification or omitted time-invariant factors 
that are correlated with the dependent variable and some of the repressors. For example 
a country would exports different amounts of the same product to two different 
countries, even if their GDPs are identical and they are equidistant from the exporter. 
Also a stronger trade relation may exist between UK and US than US and France even 
though there is no currency union between UK and US. Such a difference may be due to 
cultural and historical relationship between the trading partners which may not be 
accounted for in an augmented baseline gravity model as in 6.4.  Second the FE method 
of estimation addresses the possible problem of misspecification caused by the distance 
variable which is included to proxy the relative costs of trading as distance is known to 
be a poor measure of such costs (Pakko and Wall, 2001) for a number of reasons (i) the 
distance between single points within two countries, usually the capital cities, can be a 
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poor measure of trading distance between people spread across millions of points within 
the trading countries, (ii) in terms of trading costs, distance across land is not the same 
as distance across an ocean and (iii) distance across relatively developed countries is not 
the same as distance across less developed ones. For these reasons the trading costs, as 
proxied by distance, introduces bias into our estimates due to their misspecification and 
the fact that these costs may be correlated with the dependent variable and the 
regressors.  
The alternative estimation technique to the FEM is the REM. The approach of the two 
methods is similar though they have different ways of allowing for different intercept. 
REM is able to provide estimates for the time invariant variables and hence overcome 
the FEM which eliminates them out in within estimation transformation. Also it 
overcomes the problem of loss of degrees of freedom with FEM resulting from the large 
number of dummies added for the individual units in the sample. The main point of 
departure is that the REM considers the country pair-specific effects term as a random 
variable and therefore are treated as part of the error term. Another difference is that 
unlike the FEM, REM assumes that the country-specific effects are not correlated with 
the regressors and/or the error term. In other words the regressors are exogenous. This 
approach would only be appropriate if the sampled cross-sectional units were drawn 
from a large population. On the null hypothesis of no correlation between the country 
effects and the regressors, the OLS estimator is unbiased or consistent but inefficient. It 
is argued in the literature that in practice it is unlikely for the regressors to be 
uncorrelated with the individual effects which may lead to inconsistent REM estimates. 
Whilst the superiority of REM over FEM is advocated in the literature in the absence of 
correlation between country-specific effects and other regressors there is also a 
justification argument in favour of FEM in addition to its advantages. For instance 
Egger (2000) justified the use of FEM on the grounds that most of the forces behind the 
exports effects, both tariff policy measures and exports driving or impeding 
environmental variables such as taxes, duties, bureaucratic legal requirements, access to 
transnational infrastructure networks etc are not random rather they are deterministically 
associated with certain historical, political and other factors. Another argument he put 
forward in favour of FEM is that it is based on the problem of sample selection. In other 
words researchers are not interested in estimating trade impact of integration of 
randomly selected sample of countries but between an ex ante predetermined selection 
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of countries. Despite these compelling arguments in favour of FE models, the choice 
between it and the RE models is to be decided based on econometric test. Empirically 
the choice between the two estimators is made by conducting the Hausman test. 
Hausman (1978) suggested a general specification test to test the null hypothesis 
𝐻0: 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑖 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 against the alternative hypothesis 
𝐻1: 𝑥𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼𝑖  𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 
Therefore it tests whether the FE and RE estimators are significantly different. The test 
statistic is defined as:   
ℎ = (?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸)
′
{𝑉𝑎?̂? (?̂?𝐹𝐸) − 𝑉𝑎?̂? (?̂?𝑅𝐸)}
−1
(?̂?𝐹𝐸 − ?̂?𝑅𝐸)   6.8 
Where: 𝑉𝑎?̂? (?̂?𝐹𝐸) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑎?̂? (?̂?𝑅𝐸) denote the estimates of 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (?̂?𝐹𝐸) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑉𝑎𝑟 (?̂?𝑅𝐸 ). 
We base our analysis on the FEM unless the Hausman test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis in which case we use the REM. 
6.3 Model selection and data description 
The debate on the specification and estimation of the gravity equation as documented 
above is endless. Traditionally the approach is to log linearize the model although recent 
trends in the literature have suggested alternatives. It is widely accepted that the use of 
OLS to estimate the gravity equation can lead to bias estimates due to the possible 
correlation between the unobserved (fixed) effects and some of the independent 
variables which the OLS assumed doesn’t exist. The REM also made similar 
assumption which made it prone to the shortcoming of the OLS. We have discussed 
how other estimation techniques, such as fixed effect, has attempted to overcome the 
problem of the OLS and RE estimators by relaxing the assumption of no correlation 
between the fixed effects and the regressors. Simulations carried out in the recent 
literature by Silva and Tenreyro (2006), Silva and Tenreyro (2011), Sukanuntathum 
(2012) have pointed out possible biases that may result from the traditional approach of 
log-linearising the gravity equation especially in the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
also the problem of dealing with the zero trade flows. Whilst these simulations have 
extensively compared the performances of the proposed new estimators and the OLS 
there is no mentioned of how these new estimators perform relative to the fixed effects 
models. Although the fixed effect model can be based on the log-linear specification, 
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unlike the OLS and random effect estimators, it drops the assumption of no correlation 
between the fixed effects and the regressors and therefore controlled for the 
unobservable (fixed) effects that is absence in OLS and random effect models. We have 
already discussed that fixed effect models can give better estimate of our parameters in 
the presence of unobservable effects. In the absence of simulations confirming the 
superiority of the new proposed estimators over fixed effect estimator our approach in 
this thesis is to base our analysis on the latter except a Hausman test fails to reject the 
hypothesis of the random effect estimator in which case we use the Random effect 
estimator. For this thesis we apply the Cheng and Wall (2004) gravity model 
specifications in the triple index form as in equation 6.6 and double index form as in 
equation 6.7. We augment these models with the same independent variables that are 
suggested in the literature as the determinants of bilateral trade. In the next section we 
give a description of these variables and the sources of data used in the estimation then 
followed by a detailed description of exchange rate volatility. 
6.3.1 Sources of data and description of variables 
This section explains the sources of the data and how the variables were constructed.  
1. Trade 
The trade variable used in the gravity literature is defined in different ways, ranging 
from exports, imports, exports plus imports, average of exports and imports, average of 
exports plus imports of i and exports and imports of j (Glick and Rose, 2002). The trade 
(both exports and imports) data for the analysis was downloaded from IMF Direction of 
trade statistics (IMF DOTs). At the time of collecting the data the IMF DOTs was not 
yet updated for the 2013 trade data. The trade (exports and imports) data is recorded in 
terms of US$ for all countries. Exports are recorded on a F.O.B. (free on board) basis 
and the imports are recorded on a C.I.F (cost including insurance and freight) basis. The 
nominal exports and imports are converted to real exports and real imports by dividing 
each by the US exports and imports price index, respectively then multiplied by 100, a 
practice followed by (Serlenga and Shin, 2007; Serlenga and Shin, 2013). Micco et al. 
(2003) used the US CPI to deflate nominal exports and imports in their European study. 
Others used the individual countries GDP deflator to deflate the nominal imports and 
exports to arrive at the real figures. The US exports and imports price indices for 1980-
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2012 were taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics. The real figures are 
computed as follows: 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑅 = (
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑈𝑆
) × 100  
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑅 = (
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝑁
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑈𝑆
) × 100  
For the triple index model trade is defined as the log of real exports of country i to 
country j where as for the double index model trade is defined as the log of total trade 
(exports + imports) i.e. exports of country i to country j and the imports of country i 
from country j.  
 The literature in the gravity model gave two reasons for the use of logs in the model. 
First it makes it possible to estimate the gravity equation in linear form. Secondly it 
allows the coefficients to be interpreted as elasticities. Some trade figures in the data 
base for both exports and imports are recorded as zero or missing. The problem with 
this is that data recorded as missing has a clearer message than those recorded as zero. 
A zero record may mean no trade at all or figure rounded down or data not available. 
We control for missing or zero trade as explained in section 6.5. Our sample size of 
N=15 countries and T= 33 years should have given us 6,930 (15x14x33) observations 
for the triple index model and 3,465 (15x14)/2x33 for the double index model. 
Alternative sources such as World Bank and Pen World table report only aggregate 
trade but not bilateral trade and Comtrade (UN international trade data base) is not free 
from missing data for the countries in our sample. 
2. GDP and population 
The real GDP data, GDP per capita and population were downloaded from the Pen 
World Table 8.0, PWT (Feenstra et al., 2013). The real GDP data reported at current 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in millions of 2005 US$. Similar data were downloaded 
from the IFS but too many gaps in the data especially for countries like Liberia, Guinea, 
and Guinea Bissau. To avoid the further loss of observations already created by the 
trade missing data the PWT data, with no missing data, was used. The real GDP per 
capita for each country was then calculated as the real GDP divided by population of 
each country.  The variables are defined as follows:  
For the double index model 
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GDP = ln(GDPit) +ln(GDPjt). 
POP =  ln(POPit) +ln(POPjt) 
GDPit  and POPit are the real GDP and population of country i (the exporter) at time t. 
GDPjt   and POPjt are the real GDP and population for country j (the importer) at time t. 
For the triple index model, the model takes on the individual exporter and importer 
GDP and POP separately as regressors. 
3. Exchange rate volatility 
The nominal exchange rate data was extracted from the PWT 8.0. The figures were 
recorded in local currency units per unit of US$ (Direct quotation). To express these 
exchange rates into a common currency for all the countries and for all the years, the 
quotation was converted into the number of units of US$ per unit of the local currency 
(indirect quotation) by taking the reciprocal of the direct quote. The nominal exchange 
rates (NER) were then converted into real terms (RER) by the formula used in some of 
the studies: 
𝑅𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑁𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡 × 𝑈𝑆 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥  
4. Distance: 
This variable which is a proxy for international trade cost is, transportation, taken to be 
the distance between the capital or commercial cities of the trading countries. A 
common measure cited in the literature is the great circle distance calculated with 
information from the CIA website (www.cia.gov ). However others used a more 
straightforward distance measure in kilometres between the capital cities. The latter is 
used in this study. The information was taken from port world website 
(www.portworld.com ). The site measures the distance from port to port which is 
appropriate since most international trade of goods are transported by sea. However 
there were three countries without port because they are landlocked (according to the 
CIA website): Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger.  
5. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
The information for the FTA was taken from the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
website (www.wto.org ). As we have seen in chapter 2 there are complex sub-regional 
agreements, trade or otherwise, in ECOWAS. It is too complex and impracticable to 
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accommodate all of them. For the purpose of this variable ECOWAS customs union, 
which is part of the economic integration towards the road to monetary union is 
considered. The customs union was signed and became effective on 24 July 1993 and 
was registered with the WTO on 6 July 2005. To see the impact of the ECOWAS 
customs union agreement on trade, the FTA dummy takes the value of 1 for all bilateral 
trade in ECOWAS from 1993 to 2012 and zero for all bilateral trade before the customs 
union, 1980-1992. 
6. Language (LANG) common border (BOR) and landlocked/Island dummies 
The language dummy (LANGij) takes the value of 1 if the trading partners i and j speak 
the same official language and zero otherwise. There are three official languages in 
ECOWAS, inherited from colonial time: English, French and Portuguese. The border 
dummy (BORij) takes the value of 1 if the two trading countries i and j share a common 
border. This is a measure of contiguity of the two countries.  
The landlocked and Island dummy (LALISij) takes the value of 1 if either one or both 
trading partners i and j are landlocked or an Island and zero otherwise. This dummy 
variable controls for the trade barriers that may impede on trade as a result of countries 
been landlocked or Island. 
The information on language, border, landlocked and Island is obtained from the CIA 
world fact book (www.cia.gov). These three variables (language, border, LALIS) and 
distance are all time constant. 
7. Currency union dummy (CUijt) and Trade diversion dummy (DIVijt) 
These two dummies takes into account of the fact that eight of the fifteen countries are 
already in a monetary union with the CFA as their currency while the others still have 
their own currencies. The CU dummy takes the value of 1 if both trading partners i and j 
are in a monetary union and zero otherwise. 
Whilst it is argued that currency union can create trade amongst members, it is also said 
that it can divert trade from non-members to the members of the union. To control for 
this effect a trade diversion dummy variable (DIVijt) has been included. The variable 
takes the value of 1 if either country i or country j (but not both) is in a currency union 
with another country. The dummy is 0 if both i and j are in a currency union or are both 
not in a currency union with any other country.  
150 
 
 
 
Both CU and DIV dummies takes into consideration of the ins and outs of the CFA. For 
instance Mali left the CFA in 1962 and re-joined in 1984, Guinea Bissau joined the 
CFA, for the first time, in 1997. Guinea exits the CFA in 1960, (shortly after 
independence) and never returns. For the period of study Mali and Guinea Bissau are 
partly in a monetary union and partly in a non-monetary union. Guinea is a non-
monetary union all through the study period.  
8. Similarity Index (SIM) 
This variable measures the degree of similarity in terms of relative size of the two 
trading partners in GDP terms. The index is bounded between zero (absolute divergence 
in size) and 0.5 (equal country size) i.e. 0 ≤ 𝑆𝐼𝑀 ≤ 0.5  (Serlenga and Shin, 2007). The 
similarity index is calculated as: 
𝑆𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 [1 − (
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑅
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑅+𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑅)
2
− (
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑅
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑅+𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡
𝑅)
2
]    6.9 
Where SIMijt  is the similarity of country i and country j at time t. 
9. Relative factor endowment (RLFijt) 
RLFijt = ln|PGDPjt
R − PGDPit
R|      6.10 
Where PGDPjt
R   and PGDPit
R  are real per capita GDP of country j and i at time t 
respectively and |. | means absolute value 
RLF takes a minimum value of 0 (equality in relative factor endowments) and also 
implies intra-industry trade. The higher the RLF means large difference in relative 
factor endowments and may also imply inter-industry trade. 
6.3.2 Measures of exchange rate volatility (ERV)   
 Various measures of ERV exist in the literature and there is no consensus on the most 
appropriate method. Before discussing these measures we should first look at relevant 
related empirical issues. The first issue, already mentioned previously in this chapter is 
the decision to use nominal or real exchange rate. According to Clark et al. (2004) the 
choice between the two depends partly on the time dimension of the decision under 
consideration. In the short run the exchange rate exposure of firms is determined by the 
nominal exchange rate. This is explained by the fact that in the short run costs of 
production are known and imports and exports prices have been determined. On the 
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other hand production costs, imports and exports prices in foreign currency will vary in 
the longer term, in which case the authors reasoned that real exchange rate measure is 
appropriate due to the fact that international transactions spread over a longer period of 
time. Although, on theoretical grounds, real exchange rate is preferred to the nominal 
one, the authors mentioned that the two rates tend to move closely together, given the 
stickiness of domestic prices and for this reason the choice between them is unlikely to 
have any significant effect on the measure of volatility or the estimation results. Whilst 
their base line analysis was based on real exchange rate Clark et al also used nominal 
exchange rate as a robustness check. A number of other studies used the nominal 
exchange rate as a measure of volatility Medhora (1990), Bailey et al. (1986), Fountas 
and Aristotelous (1999). Medhora whose study is based entirely on LDCs argued that 
traders time horizon is relatively short and therefore nominal exchange rate changes is 
more relevant to them because they move faster and more frequently than prices. For 
this reason it is the movement in exchange rates that mostly affect trader on a day to day 
basis. 
 The second issue is the important question of which currency to use. In answering this 
question the literature point to the role of currency invoicing on the grounds that most 
trade between a pair of countries, especially between the developing ones, is not 
invoiced in the currency of either country. Bilateral transactions between most of these 
countries are instead invoiced in a major currency such as US dollar or the Euro. This is 
an important point for ECOWAS where hardly any bilateral transactions take place in 
local currencies. It may then tend to appear from this decision that the exchange rate 
volatility of the currencies of the trading partner is not the relevant volatility under 
consideration. However Clark et al (2004) argued that this is not the case because any 
fluctuation in exchange rate between the currencies of the two trading partners, holding 
constant the exchange rate between the currency of one of the two trading partners and 
the invoicing currency, must reflect the fluctuations in the exchange rate of the other 
trading partner and the invoicing currency through the demand for exports channel. 
Concluding this argument the choice of the invoicing currency does not change the 
impact of exchange rate volatility on trade.  
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6.3.2.1 Forward rate and spot rate as a measure of ERV 
Exchange rate volatility/risk theoretically affects trade, although empirical results on the 
relationship have been mixed. However the extent to which such volatility is a source of 
risk, to affect trade, depends on the degree to which exchange rate movements are 
foreseen. With the existence of financial derivatives use to hedge this risk any foreseen 
part of the volatility may not affect trade since the risk can be eliminated through 
hedging. This means that an appropriate measure of exchange rate risk should be related 
to deviations between actual and predicted exchange rates. The forward rate could be 
used as a prediction of the future spot rate. Exchange rate volatility is then measured by 
taking the average absolute difference between the previous period forward rate (ft-1) 
and the current spot rate (et) expressed as: 
𝑉𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ |𝑓𝑡−1 − 𝑒𝑡|
𝑛
𝑖=1        6.11 
The problem with the spot-forward difference is that the forward rate is not a good 
predictor of future exchange rates and forward quotations are only available for major 
currencies that are actively traded in foreign exchange markets. This limits its 
usefulness to countries with well-developed financial markets.  
6.3.2.2 Standard deviation and percentage change 
The standard deviation of the first difference of logarithm of the exchange rate is the 
measure of exchange rate volatility which is most widely used in the literature 
(Caporale and Doroodian, 1994; Clark et al., 2004). The standard deviation measure can 
be expressed in level or percentage change of the exchange rate. A property of this 
measure is that it is likely to be zero if the exchange rate follows a constant trend and 
also it gives a larger weight to extreme observations. The standard deviation measure 
has been criticised for the skewed distribution of the exchange rate and also the 
exchange rate seems to be characterised by volatility clustering, meaning that successive 
price changes do not seem to be independent (Côté, 1994). In other words large changes 
tend to be followed by large changes and small changes are followed by small changes. 
The standard deviation measure is expressed as 
 𝑉 = √
1
𝑛−1
(∑ (𝛥𝑒 − 𝛥𝑒̅̅̅̅ )2𝑛𝑖=1 )        6.12 
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Where n = the number of sub-periods within the period under investigation, e is the 
logarithm of bilateral exchange rate change. 
Bailey et al. (1986), and other studies used the absolute value of the quarter-to-quarter 
(or month-to-month) percentage change in the nominal effective exchange rate as a 
measure of volatility on the basis that they are interested in the volatility and not on the 
rise and fall of exchange rate. This measure is defined as: 
𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = |
(𝐸𝑖,𝑡−𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1)
𝐸𝑖,𝑡−1
|            6.13 
Where: Vi,t is the absolute value of the percentage change in the nominal trade-weighted 
exchange rate, E, of country i. 
6.3.2.3 Moving standard deviation  
Another method is to use the percentage difference between the maximum and the 
minimum of the nominal spot rate over the t years preceding the observation, plus a 
measure of exchange rate misalignment. This measure stresses the importance of 
medium to long term volatility. It is defined as:  
Vt =
maxXt−k
t −mint−k
t
minXt−k
t + (1 +
|𝑋𝑡−𝑋𝑡
𝑝
|
𝑋𝑝
)
2
    6.14 
Where: Xt is the nominal exchange rate at time t, 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑋𝑡−𝑘
𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑋𝑡−𝑘
𝑡  refer to 
maximum and minimum values of the nominal exchange rate over a given time interval 
of size k up to time t, and 𝑋𝑡
𝑝
 is the equilibrium exchange rate. 
As we have seen in this section there are as many measures of exchange rate variability 
as there are disagreements on which one is the most appropriate. Medhora (1990) 
argued in his case that the standard deviation of the spot rates is the most appropriate 
measure. In the case of LDCs Medhora ruled out deviation from trend as a measure of 
exchange rate uncertainty because it assumes that the trend is predictable thus leaving 
only the misfits as the true measure of uncertainty and as such it is inappropriate to 
attribute this foresight to a trader in a small LDC whose concern is on a day to day, 
week to week or month to month basis. He further argued that the standard deviation 
method is informationally less demanding, than the trend method, for these types of 
traders since the mean of a group of observations is easier to compute than the trend.  
Medhora also ruled out the difference between the previous forward rate and current 
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spot rate on the grounds of non-availability of derivatives market in his sample 
countries and the invoicing on a currency other than the CFA franc7. In this thesis we 
follow Medhora and other studies by using the standard deviation as our main exchange 
rate volatility measure and then use other measures to conduct a sensitivity analysis as a 
robustness check of our results. Therefore we define exchange rate volatility between 
countries i and j at time t, as the standard deviation of the first difference of the annual 
natural logarithm of the real exchange rate in the five years preceding period t 
(RERV1). This means for the 2012 exchange rate, the standard deviation of the first 
difference of the logarithm of the exchange rate of the trading partners from 2007-2011. 
6.4  The treatment of Endogeneity 
Most studies in the literature found currency union to have a positive impact on trade 
but the unsettled question is how large is the effect. The empirical studies on currency 
union makes the assumption that currency unions are randomly chosen (Alesina et al., 
2003). This assumption can be challenged by standard endogeneity problem. The fact 
that currency union may encourage trade, and the potential for substantial trade may 
also stimulate the formation of a currency union may not be captured in the empirical 
estimation. Such simultaneity is said to have an upward bias effect on the OLS 
estimates. It is argued that countries with extensive trade relation may deliberately 
lower their exchange rate volatility in order to increase trade flows between them (Rose, 
2000a). To achieve this countries can foster integration, through lowering regulatory 
barriers, harmonizing standards of production, and so on (Tenreyro, 2007). In other 
words exchange rate volatility should be bad for trade but more trade should reduce 
exchange rate volatility (ERV) (Rose, 2000a:29). Based on this, Rose argued that the 
sign of this simultaneity bias is indeterminate and therefore there is no reason why the 
ERV coefficient should be biased in one particular direction. Rose cited some examples 
from his sample that supports the irrelevancy of the reverse causality argument. His first 
example is that trade does not appear to have any role for two of the countries that 
joined the CFA franc zone during his sample period and second the decision by Ireland 
to abandon its sterling peg as its reorientation from the UK towards Europe was also not 
trade motivated. Overall he argued that even the countries that left the currency unions 
                                                 
7  For a summary of the different exchange rate volatility measures see McKenzie 
(1999), Bahmani-Oskooee et al (2007) 
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before his sample period were motivated by political considerations rather than 
economic. With this trade irrelevancy argument Rose concluded that the issue of reverse 
causality should not affect OLS estimate of the currency union coefficients. Some 
empirical works address this problem by the use of country-pair effects as a first step 
although usually not considered to be adequate to resolve it completely and some resort 
to the use of instrumental variables. However, the choice of good and appropriate 
instruments for the estimation leaves a great degree of subjectivity.  Rose used, as 
instrumental variables, the product of the two relevant inflation rates; their sum; and the 
absolute value of the difference between the two inflation rates. After instrumenting for 
ERV Rose’s significant results of the positive and negative effects of currency union 
and ERV respectively remained unchanged. Alesina et al. (2003) used as instrument, a 
dummy variable that indicates whether two countries share a common base country or 
the probability that two countries share a common base. They found a strong positive 
effect of currency union on trade. In a similar study Frankel and Wei (1993a) used 
standard deviation of relative money supplies as instrument for ERV and found a 
negative and significant effect of ERV on trade although the size of the effect is smaller 
with IV than when using OLS.  Using the two trading countries’ average distance from 
all the countries in the gold standard as instrument, Estevadeordal et al. (2003) found 
that the bilateral trade estimates, of countries in the gold standard, with OLS are robust. 
They considered membership in the gold standard to be more likely to be endogenous 
than exchange rate regime choice in today’s modern era. Despite the usefulness of IV to 
correct for endogeneity the literature acknowledged the difficulty of obtaining proper 
instruments that are really exogeneous which should also make us less worried about 
reverse causation (Estevadeordal et al., 2003). Barr et al cited in Micco et al. (2003) use 
correlation of cycles as an instrument for currency union on the basis that the OCA 
literature suggests that there should be a close association between currency unions and 
cycle correlations among country pairs. This instrument was considered not ideal due to 
the endogeneous literature which states that cycle correlation is also strongly associated 
to trade intensity. Despite this critique the estimates from the use of this instrument 
yield positive and statistically significant currency union effect on trade and much lower 
than the Rose’s estimate. The similarity of the Barr et al estimates to that of Micco et al. 
(2003) is argued to give some support to their instrument. 
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The choice of an appropriate instrument is difficult and one strand of the literature 
suggests the use of instruments outside the model under consideration (Larcker and 
Rusticus, 2010) because, if they can be identified, they help to solve the identification 
problem. The problem with this approach is that outside instruments are difficult to find 
and as such most researchers prefer to use internal instruments since they are more 
readily available and may be free of some of the criticisms affecting outside instruments. 
With outside instruments it is difficult to prove that they are uncorrelated with the error 
term, and at the same time, contain enough information on those regressors in the model 
that are not strictly exogenous.  
As an alternative to instrumental variable to account for the endogeneity problem Micco 
et al. (2003) use country-pair dummies although they acknowledged that this approach 
does not completely eliminates the problem. The country-pair dummies are also use to 
control for heterogeneity which actually capture the unobservable effects of country-
pair effects. They argued that these dummies should also capture any trade effect caused 
by reverse causality. In particular in their study they observe no substantial increase in 
trade among EMU countries before joining the monetary union, which they said 
suggests that the endogeneity problem should be less serious and therefore it is 
sufficient for country-pair dummies to account for the problem. To make the 
endogeneity problem less of a concern they also choose a short period (1992-2002).  
The above discussion provided us with the platform to make a decision about the 
relevancy or irrelevancy of reverse causality of currency union on trade in the case of 
the 15 ECOWAS countries in our sample. First the complexity and uncertainty involved 
in choosing an appropriate instrument is in itself a potential to introduce noise in our 
results. Second we saw from Rose’s argument, above, against the relevancy of reverse 
causality where his first example cited was that none of the countries that joined the 
CFA Franc during his sample period was motivated by trade. Following this argument 
we looked at our sample very closely to see the ins and outs of the CFA currency union 
(WAEMU) since its formation. Guinea left the CFA in 1960 due to political fallout with 
France. In 1962, similar politically related problem led to the exit of the CFA by Mali. 
Mali rejoined the CFA in 1984 but there is no evidence in the data that this return was 
trade motivated. Guinea Bissau, one of the least trading countries within ECOWAS, 
decided to join the CFA in 1997 but there was nothing in the trade figures that indicate 
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that the reason was because of trade. Above all, the creation of the CFA currency union 
in 1945 by France and its membership at that time was not because of extensive trade 
between those countries. In fact most commentators said the CFA is a colonial legacy 
and if that is the case then one would say that it formation was politically motivated 
rather than trade. Looking at our sample of countries outside the WAEMU there is no 
English speaking country in ECOWAS that has ever joined WAEMU on the basis of 
trade or any other reason. Nigeria- English speaking- shared border with two WAEMU 
countries (Benin and Niger) and two CEMAC countries (Cameroon and Chad) and 
despite the trade between Nigeria and these four French speaking countries, Nigeria has 
never joined either of the two monetary unions. The Gambia (English) is engulfed by 
Senegal (French) and no reason has ever made the former to join WAEMU. This 
situation also applies to Ghana. Since its formation in 1945, WAEMU remained a 
French speaking countries monetary union except for Guinea Bissau (Portuguese) who 
joined in 1997. These evidences in our sample corresponds to the observations made by 
Micco et al. (2003) in their EMU sample where they said there was no substantial 
increase in trade before countries join the EMU just like the CFA case. The lack of trade 
motivation to join the monetary union in our sample according to Rose and Micco et al 
suggests that endogeneity problem should be less serious in our study and therefore we 
consider country-pair dummies to be sufficient to address the problem (see section 
6.6.3.4).   
6.5 The treatment of Zero trade 
For the double index model, where we use total trade (exports + imports), there were 
926 values that are either missing or recorded as zero out of a total of 3,465 ((15x14)/2 
x 33) observations, representing 26.7% of the sample size.  Trade measured as exports 
or imports has 2,509 and 2,362 missing values respectively out of a total of 6,930 
(15x14x33) observations. In Helpman (1987) sample of 24,806 possible bilateral 
trading relationships there were only 11,146 (44.9%) observations that are positive with 
55.1% either missing or zero (they used an exports model).                                          
The zero trade recorded may be due to the levels of trade are too small to be recorded. 
Most statistics authorities may have a policy of recoding data, trade or otherwise, if they 
exceed a set threshold. This means it is not always possible to ascertain whether their 
trade is zero or is merely too small and have been rounded down to zero (Frankel et al., 
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1997). The double log specification of the gravity model permits the coefficients to be 
interpreted as elasticities but at the same time the inability of this model to 
accommodate zero trade presents a challenge since we cannot take the log of zero.   
Different approaches are commonly used in the literature to account for the zeros in the 
trade variable. The first approach is to ignore the zeros/missing observations. This 
approach is followed by Baier and Bergstrand (2007),  Frankel (1997), Fukao et al. 
(2003), Wang and Winters (1992). Frankel (1997) justifies the omission of the zero 
trade flows on the basis that the final results are not very different from their inclusion. 
Soloaga and Winters (2001) made similar justification on the argument that their results 
are robust to either the Tobit or the more traditional OLS methods without the zero trade 
flows. However, the concern with this approach is that it might bias the results since the 
omitted observations contain information about why such low levels of trade are 
observed. The second method is to substitute arbitrary small numbers, usually 1, for the 
zeros. Papers that followed this technique found that the inclusion of the missing values 
made little substantive difference to the results (Linnemann, 1966). As a robustness 
check Baier and Bergstrand (2007) substituted 1 for the zeros and estimated the model 
and they found no difference in the results. However, there were only 1,818 (19.9%) 
zeros out of 9,120 observations in their sample.  The third technique is to use a semi-log 
specification where the dependent variable, is expressed in levels rather than in logs and 
then apply Tobit to estimate the model. This method is used by Gauto (2012). Soloaga 
and Winters (2001) followed this approach. Linders and Henri (2006), however, 
questioned the appropriateness of the Tobit approach on the grounds that the model 
would be justified if the censored data reflected negative trade values or if the 
dependent variables exists but it is unobservable.  
A fourth approach which is employed by Eichengreen and Irwin (1995), Boisso and 
Ferrantino (1997), Chen (2004)  is to express the dependent variable as the log of 
(1+TRADEij). The logic behind this specification is that for large values of trade, 
ln(1+TRADE)≈ln(TRADE) and the constant elasticity relationship is preserved; for 
small values, ln(1+TRADE) ≈ TRADE, which approximates the semi-log Tobit 
relationship. In order to include the zeros and avoid the complication caused by taking 
logs Frankel et al. (1997) used a non-linear specification in multiplicative rather than 
log-linear. In this model both dependent and independent variables are expressed in 
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level. The logic of this specification is that when the sizes of the countries are close to 
or equal to zero the predicted level of bilateral trade will also be close to or equal to 
zero, exactly as it should be. He then used a log-linear specification to test the 
sensitivity of the results and they found no difference between the two results. 
However, the traditional practice of log linearising the gravity model has received 
criticism on the basis of Jensen’s inequality which implies that E(lnY) ≠ lnE(Y). One of 
the implications of Jensen’s inequality is that the normal practice of interpreting the 
parameters of log-linearised models estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) as 
elasticities can be highly misleading in the presence of heteroscedasticity (Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006). The two authors argued that the gravity equation should be estimated 
in their multiplicative form. They proposed a simple Pseudo-maximum-likelihood 
(PML) estimation technique. They further argued that the PML is not only consistent in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity but also provides a natural way to deal with the zero 
values of the dependent variable. In their Monte Carlo simulations, they compared the 
performance of OLS log-linearised specification and PML estimator and found that in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity the former is severely biased and hence distorting the 
interpretation of the model. In their results where the OLS estimator gives large and 
statistically significant impact, the PML on the contrary yield small and sometimes 
statistically insignificant effect. The problem of log-linearisation of the gravity equation 
and the use of OLS in the presence of zero trade and heteroscedasticity is also addressed 
by Sukanuntathum (2012). The author accept that the Poisson pseudo maximum 
likelihood (PPML) estimator, proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) gives consistent 
parameters when heteroscedasticity occurs but it got a problem when there are zero 
trade flows and the solution to that is to use a two steps estimation method and use 
Negative binomial pseudo maximum likelihood (NBPML) estimator in the second step. 
The author argued that in the presence of both heteroscedasticity and zero trade flows 
the NBPML gives consistent parameter and robust to different forms of 
heteroscedasticity and greatly deal with zero flows. However, a further simulation by 
Silva and Tenreyro (2011) confirmed that their proposed PPML is well behaved in a 
wide range of situations and that the estimator’s performance is not affected even with a 
large number of zeros in the dependent variable.     
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6.6 Empirical Application to the Intra-ECOWAS Trade 
In this section we attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the sources of 
bilateral trade amongst the 15 ECOWAS countries over the 33 year period, 1980-2012 
using both triple and double index models of the gravity equation as shown in equations 
6.6 and 6.7 respectively.  A detailed definition of all the variables and data sources is 
already given in section 6.3.1. In the next section we discuss the theoretical expectation 
of the signs of the variables in our model. 
6.6.1 A priori expectations of variable signs 
The expected signs of the base line gravity equation are already discussed above. Two 
linked variables, population and per capita GDP have ambiguous effects on trade 
leading to competing views on the matter. The interpretation of Bergstrand (1989) is 
that a positive (negative) impact of exporter population is an indication that the exports 
are labour (capital) intensive in nature. On the other hand a positive (negative) impact of 
the importer population indicates that the imports tend to be necessity (luxury) in 
nature. The opposing view, as noted by Baldwin (1994), is that both impacts can be 
negative since larger countries may sometime be regarded as self-efficient. It should be 
noted that the exporter and importer population are only shown as separate variables in 
the triple index model but not in the double index one since in the latter the two 
populations are shown as a combined characteristics. 
In their two industries and two factors model (Bergstrand, 1989:146) states: 
“If good A is the luxury in consumption, good A is capital intensive in production 
and good A’s elasticity of substitution exceeds unity, the theoretical coefficients 
for exporter and importer incomes and per capita incomes…are all positively 
signed. Thus…these are feasible inferences since estimation usually involves trade 
flows among major industrialised countries. Of course, expected coefficient sign 
would change as one or more of these assumptions change. Moreover, only in this 
special case of two industries and two factors can the capital or labour intensity 
of an industry be inferred.”    
The first category of variables we use to augment the basic gravity equation include 
important variables considered to be determinants of bilateral trade. These includes 
currency union (CU) membership, exchange rate volatility (ERV), free trade/customs 
union agreement (FTA), trade diversion (DIV) and time invariant determinants such as 
common language (LANG), common border (BOR), landlocked and/or island (LALIS). 
The key variables of interest in this analysis are the currency union (CU) dummy and 
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the exchange rate volatility variables. The benefits of currency union are already 
discussed in chapter 4. A quick recap of the main argument is that a currency union will 
reduce transaction costs of trading with the member countries. On the basis of this 
argument, the impact of currency union on bilateral trade flows is therefore expected to 
be positive although the empirical evidence in the literature is mixed. For the trade 
diversion (DIV) dummy the literature suggests that a significant negative coefficient on 
this variable would indicate the existence of a potentially harmful trade diversion, and 
could be interpreted as implying that currency unions boost trade inside the union at the 
expense of trade with non-members (Rose 2000a:25). Landlocked and/or island 
countries can experience trading difficulties due to accessibility through transportation. 
As these features of a countries are constraints to trade it is therefore expected that the 
variable LALIS should have a negative impact on trade. 
The transaction cost argument also applies for the exchange rate volatility and in 
addition such volatility creates uncertainty for international trade and investment and 
therefore a disincentive to trade which may have an adverse impact on trade. It is argued 
that fixing the exchange rate, in our case here, through currency union will be beneficial 
for bilateral trade flows amongst member countries. To analyse the impact of exchange 
rate volatility on bilateral trade of ECOWAS we include an ERV variable which is 
already defined in the data definition (section 6.3.2). For reason already explained the 
US dollar was used as the foreign currency. In this indirect/European style quotation, an 
increase in the exchange rate means an appreciation of the exporter’s currency and a 
depreciation of the importer’s currency. In this case the importer will buy less since it is 
expensive to acquire the currency hence resulting to less exports. It is therefore expected 
that the ERV will have a negative impact on bilateral trade flows. It is worth noting the 
alternative quotation and its interpretation as failure to recognise the difference might be 
a source for conflicting findings in the literature. Some empirical studies Bergstrand 
(1989) used the direct/US style quotation where the exchange rate between the two 
countries is expressed as the number of units of the home currency (exporter) per unit of 
the foreign (importer) currency. In this style of quotation a rise in the exchange rate 
implies a depreciation of the exporter’s currency and an appreciation of the importer’s 
currency. This will lead to an increase in imports and a corresponding increase in 
exports. Therefore a positive impact of ERV will be expected on bilateral trade flows. 
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The free trade agreement (FTA) dummy, the common border, and common language 
dummies are all expected to have a positive impact on bilateral trade. 
For the second category of variables we follow recent developments in the literature and 
include other variables measuring both similarity in relative size of trading countries 
(SIM) and differences in relative factor endowments (RLF) Egger (2002), Helpman 
(1987), Serlenga and Shin (2007), Serlenga and Shin (2013). What is common in the 
recent literature is that these two variables (SIM and RLF) have been included primarily 
to explain trends of intra-industry trade share. For instance Helpman (1987), in his study 
of imperfect competition and international trade, finds a negative correlation between 
the intra-industry trade share and RLF but the correlation between the intra-industry 
trade share and SIM is positive. He interpreted his findings as a supporting evidence of 
the theory of increasing return to scale (IRS) and imperfect competition in international 
trade. However, such an unambiguous correlation may not exist in a model involving 
total trade, which is the sum of intra- and inter-industry trades as commented by 
Serlenga and Shin (2007). The larger the similarity index means the two trading 
countries are similar which implies that the share of intra-industry trade is high.  
According to Bergstrand (1989) in a typical gravity model, exporter GDP is a proxy on 
i’s national output expressed in terms of units of capital whilst exporter per capita GDP 
is a proxy of i’s capital-labour endowment ratio. On the other hand importer GDP is j’s 
national income and importer per capita GDP is j’s per capita income. This provides the 
basis for the definition of RLF for inclusion in the gravity model. RLF is a measure of 
the difference in terms of relative factor endowments (as proxied by the per capita 
GDPs) between the two trading countries and takes a minimum value of 0 (equality in 
relative factor endowments) and also implies intra-industry trade. The higher the RLF 
means large difference in relative factor endowments and may also imply high volume 
of inter-industry (and the total) trade and the lower the share of intra-industry trade 
(Serlenga and Shin, 2007).  
6.6.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
This section presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation of the variables. Table 
6.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the triple and double index models. The total 
number of observations for the TIM should be 6,930 (15x14x33) as indicated by most 
of the variables. The exports (trade1) variable only shows 4,421 because 2,509 (36.2%) 
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of the total is either missing or recorded as zero. The trade variable has a minimum of 
1.3346 and maximum of 9.2636. In the DIM the trade variable (trade7) which is log(real 
exports + real imports) shows a minimum value of 1.2791 and maximum of 9.4206. The 
total observations for the DIM should be 3,465 ((15x14)/2 x 33). Only 2,539 of the 
3,465 observations are greater than zero. 926 (26.7%) of the total observations are all 
zero/missing trade. The correlation matrix for the triple and double index models are 
shown in table 6.2. From this table there seems to be less problem with multicollinearity 
as indicated by the low correlation between most of the explanatory variables with the 
exception of the GDP and population variables. The correlation of the GDP and 
population in the double index case is 0.91 while that of the triple index case is 0.906 
and 0.911 respectively for GDPi/POPi and GDPj/POPj. The high correlation between 
GDP and POP in both models could be a potential source for collinearity if both 
variables are included in the same estimation. For this reason we exclude the population 
variable from our estimation and this we hope will yield more reliable estimates since 
the problem of multicollinearity is avoided. Instead we include the GDP per capita 
(GDPC) variable which has low correlation, less than 0.5 in absolute term in both TIM 
and DIM, with the GDP. For the LDV we made a choice between first and second lags 
and selected the one with the higher correlation with trade. The correlation between 
trade1 and trade1l (first lag) is 0.895 and the correlation between trade1 and tradel2 
(second lag) is 0.858. The first lag is selected and included as one of the explanatory 
variables. Similarly for the DIM model we select the first lag whose correlation with 
trade7 is 0.927 as compared to 0.924 for correlation between trade7 and trade7l2.  
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Table 6.1   Descriptive statistics for TIM and DIM 
 
Notes: Var is variable, Trade1 is log(real exports) of i to j., Trade7 is log(real exports + real imports), 
trade1l is first lag of trade1, trade7l is first lag of trade7 
Source: Results from STATA 
In both the triple and double index models, language appears to have a moderately high 
correlation with currency union, 0.600 for TIM and 0.542 for DIM. The correlation 
between currency union and trade diversion dummy is also -0.648 and -0.598 for TIM 
and DIM respectively. Other correlations that are in the middle range in both TIM and 
DIM are GDP and GDPC (<|0.5|) in both cases, distance and border, language and trade 
diversion are both slightly higher than 0.5 in absolute term. All the correlations shown 
in table 6.2, apart from population and GDP already mentioned don’t appear to pose any 
serious problem of multicollinearity as they are below even |0.7|. The high positive 
correlation between language and currency union may be an early indication of the fact 
that seven of the eight currency union member countries in ECOWAS are of the same 
language, French speaking. Early indication from the correlation matrix for both the 
triple and double index models suggest that there is a weak relationship between intra-
ECOWAS trade and the explanatory variables.  
 
 
 
Var    Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Var Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
trade1 4421 5.9450 1.355 1.3346 9.2636 trade7 2539 6.3340 1.376 1.2791 9.4206
gdpi 6930 3.7678 0.599 2.4776 5.6537 gdp2 3465 7.5398 0.831 5.1564 10.5737
gdpj 6930 3.7699 0.597 2.4776 5.6537 gdpc2 3465 6.0189 0.320 3.9688 7.1390
gdpci 6930 3.0100 0.231 1.9395 3.6157 pop2 3465 1.5210 0.799 -0.7236 3.6135
gdpcj 6930 3.0094 0.231 1.9395 3.6157 dist 3465 3.0699 0.330 2.0874 3.5339
popi 6930 0.7577 0.577 -0.5228 2.2168 sim 3465 -0.6241 0.356 -2.3459 -0.3010
popj 6930 0.7605 0.575 -0.5228 2.2168 rlf 3465 2.6176 0.498 -0.9358 3.6064
dist 6930 3.0662 0.325 2.0874 3.5339 rerv1 3459 0.0608 0.054 0.0081 0.9076
sim 6930 -0.6252 0.356 -2.3459 -0.3010 cu 3465 0.2141 0.410 0.0000 1.0000
rlf 6930 2.6150 0.502 -0.9358 3.6064 div 3465 0.5307 0.499 0.0000 1.0000
rerv1 6924 0.0616 0.051 0.0081 0.9076 lang 3465 0.3714 0.483 0.0000 1.0000
cu 6930 0.2198 0.414 0.0000 1.0000 fta 3465 0.6061 0.489 0.0000 1.0000
div 6930 0.5309 0.499 0.0000 1.0000 bor 3465 0.2381 0.426 0.0000 1.0000
lang 6930 0.3714 0.483 0.0000 1.0000 lalis 3465 0.4667 0.499 0.0000 1.0000
fta 6930 0.6061 0.489 0.0000 1.0000 trade7l 2451 6.3205 1.373 1.2791 9.3891
bor 6930 0.2381 0.426 0.0000 1.0000
lalis 6930 0.4714 0.499 0.0000 1.0000
trade1l 4266 5.9329 1.352 1.3346 9.2636
Triple index model Double index model
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Table 6.2   Correlation matrix for TIM and DIM 
 
Source: Results from STATA 
For instance our key variables of interest, CU and exchange rate volatility, has a 
correlation with trade respectively of 0.205 and -0.049 for the triple index model and 
0.263 and -0.065 for the double index model. What is important to note is that the key 
explanatory variables of the gravity model, GDP and distance, both have the correct 
signs positive and negative respectively in both the triple and double index cases of the 
model. The correlation statistics in both models appear to suggest that there is a greater 
supply force than demand in the intra-ECOWAS trade. This supply driven trade is 
supported by the higher correlation, in the triple index model, between trade and 
exporter’s GDP (GDPi) of 0.453 and lower correlation between trade and the importer’s 
GDP (GDPj) of 0.202. The former correlation is twice that of the latter. This correlation 
pattern is the similar for trade and population of the exporter (0.410) and trade and 
trade1 gdpi gdpj gdpci gdpcj popi popj dist sim rlf rerv1 cu div lang fta bor lalis trade1l
trade1 1.000
gdpi 0.453 1.000
gdpj 0.202 -0.069 1.000
gdpci 0.188 0.413 -0.094 1.000
gdpcj -0.027 -0.077 0.336 -0.043 1.000
popi 0.410 0.906 -0.032 -0.012 -0.065 1.000
popj 0.226 -0.039 0.911 -0.081 -0.082 -0.005 1.000
dist -0.193 0.067 0.064 -0.010 0.040 0.078 0.050 1.000
sim 0.027 -0.013 -0.096 0.022 -0.041 -0.025 -0.084 -0.071 1.000
rlf 0.056 0.090 0.051 0.037 0.097 0.082 0.012 0.068 -0.209 1.000
rerv1 -0.049 0.040 -0.070 -0.094 -0.058 0.088 -0.048 -0.022 0.022 0.041 1.000
cu 0.205 -0.010 -0.017 0.005 -0.068 -0.014 0.012 0.083 0.347 -0.114 -0.042 1.000
div -0.023 0.109 0.082 0.058 0.045 0.093 0.068 -0.083 -0.110 0.059 -0.005 -0.648 1.000
lang 0.113 -0.035 0.022 -0.044 -0.068 -0.018 0.053 0.193 0.294 -0.138 0.005 0.600 -0.618 1.000
fta 0.030 0.090 0.086 -0.059 -0.036 0.127 0.106 0.085 -0.031 0.001 -0.030 -0.020 0.077 -0.069 1.000
bor 0.248 -0.017 -0.005 -0.043 -0.084 0.002 0.031 -0.541 0.149 -0.094 0.034 0.145 -0.009 0.084 -0.071 1.000
lalis -0.036 0.043 -0.026 -0.166 -0.152 0.124 0.039 0.180 0.236 0.011 -0.028 0.375 -0.123 0.229 0.008 0.163 1.000
trade1l 0.895 0.447 0.197 0.187 -0.026 0.404 0.219 -0.192 0.021 0.059 -0.044 0.202 -0.030 0.113 0.016 0.248 -0.033 1.000
trade7 gdp2 gdpc2 pop2 dist sim rlf rerv1 cu div lang fta bor lalis trade7l
trade7 1.000
gdp2 0.563 1.000
gdpc2 0.115 0.288 1.000
pop2 0.531 0.907 -0.143 1.000
dist -0.264 0.031 0.075 -0.001 1.000
sim 0.034 -0.116 -0.061 -0.093 -0.154 1.000
rlf 0.023 0.076 0.114 0.028 0.057 -0.212 1.000
rerv1 -0.065 -0.039 -0.094 0.001 -0.058 0.064 -0.007 1.000
cu 0.263 0.026 -0.049 0.049 0.030 0.318 -0.096 -0.041 1.000
div -0.022 0.095 0.074 0.066 -0.027 -0.091 0.033 -0.001 -0.598 1.000
lang 0.136 0.021 -0.100 0.066 0.120 0.271 -0.111 0.050 0.542 -0.605 1.000
fta 0.006 0.086 -0.075 0.121 0.081 -0.037 0.000 -0.038 -0.003 0.052 -0.067 1.000
bor 0.325 0.022 -0.106 0.069 -0.579 0.166 -0.086 0.046 0.154 -0.029 0.101 -0.070 1.000
lalis -0.076 -0.031 -0.187 0.051 0.196 0.179 0.026 -0.068 0.310 -0.081 0.156 -0.006 0.126 1.000
trade7l 0.927 0.557 0.116 0.524 -0.263 0.029 0.025 -0.058 0.262 -0.028 0.140 0.000 0.326 -0.078 1.000
Double index model correlation matrix
Triple index model correlation matrix
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population of the importer (0.226). However, since correlation is not causation we 
should only take these statistics as an eye opener and move on to the econometric 
analysis of the results. 
6.6.3 Econometric estimation results 
In this section we present and discuss the econometric results of alternative estimation 
procedures applied to estimate the triple index model (equation 6.6) and the double 
index model (equation 6.7). We divide the analysis into different sections. In section 
6.6.3.1 we run the regressions for the full sample period (1980-2012) for different trade 
measures using both the triple and double index models. In section 6.6.3.2 we carry out 
a sensitivity analysis using the same two trade measures (trade 1 and 7) with three 
different exchange rate volatility measures as a robustness check of our results. Section 
6.6.3.3 incorporates country pair dummies to account for endogeneity. Finally section 
6.6.3.4 addresses the problem of cross sectional dependence. In each of the regressions 
in the four sections we used Pooled OLS and FE estimators. We also included separate 
estimations where the lag of the dependent variable (tradel) is included as one of the 
regressors. This accounts not only for the dynamic effects of trade over time but also for 
any possible autocorrelation in the data. Each of these estimations are made with and 
without time dummies so we can control for the effects of the business cycle and 
globalisation.  
We use six different trade measures, four for TIM and two for DIM. Trade1 is defined 
as log(real exports), Trade2 is log(real imports). Most empirical work use either of these 
two but our approach here is to have a deeper interrogation of the ECOWAS data 
especially with a large number of missing values. Approaching our analysis from 
exports and imports perspectives gives stronger assurance of our results and how 
resilience they are under different situations. Trade3 is log(1+real exports) and trade4 is 
log(1+real imports). These two trade variables account for the zeros in our dependent 
variable (trade) following the practice in the literature as discussed in section 6.5. 
Trade7 and Trade8 are used to estimate the double index model where the former is 
defined as log(real exports + real imports) and the latter is log(1+real exports + real 
imports). Just as in TIM we use trade8 to account for the zero trade in the DIM.        
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6.6.3.1 Econometric estimation results for the full sample period 
The estimation results for the full period are shown on tables 6.3-6.6 for TIM and 6.7 
and 6.8 for DIM. First we consider the exports model with and without controlling for 
zero trade values. From table 6.3 the exporter GDP effect is shown to have a positive 
and significant effect on trade by the OLS both before and after time dummies. The FE 
indicates that the exporter’s GDP has a positive but not significant effect before time 
dummies while the effect is shown to be negative but not significant after time 
dummies. The effect of the exporter’s GDP is all positive and significant in table 6.4. 
This result suggests that the exporter’s GDP plays a significant role in ECOWAS intra-
regional exports. However, the effect is less important after taking into consideration the 
effect of heterogeneity as shown by the FE estimator. 
The importer’s GDP in both tables 6.3 and 6.4 is shown to have a similar effect as that 
of the exporter’s. The GDP per capita variable for exporter and importer in both tables 
6.3 and 6.4 is shown to have a negative impact on ECOWAS trade although the effect is 
more significant in table 6.4 than 6.3.  
Coming to our main variable of interest the currency union effect on ECOWAS intra-
regional exports is shown to have a positive and significant effect by the OLS estimator 
but negative and significant by the FE even with the lagged dependent variable (LDV). 
This difference has implication for the effect of heterogeneity in countries bilateral 
trade. From table 6.3 the OLS in column 1 shows that the trade elasticity of currency 
union is 0.83 (0.20 with LDV). This means that countries in a currency union trade 
129% [(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝛽 − 1) × 100] more than those not in a currency union. With LDV the 
trade effect of CU reduces to only 22%.  
After controlling for the effects of business cycle and globalisation using time dummies, 
the OLS estimate of CU effect on exports trade remains almost the same. With FE 
estimator that accounts for heterogeneity the currency union trade elasticity in column 4 
of table 6.3 is -0.69. This means that countries in a currency union trade 50% less than 
countries that are not in the union. After introducing time dummies, the currency union 
effect on trade remains statistically significant and the economic significant is almost 
the same. With LDV in column 5 the trade reducing effect of CU is 82% (β=-0.20). 
After controlling for the sample selection bias that may be caused by the omission of the 
zero trade our findings for the effect of CU on intra-ECOWAS exports trade, from table 
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6.4 is no different from the results in table 6.3. Both before and after time dummies the 
OLS shows a positive and statistically significant while the FE estimator show a 
negative and significant impact before time dummies and LDV but the effect after is 
negative but not significant. The OLS estimator from table 6.4 shows a CU elasticity of 
1.81 (0.45 after LDV) before time dummies. According to the OLS, exports trade for 
countries in CU will increase by 511% as compared to those countries not in the union. 
With LDV the effect is 57% as compared to 22% before truncation. The difference 
between the CU impacts reported in table 6.3 and that in table 6.4 may imply that the 
omission of the zero trade reduces the CU effect on trade due to the sample selection 
bias. 
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Table 6.3   Regression results for real exports (TIM)- 1980-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdpi 1.11*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.40 0.41 -0.52 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.78) (0.43) (0.81) 
gdpj 0.59*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 2.68*** 1.33*** 0.42 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.72) (0.39) (0.57) 
gdpci -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07 -0.28 0.66 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.81) (0.44) (0.82) 
gdpcj -0.43*** -0.09** -0.09* -2.50*** -1.25*** -0.34 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.76) (0.41) (0.59) 
dist -0.67*** -0.12*** -0.13***    
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)    
cu 0.83*** 0.20*** 0.19*** -0.69*** -0.20* -0.23* 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) 
rerv1 -1.66*** -0.43** -0.27 -0.59 -0.42* -0.22 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.22) (0.37) (0.23) (0.21) 
sim -0.19*** -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.10 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) 
rlf 0.18*** 0.03 0.04* 0.06 0.05* 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
div 0.27*** 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.25 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) 
lang 0.26*** 0.05* 0.05*    
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
fta -0.05 0.02 0.12 -0.12* -0.08** 0.16 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.19) 
bor 0.44*** 0.07*** 0.07***    
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)    
lalis -0.46*** -0.11*** -0.11***    
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)    
trade1l  0.81*** 0.82***  0.53*** 0.53*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.03) 
Con 2.05*** 0.39* 0.25 2.01*** 0.67** 2.04** 
 (0.35) (0.22) (0.23) (0.62) (0.30) (0.84) 
No of obs 4,417 3,991 3,991 4,417 3,991 3,991 
R-sq 0.43 0.81 0.81 0.16 0.43 0.44 
Ad R-sq 0.425 0.810 0.812    
F-test 227.1 922.6 354.9    
No of ind    198 185 185 
Rho    0.856 0.690 0.701 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is the logarithm of real exports (Trade1). OLS stands 
for the pooled OLS estimator, _1 means first lag of trade1 included, _1t means first lag and time 
dummies included, FE is fixed effects estimator, VAR means variables, R-sq is R-squared, Ad 
R-squared is adjusted R-squared, No of ind is no of individuals, Robust standard errors in 
parentheses,  ‘*’  ‘**’ ‘***’ denote coefficient significant at the 10%, 5%,  and  1% levels of 
significance respectively, Hausman test statistics rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between explanatory variables and unobserved individual effects in all cases considered. 
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Table 6.4   Regression results for truncated real exports (TIM)-1980-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdpi 1.67*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 3.49** 1.36** 2.18** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (1.37) (0.68) (1.02) 
gdpj 1.37*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 1.25 0.67 1.47 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (1.33) (0.63) (1.09) 
gdpci -0.82*** -0.18** -0.15** -4.61*** -1.83*** -2.64** 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (1.43) (0.70) (1.05) 
gdpcj -0.26** -0.02 0.01 -0.82 -0.49 -1.28 
 (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (1.38) (0.66) (1.12) 
dist -1.64*** -0.37*** -0.37***    
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)    
cu 1.81*** 0.45*** 0.45*** -0.53* -0.13 -0.05 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.31) (0.17) (0.18) 
rerv1 -4.20*** -1.05** -1.16** -0.95 -0.40 -0.12 
 (0.58) (0.43) (0.52) (0.72) (0.52) (0.55) 
sim 0.16 -0.01 -0.01 0.58 0.01 0.02 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.37) (0.18) (0.18) 
rlf 0.39*** 0.10*** 0.10*** -0.10 -0.02 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) 
div 0.30*** 0.10* 0.10* -0.53** -0.17 -0.11 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.25) (0.14) (0.14) 
lang 0.67*** 0.15*** 0.14**    
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)    
fta 0.41*** 0.08** -0.05 0.25** 0.12** -0.59 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.14) (0.10) (0.05) (0.64) 
bor 1.02*** 0.26*** 0.25***    
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)    
lalis -1.04*** -0.29*** -0.28***    
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)    
trade3l  0.76*** 0.76***  0.55*** 0.55*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) 
Con -0.83 -0.66* -0.83** 3.23** 1.20* 0.21 
 (0.62) (0.36) (0.38) (1.38) (0.66) (1.16) 
No of obs 6,924 6,715 6,715 6,924 6,715 6,715 
R-sq 0.49 0.79 0.80 0.14 0.41 0.42 
Ad R-sq 0.493 0.793 0.796    
F-test 759.5 2640 989.2    
No of ind    210 210 210 
Rho    0.666 0.355 0.457 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is the log(1+ real exports)- Trade3. All other definitions are as 
in table 6.3 
However, whilst controlling of zero trade by the truncation method (with an arbitrary 1 
added) may have increased the impact of CU on trade, it is also possible that the results 
shown by the OLS in table 6.4 may be an overestimation. Before time dummies the FE 
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in column 4 of table 6.4 indicates a CU elasticity of -0.53, meaning that CU reduces 
trade by 41% as compared to none union members. In other words countries sharing a 
common currency trade 59% less than when they have their separate currencies. After 
LDV the CU effect on trade as shown in column 5 (-0.13) is still negative but no longer 
significant. While there is a high difference between the OLS estimates of CU effect on 
trade before and after truncation in tables 6.3 and 6.4 the FE estimates are very similar 
in both cases (50% before and 59% after). What is common in these FE estimators 
before and after truncation is that CU effect on trade is negative. 
As already discussed, the literature suggests that a significant negative trade diversion 
dummy means that CU boosts trade for members and harmful for trade with non-
members. In tables 6.3 and 6.4 all OLS estimators are positive and significant both 
before and after time dummies suggesting that the ECOWAS currency union 
(WAEMU) does not divert trade from non-members to boost trade for members. For FE 
estimator in table 6.3 the DIV coefficient is negative but not significant. After 
controlling for zero trade on table 6.4 the FE shows a negative and significant trade 
diversion effect but after LDV the effect is no longer significant.   
Turning to our second variable of interest we see from table 6.3 that exchange rate 
volatility effect on ECOWAS exports has mixed effects. From table 6.4 all OLS 
estimates show RERV to have a significant negative effect on trade before and after 
time dummies while FE shows negative but not significant impact both before and after. 
We now consider the political and cultural variables. From both tables 6.3 and 6.4 the 
sharing of a common language has a significant effect on trade both before and after 
time dummies. Interesting results for the FTA dummy. Generally we expect free trade 
agreement or customs union to have a positive effect on trade. In the ECOWAS case 
table 6.3 and 6.4 the effects are mixed. The border dummy is consistently positive and 
significant, before and after time dummies, in all the estimators both in table 6.3 and 
6.4. This means that sharing a common border increases trade in ECOWAS. It is also 
overwhelming in tables 6.3 and 6.4 that landlocked/Island dummy is negative and 
significant both before and after time dummies. Even with LDV the results remained 
unchanged. This implies that countries that share no land border with others (Island) 
and or have no access to the sea (landlocked) experience a decline in trade. The effects 
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of border and landlocked/Island shown in our results are consistent with the theoretical 
expectations. 
The coefficients of SIM and RLF in tables 6.3 and 6.4 appear to be ambiguous when 
interpreted within the framework of Helpman (1987).  
The second estimation is the imports model and the results before and after controlling 
for the zero trade are reported in tables 6.5 and 6.6 respectively. In both tables distance 
is negative and significant both before and after time dummies. Like the exports model 
above, all OLS estimators in tables 6.5 and 6.6 estimated the CU to have a positive and 
significant impact on ECOWAS imports trade both before and after time dummies 
although the effect is much smaller with LDV. Before controlling for zero imports 
trades in table 6.5 the OLS CU coefficient in column 1 is 0.55 (0.13 with LDV). This 
means that currency union increases imports trade by 73% (14% with LDV) for 
members. The FE estimators shows CU to have a negative but not significant impact on 
imports both before and after time dummies and LDV as shown in columns 4-6 of table 
6.5. The FE coefficients are -0.12 (11% less trade) and -0.03 (3% less reduction) before 
and after LDV respectively but the figures are not significant.  
After controlling for zero imports trade in table 6.6 the OLS estimates are much larger 
1.44 and 0.36 before and after LDV respectively. This means countries in CU union 
trade 322% more than those that are not in the monetary union. The trade effect of 
currency union, however, shrinks to 43% after the LDV. The size of the imports trade 
here, after truncation, is similar to that of the exports model though much less. The 
fixed effect predicts a negative and significant CU effect on imports (-0.57) before LDV 
but negative and insignificant effect (-0.18) after LDV. This implies before LDV   
countries in currency union trade 43% less than those that are not in the currency union. 
This figure fell to 16% when we include the LDV. Based on the FE it is reasonable to 
conclude that the CU effect on imports is negative but not significant. The trade 
diversion dummy is positive in both estimators in table 6.5 but only significant in the 
OLS cases. This means there is no evidence of trade diversion as a result of the currency 
union. After truncation in table 6.6 the same variable is shown to be positive significant 
by the OLS estimators and negative significant by the fixed effects estimators. Similar 
to the exports model the results for the trade diversion effects in the imports model are 
mixed. The results for the RERV in tables 6.5 and 6.6 are mixed. 
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Table 6.5   Regression results for real imports (TIM) -1980-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdpi 0.57*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.74 0.59* 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.65) (0.35) (0.54) 
gdpj 1.22*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 2.32*** 1.13*** 0.55 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.69) (0.39) (0.67) 
gdpci -0.61*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.49 -0.52 0.01 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.70) (0.37) (0.56) 
gdpcj -0.03 0.01 0.01 -2.08*** -0.99** -0.42 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.70) (0.40) (0.68) 
dist -0.65*** -0.10*** -0.11***    
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
cu 0.55*** 0.13*** 0.13*** -0.12 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.10) (0.09) 
rerv1 -1.59*** -0.34* -0.04 -1.09*** -0.55*** -0.22 
 (0.38) (0.20) (0.22) (0.41) (0.20) (0.23) 
sim -0.22*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.03 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) 
rlf 0.06* 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) 
div 0.20*** 0.06** 0.07** 0.03 0.09 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.08) (0.07) 
lang 0.27*** 0.03 0.04    
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
fta -0.07** 0.01 0.01 -0.20*** -0.10** 0.01 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.15) 
bor 0.45*** 0.08*** 0.08***    
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)    
lalis -0.44*** -0.08*** -0.08***    
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)    
trade2l  0.82*** 0.82***  0.52*** 0.51*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.03) 
Con 2.33*** 0.38* 0.39* 1.91*** 0.74** 1.72** 
 (0.35) (0.20) (0.22) (0.61) (0.31) (0.74) 
No of obs 4,561 4,109 4,109 4,561 4,109 4,109 
R-sq 0.44 0.81 0.81 0.15 0.41 0.42 
Ad R-sq 0.434 0.809 0.812    
F-test 250.5 1011 370.7    
No of ind    202 191 191 
Rho    0.784 0.582 0.531 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is the logarithm of real imports (Trade2). All other definitions 
are as in table 6.3 
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Table 6.6   Regression results for truncated real imports (TIM) -1980-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdpi 1.35*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 1.11 0.87 3.22*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (1.32) (0.66) (1.14) 
gdpj 1.76*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 2.94** 0.66 3.03*** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (1.39) (0.73) (1.14) 
gdpci -0.40*** -0.03 -0.02 -0.71 -0.56 -2.94** 
 (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (1.38) (0.70) (1.17) 
gdpcj -0.38*** -0.05 -0.03 -3.61** -0.96 -3.35*** 
 (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (1.44) (0.76) (1.19) 
dist -1.60*** -0.38*** -0.38***    
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)    
cu 1.44*** 0.36*** 0.37*** -0.57** -0.18 0.04 
 (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.28) (0.16) (0.17) 
rerv1 -3.72*** -0.61 -0.89 -2.05*** -0.71 -0.78 
 (0.63) (0.65) (0.78) (0.71) (0.47) (0.54) 
sim 0.15 -0.01 -0.01 0.72** 0.11 0.10 
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.36) (0.19) (0.19) 
rlf 0.38*** 0.10*** 0.10*** -0.05 0.01 0.04 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.05) (0.06) 
div 0.19** 0.09 0.09 -0.68*** -0.25* -0.11 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.24) (0.14) (0.14) 
lang 0.62*** 0.15*** 0.14**    
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)    
fta 0.39*** 0.07 -0.62*** 0.33*** 0.19*** -1.13*** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.16) (0.11) (0.06) (0.31) 
bor 0.92*** 0.24*** 0.23***    
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05)    
lalis -1.03*** -0.28*** -0.28***    
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)    
trade4l  0.76*** 0.76***  0.53*** 0.53*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.02) 
Con -1.81*** -0.94** -0.54 2.61* 0.80 -1.46 
 (0.64) (0.39) (0.40) (1.43) (0.73) (1.22) 
No of obs 6,924 6,715 6,715 6,924 6,715 6,715 
R-sq 0.47 0.78 0.78 0.13 0.38 0.39 
Ad R-sq 0.470 0.779 0.783    
F-test 652.2 2337 881    
No of ind    210 210 210 
Rho    0.631 0.349 0.685 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is the log(1+ real imports)- Trade4. All other definitions are as 
in table 6.3 
Finally we estimate equation 6.7 (DIM) where we define our dependent/trade variable 
as log(total trade) i.e. real exports + real imports. First we estimate the model without 
controlling for the zero trade where the dependent variable is log(real exports + real 
imports) and the results are shown on table 6.7. We then truncate our trade variable to 
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account for the zero trade by estimating the model with a dependent variable of log(1 + 
real exports + real imports) and we report the results on table 6.8. In both tables 6.7 and 
6.8 the base line gravity equation variables have the correct signs: The GDP is positive 
significant and distance is negative and significant both before and after time dummies. 
After controlling for zero trade, sharing a common language (LANG) and common 
border (BOR) both have statistically significant impact on ECOWAS total trade both 
before and after LDV and time dummies. The results are also overwhelming for the 
landlocked/Island variable, it is negative and significant in all cases in tables 6.7 and 6.8 
before and after LDV and time dummies meaning that countries in ECOWAS with no 
access to the sea and or no access to land experience a decline in trade. The FTA 
dummy has mixed results. In table 6.7, before truncation, it appears to be negative and 
significant which means the ECOWAS customs union led to less trade. On the other 
hand after controlling for the zero trade the FTA variable is positive and significant 
except that after controlling for time dummies the FE estimate is no longer significant. 
Perhaps a more reasonable conclusion for FTA is that its effect on ECOWAS trade is 
less promising than what might be expected from its creation.   
The currency union dummy on tables 6.7 and 6.8 is predicted by all OLS estimators to 
have a positive significant effect on total trade both before and after time dummies 
although the effect is much higher after controlling for zero trade but before LDV.  
Before controlling for zero trade in table 6.7 the OLS CU elasticities are 0.99 (0.17 after 
LDV).  This means that currency union increases trade for countries by 169% before 
and 19% after the inclusion of the LDV. The same coefficients after controlling for 
zeros in table 6.8 are 1.31 before and 0.31 after TDV for the OLS which equates to a 
trade increase of about 271% and 36% respectively. With the FE estimator the CU 
elasticity is positive but not significant (0.07) from table 6.7. After controlling for zero 
trade on table 6.8 the CU elasticity is negative and significant (-0.67) but with the 
inclusion of LDV the effect is negative but not significant (-0.23). The trade diversion 
dummy variable in table 6.7 and 6.8 shows mixed results. The effects of RERV from 
both tables 6.7 and 6.8 have mixed results. 
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Table 6.7   Regression results for total trade (DIM)- 1980-2012   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdp2 0.92*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 1.64*** 0.76*** 1.27** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.12) (0.57) 
gdpc2 -0.16** -0.04 -0.03 -1.54*** -0.71*** -1.27** 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.20) (0.12) (0.58) 
dist -0.66*** -0.10** -0.10**    
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)    
cu 0.99*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.07 0.07 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09) 
rerv1 -1.53*** -0.40 -0.29 -0.30 -0.31* -0.15 
 (0.37) (0.39) (0.50) (0.29) (0.18) (0.22) 
sim -0.15** -0.00 -0.00 0.16 0.08 0.10 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09) 
rlf 0.12*** 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
div 0.44*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.06 0.08 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.07) (0.07) 
lang 0.28*** 0.02 0.02    
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)    
fta -0.06 -0.00 0.00 -0.17** -0.07* -0.50 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.40) 
bor 0.57*** 0.08*** 0.08***    
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)    
lalis -0.48*** -0.07** -0.07**    
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
trade7l  0.84*** 0.84***  0.55*** 0.54*** 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Con 1.28*** 0.27 0.23 3.24*** 1.34*** 1.11 
 (0.42) (0.22) (0.24) (0.86) (0.37) (0.90) 
No of obs 2,533 2,333 2,333 2,533 2,333 2,333 
R-sq 0.53 0.87 0.87 0.21 0.49 0.51 
Ad R-sq 0.528 0.866 0.868    
F-test 228.4 754.4 283.8    
No of ind    103 99 99 
Rho    0.818 0.609 0.763 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is the Log(real exports + real imports)- Trade7. All other 
definitions are as in table 6.3 
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Table 6.8   Regression results for truncated real total trade (DIM)- 1980-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdp2 1.61*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 2.62*** 1.06*** 2.35** 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.41) (0.20) (1.12) 
gdpc2 -0.32** -0.01 0.01 -2.68*** -1.05*** -2.37** 
 (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.54) (0.26) (1.16) 
dist -1.12*** -0.22*** -0.22***    
 (0.14) (0.08) (0.08)    
cu 1.31*** 0.31*** 0.32*** -0.67* -0.23 -0.12 
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.36) (0.18) (0.18) 
rerv1 -2.82*** 0.01 0.10 -0.39 0.45 0.71 
 (0.76) (0.72) (0.82) (0.84) (0.58) (0.60) 
sim -0.03 -0.10 -0.10 0.55 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.47) (0.24) (0.25) 
rlf 0.42*** 0.09** 0.09** 0.03 0.03 0.05 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) 
div 0.06 0.04 0.05 -0.81** -0.30* -0.22 
 (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.32) (0.17) (0.17) 
lang 0.96*** 0.24*** 0.23***    
 (0.11) (0.07) (0.07)    
fta 0.71*** 0.14*** -0.43** 0.47*** 0.23*** -1.21 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.19) (0.14) (0.07) (0.86) 
bor 1.20*** 0.31*** 0.30***    
 (0.10) (0.06) (0.06)    
lalis -1.13*** -0.31*** -0.30***    
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06)    
trade8l  0.77*** 0.77***  0.54*** 0.55*** 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.04) (0.04) 
Con -3.98*** -1.47*** -1.14** 1.62 0.45 -0.61 
 (0.87) (0.53) (0.54) (1.83) (0.86) (1.46) 
No of obs 3,459 3,355 3,355 3,459 3,355 3,355 
R-sq 0.54 0.82 0.82 0.21 0.45 0.47 
Ad R-sq 0.533 0.817 0.821    
F-test 478.2 1332 486.1    
No of ind    105 105 105 
Rho    0.647 0.365 0.581 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is Log(1 + real exports + real imports) – Trade8. All other 
definitions are as in table 6.3 
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6.6.3.2 Econometric estimation results for sensitivity analysis 
 This section repeats the estimation of equations 6.6 (TIM) and 6.7 (DIM) substituting 
the real exchange rate volatility measure (RERV1) used in the main analysis with 
alternative exchange rate volatility measures. The aim is to provide a robustness check 
as to whether a change in exchange rate volatility measure affects our findings. For this 
purpose we use the following three alternative volatility measures:   
1. the standard deviation of the first difference of the annual natural logarithm of the 
real exchange rate during year t (i.e. t-4 through t, rather than from t-5 through t-1). 
We define this volatility measure as RERV2, 
2. the absolute value of the percentage change of the log of real exchange rate of the 
current year (t) and the preceding year (t-1), defined as RERV3, and 
3. the standard deviation of the first difference of the annual natural logarithm of the 
nominal exchange rate in the five years preceding period t, defined as RERV4.  
We use each of these three measures of volatility to estimate equation 6.6 using log(real 
exports) as our dependent variable for the full sample period only so that we can use the 
results of table 6.3 as our bench mark. We do the same for equation 6.7 with log(real 
exports + real imports) as dependent variable with table 6.7 as the bench mark for 
comparison. The estimation results for equation 6.6 for the three volatility measures are 
shown in appendices A.19-A.21. In terms of the basic gravity equation variables, GDP 
and distance, all the estimations in the three tables are consistent with table 6.3. 
Common language and common border are all positive and significant in all three tables 
and landlocked/Island is consistently negative and significant both before and after time 
dummies and LDV just as the case in table 6.3. Most importantly our key variable of 
interest, CU, have results in the three tables very similar to those in table 6.3. All OLS 
estimators estimate the CU coefficient as positive significant both before and after time 
dummies with very similar size to the bench mark. Like table 6.3, the FE estimates in 
appendices A.19-A.21 for the currency union dummy are all negative significant both 
before and after LDV and time dummies with the size of the coefficients close to each 
other. Just like the results of table 6.3 the size of the CU coefficient, in appendices 
A.19-A.21, is significantly reduced when we included the LDV as an explanatory 
variable. For the RERV variable there is no significant departure from the bench mark 
results in all three appendices.  
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Our finding from this perturbation is that irrespective of the exchange rate volatility 
measure that we use, including even nominal exchange rate volatility, the finding from 
our main results are unaltered.    
We repeat the same perturbation with the three alternative volatility measures and use 
the full sample period to estimate equation 6.7 using as dependent variable log(real 
exports + real imports). The estimation results for the three measures, RERV2, RERV3 
and RERV4 are shown in appendices A.22, A.23 and A.24 respectively. GDP, GDPC 
and distance carry similar sign to the results in table 6.7. Common border has positive 
and significant impact on total trade in all the three appendices same way as in table 6.7 
while the effect of landlocked/Island is negative and significant. The impact of common 
language on trade in appendices A.22-A.24 is no different from that in table 6.7. The 
OLS CU estimates are all positive and significant while the fixed effects are all positive 
but not significant in all the three appendices both before and after time dummies and 
LDV which are similar to the results of table 6.7. The RERV is also consistently 
estimated, by the FE estimator, to be negative but not significant before and after time 
dummies and LDV. The double index estimates like the triple index case are consistent 
to the main estimates in table 6.7 which suggest that our results are insensitive to the 
exchange rate volatility measures.   
6.6.3.3 Endogeneity and country-pair effects 
In section 6.4 we discussed the problem of endogenity and how it is addressed in the 
literature. In that section we presented a detailed argument on the relevancy/irrelevancy 
of reverse causality of currency union especially that made by Rose (2000a). The 
difficulty of getting appropriate instruments to control for endogeneity in different 
studies was also discussed in the section. We believe that an attempt to search for valid 
instrument(s) for ECOWAS countries where data availability for empirical work is 
always a concern may compound the estimation problems. Similar to Rose (2000a) and 
Micco et al. (2003) we argued in section 6.4 that any impact of endogeneity should not 
be of a serious concern for ECOWAS countries. However, we conduct a Granger 
causality test and the results are shown on the first two columns of appendices A.25, for 
TIM, and A.26 for DIM. In column 1 we regressed trade1 (log real exports) on currency 
union and other trade determinants and in column 2 we regressed the currency union 
dummy on the lag of trade1 and other trade determinants. In both cases the null 
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hypothesis of no reverse causality is rejected. Following Micco et al. (2003), we 
addressed the problem by using the OLS estimator with country pair dummies included 
as part of the regressors. The regression estimates are reported in columns 5 and 6 of 
appendices A.25 and A.26 of TIM and DIM respectively. In addition to country-pair 
dummies, time dummies are also included in the estimates of column 6 (OLS_1CPT). 
We presented the FE and OLS estimates alongside the estimation in appendices A.25 
and A.26 for comparison. The results from these two appendices are no different from 
the results of our main analysis as shown in tables 6.3 and 6.7. In columns 5 and 6 of 
appendix A.25 the CU coefficient is not only negative but identical to the FE estimates 
in columns 5 and 6 of tables 6.3.  
The results in appendix A.26 are also consistent with our main results in table 6.7. With 
the FE estimator we found the impact of currency union on total trade to have a positive 
but not significant effect and real exchange rate volatility negative but not significant as 
shown in columns 5 and 6 of appendix A.26. There are no differences in both the signs 
and magnitude of the coefficients in columns 5 and 6 with those in column 4 (the fixed 
effects).  
However the results in appendices A.25 and A.26 deviate from the inverse relationship 
between trade and distance as stated in the general theory of gravity model. The 
distance coefficient is positive and significant in columns 5 and 6 of both appendices 
except column 6 of A.25 where it is not significant. Such phenomenon may not occur if 
the ECOWAS countries are included in a global sample study. We found in this study 
and previous studies that ECOWAS countries are heavily dependent on primary 
produce especially agriculture. The positive distance in our estimation may be 
associated with the explanation provided by (Wu, 2015). In this paper Wu 
disaggregated total distance coefficient into three: Agricultural distance coefficient, 
manufacture distance coefficient and service distance coefficient. (S)he found the three 
distance coefficients to be positive not significant, negative significant and negative not 
significant respectively. The author argued that when science and technology are not 
well developed (which is the case for ECOWAS) and transportation methods limited to 
land and sea the role of distance (a proxy for transportation cost) is less since the 
marginal cost per distance is low. In such a case they argued that the difference in 
climate, which governs the type of agricultural product, is probably the most important 
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factor such that the closer the countries the more are likely to be affected by similar 
climatic conditions and therefore the more likely to produce similar or same product 
which may not create any absolute or comparative advantage. The further apart the 
countries the more they can produce different agricultural product and more likely to 
trade between them. Adding to this we also argue that Nigeria is a big market for 
ECOWAS due to its size and as a result countries may not resist trading with Nigeria on 
distance grounds.  
6.7 Cross sectional dependence (CSD) 
We examined our models for cross sectional dependence using a number of tests 
proposed by Pesaran (2004), Friedman (1937), Frees (1995). In all these tests the null 
hypothesis of cross sectional independence is rejected. The method that is use in the 
literature to control for CSD for both balanced and unbalanced panels with large time 
dimension (i.e. T→ ∞) is the one proposed by Driscoll and Kraay (1998). The Driscoll 
and Kraay (DK) non-parametric estimator is said to produce heteroscedasticity- and 
autocorrelation- consistent standard errors that are robust to general forms of spatial and 
temporal dependence (Hoechle, 2007). The DK standard errors for coefficients can be 
estimated by pooled OLS and weighted least squares or fixed-effects (within) 
regression. We estimated the DK robust standard errors for the full sample period using 
both pooled OLS and FE estimators for all our six trade measures and the results for 
four of them are reported on tables 6.9-6.12. Tables 6.9 and 6.10 show the results using 
equation 6.6 (TIM) for log(real exports), Trade1, and log(1+ real exports), trade 3 
respectively. The estimation results from equation 6.7 (DIM) for log of total trade 
(trade7) and the truncated total trade (trade8) are shown on tables 6.11 and 6.12 
respectively. The OLS consistently estimates the CU to have a positive and significant 
effect on ECOWAS bilateral trade irrespective of the trade measure and the model used 
for the estimation. After controlling for CSD the results from table 6.9 shows CU to 
have a negative and significant effect on ECOWAS trade but the effect becomes 
negative not significant after controlling for zero trade as shown on table 6.10. The 
effect of CU on ECOWAS total trade is positive not significant before (table 6.11) but 
negative and significant after controlling for zero trade (table 6.12).  
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Table 6.9  Regression results for log real exports (TIM)-1980-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VAR OLS_DK OLS_DKl FE_t FE_DK FE_DKl 
gdpi 1.11*** 0.23*** -0.15 0.40 0.41 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.55) (0.53) (0.41) 
gdpj 0.59*** 0.12*** 1.89*** 2.68*** 1.33*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.51) (0.65) (0.36) 
gdpci -0.11 -0.05 0.37 -0.07 -0.28 
 (0.17) (0.03) (0.56) (0.59) (0.44) 
gdpcj -0.43*** -0.09** -1.83*** -2.50*** -1.25*** 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.52) (0.71) (0.39) 
dist -0.67*** -0.12***  0.67*** 0.22* 
 (0.08) (0.02)  (0.16) (0.12) 
cu 0.83*** 0.20*** -0.65*** -0.69*** -0.20** 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.10) (0.16) (0.09) 
rerv1 -1.66*** -0.43** -0.16 -0.59 -0.42** 
 (0.35) (0.16) (0.25) (0.39) (0.20) 
sim -0.19*** -0.02 0.09 0.05 0.06 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.07) (0.12) (0.05) 
rlf 0.18*** 0.03* 0.07** 0.06** 0.05** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
div 0.27*** 0.09** -0.26*** -0.25** 0.01 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) 
lang 0.26*** 0.05*  0.00 0.00 
 (0.08) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.00) 
fta -0.05 0.02 -0.31** -0.12 -0.08 
 (0.08) (0.04) (0.16) (0.11) (0.05) 
bor 0.44*** 0.07***  0.00 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.00) 
lalis -0.46*** -0.11***  0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.03)  (0.00) (0.00) 
trade1l  0.81***   0.53*** 
  (0.02)   (0.04) 
Constant 2.05*** 0.39** 3.96*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.48) (0.16) (0.61) (0.00) (0.00) 
      
Observations 4,417 3,991 4,417 4,417 3,991 
R-squared 0.43 0.81 0.19   
No of groups 198 185  198 185 
No of ind   198   
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is Log real exports- Trade1. OLS_DK is pooled OLS with 
Driscoll and Kraay robust standard errors, _DKl means Driscoll Kraay robust standard errors with LDV 
included. All other definitions are as in table 6.3. 
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Table 6.10  Regression results for truncated real exports (TIM)-1980-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VAR OLS_DK OLS_DKl FE_t FE_DK FE_DKl 
gdpi 1.67*** 0.46*** 5.38*** 3.49*** 1.36** 
 (0.14) (0.08) (0.83) (1.09) (0.63) 
gdpj 1.37*** 0.33*** 3.11*** 1.25 0.67 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.83) (0.95) (0.54) 
gdpci -0.82*** -0.18* -6.56*** -4.61*** -1.83** 
 (0.21) (0.09) (0.84) (1.19) (0.71) 
gdpcj -0.26 -0.02 -2.73*** -0.82 -0.49 
 (0.24) (0.09) (0.84) (1.02) (0.59) 
dist -1.64*** -0.37***  1.05*** 0.39 
 (0.20) (0.12)  (0.32) (0.24) 
cu 1.81*** 0.45*** -0.33* -0.53*** -0.13 
 (0.16) (0.10) (0.18) (0.18) (0.14) 
rerv1 -4.20*** -1.05 -0.66 -0.95* -0.40 
 (1.19) (0.73) (0.46) (0.48) (0.43) 
sim 0.16 -0.01 0.64*** 0.58* 0.01 
 (0.34) (0.11) (0.13) (0.29) (0.09) 
rlf 0.39*** 0.10*** -0.08* -0.10 -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) 
div 0.30** 0.10* -0.39*** -0.53*** -0.17 
 (0.15) (0.05) (0.12) (0.14) (0.10) 
lang 0.67*** 0.15***  0.00 0.00 
 (0.10) (0.05)  (0.00) (0.00) 
fta 0.41*** 0.08 -0.51** 0.25*** 0.12* 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.24) (0.09) (0.06) 
bor 1.02*** 0.26***  0.00 0.00 
 (0.09) (0.04)  (0.00) (0.00) 
lalis -1.04*** -0.29***  0.00 0.00 
 (0.14) (0.03)  (0.00) (0.00) 
trade3l  0.76***   0.55*** 
  (0.04)   (0.04) 
Constant -0.83 -0.66 1.36 0.00 0.00 
 (1.74) (0.52) (0.95) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 6,924 6,715 6,924 6,924 6,715 
R-squared 0.49 0.79 0.15   
No of groups 210 210  210 210 
No of ind   210   
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is Log(1+real exports)- Trade3. All other definitions are as in 
tables 6.3 and 6.9. 
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Table 6.11  Regression results for log real total trade (DIM)-1980-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VAR OLS_DK OLS_DKl FE_t FE_DK FE_DKl 
gdp2 0.92*** 0.15*** 2.62*** 1.64*** 0.76*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.42) (0.25) (0.16) 
gdpc2 -0.16 -0.04 -2.68*** -1.54*** -0.71*** 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.44) (0.34) (0.19) 
dist -0.66*** -0.10***  1.07*** 0.44*** 
 (0.11) (0.03)  (0.14) (0.09) 
cu 0.99*** 0.17*** 0.12 0.07 0.07 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.10) (0.08) (0.05) 
rerv1 -1.53*** -0.40** -0.07 -0.30 -0.31* 
 (0.26) (0.20) (0.26) (0.24) (0.18) 
sim -0.15 -0.00 0.20** 0.16 0.08 
 (0.14) (0.03) (0.08) (0.13) (0.07) 
rlf 0.12** 0.02 -0.05 -0.05* -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) 
div 0.44*** 0.08** 0.07 0.06 0.08 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 
lang 0.28*** 0.02  0.00 0.00 
 (0.10) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.00) 
fta -0.06 -0.00 -0.76*** -0.17 -0.07 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.17) (0.11) (0.06) 
bor 0.57*** 0.08***  0.00 0.00 
 (0.04) (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) 
lalis -0.48*** -0.07***  0.00 0.00 
 (0.05) (0.02)  (0.00) (0.00) 
trade7l  0.84***   0.55*** 
  (0.03)   (0.05) 
Constant 1.28*** 0.27 3.09*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.42) (0.19) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 2,533 2,333 2,533 2,533 2,333 
R-squared 0.53 0.87 0.25   
No of groups 103 99  103 99 
No of ind   103   
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is Log(real exports + real imports)- Trade7. All other 
definitions are as in tables 6.3 and 6.9. 
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Table 6.12  Regression results for truncated real total trade (DIM)-1980-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VAR OLS_DK OLS_DKl FE_t FE_DK FE_DKl 
gdp2 1.61*** 0.37*** 4.99*** 2.62*** 1.06*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.81) (0.34) (0.26) 
gdpc2 -0.32* -0.01 -5.11*** -2.68*** -1.05*** 
 (0.16) (0.07) (0.82) (0.48) (0.37) 
dist -1.12*** -0.22*  0.53 0.15 
 (0.30) (0.12)  (0.47) (0.27) 
cu 1.31*** 0.31*** -0.51** -0.67*** -0.23* 
 (0.17) (0.07) (0.21) (0.18) (0.13) 
rerv1 -2.82*** 0.01 -0.62 -0.39 0.45 
 (0.98) (0.67) (0.57) (0.84) (0.47) 
sim -0.03 -0.10 0.58*** 0.55 -0.03 
 (0.28) (0.10) (0.18) (0.34) (0.13) 
rlf 0.42*** 0.09*** 0.06 0.03 0.03 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.02) 
div 0.06 0.04 -0.69*** -0.81*** -0.30** 
 (0.12) (0.06) (0.15) (0.20) (0.13) 
lang 0.96*** 0.24***  0.00 0.00 
 (0.12) (0.08)  (0.00) (0.00) 
fta 0.71*** 0.14* -0.39 0.47*** 0.23** 
 (0.11) (0.08) (0.32) (0.15) (0.11) 
bor 1.20*** 0.31***  0.00 0.00 
 (0.13) (0.05)  (0.00) (0.00) 
lalis -1.13*** -0.31***  0.00 0.00 
 (0.21) (0.06)  (0.00) (0.00) 
trade8l  0.77***   0.54*** 
  (0.03)   (0.04) 
Constant -3.98** -1.47*** -1.18 0.00 0.00 
 (1.50) (0.53) (1.26) (0.00) (0.00) 
Observations 3,459 3,355 3,459 3,459 3,355 
R-squared 0.54 0.82 0.23   
No of groups 105 105  105 105 
No of ind   105   
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is Log(1 + real exports + real imports)- Trade8. All other 
definitions are as in tables 6.3 and 6.9. 
  
186 
 
 
 
The effect of RERV1 on exports and imports (the latter results not reported) is both 
negative significant before but negative not significant after controlling for the zero 
trade as shown on tables 6.9 and 6.10. The effect on total trade is negative significant 
before (table 6.11) and positive not significant after controlling for the zero trade.    
6.8 Summary of findings 
In this chapter we estimate the gravity model with two different specifications (TIM and 
DIM) using panel data methodology with different trade measures. The main findings 
from the analysis are: 
For currency union 
 The effect on exports is negative significant before controlling for zero trade but 
negative not significant after. 
 The effect on imports is negative but not significant both before and after 
controlling for zero trade. 
 The effect on total trade is positive but not significant before controlling for zero 
trade but it becomes negative and significant after. 
For real exchange rate volatility 
 The effect on exports and imports is negative significant before but negative not 
significant after controlling for zero trade. 
 The effect on total trade is negative significant before but positive not significant 
after controlling for zero trade 
Our findings are consistent with alternative measures of exchange rate volatility and 
even after controlling for the effect of cross sectional dependence. 
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Chapter 7 A Cluster Analysis of ECOWAS proposed Monetary Union 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter uses cluster analysis, a different methodology from the previous chapter, to 
continue to address our research questions and objectives. The central focus of this 
chapter is to explore on the question of whether ECOWAS countries are good 
candidates to form a currency union. We attempt to answer this question by grouping 
the countries according to eight macroeconomic characteristics as defined by the OCA 
theory and the ECOWAS convergence criteria. The resulting clusters/groups provide us 
with information on the degree of similarity or dissimilarity of these countries. 
According to the OCA theory the more similar the countries are the lesser the costs of 
abandoning their individual national monetary policy and the more suitable they are to 
form a currency union, verse versa.    
Our analysis, in this chapter, revealed a high degree of dissimilarity (heterogeneity) 
among ECOWAS countries especially within WAMZ. We found the eight WAEMU 
countries to exhibit high degree of similarities that made these countries to belong to the 
same cluster in almost all our clustering results. On the other hand, WAMZ countries 
are very heterogeneous making them fragmented into different clusters and hardly to 
find most of these countries in the same cluster with WAEMU countries. We conduct 
sensitivity analysis as robustness check of our results by using different agglomerative 
methods, different distance (similarity/dissimilarity) measures and dividing our eight 
variables into OCA and ECOWAS convergence categories and we found our results to 
be insensitive to these options. 
The remaining part of this chapter is structured as follows: The next section discusses 
the empirical literature of cluster analysis then followed by the methodology in section 
7.3. We report and discuss our empirical results in section 7.4. Finally section 7.5 
concludes.  
7.2 Empirical literature 
Two criteria are identified in evaluating the feasibility of a monetary union, the nature 
of the shocks affecting the members or potential members of the union and the speed 
with which they adjust to these shocks. Since monetary union entails the loss of 
flexibility, as member countries cannot use monetary policy (interest or exchange rate), 
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it is therefore argued in the literature that countries that are found to cluster together 
(homogeneous) can form a monetary union, as one monetary policy would be 
appropriate. On the other hand a lack of homogeneity is an indication that a single 
monetary policy would be unsuitable for such countries unless alternative channels for 
adjustments are available (Buigut, 2006). The implication is that the costs of forming a 
currency union are lower if the shocks are symmetrical, but higher if they are 
asymmetric. However, if after the shocks there are adjustment mechanisms (labour 
mobility, wage flexibility, fiscal transfers) to quickly restore equilibrium then 
asymmetric shocks need not necessarily imply large costs even if they are large 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994) . 
Since the formation of the Euro in 1999, the enthusiasm for economic and monetary 
integration in other regions has grown and much research has been done in this area. 
Different methodologies have been used to address this topic but what is becoming 
popular in recent studies is the application of cluster analysis.  Bénassy‐Quéré and 
Coupet (2005) used cluster analysis methodology on seventeen sub-Saharan African 
countries (12 from ECOWAS and 5 from CEMAC) to examine the economic rationale 
for monetary union in sub-Saharan Africa. They found that the existing CFA franc zone 
(WAEMU and CEMAC) countries do not belong to the same clusters and that a core of 
WAEMU can be defined on economic grounds. Their findings also support the 
inclusion of the Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone (and perhaps also Guinea) in an 
extended WAEMU arrangement, or the creation of a separate monetary union with the 
core of the WAEMU and the Gambia, rather than the creation of a monetary union 
around Nigeria. Their results support the creation of WAMZ with a regional monetary 
arrangement in the limited sense connecting the Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone to the 
WAEMU. However, the inclusion of Nigeria in this monetary zone is not supported by 
their analysis; neither does the creation of a separate WAMZ monetary union. In 
another study, Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) applied cluster analysis on twenty sub-
Saharan African countries (14 ECOWAS and 6 CEMAC) to examine the preparedness 
and status of the candidate countries for the proposed WAMZ and ECOWAS monetary 
unions. The details of their findings are as follows: 
I. WAMZ do not form cluster with WAEMU. 
II. Significant lack of homogeneity 
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III. Significant heterogeneity within CFA zone countries (WAEMU and CEMAC) 
IV. Some similarities between CEMAC and WAMZ countries 
V. WAMZ countries with the highest degree of dissimilarity and have little in 
common with WAEMU countries, which in principle tend to cluster together 
VI. Ghana and especially Nigeria appeared as singletons i.e. independent of any 
other cluster, the remaining WAMZ countries tend to group together casting 
doubt on the inclusion of Ghana and Nigeria in WAMZ and the feasibility of 
separate monetary union that includes all WAMZ countries.  
Another study by  Cham ( found that WAMZ does not meet the convergence and OCA 
criteria. Out of the three OCA criteria used in his analysis (openness, labour mobility 
and synchronisation of shocks) WAMZ only did well in the openness criteria. However, 
the good performance in openness may be due to the measure used- (Exports + 
Imports)/GDP.  A smaller study focusing only on WAMZ was conducted by Alagidede 
et al. (2012). They attempt to explain the level of similarity in economic structure of the 
four of the current six member countries using fractional integration and cointegration 
methods. They found significant heterogeneities in behaviour among the countries. An 
interesting comment made by the authors is that attention is currently being placed on 
convergence criteria and preparedness of the aspiring member states, with less attention 
given to the extent to which the dynamics inflation and economic trends in the 
individual countries are (dis)similar.  
A similar study was conducted by Buigut (2006) for the Eastern and Southern African 
(ESA) region using a combined methodology of vector autoregression (VAR) and 
cluster analysis. In light of the OCA and nominal convergence criteria the author 
classified countries that are good candidates for monetary union in the region. He also 
attempts to resolve the overlapping monetary arrangement in the region and more 
specifically whether the EAC should be grouped within COMESA or the SADC. His 
results revealed that the ESA region is not converged enough for an ESA-wide 
monetary union. He found two fairly distinct clusters, one in the southern cone around 
South Africa and the other around the EAC. He implied from his study that a two-track 
monetary integration route is more appropriate for the region. His results further 
identified EAC as a sub-group within COMESA, which suggests that Tanzania should 
cede SADC membership for COMESA. On the suitability of East African (EA) 
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countries to form a monetary union Buigut and Valev (2005) used a VAR approach in 
their investigation. They found that supply and demand shocks are generally 
asymmetric, which does not lend strong support for forming a monetary union in the EA 
region.   
Another study involving 43 sub-Saharan African countries for 1963-89 by Bayoumi and 
Ostry (1997) looked at whether the existing highly fractured monetary arrangements in 
the region correspond to the expectation of the OCA criteria. Their methodology is 
based on the size and correlation of real disturbances across countries and the level of 
intra-regional trade. The results indicate that most SSA countries have significantly 
smaller links than those across the three major industrial countries implying that the 
main benefit from the existing arrangements of the CFA franc zone may well come 
from the monetary stability generated by the peg rather than the common currency 
across members. They argued such monetary stability does not require the existence of a 
common currency. In both macroeconomic disturbances and intra-regional trade the 
results provide no evidence in support of monetary union in SSA. Their conclusion is 
that there is little evidence that SSA countries would benefit in the near future from 
larger currency unions.  
In a global sample of 39 countries (15 Western Europe, 11 East Asia, 13 the Americas) 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) used a VAR approach to identify groups of countries 
suited for monetary union. On the basis of macroeconomic disturbances and responses 
they identified three sets of countries that are plausible candidates for monetary 
unification: a Northern-European group (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
the Netherlands, and perhaps Switzerland); a Northeast Asian bloc (Japan, Korea, and 
Taiwan); and a Southeast Asian zone (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and 
possibly Thailand). For the Americas, their results suggest the need for the region to 
undertake major adjustments in policy and performance in laying the foundation for 
monetary union. One of the limitations of their study which they mentioned is the focus 
on aggregate disturbances, ignoring other factors such as the level of intra-regional 
trade, which may also be relevant to the benefits of monetary union. Cluster analysis 
with the feature to incorporate many variables, including intra-regional trade in our 
study, has the potential to remedy this limitation. On the European side, a policy 
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implication that emerged from their study is that EMU might run more smoothly if 
limited to a sub-set of EU countries. 
Further on the Asian studies Ibrahim (2008) applied cluster analysis to examine the 
feasibility of ASEAN+3 Monetary Union by investigating the homogeneities of the 
countries. Their results suggest that the sub region is not OCA compliance as indicated 
by the high degree of heterogeneities. He concluded that an immediate formation of a 
monetary union by the ASEAN+3 member states could entail serious potential costs as 
the ‘one-size-fits-all’ monetary policy would be inappropriate. Another finding is that 
the clustering of countries pre and post 1997 financial crisis differs which he interpreted 
as a reflection of the varied impact of the Asian financial crisis on member states 
economies and the different response of each. A similar investigation in East Asia with 
the use of cluster analysis by Quah and Crowley (2010) found a significant rise in the 
degree of regional symmetry in terms of the OCA features after the 1997-98 Asian 
crisis 
As the creation of the Euro in 1999 is the motivating factor for other regions to emulate 
the path to monetary integration, a number of studies have been conducted on the 
European economies. For instance Artis and Zhang (2001) attempt to answer the 
question whether, in the light of traditional OCA criteria, the EMU is a wholly 
homogeneous group of countries. With cluster analysis methodology, their results 
revealed that the member countries may be divided into those belonging to the core 
(Germany, France, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands) or to one of two peripheries, 
Northern (the Scandinavian countries, the UK, Ireland and Finland) and Southern 
(Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece). They commented that with such well-defined 
grouping it may have the implication of a potential problem of ‘fit’ of the single 
monetary policy to the needs of the member countries. A subsequent study on Europe 
with the same methodology found similar core-periphery classification (Artis and 
Zhang, 2002). Similar studies carried on Europe using cluster analysis all point to 
similar core-periphery classification (Artis, 2000; Boreiko and Nationalbank, 2002; 
Crowley, 2009; Ferreira-Lopes and Pina, 2011).    
7.3 Methodology 
 Cluster analysis (CA) is a term used to describe a family of statistical procedures 
specifically designed to discover classifications within complex data sets with the 
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objective of grouping objects into cluster (groups) such that objects within one cluster 
share more in common with one another than they do with objects of other clusters 
(Gore(JR), 2000).  The purpose of the analysis, therefore, is to arrange objects into 
relatively homogeneous groups based on multivariate observations. The resulting 
partitioning improves our understanding of the data by revealing its internal structure. 
Clustering is a useful exploratory tool that has been applied to a wide variety of research 
problems with the aim to examine the underlying relationships in the data for 
classification, pattern recognition, model reduction, and optimisation purposes. There 
are a number of clustering methodologies which are generally classified into two groups 
according to the types of clusters obtained: (a) Crisp (or hard) clustering methods and 
(b) soft (or fuzzy) clustering method. We discuss these methods in details in the next 
section but before that let’s first look at the pros and cons of cluster analysis as an 
analytical technique. 
First, cluster analysis allows us to account for a number of variables simultaneously 
which in turn enables us to investigate synchronisation in terms of the symmetry of 
business cycles as well as the symmetry of various other relevant variables. Second, CA 
has less stringent data requirements in terms of the time dimension of data than other 
methodologies. This makes the technique to work well for countries with limited time-
series data such as the African economies. Third, by exploring the group pattern in the 
data, the CA methodology identifies the areas in which each country needs to improve 
to achieve macroeconomic convergence, which is necessary for the formation of the 
monetary union. In this respect the technique provides useful information for making 
informed policy choices. 
On the other hand CA is not without problems. Everitt (1972) discussed some of these 
problems. The first one is the lack of a well-defined concept of a cluster. A possible 
reason for this as suggested by Gower (1967) cited in Everitt (1972) is that no single 
definition is sufficient. It is argued that some CA techniques are better at finding 
clusters of a certain shape than others (e.g. spherical, long parallel clusters). Most 
techniques in common use are said to be good at finding clusters of the latter shape. 
This problem is compounded, as stated in Everitt (1979) that different techniques of CA 
applied to the same data set may give very different results, hence the need to validate 
any clusters found. One way to partially overcome this problem is to run the data on 
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more than one clustering technique of different types and accept as definite entities only 
those clusters which are found by all the techniques (Everitt, 1972). The second 
problem is the choice of variables to measure on the objects. The technique itself has no 
mechanism for differentiating between relevant and irrelevant variables. The choice of 
variables for inclusion must therefore be guided by theoretical or conceptual 
considerations. The formation of clusters is partly influenced by the types of variables 
included. A problem which is related to the selected variables is whether to standardise 
or not. The final problem which is considered to be difficult is the question of how 
many groups/clusters are there in our data. Several methods have been proposed to 
answer this question but none of them have a very high accuracy rate. In the next 
section we discuss the two commonly used clustering methods and measurement of 
(dis)similarities.   
7.3.1 Fuzzy/soft clustering (FC) 
Unlike hard clustering (HC), fuzzy clustering technique allows some ambiguity in the 
data by assigning each object to a cluster with a probability indicating the degree of 
belongingness of the object to that cluster. The probabilities are termed membership 
coefficients and lie in the range 0 to 1. A membership coefficient close to or equal to 
zero (one) suggests that the object is dissimilar (similar) to other objects in that cluster. 
An object is most likely to belong to the cluster with which it has the highest 
membership coefficient. The main advantage of fuzzy clustering over HC is that it 
yields much more detailed information on the structure of the data and therefore allows 
a description of some of the uncertainties that often go with real data. On the other hand, 
this could also be considered a disadvantage, because the amount of output grows very 
fast with the number of objects and the number of clusters, which may become too 
much to digest (Kaufmann and Rousseeuw, 1990). Also given the problem of 
incomplete and noisy data, fuzzy clustering has an advantage over HC especially with 
missing data. As it allows for ambiguity, FC is also said to be better equipped to analyse 
data where some ambiguity is present.   
Fuzzy clustering is performed using the fuzzy c-means (FCM) algorithm developed by 
(Dunn, 1974) and further extended by Bezdek et al. (1984). The algorithm of FC is 
taken from Kaufmann and Rousseeuw (1990) and is briefly described as follows. The 
data set consists of n objects (countries in our case) and for each country there are p 
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variables (using the OCA criteria and the ECOWAS convergence criteria), which are 
denoted by 
𝑋𝑛𝑝 = {𝑋1, 𝑋2, … , 𝑋𝑛}, where each 𝑋𝑖 = {𝑋𝑖1, … , 𝑋𝑖𝑝}. 
Each variable is standardised with mean zero and standard deviation of one in order to 
treat them as having equal importance in determining the structure. Standardisation of 
the variables (i.e. converting to z scores) is also important in order to keep variable with 
high variance from dominating the cluster analysis. When variables are of different 
magnitude and are not directly comparable, standardisation helps to overcome this 
problem.  
We use the standardised variables to classify the objects into cluster using certain 
mathematical relationships known as algorithm which we briefly described as follows:   
The dissimilarity coefficient or distance between two objects/countries i and j i.e. d(i, j) 
is defined as the Euclidean distance: 
𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗) = √∑ (𝑥𝑘𝑖 − 𝑥𝑘𝑗)
2𝑝
𝑘=1         7.1a)   
A version of this, the squared Euclidean distance, is obtained by squaring 7.1a as 
follows: 
𝑑2(𝑖, 𝑗) = ∑ (𝑥𝑘𝑖 − 𝑥𝑘𝑗)
2𝑝
𝑘=1       7.1b) 
The objective of the algorithm of fuzzy clustering analysis is to minimise the function C 
(total dispersion): 
𝐶 = ∑
∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑣
2 𝑢𝑗𝑣
2 𝑑(𝑖, 𝑗)𝑛𝑖,𝑗=1
2 ∑ 𝑢𝑗𝑣
2𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑘
𝑣=1
                                                                        (7.2) 
Subject to the constraints:      
𝑢𝑖𝑣 ≥ 0 for i = 1,….,n; v = 1,….,n     (7.3a) 
∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑣 = 0𝑣  for i = 1,….,n      (7.3b) 
For equations 7.1a to 7.3b: uiv represents the unknown membership coefficient of object 
i to cluster v, and k represents the number of clusters into which the data is partitioned. 
The algorithm produces the matrix of coefficients 𝑈𝑛×𝑘  with rows summing to one 
indicating the degree of belongingness of that object to each of the clusters. If one of the 
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coefficients is very high then it can be said that there is a high degree of certainty that 
this object belongs to that group, otherwise this object cannot easily be classified. The 
factor 2 in the denominator compensates for the fact that each of the terms uiv and ujv 
appear two times in the multiple sum. The two constraints (7.3a and 7.3b) is an 
expression that memberships cannot be negative and that each object has a constant 
total membership, distributed over the different clusters.  
To choose the optimal number of cluster that helps to analyse how well the data is 
partitioned, several statistical measures are used as validity tests and we discussed three 
of these. The first test is the normalised Dunn coefficient (DC) defined as 
𝐹𝑘 =
𝑘
𝑛
×∑ ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑣
2 −1𝑘𝑣=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑘−1
       (7.4) 
The Dunn coefficients vary between 1 (indicating well-partitioned data) to 0 (indicating 
complete fuzziness of the data). The value reaches 1 only if, for each object/country, 
there is one coefficient equal to 1and the others to 0, and 0 when all the coefficients of 
belongingness are 1/k.  
The second validity test is the silhouette width (SW) for each object which is defined as: 
𝑠(𝑖) =
𝑏(𝑖) − 𝑎(𝑖)
max (𝑎(𝑖), 𝑏(𝑖))
                                                                                (7.5) 
Where a(i) represents the average dissimilarity of object i to all objects in the same 
cluster and b(i) as the minimum across all other clusters of average dissimilarity of 
object i to all objects in each cluster. The value of SW ranges from -1 to 1. A value 
close to 1 indicates that the object is well-clustered while a value near 0 signals high 
degree of fuzziness (ambiguity) and the object might be better classified to a 
neighbouring cluster. A negative SW indicates the object is misclassified. The 
corresponding average for each cluster and for the total data set indicates how well the 
data in each cluster and the total data set were partitioned.  
A third optimal cluster validity test is the Xie and Beni (1991) (XB) index: 
𝑋𝐵 =
1
𝑛
∑ ∑ 𝑢𝑖,𝑗
2 𝑑𝑖,𝑗
2𝑐
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑚𝑖𝑛 {(𝑘𝑗 − 𝑘𝑣)
2
|𝑗, 𝑣 = 1,2, … 𝑐; 𝑗 ≠ 𝑣}
                                        (7.6) 
Where kj, kv are the centres of cluster j and cluster v respectively. Smaller XB index 
indicates more compact and separated clusters. 
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7.3.2 Crisp/hierarchical/hard clustering (HC) 
Hierarchical clustering technique attempts to assign each object to one and only one 
cluster. Expressed mathematically, Hierarchical clusters must satisfy the following 
properties: 
𝑢𝑖𝑘 ∈ 0,1   and 1 ≤ i ≤ n; 1 ≤ k ≤ c,      (7.7a) 
∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑘 = 1
𝑐
𝑘=1 , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and      (7.7b) 
0 < ∑ 𝑢𝑖𝑘 < 𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1 ,   1≤ k ≤ c,       (7.7c) 
Where uik represents the membership coefficient or degree of belongingness of an 
object i to a cluster k, c is the number of possible clusters, and n is the number of 
objects/countries in the data set. Properties 7.7a-7.7c states that a membership 
coefficient is either zero or one meaning that an object belongs to either one cluster or 
the other), the sum of the membership coefficients of an object across clusters is equal 
to one (i.e. every object must belong to a cluster), the sum of the membership 
coefficients in a cluster lies between zero and the total number of objects in the data set 
(i.e. each cluster must contain at least one but less than all objects in the data set), 
respectively. Broadly speaking, hierarchical method is subdivided into two. The first is 
the Divisive methods: in this technique all objects start in the same cluster and the 
agglomerative procedures are applied in reverse order until every object is in a separate 
cluster. The second is the agglomerative method and this is the most commonly used in 
cluster analysis literature. In the next section we discuss in detailed the second method. 
7.3.2.1 Agglomerative hierarchical clustering (AHC)  
In agglomerative hierarchical clustering, the method starts with N separate objects (i.e. 
clusters of one member). The two closest (most similar) are then merged to yield N-1 
clusters. The next two are merged to produce N-2 clusters and so on. This process is 
done repeatedly until all the objects are in one large cluster. At the end of this process, 
the optimum number of clusters is then chosen out of all cluster solutions. When 
merging clusters, the agglomerative algorithms use dissimilarities or distance between 
objects which therefore call for a definition of the dissimilarity between clusters based 
on the dissimilarities between their objects.  
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Within AHC approach to cluster analysis there are a number of different agglomerative 
algorithms, suggested in the literature, used to determine which cluster should be joined 
at each stage. The difference in these methods lies in the way they define dissimilarity 
(or distance) between objects/clusters. The methods include: single linkage (nearest 
neighbour), complete linkage (furthest neighbour), Average (between groups) linkage 
(sometimes known as UPGMA), centroid, and Ward’s method. The most popular and 
common in the literature is the group average (average) linkage method as applied in 
(Artis and Zhang, 2001; Buigut, 2006; Quah and Crowley, 2010; Tsangarides and 
Qureshi, 2008).  
I. Ward’s method 
The Ward’s method is also known as Minimum Variance Clustering (MVC). Ward’s 
method combines groups based on minimisation of the sum of squared errors (ESS) of 
any two, hypothetical, clusters that can be formed at each step. In other words the 
method combines all possible pairs of clusters and the sum of the squared distances 
within each cluster is calculated. This is then summed over all clusters. We then choose 
the combination that gives the lowest sum of squares. Ward’s method tends to produce 
clusters of approximately equal in size, which is not always desirable. The method is 
also sensitive to outliers. Despite this problem, it still remains one of the most popular 
methods, along with the average linkage method. The Ward distance is calculated as:   
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑊1,2 =
𝑛1𝑛2𝑑
2(?̅?1, ?̅?2)
(𝑛1 + 𝑛2)
                                                                             (7.8) 
Where ?̅?𝑐 =
1
𝑛1
∑ 𝑥𝑐𝑖
𝑛1
𝑖=1  is the centre of each cluster and 𝑑
2(?̅?1, ?̅?2)  is the distance 
between the centres of two clusters. 
II. Average linkage (group average) method. The average linkage method is also 
known as unweighted pair-group average method (UPGMA). In this method the 
dissimilarity or closeness between clusters 1 and 2 is taken to be the average of all 
dissimilarities d(i,j), where i is any object of cluster 1 and j is any object of cluster 2. 
Assume n1 and n2 are the number of observations in clusters 1 and 2 respectively. 
The average linkage method measures proximity (DistGA), as 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝐺𝐴1,2 =
1
𝑛1𝑛2
∑ ∑ 𝑑(𝑥1𝑖, 𝑥2𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
𝑖=1                                                    (7.9)  
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III. Single linkage (nearest neighbour) method 
In this method the distance between two clusters is taken to be the distance between the 
two closest members, or neighbours in the two clusters. In other words it looks for an 
object in a cluster that is most closely placed to another object in a different cluster and 
uses the distance between them to measure the closeness of clusters. It is expressed as 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑆1,2 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑑(𝑥1𝑖 , 𝑥2𝑗)}                                           (7.10) 
Where 𝑖 ∈  (1, 2, … , 𝑛1), 𝑗 ∈  (1, 2, … . , 𝑛2). 
IV. Centroid 
The centroid (the mean value for each variable) of each cluster is calculated and the 
distance between centroids is used. The algorithm merges clusters whose centroids are 
closest together. Due to the differences in measuring the dissimilarities (distance) 
between objects within clusters and between clusters in the different algorithms the 
usual practice in cluster analysis is to conduct the computation using more than one of 
the algorithms and choose the one that best represents the data. The choice between 
algorithms is guided by the cophenetic correlation coefficient (CCC) which determines 
how well the generated clusters represent dissimilarities between objects, with values 
close to one representing better clustering. Letting d be the average of d(i,j), and letting t 
be the average of t(i,j), the distance generated by the linkage method when two objects 
are first joined together, then the cophenetic correlation coefficient is defined as 
𝐶𝐶𝐶 =
∑ (𝑑(𝑖,𝑗)−𝑑)(𝑡(𝑖,𝑗)−𝑡)𝑖<𝑗
√[∑ (𝑑(𝑖,𝑗)−𝑑)2𝑖<𝑗 ][∑ (𝑡(𝑖,𝑗)−𝑡)2𝑖<𝑗 ]
                                           (7.11)   
The outcome of hierarchical clustering is represented in a hierarchical tree diagram, 
called a dendrogram. The heights of the links of the dendrogram represent the distance 
at which each fusion is made such that greater dissimilarity between objects is reflected 
by large distances and taller links. A dendrogram provides a natural visual rule of thumb 
for cluster divisions, where large changes in fusion levels indicate the best cut for 
forming clusters and therefore deciding on the number of clusters. However, there are 
several formal rules proposed to determine the best number of clusters (Everitt et al., 
2001). Amongst them is the pseudo-F (CHI) index developed by Calinski and Harabasz 
(1974) is one of the widely applied criterion to determine the optimal number of 
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clusters. The empirical popularity of the CHI is supported by a study by Milligan and 
Cooper (1985) who evaluated the performance of thirty cluster-stopping rules and found 
that the pseudo-F index performs the best. The CH index is defined as 
𝐶𝐻𝐼 =
𝑆𝑏/(𝐾 − 1)
𝑆𝑤(𝑛 − 𝑘)
                                                                                               (7.12) 
Where Sb is the between clusters sum of squares, Sw is the within-clusters sum of 
squares, k is the number of clusters and n is the number of objects. Higher values of the 
index indicate more distinct partitioning and therefore better clustering.  
Despite its usefulness in cluster analysis, Agglomerative Hierarchical clustering method 
is not without its problems. The method suffers from the defects that it can never repair 
what was done in previous steps. Indeed, once an agglomerative algorithm has joined 
two objects, they cannot be separated any more. Also, whatever a divisive algorithm has 
split up cannot be reunited. This rigidity of hierarchical methods is both the key to their 
success - because it leads to small computation times- and their main disadvantage (the 
inability to correct erroneous decisions). 
7.3.3 Data sources and variables description 
Cluster analysis provides no guidance on the choice of variables as already discussed is 
one of its limitations. The variables chosen for our analysis and described in this section 
is guided by the OCA theory discussed in chapter 4 and the ECOWAS convergence 
criteria in chapter 2 shown in appendix A.3.  
I. Synchronisation in the business cycle phase (BUS) 
It is argued that when business cycles between two economies are synchronised, the 
need for flexible exchange rates that can absorb asymmetric shocks becomes less 
relevant. This means that the more synchronised the business cycles of member states of 
a monetary union the less the need for an independent exchange rate and interest rate 
policy and therefore the more appropriate a common monetary policy. According to the 
OCA theory the more synchronised the business cycles are the less the costs on 
monetary union membership and verse versa. Countries with similar or synchronised 
business cycles are said to be good candidates for the formation of monetary union. 
Business cycle synchronisation/symmetry is measured in different ways in the literature. 
Ibrahim (2008) measured BUS as the standard deviation of the difference of the 
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logarithm of real GDP between each country and the anchor/reference country. Another 
method is to identify shocks by applying a switching vector autoregressive (SVAR) 
(Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1994) on the basis that it facilitates the separate 
identification of the initial shock and the policy response. The most popular method of 
measuring the business cycle in the literature is the cross correlation of the cyclical 
components of output (Artis and Zhang, 2001; Bénassy‐Quéré and Coupet, 2005; Quah 
and Crowley, 2010; Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2008). The computation of cross 
correlation usually requires an anchor country and the European studies mostly used 
Germany. The potential Germany for ECOWAS is Nigeria but has not been considered 
an appropriate anchor for the region due to its lack of financial development and 
disciplined fiscal policies (Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2008). Most studies in sub-Saharan 
Africa that focused on ECOWAS and Central Africa used the Euro area as an anchor on 
the basis of the extent of trade between those countries and Europe and also the pegging 
of the current single currencies (CFA franc zone) to the Euro. In this case two countries 
with high correlation values will exhibit similar business cycles and therefore will have 
the incentive both to form a monetary union and to choose the Euro as a monetary 
anchor rather than another foreign currency (Bénassy‐Quéré and Coupet, 2005). 
Conversely, two countries with negative correlation values will face a low incentive to 
use the euro as a monetary anchor. The closer the correlation value is to zero, the lower 
the incentive to both join a monetary union and peg to the euro. This thesis used the 
Euro as our anchor and the cross correlation approach, described by (Artis and Zhang, 
2001) as the more ‘atheretical’,  is used as a measure of output symmetry. The annual 
(with frequency=1) real GDP of the individual countries and the Euro are detrended by 
applying the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997) with a 
smoothing parameter of 100 (i.e. the square of the frequency x 100). An alternative 
detrending method used by Nguyen (2007) is to take the log and then first difference the 
series.  
II. Trade openness (GTI/RTI ) 
According to the OCA theory, countries that trade more with each other are good 
candidates for monetary integration, because they will benefit from significant 
transaction costs savings (McKinnon, 1963). Trade openness is measured for a country 
either with reference to the rest of the world (global trade intensity-GTI) or with 
201 
 
 
 
members in the region (regional trade intensity-RTI). This study adopts the latter which 
is measured as: 
𝑋𝑖,𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑊𝐴𝑆+𝑀𝑖,𝐸𝐶𝑂𝑊𝐴𝑆
𝑋𝑖+𝑀𝑖
 Where Xi denotes exports, Mi imports of goods and services and 
subscript ECOWAS indicates the direction of trade flows (destination or source). The 
reason for this choice is because the ECOWAS proposed currency union is not a global 
one but it is for only member countries and therefore extensive trade with non-
ECOWAS members and less trade with members yield no transaction costs saving 
benefits for the region. We compute the annual regional trade intensity for each country 
and average it over the sample period and a higher value indicates higher intra-regional 
trade and more potential benefits from joining the monetary union. 
III. Terms of trade synchronisation (TOT) 
A country’s terms of trade measures its exports prices in relation to its imports prices, 
and is expressed as (index of exports prices/index of imports prices) x 100. Similar to 
the business cycle synchronisation, the computation of terms of trade synchronisation 
requires an anchor country and for reasons already discussed in BUS above we used the 
Euro area for this purpose. Just as in the case of BUS the more synchronised/correlated 
the terms of trade of member states the lower the costs of joining a monetary union as 
the exchange rate is no longer available as a policy instrument to cushion against these 
shocks. To measure the cross correlation of the terms of trade movements, we follow 
Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) by computing the first difference of the annual terms of 
trade index for each of the ECOWAS countries and the Euro area, and measure the 
correlation between them. We compute terms of trade index taking the exports value 
index divided by the imports value index. We used the same formula for each euro 
country and calculate a weighted average taking total trade (exports + imports) as 
weights for each year. 
IV. Convergence of inflation (INF) 
It is noted by Artis and Zhang (2001), Artis and Zhang (2002) that the traditional OCA 
literature was generated during the ‘fix-price’ economics era, so the introduction of 
inflation convergence as a criterion could just be regarded as an appropriate 
normalisation. Because similar inflation rates can result from similar monetary and 
fiscal policy stances as well as similar institutional economic structures, the cost of 
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joining a monetary union is presumably low when inflation rates are similar across 
countries (Nguyen, 2007). In addition to the OCA, convergence in inflation is a primary 
criterion in ECOWAS monetary integration. WAMZ requires a single digit inflation 
rate, WAEMU requires inflation rate of less or equal to 3% and ECOWAS less or equal 
to 5% (appendix A.3, in chapter 2). Overall ECOWAS requires low inflation rates for 
its members to converge. We measure inflation convergence as the absolute inflation 
differential between each country (Xi) and the anchor country (X€), the euro in our case 
i.e. |𝑋𝑖 − 𝑋𝜖|. This measurement is common in the literature (Ibrahim, 2008; Quah and 
Crowley, 2010). Although (Artis and Zhang, 2001) used the inflation differential of 
each country and Germany without taking the absolute value, (Quah and Crowley, 
2010) noted that in a correspondence with Artis he indicated that the absolute value may 
be a better option in order to avoid the problem of cancellation of values of the opposite 
sign. The smaller is the inflation differential, the higher the convergence.  
V. Volatility in the real exchange rate (RER) 
As already explained in the OCA theory in chapter 4 the loss of an independent 
exchange rate, as one of the monetary policy tools to stabilise the economy in the case 
of a shock, is one of the costs of joining a monetary union. It is the real exchange rate 
that is the concern here, even though monetary policy can only directly influence the 
nominal rate with the implication that the real exchange rate will be able to move in the 
right way responding to the independent monetary policy action (Artis and Zhang, 
2001). If there has been little cause for real exchange rate volatility, the cost of 
abandoning a separate exchange rate would be presumably small (Nguyen, 2007). It is 
also argued that lower real exchange rate volatility might indicate an absence of 
asymmetric shocks and greater business cycle synchronicity, and thus a stronger case 
for monetary union (Artis and Zhang, 2001). Across many studies the common 
measurement of volatility in the real exchange rate is the standard deviation of the log 
difference of the annual real exchange rates, in our case, of the individual countries. We 
compute real exchange rate as the nominal exchange rate in local currency per unit of 
US$ of a given year divide by the GDP deflator of that year then multiplied by GDP 
deflator of 1996 (i.e. 1996=100). 
203 
 
 
 
The exchange rate variable is not only an OCA criterion but also one of ECOWAS 
secondary convergence criteria. It therefore has a dual important role to play in our 
analysis.    
VI. Government/fiscal balance (FIB) 
Fiscal balance is one of ECOWAS primary convergence criteria for the membership of 
monetary union. It is common for both ECOWAS and its sub units (WAMZ and 
WAEMU). ECOWAS and WAMZ require a budget deficit to GDP ratio of greater or 
equal to -4% where as WAEMU requires the same ratio to be greater or equal to zero.  
The ratio is computed by taking the annual central government balance as a percentage 
of annual GDP. The ratios are then averaged for each country over the analysis period.  
VII. Debt servicing requirement (DSR) 
Debt service requirement is one of the primary convergence criteria for ECOWAS. The 
convergence criteria require member countries to build up surpluses to attain sustainable 
debt levels so as to ensure that they adequately service their debt stock without creating 
inflation. Debt repayment is important as it lowers the risk associated with a country, 
improves its credit rating, and strengthens the confidence of foreign investors thereby 
reducing its borrowing costs and increasing capital inflow. It is also argued that because 
the debt service is denominated in hard currencies, countries with higher debt service 
are likely to have a lower incentive to devalue their currencies.  Hence, countries with 
high debt service ratio are expected to be more willing to peg and possibly form a 
monetary union with a peg on a foreign anchor (Bénassy‐Quéré and Coupet, 2005). For 
the purpose of our analysis we calculate the debt service requirement for each country 
as the ratio of total debt service requirement to the total exports of goods and services 
and then average the ratios over the period. The alternative of looking at the same 
measure in the literature is to compute the debt service requirement as a ratio of the 
GDP. However, this latter measure is more of a measure of national indebtedness, i.e. 
level of borrowing, rather than debt servicing ability. Although WAEMU’s equivalent 
primary criterion is the latter, we decide to use the former because it is the primary 
criteria for both WAMZ and ECOWAS.   
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VIII. Tax revenue (TAR) 
Performance in terms of tax receipts is a secondary convergence criterion for 
ECOWAS. This variable is measured as the ratio of tax revenue to GDP. Both 
ECOWAS and WAMZ require member countries to achieve a ratio of greater or equal 
to 20%. However, WAEMU’s equivalent secondary criterion to the tax revenue to GDP 
ratio is current account balance excluding grants to be greater or equal to -5% (appendix 
A.3). WAMA’s macroeconomic convergence report for the first half of 2009 indicates 
that the tax revenue to GDP ratio is one of ECOWAS countries worst performance over 
the nine year period in the report. For the years 2001-2003 none of the fifteen countries 
met the requirement and for six of the years only two countries and for 2007 and 2009 
three countries met the criterion. Due to lack of data for the Tax revenue during the 
period of our study, we decide to use the current account balance to the GDP ratio.  
We collect our data from the international data bases. Real GDP (constant 2005 US$), 
nominal exchange rates, GDP deflators, exports price index, imports price index, 
Inflation (GDP deflator) annual percentage, are from the World Bank- World 
Development indicators (WB-WDI). Exports and imports data from the IMF-DOTs, 
total debt service on external debt is from the international debt statistics. 
7.3.4 Standardisation of data 
In most statistical analyses the data are standardised by some appropriate method in 
order to overcome the problem of different scale measures and ensure equal weighting 
of the variables.  Milligan and Cooper (1988) discussed a number of methods of 
standardisation that exist in the literature although many of them are not widely used8. 
For different scale values data the common approach is to standardise to a mean of 0 
and to a unit variance. This made the z-score formula, equation 7.13, to be very popular 
with researchers.   
𝑍1 =
𝑋−?̅?
𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑋
                 7.13 
Where X is the original data, ?̅?  is the sample mean and StdX is the standard deviation 
of X.  
                                                 
8 For details on the discussion of the various methods of standardisation see Milligan 
and Cooper (1988) 
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Despite the wide use of standardisation in empirical work there is still a debate in the 
literature as to whether standardisation affects similarity measures. According to Everitt 
(1980) standardisation to unit variance and mean of 0 reduces the differences between 
groups on those variables. Edelbrock (1983) on the other hand noted that variables in 
multivariate data sets may have different distribution parameters across groupings 
which may render standardisation not to constitute an equivalent transformation of these 
variables and may possibly change the relationship between them. In a subsequent 
Monte Carlo studies using correlation coefficient and other hierarchical clustering 
techniques he found that the use of standardised and non-standardised variables yield no 
substantial differences between the classification results. Milligan (1980) found that 
standardisation appears to have only a minor effect on the results of a cluster analysis. 
On the other hand Mathews (1979) cited in Aldenderfer and Blashfield (1984) showed 
that standardisation did have a negative effect on the adequacy of the results of a cluster 
analysis when compared to an optimal classification of the cases under study.  
7.4 Empirical results   
7.4.1 Features of the data 
The cluster analysis in this chapter is based on standardised/normalised data. However 
we start our discussion with a brief comment on some of the features of the data both 
before and after standardisation as represented in figures 7.2 and 7.1 respectively. In 
these two figures the data for all the eight variables, for the full period of our study 
(1998-2012), are plotted in a hatch-plot, displaying the distribution of the variables in 
the form of a matrix. 
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Figure 7.1   Hatch-Plot for standardised variables 1998-2012 
 
Figure 7.2   Hatch-Plot for unstandardised variables 1998-2012  
 
The first observation from the two hatch-plots is that the distributions (correlations and 
other measures) seem similar to each other. The similarities between the two 
distributions may imply that the results of clustering based on the standardised data may 
not significantly be different from the original (unstandardised) data. A second 
observation from the inspection of the plots is that there are no obvious groupings of 
countries for the variables under consideration, although RER, INF, DSR and CAB 
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appear to be the exception. These four variables seem to separate one of few countries 
from the rest of the group but this depends more on which other variables we look at. 
There are two possible implications from the second observation. First, the grouping of 
the data varies for each variable and that there is no simple way to categorising the data 
according to simple high/medium/low categories across all variables (Quah and 
Crowley, 2010). This feature of the data provides the justification for using an 
optimisation-based clustering technique to analyse the data. 
7.4.2 Pre-cluster Analysis results-full period (1998-2012) 
In this section we present the results and discuss them on a variable-by-variable basis in 
order to highlight the implications in terms of costs and benefits for forming a monetary 
union in ECOWAS. We do a much more in depth analysis for the full period (1998-
2012), see graphical presentation in appendices A.27-A.34. We also look at the three 
sub periods for any trend and changes in the macroeconomic structure of the countries. 
For each variable, the discussion is based on individual countries relative to sub-
regional average, WAEMU and WAMZ, and also relative to overall ECOWAS average. 
We also attempt to compare WAEMU and WAMZ relative to each other and to 
ECOWAS. This approach enables us to come up with any similarities and 
dissimilarities, in accordance with the OCA and convergence criteria, and how these are 
linked to the cluster analysis results.  
A detailed description of the data is in the methodology above (section 7.3.3). For each 
country, the average of the data for each variable for the period 1998-2012 is presented 
in table 7.1. Eight of the fifteen ECOWAS countries are members of WAEMU (CFA 
zone), six are members of WAMZ and one (Cape Verde) is not a member of any of the 
two sub-regional arrangements. However, both the CFA (WAEMU’s currency) and the 
Escudo (Cape Verde’s currency) are pegged to the Euro since the inception of the Euro 
in 1999 through bilateral agreements. Prior to the Euro, the Cape Verde Escudo was 
linked to the Portuguese escudo. The current peg is 1 Euro = 655.957 CFA Franc and 1 
Euro = 110.265 Escudo. Due to the peg of these two currencies to the same anchor, we 
grouped Cape Verde into WAEMU for the purpose of computing the descriptive 
statistics and refer to this grouping of nine countries as WAEMU+1. For a fairer 
comparison between WAEMU and WAMZ, we re-computed the mean of WAEMU 
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without Cape Verde, shown as mean no CPV, since it is not a member despite their 
similarity in pegging. 
Table 7.1   Unstandardised data and descriptive statistics- 1998-2012 
 
Source: author’s computation from the data sources stated above 
I. Synchronisation in the business cycle (BUS) 
The cross correlation of the cyclical components of real output of ECOWAS countries 
and EU 12, a measure of the synchronisation of the ECOWAS business cycle with the 
EU countries, is shown on the first column of table 7.1. 
The a priori expectation, according to the OCA theory, is that the higher the correlation 
between the individual countries output with the EU the more symmetric the shocks are 
and hence the more appropriate a monetary policy for the countries. Our results in table 
7.1 show that out of the 15 ECOWAS countries, only four (27%) with positive 
correlation with the EU (Cape Verde, Guinea, Mali and Senegal). Guinea’s correlation 
(0.159) is low and that of Mali’s (0.085) is even much lower to economically justify any 
incentive to peg to the euro or form a monetary union. Only Cape Verde with a 
country BUS TOT RTI RER INF FIB DSR CAB
BEN -0.149 -0.097 0.138 0.034 2.823 -1.823 15.865 -7.199
BFA -0.143 -0.013 0.314 0.038 1.847 -2.908 16.716 -8.354
CPV 0.431 -0.012 0.016 0.045 2.622 -5.885 137.31 -11.004
CIV -0.428 0.145 0.231 0.040 1.974 -1.323 13.360 1.981
GHA -0.336 0.281 0.153 0.106 13.726 -6.915 14.099 -6.711
GIN 0.159 -0.211 0.056 0.057 12.597 -4.923 14.763 -8.785
GNB -0.135 -0.189 0.183 0.053 4.462 -5.162 7.164 -2.147
LIB -0.283 0.502 0.009 0.053 7.979 0.177 8.939 -21.889
MLI 0.085 0.441 0.209 0.040 1.946 -0.992 32.776 -7.423
NER -0.262 -0.208 0.271 0.034 2.205 0.562 15.981 -11.618
NGA -0.013 -0.118 0.044 0.181 9.871 0.478 6.419 5.405
SEN 0.272 0.258 0.190 0.039 1.784 -3.769 20.307 -7.534
SLE -0.162 0.176 0.075 0.080 10.843 -1.908 78.094 -10.125
GMB -0.466 0.270 0.138 0.052 4.299 -3.892 74.403 -8.757
TGO -0.363 0.250 0.250 0.041 2.536 -2.377 9.579 -8.344
Descriptive statistics
ECOWAS
Min -0.466 -0.211 0.009 0.034 1.784 -6.915 6.419 -21.889
Max 0.431 0.502 0.314 0.181 13.726 0.562 137.307 5.405
Mean -0.120 0.098 0.152 0.060 5.434 -2.711 31.051 -7.500
WAEMU
Min -0.428 -0.208 0.016 0.034 1.784 -5.885 7.164 -11.618
Max 0.431 0.441 0.314 0.053 4.462 0.562 137.307 1.981
Mean -0.077 0.064 0.200 0.041 2.467 -2.631 29.895 -6.849
mean no CPV -0.140 0.073 0.223 0.040 2.447 -2.224 16.468 -6.330
WAMZ
Min -0.466 -0.211 0.009 0.052 4.299 -6.915 6.419 -21.889
Max 0.159 0.502 0.153 0.181 13.726 0.478 78.094 5.405
Mean -0.183 0.150 0.079 0.088 9.886 -2.831 32.786 -8.477
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correlation of 0.431, which we will say high by other standards, could be said to have a 
more synchronised business cycle with the EU and therefore more justification for a peg 
to the euro. 11 of the ECOWAS countries (73%) all have a negative business cycle 
correlation with the EU, ranging from -0.013 (Nigeria) to -0.466 (The Gambia). 
WAEMU with Cape Verde average correlation is -0.077 and without it is -0.140 which 
is not too far from the ECOWAS average correlation of -0.12. For WAMZ, the 
maximum correlation is 0.159 (Guinea) and the overall average is -0.183. On the basis 
of the BUS there is not much positive performance for any of the two monetary zones in 
ECOWAS.    
Out of the 18 countries (EU15 & US, Canada and Japan) studied by Zhang and Artis 
(2001) only one country has a negative business cycle correlation (-0.075) with 
Germany, the anchor country, and they classified it as low. Eight of the countries (44%) 
they classified as high correlation have a range of 0.444-0.745. Nine of the countries 
(50%) they classified as having a medium correlation range from 0.343-0.106. Bayoumi 
and Ostry (1997) used a benchmark from a previous study that considered the 
correlation between a group of 3 industrialised countries (Germany, Japan and US). The 
correlation coefficients between these three countries range between 0.34-0.57. 
Considering our results in table 7.1 with the exception of Cape Verde, no other 
ECOWAS countries could be said to meet any of these benchmarks. Based on these 
benchmarks the ECOWAS results for 1998-2012 provide us with no evidence that there 
is any degree of correlation of business cycle with EU that may justify a peg to the Euro 
neither the economic motivation to form a monetary union. 
II. Terms of trade synchronisation (TOT) 
As already discussed in the variable description section, the higher the correlation of the 
TOT with the anchor, EU, in our case the more synchronised the terms of trade and 
therefore the lower the costs of forming a monetary union. The second column of table 
7.1 shows the correlation of ECOWAS countries terms of trade with EU12. Eight out of 
the fifteen countries (53%) have positive terms of trade correlation with EU, ranging 
from 0.145 (Cote d’Ivoire) to 0.502 (Liberia). However, only two of these eight 
countries (LIB=0.502, MLI=0.441) may be considered as having a high TOT 
correlation. The third country in the TOT correlation rank is Ghana which is 0.281 
followed by The Gambia with 0.270. On the two ECOWAS zones there is no distinctive 
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statistics that could classify the two zones far from each other. WAEMU+1 shows a 
mean correlation of 0.064 and without Cape Verde, the correlation is 0.073 which 
makes no significant difference between them. WAMZ correlation average is 0.150 
which slightly exceeds the ECOWAS average of 0.098. Apart from the two countries, 
Liberia and Mali, the overall picture of ECOWAS terms of trade is not promising, a 
situation which is similar to the business cycle synchronisation.  
III. Trade openness (GTI/RTI) 
As described in the methodology section of this chapter, we measure trade openness by 
the regional trade intensity (RTI). According to the OCA theory the higher this ratio, the 
more the intra-regional trade and therefore the more the potential benefits from joining 
the monetary union. Column 3 of table 7.1 shows our intra-regional trade openness for 
ECOWAS countries for the period 1998-2012. Starting with the regional average trade 
openness of ECOWAS countries total trade to each other on average is 0.152 (15.2%) 
with a maximum of 31.4% (Burkina Faso) from WAEMU and minimum of 0.9% 
(Liberia) from WAMZ. The average trade of WAEMU+1 countries to other ECOWAS 
countries is 20% but without Cape Verde the figure increases to 22.3% which is 
7.1(46.7%) above the ECOWAS average intra-regional trade openness. WAMZ overall 
average trade within ECOWAS for the period is 7.9% which is 7.3(48%) below the 
ECOWAS average and 14.4 (64.6%) below the WAEMU average trade. Seven of the 
eight WAEMU countries (87.5%) trade with other ECOWAS countries at a level that is 
above the ECOWAS average of 15.2% while for WAMZ, apart from Ghana which 
trades with other ECOWAS countries just at the average level of ECOWAS, all the 
other five countries (83.3%) trade at a level that is below the ECOWAS average trade. 
Out of these five countries, all of them even trade at a single digit average ranging from 
0.9% (Liberia) to only 7.5% (Sierra Leone) with the exception of The Gambia which 
trades at 13.8%. Nigeria’s, the power house of WAMZ and ECOWAS, trade level with 
other ECOWAS countries stands at a level of 4.4% which is 3.5(44%) below WAMZ 
average, 17.9(80%) below WAEMU average and 10.8(71%) below the ECOWAS 
average. This ranks Nigeria in the bottom 3 of the six WAMZ countries and the bottom 
3 of the 15 ECOWAS countries exceeding only Cape Verde (1.6%), one of the smallest 
economies of ECOWAS and Liberia (0.9%), a war torn economy. What seems to be 
clear from these trade figures is that WAEMU countries trade a lot more than the 
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WAMZ countries both on individual basis and sub-regional basis and therefore stand 
distinctively from the others.    
We have observed that there is more intra-regional trade in WAEMU than in WAMZ 
but is the ECOWAS trade level sufficient enough for the region to earnest the potential 
benefits of transaction costs savings advocated in the literature? To answer this question 
we corroborate the current trade statistics with those of our comparative data analysis in 
chapter 5. A more detailed analysis in that chapter uses different trade openness 
measures for ECOWAS comparative with EU12. The results of the measure which is 
the same as the one we use in table 7.1 are in appendix A.11 for ECOWAS and A.12 for 
EU12. From those two tables we saw that for the years under consideration the 
minimum intra-regional trade for ECOWAS range from 0.9-1.6% and the maximum 
range from 26.5-35.3% compared to 38.5-55.5% and 75.4-88% respectively for EU12. 
Based on the consistency of the ECOWAS results in this chapter and chapter 5 relative 
to the EU12 benchmark, it is difficult for one to conclude that the level of intra-
ECOWAS trade statistics in table 7.1 is sufficient to yield the transaction costs saving 
benefits that will justify the formation of a monetary union in ECOWAS.   
Our trade openness conclusion therefore is that, although, in relative terms, WAEMU 
countries stands to gain more from transaction cost savings than their WAMZ 
counterpart the evidence does not support the argument that these savings, relative to 
the extra-regional trade level, are sufficient to justify a monetary union formation in 
ECOWAS.   
IV. Volatility in real exchange rate (RER) 
Exchange rate is one of the policy instruments, perhaps closer to interest rate that 
countries use to stabilise macroeconomic shocks. In a monetary union this is no longer 
available to the specific needs of countries. As we have already mentioned above, the 
lower the exchange rate volatility the less we should be concerned with the cost of 
abandoning a separate exchange rate as such costs should presumably be small. We now 
examine the ECOWAS countries’ position with regard to the real exchange rate 
volatility as presented in column 4 of table 7.1. The overall ECOWAS average real 
exchange rate volatility is 0.060 with a range of 0.034-0.181 which coincides with 
Benin from WAEMU and Nigeria from WAMZ respectively. The mean difference 
between WAEMU+1 and WAEMU is only 0.001, meaning classifying Cape Verde to 
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WAEMU makes no difference in exchange rate volatility. WAEMU has an average 
volatility of 0.040 with a minimum of 0.034 (Benin) and maximum of 0.053 (Guinea 
Bissau). This average is 0.02 (33.3%) below the ECOWAS average volatility. All the 
eight WAEMU countries have exchange rate volatility well below the ECOWAS 
average of 0.06 which is also the same for Cape Verde. On the other hands, WAMZ 
average exchange rate volatility is 0.088 with a minimum of 0.052 (The Gambia) and 
maximum of 0.181 (Nigeria). This average is 0.028 (46.7%) above the ECOWAS 
average volatility. Only one WAMZ country (Guinea) is on ECOWAS average with 3 
(50%) above and 2 (33.3%) below it. Our finding from these statistics is that there is a 
higher volatility in exchange rates in WAMZ as compared to the volatility in WAEMU 
and Cape Verde meaning the latter two outperformed the former. This finding makes 
sense given that the eight WAEMU countries share the same currency (CFA Franc) 
with a rigid peg to the Euro and given their low inflation record (next variable to 
consider), one would not expect a high real exchange rate volatility for these countries.     
V. Convergence in inflation (INF) 
INF and RER are both OCA variables and ECOWAS convergence criteria variables. 
These two variables sit in between the two categories of variables we considered in this 
analysis. The details of the ECOWAS convergence requirements with respect to these 
variables are already shown in appendix A.3, chapter 2. As we have already seen in the 
methodology section above countries with similar inflation rates are good candidates for 
monetary union as they are suitable for a one-size-fits-all monetary policy. We examine 
the ECOWAS countries as to their suitability in respect of inflation convergence in 
accordance with the OCA theory. We measure inflation convergence by the inflation 
differential between each ECOWAS country and the group of EU12. The results are 
shown in column 5 of table 7.1. The a priori expectation is that the lower the inflation 
differential between the country and its anchor, the greater the propensity to peg the 
currency on the anchor and also the formation of a monetary union. The results revealed 
an average ECOWAS inflation differential with EU12 of 5.434% ranging from a 
minimum of 1.784 (Senegal) from WAEMU and a maximum of 13.726% (Ghana) from 
WAMZ. The average inflation differential for WAEMU is 2.447 (55%)- no material 
difference between WAEMU and WAEMU+1- below the average with a minimum of 
1.784 (Senegal) and maximum of 4.462 (Guinea Bissau). All the eight WAEMU 
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countries and Cape Verde have inflation differential below the ECOWAS average. For 
WAMZ, the average inflation differential is 9.886 (≈10) which is 82% above the 
ECOWAS average differential. The WAMZ minimum inflation differential is 4.299 
(The Gambia), almost equal to the WAEMU’s maximum of 4.462 and the maximum is 
13.728 (Ghana). With the exception of The Gambia which is slightly below the 
ECOWAS average inflation differential, all the other 5 WAMZ countries are above the 
ECOWAS average, four of which are in double digits.  
Our finding from the inflation differential variable statistics is that the WAEMU 
countries and Cape Verde not only outperformed the WAMZ countries but appear to 
converged to the EU inflation rates. It could mean that these nine countries are 
benefiting from the low inflation in the Euro zone as a result of compliance with the 
possible disciplinary measures that may have been included in the bilateral agreement 
between them and France. This finding is consistent with our previous analysis in 
chapter 5 where figure 5.2 showed the 10 year average inflation rates for ECOWAS 
countries and EU12. We observed from this graph that all the eight WAEMU countries 
and Cape Verde grouped together with all EU12 countries, in almost a straight line, at 
the bottom of the inflation scale between 0 and 5%, just at the middle of this band. 
Strikingly, just as we found in this chapter, figure 5.2 showed the 6 WAMZ countries 
well scattered from the middle of the inflation scale, with The Gambia closer to 
WAEMU, up to the top of the scale with Guinea at the top end.   
VI. Government/fiscal balance (FIB)   
 ECOWAS criterion calls for a fiscal balance of -4 or better whilst WAEMU requires a 
zero or better FIB. Positive or smaller negative FIB are favourable and indicate better 
performance than larger negative FIB. The overall ECOWAS average fiscal balance is -
2.71% which is above the ECOWAS -4% requirements. The lowest, worst performing, 
is -6.92 (Ghana) from WAMZ and the highest, best performing, is 0.56 (Niger) from 
WAEMU. Next to Ghana, for adverse FIB, are Guinea Bissau (from WAEMU) and 
Cape Verde.  Out of the eight WAEMU countries only Niger that has a positive fiscal 
balance of 0.56. All the WAEMU countries, except Niger failed the WAEMU zero or 
better FIB requirement, although 7 of these countries (87.5%) met the ECOWAS 
criterion of -4% or better. Without Cape Verde WAEMU has a FIB ranging from worst 
-5.16% (Guinea Bissau) to the best 0.562% (Niger). The average FIB for WAEMU is -
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2.224 which is better than the ECOWAS average. The average for WAMZ is -2.83% 
which is slightly worse than the ECOWAS average FIB. Nigeria is the only country in 
WAMZ with a positive FIB of 0.478 next to Niger. Three of the WAMZ countries 
(50%)-Ghana, Guinea, and The Gambia - are below the ECOWAS average FIB and two 
of them- Ghana and Guinea- even performed worse than the ECOWAS -4% or better 
requirement. This means 4 (66.7%) of the WAMZ countries have a fiscal balance 
performance better than the ECOWAS criterion as compared to 87.5% for WAEMU. 
All in all four countries (26.7%)- Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea and Guinea Bissau-  in 
ECOWAS failed to meet the ECOWAS fiscal balance threshold.  
What we can conclude from the fiscal balance variable is that there is a marginally 
better performance in WAEMU countries than the WAMZ and Cape Verde. Whilst we 
observe, from these statistics, some amount of convergence by 11 of the 15 countries by 
the ECOWAS benchmark, there is still a concern for the level of disparity of fiscal 
balances among even those 11 countries.  
VII. Debt servicing requirement (DSR) 
 Debt servicing is one of the secondary criteria for ECOWAS convergence. The debt 
servicing requirements of ECOWAS countries are shown in column 7 of table 7.1. Cape 
Verde has the highest DSR up to 137.3%. This figure is exceptionally different from the 
rest of the ECOWAS countries which seems to be an outlier and because Cape Verde is 
not in any of the zones in ECOWAS we recalculate the ECOWAS average by excluding 
it in order to facilitate a fairer and more reasonable comparison of the two zones. 
ECOWAS average debt service requirement is 31.1% but reduces to 23.5% without 
Cape Verde. For the purpose of our analysis of the DSR we use the latter average. We 
have no benchmark for deciding whether the ECOWAS average is high or low. This is 
not much important since the focus of our analysis is the examination of the countries to 
know whether they are similar or not in macroeconomic terms. The average DSR for 
WAEMU is 16.5% which is 7 points (30%) below the ECOWAS. The lowest DSR is 
7.2% (Guinea Bissau) and the highest is 32.8% (Mali). Mali’s DSR appears to be an 
outlier within WAEMU as the next country to it, Senegal, is way below at 20.3%. Seven 
of the eight WAEMU countries (87.5%) are below the ECOWAS DSR. On the other 
side, WAMZ average DSR is 32.8% which is 8.3 points (40%) above the ECOWAS 
average. The lowest DSR for WAMZ is 6.4% (Nigeria) and the highest is 78.1% (Sierra 
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Leone). Four of the WAMZ countries (66.7%) are below the ECOWAS average and the 
two that are above the average (Sierra Leone and The Gambia) are exceptionally higher 
than the other WAMZ countries. 
The DSR statistics revealed that WAEMU countries are slightly better than the WAMZ 
countries and most importantly there is a high degree of dissimilarities in DSR among 
the ECOWAS countries with Cape Verde being abnormally different from the rest. 
VIII. Current account balance (CAB) 
The current account balance statistics, for ECOWAS, expressed as a percentage of GDP 
are presented in column 8 of table 7.1. The statistics show an ECOWAS average of -
7.5% with Nigeria having a surplus of 5.4% (best) and Liberia having -21.9% (the 
worst). 
The average for WAEMU+1 is -6.8% and that of WAEMU is -6.3%. The WAEMU 
average is slightly better than the ECOWAS average. Cote d’Ivoire is the best 
performing country in WAEMU with a current account surplus of 2% whilst the worst 
performing country, Niger, has a CAB of -11.6%. WAMZ CAB average is -8.5% which 
is slightly worse than the ECOWAS average. Nigeria with a current account surplus of 
5.4% is the best in WAMZ and also ECOWAS as a whole. The worst in WAMZ and 
ECOWAS as whole is Liberia with a current account balance of -21.9%.  
Our finding for the CAB variable is that Nigeria outstandingly outperformed all 
ECOWAS countries but overall the WAEMU countries appear to be slightly better than 
the WAMZ countries and overall the CAB statistics provide no evidence that the 
ECOWAS countries are similar.  
7.4.3 Pre- cluster analysis- sub periods 
In this section we analyse the sub-periods 1998-2002 (period 1), 2003-2007 (period 2), 
and 2008-2012 (period 3) in order to see how the eight macroeconomic variables have 
changed over time as compared to the full period. The results for these periods are 
shown on tables 7.2-7.4 which are also graphically presented in appendices A.27-A.34. 
Like the full period analysis we do the sub-period analysis on a variable by variable 
basis. The averages for each variable for each monetary zone and ECOWAS as a whole 
are plotted in charts shown in figure 7.3.  
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I. Synchronisation in the business cycle (BUS) 
The business cycle correlations of ECOWAS countries and the EU for each of 1998-
2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 are shown in the first column of tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 
respectively. The statistics in these tables and the charts in Appendix A.27 show no 
synchronisation pattern in the business cycles of ECOWAS countries with EU. The 
statistics show that for the five year period 1998-2002 only four of the fifteen 
ECOWAS countries (27%) have positive correlation (Cape Verde, The Gambia, 
Senegal and Togo) with a range of -0.966 to 0.899. In 2003-2007, just before the 
financial crisis, the number of countries with positive business cycle correlation 
increased to 9 (60%) with minimum of -0.717 to 0.931. Apart from Guinea Bissau with 
a positive correlation of 0.094, all the other 8 countries with positive correlations are 
greater than 0.5 meaning all of them can be considered to have a high correlation. 
Despite this improvement from the first period it is still difficult to say that there is 
symmetry in the ECOWAS business cycle since 7 (47%) of the countries business cycle 
is negative including Guinea Bissau with a marginally positive correlation. In the third 
period, 2008-2012, the countries with positive correlation even increased further to 10 
(67%) with a minimum of -0.717 and maximum of 0.894. six of these positive 
correlations are higher than 0.5 which we can consider to be high correlation while three 
may be considered moderate as shown in table 7.4 and Appendix A.27. However, six of 
the countries (40%) still have negative correlation or marginally positive (as the case of 
Guinea Bissau).  
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Table 7.2   Unstandardised data and descriptive statistics (1998-2002) 
 
Table 7.3   Unstandardised data and descriptive statistics (2003-2007) 
 
country BUS TOT RTI RER INF FIB DSR CAB
BEN -0.4038 -0.292 0.172 0.030 3.664 -1.680 25.594 -5.846
BFA -0.6835 0.199 0.272 0.042 1.042 -4.160 27.982 -10.682
CPV 0.8991 -0.152 0.014 0.048 3.373 -4.860 175.23 -10.496
CIV -0.2382 0.463 0.206 0.041 1.743 -1.000 24.633 -0.148
GHA -0.9470 0.297 0.153 0.109 18.957 -6.060 21.903 -4.978
GIN -0.9658 0.001 0.069 0.025 3.279 -4.320 22.082 -5.388
GNB -0.2625 -0.322 0.097 0.079 6.998 -9.360 7.768 1.162
LIB -0.8688 0.650 0.008 0.047 10.905 -0.240 0.275 -12.802
MLI -0.4806 0.796 0.196 0.051 1.887 -2.980 43.467 -7.522
NER -0.8134 -0.963 0.309 0.029 2.091 -3.240 18.885 -7.118
NGA -0.2579 -0.275 0.050 0.272 9.462 0.642 9.728 -1.828
SEN 0.6819 0.320 0.153 0.033 1.267 -1.300 30.374 -5.348
SLE -0.6189 0.704 0.070 0.145 10.863 -6.780 220.77 -2.804
GMB 0.8408 -0.333 0.113 0.032 4.443 -5.540 99.333 -4.166
TGO 0.5100 0.344 0.224 0.052 3.213 -0.380 14.175 -6.766
Descriptive statistics
ECOWAS
Min -0.966 -0.963 0.008 0.025 1.042 -9.360 0.275 -12.802
Max 0.899 0.796 0.309 0.272 18.957 0.642 220.769 1.162
Mean -0.241 0.096 0.140 0.069 5.546 -3.417 49.480 -5.649
WAEMU
Min -0.813 -0.963 0.014 0.029 1.042 -9.360 7.768 -10.682
Max 0.899 0.796 0.309 0.079 6.998 -0.380 175.227 1.162
Mean -0.088 0.044 0.183 0.045 2.809 -3.218 40.901 -5.863
mean no CPV -0.211 0.068 0.204 0.045 2.738 -3.013 24.110 -5.284
WAMZ
Min -0.966 -0.333 0.008 0.025 3.279 -6.780 0.275 -12.802
Max 0.841 0.704 0.153 0.272 18.957 0.642 220.769 -1.828
Mean -0.470 0.174 0.077 0.105 9.652 -3.716 62.348 -5.328
country BUS TOT RTI RER INF FIB DSR CAB
BEN 0.931 -0.213 0.170 0.028 1.735 -1.720 12.351 -7.350
BFA -0.325 -0.284 0.387 0.032 1.166 -0.600 13.165 -10.010
CPV 0.758 -0.948 0.020 0.039 2.421 -3.660 165.09 -8.806
CIV -0.311 -0.281 0.231 0.026 1.229 -0.880 5.857 1.296
GHA 0.926 0.052 0.159 0.145 12.293 -7.800 13.220 -5.702
GIN -0.692 -0.799 0.065 0.091 21.791 -2.060 15.256 -3.942
GNB 0.094 0.745 0.230 0.028 2.600 -3.380 8.162 -2.052
LIB 0.787 -0.073 0.012 0.029 6.149 1.260 6.448 -16.066
MLI 0.601 -0.532 0.207 0.028 2.135 2.820 30.965 -6.438
NER 0.585 0.793 0.255 0.028 2.040 6.420 19.981 -8.114
NGA -0.443 0.111 0.043 0.044 9.615 2.040 9.057 10.148
SEN -0.717 -0.121 0.202 0.029 2.107 -4.600 17.710 -8.582
SLE 0.815 -0.111 0.090 0.021 9.683 4.980 10.036 -4.290
GMB -0.039 -0.028 0.170 0.068 5.617 -3.260 95.538 -7.478
TGO 0.887 0.154 0.297 0.021 1.902 -2.480 5.658 -9.562
Descriptive statistics
ECOWAS
Min -0.717 -0.948 0.012 0.021 1.166 -7.800 5.658 -16.066
Max 0.931 0.793 0.387 0.145 21.791 6.420 165.090 10.148
Mean 0.257 -0.102 0.169 0.044 5.499 -0.861 28.566 -5.797
WAEMU
Min -0.717 -0.948 0.020 0.021 1.166 -4.600 5.658 -10.010
Max 0.931 0.793 0.387 0.039 2.600 6.420 165.090 1.296
Mean 0.278 -0.076 0.222 0.029 1.926 -0.898 30.993 -6.624
mean no CPV 0.218 0.033 0.247 0.027 1.864 -0.553 14.231 -6.352
WAMZ
Min -0.692 -0.799 0.012 0.021 5.617 -7.800 6.448 -16.066
Max 0.926 0.111 0.170 0.145 21.791 4.980 95.538 10.148
Mean 0.226 -0.141 0.090 0.066 10.858 -0.807 24.926 -4.555
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ECOWAS average business cycle correlation overall has shown an improvement from a 
negative of -0.241 in 1998-2002 to a positive of 0.257 but a slight decline in the third 
period to 0.208 (tables 7.2-7.4). It appears that ECOWAS business cycle correlation 
was best in the period 2003-2007 and worst in the first period, 1998-2002. A feature 
that is also common in ECOWAS business cycle correlation is the lack of consistency 
in individual countries correlation. For instance, The Gambia has a high positive 
correlation in 1998-2002 then moved to a low negative in 2003-2007 and to a high 
negative in 2008-2012 and for the same periods Senegal has high positive, high 
negative and medium positive respectively. Guinea moved from high negatives in the 
first two periods to a high positive in the final period. Only Cape Verde and Togo that 
were consistent in positive business cycle correlation for all the three periods. Overall 
average shown in figure 7.3 indicate that there is fluctuation in business cycle 
correlation for WAEMU, WAMZ and ECOWAS as a whole with WAEMU cycle 
closely following that of ECOWAS with slightly worse performance in the WAMZ 
average which tends to be below ECOWAS with the exception of the period 2003-2007. 
The finding for the trend in ECOWAS business cycle correlation is that there is a great 
degree of asymmetry among countries for each of the three sub-periods. Individual 
countries correlation performance is inconsistent over time and also WAEMU countries 
appear to show slightly a better performance than WAMZ. 
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Table 7.4   Unstandardised data and descriptive statistics (2008-2012) 
 
II. Terms of trade synchronisation (TOT) 
The terms of trade correlations of ECOWAS countries with the EU are shown in the 
second column of tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 for 1998-2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 
respectively. These correlations for the individual countries are plotted in charts shown 
in Appendix A.28 with overall regional averages shown in figure 7.3. The result show 
that for the whole of ECOWAS, nine of the fifteen countries (60%) show positive terms 
of trade correlation with EU during the period 1998-2002 with a minimum of -0.963 
(Guinea) and maximum of 0.796 (Mali). Only four of these positive correlations are 
above 0.4 and lowest of the nine is Guinea with marginally positive at 0.001. For the 
second period (2003-2007) the number of countries with positive correlation fell to only 
five (33%) with a minimum of -0.948 (Cape Verde) to a maximum of 0.793 (Niger). 
Apart from Niger (0.793) and Guinea Bissau (0.745) all the other three positive 
correlations are around 0.1. This indicates deterioration in terms of trade from period 1 
to period 2. In the third period (2008-2012) there is an improvement in the terms of 
trade as indicated by the increase in the number of positive correlation countries to 8 
(53%) though, slightly below the first period figure. The minimum for the third period 
is -0.711 (Benin) and the maximum is 0.759 (Mali). The average terms of trade for 
country BUS TOT RTI RER INF FIB DSR CAB
BEN 0.317 -0.711 0.072 0.033 3.072 -2.520 9.650 -8.400
BFA 0.534 -0.340 0.283 0.038 3.333 -4.380 9.000 -4.370
CPV 0.894 -0.599 0.014 0.035 2.072 -8.320 71.604 -13.710
CIV -0.421 -0.109 0.256 0.042 2.952 -2.000 9.590 4.794
GHA 0.812 0.136 0.149 0.033 9.928 -8.440 7.176 -9.454
GIN 0.746 -0.247 0.033 0.008 12.720 -8.340 6.951 -17.026
GNB 0.096 -0.385 0.222 0.037 3.789 -0.880 5.562 -5.550
LIB -0.717 0.537 0.008 0.030 6.884 -0.640 20.094 -36.798
MLI -0.193 0.759 0.223 0.035 1.816 -3.700 23.897 -8.310
NER 0.585 0.124 0.250 0.034 2.485 -2.760 9.077 -19.622
NGA -0.153 0.305 0.040 0.152 10.536 -2.600 0.471 7.894
SEN 0.365 0.155 0.217 0.041 1.977 -5.900 12.836 -8.672
SLE 0.345 0.542 0.064 0.031 11.984 -4.740 3.476 -23.280
GMB -0.611 0.518 0.131 0.042 2.836 -2.260 28.339 -14.628
TGO 0.526 -0.062 0.230 0.046 2.494 -4.460 8.904 -8.704
Descriptive statistics
ECOWAS
Min -0.717 -0.711 0.008 0.008 1.816 -8.440 0.471 -36.798
Max 0.894 0.759 0.283 0.152 12.720 -0.640 71.604 7.894
Mean 0.208 0.042 0.146 0.042 5.258 -4.129 15.108 -11.056
WAEMU
Min -0.421 -0.711 0.014 0.033 1.816 -8.320 5.562 -19.622
Max 0.894 0.759 0.283 0.046 3.789 -0.880 71.604 4.794
Mean 0.300 -0.130 0.196 0.038 2.665 -3.880 17.791 -8.060
mean no CPV 0.226 -0.071 0.219 0.038 2.740 -3.325 11.064 -7.354
WAMZ
Min -0.717 -0.247 0.008 0.008 2.836 -8.440 0.471 -36.798
Max 0.812 0.542 0.149 0.152 12.720 -0.640 28.339 7.894
Mean 0.070 0.299 0.071 0.049 9.148 -4.503 11.084 -15.549
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ECOWAS fell from 0.096 in period 1 to -0.102 in period 2 with a marginal 
improvement to 0.042 in period 3 (figure 7.3). The distribution of the countries in the 
scatter graph in Appendix A.28 shows a pattern similar to that of the business cycle 
correlation in Appendix A.27. There is no consistency in individual countries 
correlation performance. In 1998-2002 the countries on the top positive correlation scale 
(Mali, Sierra Leone and Liberia) all have varying degree of negative correlations in 
2003-2007 with high positive again in 2008-2012. Guinea Bissau, one of the top 
correlation countries in 2003-2007 is at the bottom (negative) in both 1998-2002 and 
2008-2012. 
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Figure 7.3   ECOWAS Macroeconomic variable charts- Average 
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Similarly Niger, with the highest positive correlation in 2003-2007 (0.793) has the 
highest negative correlation (-0.963) in 1998-2002. These results suggest that there is no 
symmetry in ECOWAS terms of trade and that countries performance over time is very 
volatile.    
III. Trade openness (GTI/RTI) 
We report in the third columns of tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, respectively, the intra-
ECOWAS trade statistics for the three periods 1, 2 and 3. These intra-regional trade 
statistics are also graphically presented in appendix A.29 with averages plotted in figure 
7.3. The ECOWAS averages are 14%, 16.9% and 23% for periods 1, 2, and 3 
respectively. Although, the averages show an improvement over time they are however 
low relative to the comparative EU statistics we mentioned above. For period 1, 8 
ECOWAS countries (53%) are above the ECOWAS intra-regional trade average, seven 
of which are WAEMU (87.5%. This figure increased to nine countries in period 2 
(60%) with eight countries being from WAEMU (100%). The statistics for the number 
of countries above the ECOWAS average in period 3 are the same as those for period 1 
for both ECOWAS and the zones. A distinctive trade pattern emerged for ECOWAS as 
indicated in appendix A.29 and figure 7.3. First, WAMZ countries trade with other 
ECOWAS countries is consistently lower than WAEMU for all the three periods and 
the full period and this trade is depicted by a U-shaped curve in all four periods with 
countries retaining their positions in the curve in all cases. All the four U-curves show 
that Ghana and the Gambia on each of the ends of the curves have the highest trade in 
WAMZ both maintaining their trade levels in double digits for all periods. Liberia is at 
the bottom of the curves in all four periods with trade level around 1% in all four 
periods. Liberia and Cape Verde are the lowest trade open countries in ECOWAS as 
shown in appendix A.29 with the latter being slightly better than the former. Nigeria’s 
intra-ECOWAS trade for the three periods range from 4% (period 3) to 5% (period 1) 
which means that it is not only low in all periods but even declining over time. Intra-
ECOWAS trade for WAEMU, as already mentioned, is higher than WAMZ with 
Burkina Faso being consistently having the highest level of trade. Benin’s trade is not at 
the level of the WAEMU trade as in all the three periods it is always closer or within the 
WAMZ level. There also appear to be diversity in intra-ECOWAS trade within 
WAEMU especially in the first period. However, the countries’ trade seem to converge 
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over time as seen in the distribution in the three periods with Benin being an outlier 
especially in 2008-2012. When the intra-ECOWAS trade averages are plotted in a graph 
as in figure 7.3 we see a clear demarcation between WAEMU, way above ECOWAS 
average, and WAMZ, well below the average. 
The finding from these results is that for all the periods under consideration, the level of 
trade within ECOWAS is low. We also found that intra-ECOWAS trade in WAEMU 
countries is consistently higher than the WAMZ countries in all the periods, both on 
individual countries and on average bases, although there is no supporting evidence that 
the level of trade by WAEMU and ECOWAS as a whole do justify the case for 
monetary union.         
IV. Volatility in real exchange rate (RER) 
The results of the real exchange rate volatility for ECOWAS countries for the three 
periods 1998-2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 are respectively shown in column 4 of 
tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 and the respective graphical plots are in appendix A.30. The 
overall averages for the four periods are presented in figure 7.3. The ECOWAS average 
real exchange rate volatility for the first three periods are 0.068, 0.044 and 0.042 
respectively. In the period 1998-2002 WAEMU’s average real exchange rate volatility 
is 0.024 (35%) below the ECOWAS average while in 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 it is 
0.017 (39%) and 0.004 (8.5%). For all the three periods all WAEMU countries’ real 
exchange rate volatility are below the ECOWAS average except in period 3 where only 
one country, Togo narrowly exceeded the average by 0.004 (9.5%). Cape Verde 
exchange rate volatility is very much similar to WAEMU as their two currencies are 
both rigidly pegged to the Euro. The exchange rate volatility in WAMZ currencies is 
diverse within and over time periods under consideration. In 1998-2002 only three of 
the WAMZ countries (Guinea, Liberia and The Gambia) are below the ECOWAS 
average. In the period after the financial crisis all ECOWAS currencies tend to 
converged with the exception of Nigeria which is a way up the volatility scale as shown 
in appendix A.30 and figure 7.3. There is inconsistency in exchange rate volatility in 
WAMZ. For instance in the period 1998-2002 the three most volatile currencies 
(Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ghana) are different from those in 2003-2007 (Ghana, 
Guinea and The Gambia). The fall in Ghana’s real exchange rate volatility in 2008-2012 
may also be partly explained by the re-denomination of their currency in 2007 which 
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coincided with the period just before the financial crisis. In 2008-2012 when almost all 
ECOWAS currencies converged, Nigeria still remained an outlier making its currency 
the most volatile in ECOWAS. Our result for Nigeria’s currency volatility is consistent 
with the finding of Ogunkola (2002). The exchange rate volatility statistics suggest that 
WAEMU countries show a low level of exchange rate volatility than WAMZ countries. 
Also Nigeria’s currency appeared to be the most volatile in ECOWAS.    
The implication of these variations in real exchange rate volatility within and over time 
is that the cost of abandoning these currencies for monetary union may be low and of no 
concern if the cause of the volatility is by chance since the currency will be fixed in the 
union. However, there might be serious costs implications and therefore concerns for 
the abandonment of these currencies if the volatility is caused by policy changes in 
exchange rate in order to fine tune the economies of these countries when they 
experience shocks as such policy instrument is no longer available to the control of any 
particular country when once the monetary union kicks in.  
V. Convergence in inflation (INF) 
The results of the inflation differential between ECOWAS countries and EU for the 
three periods 1998-2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 are respectively shown in column 5 
of tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 and the respective graphical plots are in appendix A.31. The 
overall averages for the four periods are presented in figure 7.3. Like the regional trade 
integration, the inflation differentials of ECOWAS countries show a clear division 
between WAEMU, with low differential, and WAMZ, with high differentials. The 
ECOWAS average inflation differential is 5.546, 5.499 and 5.258 for the periods 1998-
2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 respectively. There is hardly any improvement in the 
overall inflation situation. All the countries in WAEMU and Cape Verde have a low 
inflation differential with the EU, way below the ECOWAS average, for all the periods 
under consideration with the exception of Guinea Bissau which exceeded the ECOWAS 
average only in 1998-2002 by 1.45 (26%). The overall WAEMU average is below the 
ECOWAS average by 2.808 (51%), 3.864 (66%) and 2.518 (48%) for the periods 1, 2 
and 3 respectively. On the side of WAMZ, the average is above the ECOWAS average 
by 4.106 (74%), 5.359 (97%) and (74%) for periods 1, 2 and 3 respectively. This shows 
a striking difference, more so in the opposite direction, between the two zones as shown 
in figure 7.3 and appendix A.31. In 1998-2002 only two of the WAMZ countries 
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(Guinea and The Gambia) have average inflation differentials below ECOWAS average 
while in 2003-2007 all the WAMZ countries inflation differential are above the 
ECOWAS average and in 2008-2012 only The Gambia has an average below the 
ECOWAS average. This means that WAMZ countries are not only worse than 
WAEMU, in terms of the inflation differential variable, in all the periods under 
consideration but their performance is not getting any better over time. Most of these 
countries’ inflation differentials are in double digits rising as far as 19% for Ghana in 
1998-2002 and 22% for Guinea in 2003-2007, tables 7.2 and 7.3 respectively. Similar to 
real exchange rate volatility, the inflation differential for Cape Verde converges to the 
WAEMU countries for all the periods. The weak inflation performance of WAMZ as 
compared to WAEM U and Cape Verde is clearly supported and visible in figure 7.3 
and appendix A.31.  
The inflation differential results revealed that there is a lack of inflation convergence for 
ECOWAS especially among the WAMZ countries whose inflation differentials with the 
EU is consistently high for all countries and over time with no sign for improvement. 
For all the periods under consideration the inflation differential of WAEMU appear to 
show convergence with the EU. Overall, these raise question on the one-size-fits-all 
monetary policy in a monetary union. 
VI. Government/fiscal balance (FIB)   
 The fiscal balance statistics for ECOWAS for the periods under consideration are 
shown in tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 with graphical presentation in appendix A.32 and figure 
7.3. The ECOWAS averages are -3.417%, -0.861% and -4.129% for 1998-2002, 2003-
2007 and 2008-2012 respectively. For the first period, only Nigeria has a positive fiscal 
balance of 0.64%. This figure increases to five countries (33%) in the second period 
with a decline to zero in period 3. Nine of the ECOWAS countries (60%) have fiscal 
balance performance better than the ECOWAS average but the figure declined to six 
(40%) in the second period and finally 8 (53%) in period 3. Ghana is consistently on the 
high negative side of fiscal balance for all periods with Sierra Leone showing an 
improvement only in 2005-2009 (period 2). The fiscal balance statistics for the 
ECOWAS countries are very diverse with hardly any consistent pattern to clearly 
distinguish between the two zones on country by country basis, although the overall 
averages in figure 7.3 show a slightly better performance for WAEMU.   
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The indication from the FIB variable is that there is lack of consistent similarity within 
the two zones and ECOWAS as a whole.  
VII. Debt servicing requirement (DSR) 
The debt service requirement as a percentage of total exports for ECOWAS for the 
periods 1998-2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 are shown on tables 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 
respectively and the graphical presentation of the countries on appendix A.33 and the 
regional averages on figure 7.3. Cape Verde is an outlier for all the three periods with 
debt service ratio of 175%, 165% and 71% for 1998-2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 
respectively. However, in 1998-2002, Sierra Leone tops all ECOWAS countries with 
DSR of 221%. The three most indebted countries are Cape Verde, Sierra Leone and The 
Gambia as seen on the charts in appendix A.33. In the second period, Sierra Leone’s 
DSR converged with the rest of ECOWAS countries leaving Cape Verde at the top of 
the ratio followed by The Gambia. Debt dissimilarities were highest in 1998-2002 with 
more convergence in 2003-2007 with the exception of the two outliers already 
mentioned. This may be due to debt forgiveness by international creditors. The overall 
averages plotted in figure 7.3 indicate that WAEMU countries have relative lower debt 
service ratios than WAMZ. Overall, we find a very volatile debt servicing requirement 
for ECOWAS countries 
VIII. Current account balance (CAB) 
The current account balance as a percentage of GDP for ECOWAS countries is shown 
on tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 for 1998-2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 respectively and the 
plots in appendix A.34 and regional averages plotted in figure 7.3. In the first period 
only one country, Guinea Bissau, has a positive current account balance of 1.16%. In 
the second and third periods only Nigeria and cote d’Ivoire have positive balances with 
Nigeria standing at an exceptionally high figure of 10% in 2003-2007 as compared to 
the extreme end of -16% for Liberia. Liberia suffered the worst CAB consistently for all 
the periods under consideration with the peak of  
-37% in 2008-2012. Performance for the fifteen countries is mixed with high degree of 
diversity within period and over time as shown in the charts in appendix A.34. On 
overall average basis, figure 7.3 indicates that for the first period, 1998-2002, the two 
zones were at par with exactly the same average. In 2003-2007, WAMZ is slightly 
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better than WAEMU with averages of -4.6% and -6.4% respectively. The divergence 
between the two zones is highest in 2008-2012 with much better performance by 
WAEMU whose average is -7.4% (below ECOWAS average) and WAMZ average is -
15.5 (above ECOWAS average). 
Our finding, therefore, is that there is no pattern of symmetry in current account 
balances in ECOWAS and that the performance in both WAEMU and WAMZ is very 
uncertain and highly volatile.    
7.4.4 Hierarchical clustering results for the full period 
 In this section, we apply the cluster analysis technique to group the fifteen ECOWAS 
countries according to all the eight variables already discussed above: the correlation or 
synchronisation of the business cycle (BUS), Trade openness or regional trade 
integration (RTI), correlation or synchronisation of terms of trade (TOT), convergence 
of inflation (INF), real exchange rate volatility (RER), Government/fiscal balance 
(FIB), debt servicing requirement (DSR) and current account balance (CAB). We 
cluster the countries in four different periods. We consider the fifteen year period 1998-
2012 known as the full period. This enables us to see how these countries are similar or 
dissimilar in terms of their macroeconomic structure over a longer period of time. We 
then consider three sub-periods: 1998-2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 known as period 
1, period 2 and period 3 respectively. These three sub-periods enable us to analyse the 
degree to which the changing policy environments at the national and international 
levels have impacted on the homogeneity across these countries over time.   
We use the aggregation algorithm with the highest cophenetic correlation coefficient 
(CCC) as the baseline for our analysis. In order to examine the robustness of the results, 
we use other aggregation algorithms alongside the baseline. To determine the number of 
clusters, we use the Calinski/Harabasz Pseudo-F index (CHI) and Duda-Hart stopping-
rule (DH). The CHI selects the optimal number of clusters at the point with the highest 
possible index. Good practice suggests the use of two stopping rules jointly in this 
selection. For this purpose we use the second method DH jointly with CHI. The 
conventional wisdom, suggested in the STATA multivariate statistics reference manual, 
for deciding the number of groups based on the Duda–Hart stopping-rule table is to find 
one of the largest Je(2)/Je(1) values that corresponds to a low pseudo-T-squared value 
that has much larger T-squared values next to it. The CHI and DH stopping rules output 
228 
 
 
 
table is shown in appendix A.35 for the four periods in our analysis with the number of 
clusters selected in each case shown in bold. In general an effective representation of 
the data requires that the number of clusters be neither too small nor too large. As our 
sample contains 15 countries we limit the number of clusters to 2-7 solution (i.e. at least 
half of the number of cases). The merging of the countries is shown in the dendrograms 
in figures 7.4a-d for the average linkage agglomerative algorithm. The average linkage 
is the baseline for our analysis because it has the highest cophenetic correlation 
coefficients (CCC) of 0.875, 0.841, 0.851 and 0.906 for the periods 1998-2012, 1998-
2002, 2003-2007 and 2008-2012 respectively.  
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Figure 7.4   Dendrograms for all periods- group average clustering 
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The reported CCC for all the four dendrograms are reasonably high meaning that the 
cluster information generated by these dendrograms is a good representation of the 
dissimilarities in the data. In each of figures 7.4a-d the vertical axis represents distances 
(or dissimilarities) and the horizontal axis indicates the fifteen countries in our sample. 
Starting with the left of the dendrogram for the full period in figure 7.4a we can see that 
Mali and Senegal are merged first at the smallest distance as shown by the shortest 
vertical lines. Burkina Faso and Togo are merged second at a vertical distance that is 
almost the same as that for the first two. The third merger in the far left is Benin and 
Guinea Bissau at a distance not too far from the first and second mergers. The second 
merged countries are joined by Cote d’Ivoire at level 4. We observed that the merger at 
level 8 completes the merging of the eight WAEMU countries which all appeared to be 
merged at relatively shorter distances to each other indicating closer similarities 
between these countries. On the right hand side we have Cape Verde and the six 
WAMZ countries. The first merger on the right at level 6 is Sierra Leone and The 
Gambia indicating that these two countries are most similar and the distance at which 
they are merged is within the WAEMU countries. These two countries are joined by 
Ghana at level 9 with a level of distance higher than the WAEMU countries distance. 
Guinea, then later joined this group of three at level 10, not a high distance away from 
the Ghana merger. The three countries that last merged the rest of the group to have a 
single cluster at levels 12, 13 and 14 are Liberia, Cape Verde and Nigeria respectively 
and all of these three countries appeared to be singletons. Nigeria been the least country 
to join the rest indicates it is the country with the least similarities with the rest of the 
ECOWAS countries. A visual inspection of the dendrogram for 1998-2012 jointly with 
the criteria of the two cluster stopping rules, CHI and DH, in appendix A.35 suggests an 
optimal number of five clusters. The output results for this clustering are presented in 
the top part of table 7.5 and the variable means of each cluster for the average linkage 
method are shown in table 7.6.  Cluster 1 contains all the eight WAEMU countries 
shown on the left side of the Dendrogram in figure 7.4a: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. The main features of this 
cluster are that it has the highest degree of compliance in regional trade integration 
(22.3%), real exchange rate volatility (0.04), and lowest inflation differential with the 
EU countries (2.447). In each of these three variables, the cluster performance is 
exceptional better than the ECOWAS average and all the other four clusters.  
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Table 7.5   Hierarchical clustering results- 1998-2012 
 Linkage 
method 
Cluster number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Average 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.875 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GNB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
GHA 
GIN 
GMB 
SLE 
LIB CPV NGA - - 
Centroid 
Linkage 
(7 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.870 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
SLE GIN GHA LIB CPV NGA 
Single 
Linkage 
(7 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.867 
 
 
 
GHA 
 
 
GIN SLE 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
LIB CPV NGA 
Complete 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.832 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GNB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
GHA 
GIN 
GMB 
SLE 
LIB CPV NGA - - 
Ward’s 
Linkage 
(6 clusters) 
CCC=0.578 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GNB 
NER 
TGO 
MLI 
SEN 
GHA 
GIN 
GMB 
SLE 
LIB CPV NGA - 
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Table 7.6   Variable means of each Cluster using Average Linkage 
  BUS TOT RTI RER INF FIB DSR CAB 
A
v
er
ag
e 
L
in
k
 
1
9
9
8
-2
0
1
2
 
1 -0.140 0.073 0.223 0.040 2.447 -2.224 16.468 -0.6330 
2 -0.201 0.129 0.105 0.074 10.366 -0.410 45.334 -0.595 
3 -0.283 0.502 0.009 0.053 7.979 0.177 8.939 -21.889 
4 0.431 -0.012 0.016 0.045 2.622 -5.885 137.307 -11.004 
5 -0.013 -0.118 0.044 0.181 9.871 0.478 6.419 5.405 
ECOWAS 
mean 
 -0.120 0.098 0.152 0.060 5.434 -2.711 31.051 -7.500 
A
v
er
ag
e 
L
in
k
 
1
9
9
8
-2
0
0
2
 
1 -0.299 0.108 0.200 0.038 2.273 -2.383 25.899 -6.102 
2 0.870 -0.242 0.063 0.040 3.908 -5.2 137.28 -7.331 
3 -0.869 0.65 0.008 0.047 10.905 -0.24 0.275 -12.80 
4 -0.605 -0.013 0.125 0.094 12.978 -7.71 14.835 -1.908 
5 -0.619 0.704 0.070 0.145 10.863 -6.78 220.77 -2.804 
6 -0.258 -0.275 0.050 0.272 8.462 0.642 9.728 -1.828 
ECOWAS 
mean 
 -0.241 0.096 0.140 0.069 5.546 -3.417 48.480 -5.649 
A
v
er
ag
e 
L
in
k
 
2
0
0
3
-2
0
0
7
 
1 0.768 0.003 0.172 0.026 3.941 1.88 14.240 -8.637 
2 -0.260 0.006 0.244 0.037 2.544 -2.544 28.086 -5.365 
3 -0.692 -0.799 0.065 0.091 21.79 -2.06 15.256 -3.942 
4 -0.443 0.111 0.043 0.044 9.615 2.04 9.057 10.148 
5 0.926 0.052 0.159 0.145 12.293 -7.8 13.220 -5.702 
6 0.758 -0.948 0.020 0.040 2.421 -3.66 165.09 -8.806 
ECOWAS 
mean 
 
0.257 -0.102 0.169 0.044 5.499 -0.861 28.566 -5.797 
A
v
er
ag
e 
L
in
k
 
2
0
0
8
-2
0
1
2
 
1 0.286 -0.190 0.219 0.039 2.871 -3.271 8.231 -7.218 
2 -0.402 0.639 0.177 0.038 2.326 -2.98 26.118 -11.47 
3 0.634 0.144 0.082 0.024 11.544 -7.173 5.868 -16.59 
4 -0.717 0.537 0.008 0.030 6.884 -0.64 20.094 -36.80 
5 0.894 -0.599 0.014 0.035 2.072 -8.32 71.604 -13.71 
6 -0.153 0.305 0.040 0.152 10.536 -2.6 0.471 7.894 
ECOWAS 
mean 
 
0.208 0.042 0.146 0.042 5.258 -4.129 15.108 -11.06 
In terms of fiscal balance, cluster 1, is fourth out of the five clusters which is only better 
than cluster 4 (-5.9%). This means the fiscal balance position of these countries is not 
that good. In terms of the debt service requirement (DSR) and current account balance 
(CAB) the cluster is third in the rank. The average terms of trade (TOT) correlation with 
the EU is relatively low at 0.073 (even lower than the ECOWAS average correlation of 
0.098). The business cycle correlation with the EU is on the low negative (-0.14) which 
is common problem for other clusters with the exception of cluster 4 which has a high 
positive correlation (0.431).  
Cluster 2 contains four of the WAMZ countries: Ghana, Guinea, The Gambia and Sierra 
Leone which were also closely merged in figure 7.4a. From table 7.6, the features of 
these countries include a moderate level of intra-ECOWAS trade at 10.5% though lower 
than cluster one and ECOWAS as a whole, the second highest exchange rate volatility 
and the highest level of inflation differential from the EU (at 10.4). For the fiscal 
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balance, cluster 2 is better than clusters 1 and 4 but the DSR is second highest, exceeded 
only by cluster 4. Finally it has relatively low negative CAB, low negative BUS and low 
positive TOT correlation. Clusters 3, 4 and 5 are all singletons, as shown on the far right 
of figure 7.4a, and contain Liberia, Cape Verde and Nigeria respectively. The key 
features of cluster 3 include a very low level of intra-ECOWAS trade (0.9%), moderate 
exchange rate volatility, high inflation differential, positive fiscal balance, low debt 
service requirement, very high negative current account balance, the highest positive 
terms of trade correlation with the EU but low negative BUS. Cluster 4’s features 
include highest business cycle correlation with the EU (0.431), very low negative TOT 
correlation, low intra-ECOWAS trade, second lowest exchange rate volatility and 
inflation differential (next to WAEMU), the highest negative fiscal balance, highest 
debt service requirement (137.3%) and second highest negative current account balance. 
Finally, cluster 5 main features include low level of intra-ECOWAS trade, highest 
exchange rate volatility, second highest inflation differential, positive fiscal and current 
account balances and a low debt service requirement. 
We compare the baseline results for the full period with the other four agglomerative 
algorithms in the same period as shown in table 7.5 as our robustness check. The 
grouping of the ECOWAS countries is no different from our baseline results. This 
comparison provides us with evidence that our results are not affected by a change in 
the merging method. The cophenetic correlation coefficients of the dendrograms for the 
centroid linkage, single linkage, complete linkage and Ward’s linkage are 0.870, 0.867, 
0.832 and 0.578 respectively. Apart from the Ward’s linkage, the other three methods 
all have CCC closer to 1. This means that the cluster information produced by the 
dendrograms of these methods is a good representation of the dissimilarities in the data. 
Although the Ward’s method has the lowest CCC we still present its results in order to 
check the consistency and strength of our results. Using the two cluster stopping rules 
(CHI and DH) in appendix A.35 the optimal number of clusters for the centroid linkage 
(CL), single linkage (SL), complete linkage (COL) and Ward’s linkage (WL) are 7, 7, 5 
and 6 respectively. We have not shown the dendrograms for the other four methods, due 
to space, but the output results are on table 7.5.  We see from the results that All the 
four alternative methods clustered the 8 WAEMU countries together just as cluster 1 of 
the baseline results. These 8 countries are in cluster 1 of the CL, cluster 4 of the SL, 
cluster 1 of the COL and clusters 1 and 2 of the WL. The four countries (Ghana, Guinea, 
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The Gambia and Sierra Leone) in cluster 2 of our baseline results are also in the same 
clusters for two of the alternatives: cluster 2 of the COL, and cluster 3 of the WL while 
in the other two alternative- CL and SL- three of these four countries are shown as 
singletons with the exception of The Gambia which is clustered in the WAEMU 
countries indicating closer similarities of this countries with the group of eight.  
A number of findings are revealed from the clustering of the ECOWAS countries for 
the period 1998-2012. First, the eight WAEMU countries all belong to the same cluster 
and our sensitivity/robustness check does not change this result. This means that these 
eight countries shared many similarities in their macroeconomic features. The policy 
implication of this finding is that these eight countries are good candidates for monetary 
union and/or for a peg with the EU. Second, the non WAEMU countries, WAMZ and 
Cape Verde, do not form the same cluster with WAEMU neither within themselves 
although there is some evidence that four of the WAMZ countries- Ghana, Guinea, The 
Gambia and Sierra Leone- appeared to belong to a cluster of their own from the rest. 
Three of the non WAEMU countries- Liberia, Cape Verde and Nigeria- are all 
singletons (each of them on a cluster of their own). This finding, about the non 
WAEMU countries is insensitive even with our robustness check. This means that these 
seven countries in ECOWAS have many economic dissimilarities from their WAEMU 
counterpart leading us to the conclusion, from the OCA theory perspective, that a single 
monetary union is not only inappropriate for ECOWAS as a whole but also for the non 
WAEMU countries as such moves may have serious costs consequences. The results, 
however, provide evidence that only four countries- Ghana, Guinea, The Gambia and 
Sierra Leone- are good candidates for the formation of WAMZ, the ECOWAS second 
monetary zone, without the inclusion of Liberia and Nigeria. Although our empirical 
results support the formation of such a union its size, however, will cast doubt on the 
economic benefits to be derived from such a small monetary union which may make 
such a move inappropriate for these four countries. Whilst the current ECOWAS 
integration arrangement provides the option for Cape Verde to join either WAEMU or 
WAMZ, there is no evidence from our results supporting that it is a good candidate for 
any of the two zones.   
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Table 7.7   Hierarchical clustering results for- 1998-2002 
 Linkage 
method 
Cluster number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Average 
Linkage 
(6 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.841 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GIN 
 MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
CPV 
GMB 
LIB 
GHA 
GNB 
SLE NGA 
 
Centroid 
Linkage 
(3 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.844 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
CPV 
GHA 
GIN 
GMB 
GNB 
LIB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
SLE NGA 
    
Single 
Linkage 
(7 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.783 
 
NGA GHA LIB 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GIN 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
CPV 
GMB 
GNB SLE 
Complete 
Linkage 
(6 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.730 
 
NGA 
 
GHA 
GNB 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GIN 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
LIB CPV 
GMB 
SLE - 
Ward’s 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.60 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GIN 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
CPV 
GMB 
LIB NGA GHA 
GNB 
SLE 
- - 
7.4.5 Hierarchical clustering results for the sub-periods         
Next we turn to the clustering for the three sub-periods, 1998-2002, 2003-2007 and 
2008-2012. The results of these clustering will enable us to see whether the grouping of 
ECOWAS countries have changed over time and if so how and also explore on possible 
reasons for such changes. Starting with period 1 (1998-2002) the cophenetic correlation 
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coefficients (CCC) of each of the dendrogram from the average linkage, centroid 
linkage, single linkage, complete linkage and the Ward’s linkage are 0.841, 0.844, 
0.783, 0.730 and 0.60 respectively. These are reasonably high, indicating that the cluster 
information generated by the dendrograms is a good representation of dissimilarities in 
the data. The CCC for the average linkage and the centroid linkage are the highest with 
only a difference of 0.003. Since the difference between these two is immaterial we 
continue to use the average linkage agglomerative algorithm as the baseline for our 
analysis and use the other four as robustness check.  
The dendrogram for the average linkage method for the period 1998-2002 is shown in 
figure 7.4b. From this graph we see that Senegal and Togo are the first two countries 
merged at the shortest distance at level 1, Benin and Guinea merged at level 2, Burkina 
Faso and Mali at level 3, Cote d’Ivoire joined Senegal and Togo at a much higher 
distance at level 4. Niger at the centre joined other WAEMU countries on the left at a 
much higher distance at level 8 but still does so before any of the none-WAEMU 
countries first join the group at level 10 which is Cape Verde and The Gambia. What 
this means is that although Niger is much similar to the other WAEMU countries than 
non-WAEMU countries it features some degree of dissimilarities with the WAEMU 
countries. Also Cape Verde and the Gambia are the most similar countries to WAEMU 
than any other non-WAEMU countries. On the right side of the dendrogram are the 
none-WAEMU countries with Nigeria been the least to join the rest of the other 
countries. An inspection of the dendrogram in figure 7.4b and the cluster stopping rules 
(CHI and DH) in appendix A.35 suggest an optimal number of 6, 7, 6 and 5 clusters for 
the average linkage, single linkage, complete linkage and Ward’s respectively. The 
clustering results for all the methods including the centroid are shown on table 7.7 and 
the variable means of each cluster on table 7.6. Cluster 1 of the average linkage (our 
baseline) consists of 8 countries, 7 of which are WAEMU and Guinea. Guinea Bissau, a 
WAEMU country, joins Ghana in cluster 4. The features of cluster 1 are mainly highest 
intra-ECOWAS trade (20%), lowest real exchange rate volatility, lowest inflation 
differential, third highest debt service requirement, fourth highest negative current 
account balance, low negative business cycle correlation and a low positive terms of 
trade correlation. A possible reason that might have brought Guinea to the WAEMU 
group during period 1 might be due to its lowest real exchange rate volatility (0.025) 
and low inflation differential (table 7.2) which are key features of these countries. Cape 
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Verde and The Gambia are in cluster two with the key features of Highest positive 
business cycle correlation (0.870), low intra-ECOWAS trade, low exchange rate 
volatility and inflation differential (next to cluster 1 in both cases), high negative fiscal 
balance, second highest DSR and fourth largest negative CAB. Clusters 3 (Liberia), 5 
(Sierra Leone) and 6 (Nigeria) are all singletons. The key features of cluster 4 (Ghana 
and Guinea Bissau) include: high negative business cycle correlation, moderate intra-
ECOWAS trade (12.5%) which is next to cluster 1, high exchange rate volatility (above 
ECOWAS average), highest inflation differential (12.98%), highest negative fiscal 
balance and second lowest CAB. The highest level of DSR (220.8%) for Sierra Leone, 
in period 1, is the key feature in addition to highest TOT correlation (0.704) that might 
have singled it out in cluster 5. For Liberia in cluster 3 the main features include: 
highest negative BUS correlation, second highest positive TOT correlation, lowest 
intra-ECOWAS trade (0.8%) and largest CAB. For Nigeria in cluster 6 it is the only 
cluster with a positive FIB, low intra-ECOWAS trade, the largest RER volatility 
(0.272). The centroid linkage with only 3 clusters is still consistent with the rest of the 
methods in showing Sierra Leone and Nigeria as singletons and the rest of the countries 
in cluster 1.  
Considering the alternative methods we can see consistency in grouping of these 
countries. Clusters 4, 3 and 1 of the single linkage, complete linkage and Ward’s 
linkage respectively all have the same 8 countries contained in cluster 1 of our baseline 
results. Liberia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria are all shown as singletons, just as our 
baseline results by the single linkage and the complete linkage which is the same for the 
Ward’s linkage except that Sierra Leone is joined to Ghana and Guinea Bissau. Overall 
our finding for period 1 is that WAEMU countries are mainly in the same cluster, joined 
by Guinea, except Guinea Bissau which clustered with others outside the zone. Second 
we found that the 7 none-WAEMU are fragmented into different clusters with most of 
them as singletons which indicates a degree of dissimilarities among these countries. 
Our findings are insensitive to the type of agglomerative method used for merging the 
countries and that the findings for 1998-2002 are no different from the full period.  
2003-2007  
 We consider the results for period 2 (2003-2007). The dendrogram showing the 
merging process, using the average linkage, for this period is shown in figure 7.4c. The 
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average linkage and centroid linkage both have the same CCC of 0.851 but for 
consistency we continue to use the former as the baseline for our analysis for period 2. 
The cophenetic correlation coefficients for the single linkage, complete linkage and the 
Ward’s linkage are respectively 0.811, 0.823 and 0.656. From the far left of the 
dendrogram (figure 7.4c) Benin and Togo are the first two countries that are merged at 
the shortest distance at level 1 then joined by Mali at the second level. Cote d’Ivoire and 
Senegal are merged at level 3 then joined by Burkina Faso at level 4 and later by Guinea 
Bissau (level 7) and The Gambia (level 8). The group in the middle is then merged with 
the left group at a very small distance. This left-middle group is finally joined by the 
group on the right at a larger distance as indicated by the vertical line. The least country 
to join the rest of the group is Cape Verde after Ghana. This dendrogram has no clear 
separation between WAEMU and non-WAEMU countries especially in the middle and 
the far left. An inspection of the dendrogram and the cluster stopping rules (CHI and 
DH) in appendix A.35 indicates an optimal number of 6 clusters. Similarly the optimal 
number of clusters for the centroid linkage, single linkage, complete linkage and the 
Ward’s linkage are 5, 5, 5 and 2 respectively. The clustering output results for the 
average linkage and the other four merging methods are shown on table 7.8. The 
variable means of each cluster reported on table 7.6. 
The baseline results (average linkage) produced four singletons out of the six clusters: 
cluster 3 (Guinea), cluster 4 (Nigeria), cluster 5 (Ghana) and cluster 6 (Cape Verde), all 
of which are non-WAEMU countries with three of them been from WAMZ. The key 
features of cluster 3 are highest negative BUS and TOT correlations, second highest 
RER volatility and the highest inflation differential. For cluster 4 the main features 
include: highest positive (though still very low) TOT correlation, second lowest intra-
ECOWAS trade and the highest and the only positive CAB. Cluster 5 is mainly 
characterised by highest positive BUS correlation (0.93), highest RER volatility, second 
highest inflation differential and highest negative FIB. Cluster 6’s key features are high 
positive BUS correlation, highest negative TOT correlation, lowest intra-ECOWAS 
trade, highest DSR and high CAB. The WAEMU countries are split into 50% each into 
clusters 1 and 2 with 50% of the WAMZ countries included in these two clusters. 
Cluster 1 contains Benin, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone and Togo. The main 
features of cluster 1 are high positive BUS correlation, low RER volatility, low inflation 
differential, second highest positive FIB and second highest negative CAB. For cluster 
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2, main features include highest intra-ECOWAS trade (24.4), low RER volatility, 
second lowest inflation differential and second highest DSR. Despite the unusual 
grouping, we still see the WAEMU countries in only two clusters meaning they still 
group together as opposed to the WAMZ and Cape Verde which are spread into all the 
six clusters and four of which are singletons.  
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Table 7.8   Hierarchical clustering results for- 2003-2007 
Linkage 
method 
Cluster number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Average 
Linkage 
(6 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.851 
 
BEN 
LIB 
MLI 
NER 
SLE 
TGO 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
SEN 
GIN NGA GHA CPV 
 
Centroid 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.851 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
LIB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
SLE 
TGO 
NGA GHA GIN CPV   
Single 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.811 
 
GIN CPV 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
LIB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
SLE 
TGO 
NGA GHA - 
- 
Complete 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.823 
 
GIN 
NGA 
 
GHA CPV BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
SEN 
TGO 
LIB 
MLI 
NER 
SLE 
  
Ward’s 
Linkage 
(2 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.656 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GNB 
LIB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
SLE 
TGO 
CPV 
GHA 
GIN 
GMB 
NGA 
     
Apart from some mergers of some of the clusters, our results from the other four 
merging methods do not change the results in any significant way. For instance the four 
singletons in our baseline method (Guinea, Nigeria, Ghana and Cape Verde) remained 
so in the centroid (clusters 2, 3, 4 and 5), single linkage (clusters 1, 2, 4 and 5), 
complete linkage (clusters 2, 3 and 1 which merges two of them). The Ward’s linkage, 
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with only 2 clusters the four singletons into one cluster and brought The Gambia into it 
making it a cluster of 71% of non-WAEMU countries. The Ward’s linkage has brought 
together in its cluster 1 the two clusters (1 and 2) of the baseline results that constitute 
the WAEMU countries. These clustering results continue to provide evidence in support 
of our earlier finding that the WAEMU countries are so similar that they always group 
together and despite of the events that may have affected these countries during the 
2003-2007 period they have not suffered any serious fragmentation as compared to the 
WAMZ countries.    
The slightly unusual grouping that we see in period 2 such as the 50:50 split of 
WAEMU countries and the mixing of the non-WAEMU countries in this split should 
attract our attention on some developments in the region that may help to explain these 
clustering results. Cote d’Ivoire, in 1999, saw the overthrown of her post-independence 
president with presidential elections in 2000 which was followed by violence. In 2002, 
armed rebellion splits the country into the rebel controlled north and government 
controlled south. In 2004, most of the conflicts ended but the country was still in a tense 
situation and elections held in 2010. In Senegal and The Gambia, there were several 
political instabilities at different times – for instance the Casamance rebels in Senegal, 
but the main one to mention here that involved both countries is the 2005 ferry tariffs 
dispute on the border that resulted to a transport blockade which led to the suffering of 
both economies (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14093813). Guinea Bissau 
experienced a military coup in 1998 and two in 1999 with elections held in 2000 
followed by political instability in 2001 and another military coup in 2003. Following 
elections in 2004 there were two failed coups in 2004 and 2009  
(http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=95341). In 2000, Sierra Leone’s 
decade of civil conflict came to an end with stability and recovery in early part of the 
decade and the situation is similar for Liberia. Mali’s war began in the 1990s but not 
until 2007 when it gained a momentum with serious escalation in 2011 following the 
influx of arms from Libya after the Fall of Gadhafi. It appears that, in the average 
linkage method, those countries with conflicts either in an early or recovery stage 
(Liberia, Sierra Leone and Mali) are grouped together with Benin, Niger and Togo 
(relatively stable WAEMU countries) in cluster 1 where as those with more troubled 
conflicts especially close to or within the 2003-2007 period (Cote d’Ivoire, The Gambia, 
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Guinea Bissau and Senegal) are mainly in cluster two. This may suggest that the 
political instability in ECOWAS countries may partly be responsible for some of the 
asymmetries in the region and therefore might be obstacle to convergence. 
Our finding for the period 2003-2007 is that countries in WAEMU and WAMZ are 
mixed in the two largest clusters although the fact that the WAEMU countries are more 
similar than the WAMZ countries and always group together is still not refuted. WAMZ 
countries still not grouping together which is an indication of the lack of similarities in 
their economic structures. We also found that conflicts and political instability could 
partly be responsible for the lack of homogeneity in ECOWAS countries.     
2008-2012 
The dendrogram for the average linkage for period 3 (2008-2012) is shown in figure 
7.4d with a cophenetic correlation coefficient of 0.906 which is not only the highest for 
the agglomerative algorithms used in this period but for all the dendrograms produced 
in our analysis which continues to justify its use as our baseline for the analysis. The 
CCCs of the dendrograms for the centroid linkage, single linkage, complete linkage and 
the Ward’s linkage are 0.837, 0.834, 0.881 and 0.689 respectively. The values of all the 
CCCs are reasonably high indicating that the clustering results produced by these 
dendrograms are a good representation of the data. Unlike the 2003-2007, the 
dendrogram for 2008-2012, just like all others in other periods showed a clear 
demarcation between WAEMU and WAMZ. Senegal and Togo are the first countries 
merged at the lowest distance at level 1 later joined by Burkina Faso (level 2) and Niger 
(level 3). Cote d’Ivoire and Guinea Bissau are both merged at level 4, Mali and The 
Gambia at level 5, Ghana and Guinea at level 6. The far right countries that joined the 
rest of the group at much higher distances are non-WAEMU countries with Liberia, 
Cape Verde and Nigeria been the least to join the rest of the countries. The dendrogram 
in figure 7.4d and the cluster stopping rules (CHI and DH) in appendix A.35 suggests an 
optimal number of 6 clusters for the average linkage and 5, 4, 6, 5 for the centroid, 
single linkage, complete linkage Ward’s linkage respectively. The clustering results for 
all the five methods are shown in table 7.9 and the variable means for each of the 
clusters are in table 7.6. The average linkage method grouped all the 8 WAEMU 
countries, with the exception of Mali, in cluster 1 whose key features include: highest 
intra-ECOWAS trade (21.9%), low RER volatility and inflation differential. Cluster 2 is 
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made up of The Gambia and Mali with key features of highest positive TOT correlation, 
high intra-ECOWAS trade, low RER volatility and inflation differential and high DSR. 
Cluster 3 includes Ghana, Guinea and  
  Table 7.9   Hierarchical clustering results- 2008-2012 
 Linkage 
method 
Cluster number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Average 
Linkage 
(6 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.906 
 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GNB 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
GMB 
MLI 
GHA 
GIN 
SLE 
LIB CPV NGA 
Centroid 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.837 
 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
GIN 
GHA 
SLE 
LIB CPV NGA  
Single 
Linkage 
(4 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.834 
 
 
NGA LIB BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GHA 
GIN 
GMB 
GNB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
SLE 
TGO 
CPV - - 
Complete 
Linkage 
(6 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.881 
 
 
NGA LIB BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GNB 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
GMB 
MLI 
GHA 
GIN 
SLE 
CPV 
Ward’s 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
 
CCC=0.689 
 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GNB 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
GMB 
LIB 
MLI 
NGA GHA 
GIN 
SLE 
CPV - 
Sierra Leone. The main features of cluster 3 are high BUS correlation, low RER 
volatility, high inflation differential and high negative FIB. Clusters 4, 5 and 6 are all 
singletons with Liberia, Cape Verde and Nigeria respectively. Cluster 4 has a high 
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negative BUS correlation, high positive TOT correlation, low RTI, and highest negative 
CAB. Cluster 5 is with the highest positive BUS correlation, highest negative TOT 
correlation, low RTI, high negative FIB, and Highest DSR. Finally cluster 6 has the 
highest RER volatility, second highest inflation differential, lowest DSR and highest 
and the only positive CAB.  
The baseline clustering results are not different from the other four alternative methods. 
Nigeria and Cape Verde still are singletons in all the four alternatives and Liberia in 
three of them. Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone are consistently clustered together in 
three of the four alternatives (centroid, complete linkage and Ward’s linkage). Like the 
baseline results, the 8 WAEMU countries with the exception of Mali are all in the same 
cluster in all the four alternatives. The singling out of Mali from the rest of the 
WAEMU countries in the 2008-2012 may be connected with the escalation of its 
conflict in 2007 and 2011 as already mentioned above. We observe no significant 
difference between the 2008-2012 results and the other three periods. The WAEMU 
countries are similar and form a single cluster whereas the WAMZ countries show a 
high degree of dissimilarities and therefore do not belong to the same clusters.   
7.4.6 Hierarchical clustering results for OCA and convergence variables    
The final stage of our analysis is a further check of our results with regard to two sets of 
variables. The first set is the Optimum currency area (OCA) criteria comprising of BUS, 
TOT, RTI, RER and INF.  The second category is the ECOWAS convergence criteria 
including RER, INF, FIB, DSR and CAB. RER and INF are the two overlapping 
variables. This further analysis enables us to see whether there is any difference in our 
findings and any difference in grouping performance in terms of these two sets of 
variables. For the purpose of this particular analysis we only consider the full period 
(1998-2012). The clustering results are shown in appendix A.36 for the OCA variables, 
appendix A.37 for the convergence criteria variables. We further interrogate the data by 
asking whether the change of distance measure, such as the Euclidean distance used so 
far, will change our results. To answer this we use an alternative distance measure 
known as cityblock and the clustering results are shown in appendix A.38. In all these 
results we reported the cophenetic correlation coefficients which are reasonably high 
indicating the clustering information from these dendrograms are a good representation 
of the data (dendrograms not shown due to space). The number of clusters used to 
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generate the clusters is based on the two cluster stopping rules (CHI and DH). The 
average linkage method continues to have the highest CCC and therefore we continue to 
use it as our baseline. 
For the OCA variables, the average linkage method grouped six of the WAEMU 
countries in cluster 1 plus The Gambia and the other two (Mali and Senegal) in cluster 2. 
This grouping is the same for the complete linkage method, which has a similar number 
of clusters to the average linkage. The Ward’s method even have all the eight WAEMU 
countries plus The Gambia in cluster 1 and all the six non-WAEMU countries including 
five of WAMZ in cluster 2. Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone are in clusters 3 and 4 of 
the average linkage and complete linkage respectively. The single linkage only singled 
out Nigeria with all 14 others in one cluster. Our findings from the OCA variable 
grouping are that we have the WAEMU countries in the same clusters with more 
fragmentation of the non-WAEMU countries and that The Gambia is the only WAMZ 
countries that appeared to be similar to WAEMU countries as we can see it grouping in 
these countries. Therefore for the OCA criteria we conclude that WAEMU performs 
better than WAMZ which is consistent with earlier findings and conclusion. 
The clustering results for the convergence criteria in appendix A.37 seem more 
overwhelming than the OCA. The eight WAEMU countries are all in clusters 1, 3 and 1 
of the average linkage, single linkage and Ward’s linkage respectively with the 
complete linkage having six of these countries in cluster 2 and 2 of them in cluster 1. 
The WAMZ countries and Cape Verde are fragmented into different groups with 
Liberia, Cape Verde and Nigeria as singletons in most of the cases. The Gambia and 
Guinea appeared to stick together in the same clusters for all the four methods. The 
clustering results of the ECOWAS convergence criteria still leave us with the 
conclusion that WAEMU countries are much more similar than their ECOWAS 
counterpart and much more dissimilarities among WAMZ and Cape Verde. 
Finally, the change of distance measure from Euclidean to Cityblock appears not to 
change any of our findings so far. The average linkage, complete linkage and Ward’s 
linkage clustering results in appendix A.38 grouped seven of the WAEMU countries in 
cluster 1, 2 and 1 respectively. In all three cases it is only Guinea Bissau that is not in 
the group which may be due to persistent and perennial conflicts and instability we 
discussed earlier. For the single linkage, all eight WAEMU countries plus The Gambia 
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are in cluster 2 with the rest of the five WAMZ and Cape Verde shown as singletons. 
Liberia, Cape Verde and Nigeria are singletons in all the 4 cases while Ghana, The 
Gambia and Sierra Leone appeared in the same cluster in 3 of the methods (average 
linkage, complete linkage and Ward’s linkage) with Guinea being relatively unstable.   
  
247 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 Findings and Conclusion 
8.1 Introduction 
Since independence African countries have being following the path to economic 
integration with the objective of a united Africa, enhanced cooperation, improved trade 
flows between countries, and the alleviation of poverty on the continent. These 
objectives in mind led to the formation of the OAU in 1963 which was changed to the 
African Union in 2000 with a more strategic focus of African integration. With the 
formation of new RECs where they do not exist and the strengthening of existing ones, 
the aim on the continent is to form a monetary union and introduce the African single 
currency by 2021. The implementation of the African integration plan led to a number 
of overlapping regional economic community (RECs) being formed and virtually every 
African country belongs to one or more of these RECs. Examples include: Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).  
As part of Africa’s post-independent economic integration plan, fifteen West African 
countries established the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 
May 1975. The aims of ECOWAS are to promote co-operation and integration, leading 
to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa. Despite these common 
objectives, different monetary arrangements have existed since independence. The 
former British colonies moved from currency boards to floating exchange rates in the 
early 1970s, while, in 1945, after World War II, former French colonies and France set 
up a monetary arrangement in the form of the CFA franc (CFAF) zone. Two CFAs 
exist: Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CAEMC) and the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU). The former is not within the scope 
of this thesis.  
In pursuit of its aims, ECOWAS has implemented a number of reforms over the years, 
as seen in the establishment of a common market through the channels of trade 
liberalisation, common trade policy and common external tariffs, removal of obstacles 
to the mobility of persons in order to foster intra-regional trade. With all these 
developments the hope of the ECOWAS to achieve a balanced and enhanced growth in 
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the region through larger and competitive market has fallen far below expectations 
(Okolo, 1988).  
The purpose of this thesis therefore is to investigate three objectives in an attempt to 
answer the two research questions as stated in section 1.2 of chapter 1. The rest of the 
chapter is organised as follows: section 8.2 gives a brief background of theoretical 
framework and methodology, section 8.3 presents the findings and conclusions, we 
provide policy implications of our findings in section 8.4 and end with suggestions for 
further research in section 8.5.  
8.2 Theoretical background and methodology 
The existing literature on currency unions documents the costs and benefits of currency 
union. The main argument against floating exchange rates is the volatility of exchange 
rates which discourages international trade and investment. Monetary union is a 
collective way of countries fixing their exchange rates to avoid the risk caused by 
exchange rate volatility. The successful creation of the Euro in 1999 serves as additional 
incentive for other nations to continue or follow the path towards monetary union. The 
transaction costs saving arising from currency union come from the trade between union 
members. To join a monetary union countries have to relinquish their national 
currencies and central banks. This loss of monetary autonomy is what the literature 
described as the main cost of joining the monetary union. Mundell (1961) put forward  
the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) which emphasises a number of criteria 
that countries should possessed to minimise the costs of monetary union.  
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) extended the OCA theory by adding openness and 
product diversification respectively. In the sense of Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), 
and Kenen (1969), “an optimum currency area is defined as an area in which factor 
mobility is sufficiently great, or economic shocks are sufficiently common, that there is 
little need for relative price adjustment between different regions within the area” 
(Ching and Devereux, 2003:674). According to the OCA theory countries that possess 
the OCA characteristics are good candidates to form a currency union. The OCA theory, 
discussed in chapter 4, has since become widely used in empirical work on monetary 
union.  
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On the transaction costs saving side of monetary union the literature has emphasised  
the impact of currency union on trade between members. The seminal paper of Rose 
(2000a) opened up the debate on this topic when he found that countries in a currency 
union trade 3 times more than those not in a currency union. Following this finding a 
number of studies have been conducted with different results. Similarly the impact of 
exchange rate volatility on trade has attracted the attention of researchers since the 
collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime (Bretton Woods) in early 1970s. A study on 
this was pioneered by Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978). The literature on exchange rate 
volatility is much more volatile than the impact of currency union on trade. We 
reviewed the literature on the impact of exchange rate volatility and currency union on 
trade in chapter 4 together with the benefits and other costs.  
To address the research questions of the thesis we adopt a three track approach. First in 
chapter 5 we applied the OCA and political criteria (labour mobility (Mundell, 1961); 
trade openness (McKinnon, 1963); product diversification (Kenen, 1969); similarity of 
inflation; fiscal transfers; homogeneous preferences; and solidarity vs nationalism) 
discussed in chapter 4 to assess the suitability of ECOWAS countries for currency union 
using EU12 as a benchmark. The second track in chapter 6 involved using panel data 
methodology to estimate an augmented gravity model of international trade, in both 
triple and double index form, in order to examine the impact of currency union and 
exchange rate volatility on ECOWAS bilateral trade. We estimate the model for the 
sample period 1980-2012. We conduct a sensitivity analysis with different exchange 
rate volatility measures to check the robustness of our results. In the third track we 
applied a cluster analysis methodology in chapter 7 in order to assess the degree of 
similarity/dissimilarity of ECOWAS countries in macroeconomic terms. For this 
analysis we used eight variables chosen from the OCA criteria and the ECOWAS 
convergence criteria. The variables include: Synchronisation in the business cycle, trade 
openness, terms of trade synchronisation, convergence of inflation, volatility in the real 
exchange rate, government/Fiscal balance, debt servicing requirement, and current 
account balance. According to the OCA theory the more similar the countries are in 
macroeconomic terms the lower the costs for them when they lose their individual 
monetary policies and the better they are for currency union. While the analysis in 
chapter 5 help us to know on country by country and variable by variable basis whether 
they satisfy the criteria, cluster analysis as a multivariate technique puts all the variables 
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together and classifies the countries into groups/cluster according to their degree of 
similarity/dissimilarity. We grouped the ECOWAS countries for the full period 1998-
2012, and three sub-periods 1998-2002, 2003-2007, and 2008-2012. We applied 
hierarchical clustering to merge the countries with the agglomerative algorithm having 
the highest cophenetic correlation coefficient. As a robustness check we grouped the 
countries with a different distance measure and different agglomerative algorithms.  
We used data from international data bases- IMF, World Bank, Pen world table- 
accessed via the UK data service.  
8.3 Findings and conclusions 
8.3.1 Findings 
This section presents a summary of findings from our analysis. 
I. Trade openness/Regional trade integration (RTI) 
Theory suggests that the reduction of exchange rate uncertainty through the formation 
of a monetary union reduces transaction costs with the subsequent effect of increased 
cross-border trade. Also the OCA theory as argued by McKinnon (1963) that openness 
is an important characteristic for countries in a monetary union or contemplating the 
formation of one. We considered the openness criterion for ECOWAS in both chapters 
5 and 6 and our findings depend on the measure of openness.  
When trade openness is measured by the ratio of trade with the rest of the world to GDP 
we found ECOWAS to be highly open and in some cases even more than some of the 
EU12 countries. With this measure, excluding Liberia, the highest ratio was 151.5% 
(Benin) and lowest is 21.1% (Burkina Faso). With the exception of Nigeria and Cote 
d’Ivoire we found that greater proportion of total trade to GDP ratio is accounted for by 
imports and this finding is consistent with the trade deficit of the ECOWAS countries 
exhibited in chapter 3. Most of the exports to GDP ratios for these countries are in 
single digits. This could be explained by the overreliance on primary produce with 
adverse terms of trade. 
However, when we measure countries’ openness as a ratio of intra-ECOWAS trade to 
GDP we found ECOWAS countries’ openness to be consistently far below the EU12. 
For the period under consideration from 1981-2011, the range of the ECOWAS ratio is 
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0.6-22.5% (or 0.6-20.9% without Liberia) as compared to the EU12 range of 15.8-
128.4% (or 15.8-94.5% without Belgium). Liberia’s ratios, especially imports, are 
extraordinarily large in the period 1993 and beyond which we explained in chapter 5 
may have been caused by the civil war that broke out in 1991. Nigeria, the largest 
economy, has the smallest intra-ECOWAS imports to GDP ratio for all the five years 
considered. In terms of total intra-ECOWAS trade, Nigeria’s ratio is only 0.9% in 1981, 
4.3% in 1993 and by 2011 the ratio declined to 2.2%. Strikingly, by this measure of 
openness we found the least open economy in EU12, Greece (15.8-20.2%), to be even 
more open than almost all ECOWAS countries. While some countries show small 
increases over time, others show a decline even after the implementation of trade 
liberalisation which seems to suggest that ECOWAS trade benefits very little, if at all, 
from the trade liberalisation scheme that was intended to boost trade flows within 
ECOWAS.  The lack of increase in trade from trade liberalisation has some support in 
the gravity model estimation in chapter 6 where in most of the estimations (exports, 
imports or total trade) the free trade agreement (FTA) has mixed results which are 
mostly negative significant, negative not significant, and positive not significant.  
For our third openness measure (the ratio of intra-ECOWAS trade to total trade) we 
found, over the period under consideration, that the minimum ratio of 38.5% for the 
EU12 to be even higher than the maximum ratio of 33.2% for ECOWAS. This indicates 
the low level of trade among ECOWAS countries. Another finding with this measure of 
openness for ECOWAS is that the degree of openness is not only low for all countries 
and for all years under consideration but also the increase from one period to another is 
very small making these countries incomparable with the level of trade flows among the 
EU12 countries.  
We also found that intra-ECOWAS trade in WAEMU countries is distinctively higher 
than the WAMZ countries in the full period and three sub-periods considered in chapter 
7 (cluster analysis). WAMZ show hardly any improvement over time. Despite the 
relative difference between the two zones the overall intra-ECOWAS trade performance 
appears inadequate to yield significant benefits that justify the formation of currency 
union. Our findings in these different trade measures are similar to Masson and Patillo 
(2005); Masson (2008). In the 2008 paper, Masson found that intra-ECOWAS exports 
as a percentage of total exports was only 9.1% as compared 37.2 and 49.3% to 
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European Union and the rest of the world respectively. He described the intra-
ECOWAS exports as being relatively unimportant relative to its total exports.  
We conclude from the trade openness criterion that ECOWAS countries are very open 
to the rest of the world as indicated by the high level of extra-ECOWAS trade. As the 
level of trade among ECOWAS countries is low our results therefore provide no 
supporting evidence that the countries are open to each other. We argued that since the 
ECOWAS proposal is not for a single currency with the rest of the world but only for 
the fifteen member states what really matters most from the transaction costs savings 
argument of monetary union is the level of trade among the union members. Therefore 
our conclusion for the trade openness criterion is that the level of trade within 
ECOWAS is too small to justify the formation of a currency union.  
II. Product diversification  
According to the OCA theory, Kenen (1969) argued from the law of large number 
perspective that countries with a wide range of products in their trading portfolio can 
better smooth out the effects of shocks on trading commodities. Such countries can rely 
less on monetary policy to fine tune their economies and therefore feel less concerned 
about the loss of their national monetary policy to a common central bank. We 
examined ECOWAS countries in chapter five and found a lack of diversification in 
ECOWAS countries exports commodities. Six (40%) of the ECOWAS countries, 
Nigeria included, have 75% or more of their total exports dominated by the top three 
exports. These countries represent on average 76% of the ECOWAS GDP. The finding 
show a skewed distribution of this percentage among the three products with some 
countries showing high domination by one or two products (86.3% out of 93.8% from 
oil for Nigeria, 92.2% out of 92.2% from cashew nuts for Guinea Bissau, 70.5% out of 
94.3% from natural uranium for Niger).  We found Sierra Leone and Senegal to be 
exceptionally different from the rest of the ECOWAS countries in terms of the number 
of products in their top three exports as percentage of total exports being 41.8% and 
38.3% respectively and the number of exports accounting for 75% of total exports is 22 
for Sierra Leone and 19 for Senegal. Cape Verde, the country closest to these countries 
has only 9 exports accounting for 75% of total exports. However, further analysis 
revealed that Sierra Leone and Senegal are not significantly different from the rest 
despite the large number of exportables since most of them are either from agriculture 
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or mining which all belong to the group of primary produce.  A price shock in primary 
produce may affect these countries in the same way it affects others and, as such, their 
range of exports cannot provide the shock absorbers advocated by Kenen. 
Kenen concluded his argument that less developed countries, being less diversified and 
less well equipped with policy instruments, should make more frequent changes or 
perhaps resort to full flexibility of exchange rates. The lack of product diversification by 
ECOWAS countries implies, by this criterion, that they are not suitable candidates for 
monetary union. 
III. Similarity of inflation (INF)  
The study found a distinctive difference in inflation performance between WAEMU and 
WAMZ countries both before and after using the euro as anchor. Virtually all WAEMU 
countries have inflation below 5% bringing them closer to EU inflation rates. With EU 
as a benchmark WAEMU inflation differential is very low compared to WAMZ 
indicating that the former’s inflation rates are not only similar but also converged to the 
euro area inflation. Cape Verde’s inflation record is similar to WAEMU. The inflation 
rates of WAMZ countries for all the four periods considered in chapter 7 are 
consistently in double digits with very limited improvements. The rates are high and 
fragmented showing no sign of convergence with the ECOWAS criterion or EU’s 
inflation rates. It appears that the euro peg of WAEMU and Cape Verde’s currencies is 
yielding credibility benefit to these countries as argued in the literature. With this lack 
of similarity in inflation performance putting all ECOWAS countries together in a one-
size-fits all monetary policy could have severe costs implications. 
IV. Real exchange rate volatility (RERV)  
For the exchange rate volatility we found that for all the four periods we considered: the 
full period (1998-2012) and the sub-periods (1998-2002, 2003-2007, 2008-2012) the 
exchange rate volatility in WAMZ countries is much higher than WAEMU countries 
and Cape Verde. Nigeria is found to have the most volatile currency in ECOWAS. As 
with the inflation case the euro peg appears to provide currency stability for the 8 
WAEMU countries and Cape Verde meaning that these countries may be benefiting 
from the peg.  
Putting all ECOWAS countries together in a single currency has a number of 
implications for monetary policy as we discussed in the policy implication section. 
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V. Business cycle (BUS) and terms of trade (TOT) synchronisation  
For both BUS and TOT we used EU as an anchor to measure the correlation between 
the individual ECOWAS countries and EU as a measure of the degree of convergence 
with EU. It is argued that the more similar the business cycle or terms of trade as 
measured by their degree of synchronisation the better the countries are to form a 
monetary union or to peg against the anchor country. We found a lack of convergence 
with the EU12 countries in all ECOWAS countries for both business cycle and terms of 
trade. The results show either low positive or negative correlations. The lack of 
convergence in business cycle and terms of trade in ECOWAS means that asymmetric 
shocks exist which may cause difficulties for an ECOWAS central bank in designing 
and implementing a monetary policy that will fits all these countries in times shocks 
whether symmetric or asymmetric.  
VI. Factor mobility: Labour and capital mobility 
  
Mundell (1961) argued in his pioneering OCA theory that labour and capital mobility 
within a region are important characteristics for those countries to be good candidates 
for monetary union. On labour mobility we found that: 
Intra-ECOWAS migration is higher in the periods prior to the ECOWAS liberalisation 
to allow free movement of persons, residence and establishment. This suggests the lack 
of evidence that the removal of restrictions on labour mobility mainly in the 1980s and 
1990s is having any positive effects on ECOWAS economies. 
Another finding on labour mobility is that intra-ECOWAS migration is higher than the 
intra-EU12 migration, although the former declines whilst the latter increases over time. 
However, the higher intra-ECOWAS migration is found to be caused mainly by wars 
and instability and the result of this migration is violence between migrants and citizens 
arising from competition for the limited jobs available, which fuels conflicts in other 
areas as some of the migrants become a source of recruitment for militants. 
We argue that this kind of migration or labour mobility could play a little role as 
adjustment mechanism especially in the absence of jobs for the youth of the host 
countries. We saw in chapter 3 that youth unemployment and underemployment is a 
common problem for ECOWAS countries. Unless ECOWAS countries can create 
employment opportunities the free movement of persons with the right of residence and 
establishment policy will continue to cause violence, fiscal difficulties for host countries 
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and possible tension between countries in the region. This will not only fail the 
liberalisation objectives but even threaten ECOWAS unity and cooperation.  
Capital mobility requires well established and integrated stock markets with cross 
border security trading (bonds and equities). This should be supported with an 
integrated banking sector with an effective payment system. Not all ECOWAS 
countries have stock markets and those that have may not have well diversified 
investors either nationally or across other ECOWAS countries. It may also be possible 
that only a few privileged wealthy individuals, institutional investors or international 
investors outside ECOWAS or Africa that hold securities in these markets due to 
poverty, low income or lack of investment awareness of ECOWAS citizens. Although 
not much analysis has been done in this area due to the data availability the information 
we considered does not seem to provide any evidence that the ECOWAS financial 
system (stock market and banking) is developed and integrated in the sense that can 
make capital mobility to be able to serve the purpose of adjustment when shocks happen 
in a monetary union.    
VII. Fiscal transfers 
Fiscal transfer is a form of risk sharing where payments can be made to people in an 
area that is adversely affected by a shock. It works best in a centrally coordinated fiscal 
system where a central authority collects and disburses tax revenue from member states. 
Such a system is not in existence in ECOWAS and it is very doubtful whether it will be, 
given the current level of disagreement in the establishment and implementation of a 
common external tariff. Although a fiscally federated system does not exist in the Euro 
zone, the existence of European budget and welfare systems that pay benefits to support 
people in difficulties could partly help solve the problem. We found no such system in 
existence in ECOWAS countries.  
VIII. Other criteria 
A number of other economic characteristics included in our analysis are: 
government/Fiscal balance, debt servicing requirement, current account balance. In all 
these three characteristics we found disparity in ECOWAS countries. The political 
criterion solidarity vs. nationalism which is the feeling of a sense of common destiny by 
member states is usually tested when the currency union is in action. However the 
experience of the euro has not provided any evidence that the sense of common destiny 
works in reality. The negative experiences of ECOWAS with migrants and the host 
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countries may also be an early indication that this criterion may not work for ECOWAS 
and therefore cannot be relied on as a risk sharing mechanism.  
IX. Findings from cluster analysis 
The cluster analysis in chapter 7 revealed a number of findings: 
 We found the eight WAEMU countries all belong to one cluster and this is 
consistently so over all the four periods under consideration although Guinea Bissau 
appears to be economically uncomfortable on some occasions. We interpret this 
togetherness as a sign of similarity in macroeconomic characteristics that the OCA 
literature considered as one of the conditions countries should fulfil in order to be 
suitable for currency union if the cost of joining are to be minimised.   
 We found a high degree of dissimilarity among the WAMZ countries with hardly 
any common characteristics which makes it difficult to see all of these countries in 
the same cluster. 
 Three of the non-WAEMU countries, Liberia, Cape Verde and Nigeria, appeared as 
singletons i.e. each of them form an independent cluster from the rest. We interpret 
this as a lack of similarity of each of these three countries with the rest of ECOWAS 
countries.    
 Ghana, Guinea, The Gambia and Sierra Leone appeared to belong to one cluster 
although over time they are not consistently together. This may imply that a WAMZ 
which includes Liberia, Nigeria and Cape Verde may have potential economic 
difficulties. However, the formation of a monetary union by only four countries may 
cast doubt on its economic benefit especially when these countries trade little with 
each other. This finding is similar to Bénassy‐Quéré and Coupet (2005)  whose 
study supports the creation of WAMZ with a limited sense connecting the Gambia, 
Ghana, and Sierra Leone to the WAEMU. They found no evidence supporting the 
inclusion of Nigeria in this monetary zone.   
 Our findings are consistent for the full period and the three sub periods. We observe 
a slight difference in grouping for the sub-period 2003-2007. During this period we 
found a little fragmentation of WAEMU countries although not as much as the one 
we observed for WAMZ. WAEMU and WAMZ are mixed in the two largest 
clusters. However, the fact that the WAEMU countries are more similar than the 
WAMZ countries and always group together is still not wholly refuted. We 
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investigated the possible reasons for the distortion in the clustering results of this 
period and we observed that it is likely due to conflicts and political instability in the 
region, a problem that similarly distorts the trade statistics of Liberia. 
 We carry out sensitivity analysis using different agglomerative methods of merging 
the countries (centroid linkage, single linkage, complete linkage and Wards’ 
linkage) we found our results to be robust.  
Overall, putting all ECOWAS countries into one monetary union while it may be 
politically feasible it may be economically problematic due to the high degree of 
heterogeneity in macroeconomic characteristics especially among the WAMZ 
countries. Our findings are consistent with those of Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008), 
summarised in section 6.2. In their twenty sub-Saharan country study including 14 
ECOWAS countries they found a significant lack of homogeneity in their sample 
with the highest degree of dissimilarities among WAMZ countries which have little 
in common with WAEMU. They also found WAEMU countries to belong to the 
same cluster just as our results revealed. With a fractional integration and 
cointegration methods Alagidede et al. (2012) also found significant heterogeneities 
in behaviour among WAMZ countries. Most importantly, the inclusion of Nigeria 
either in WAMZ or ECOWAS monetary union is not supported in our analysis as 
well as the findings of Tsangarides and Qureshi (2008) and Bénassy‐Quéré and 
Coupet (2005). 
X. Trade, currency union and exchange rate volatility findings 
To examine the impact of currency union and real exchange rate volatility (RERV) on 
trade we estimate the gravity model, in chapter 6, using panel data methodology with 
different trade measures. Whatever trade measure we used (exports, imports, total trade) 
the effect of currency union on trade, using the OLS estimator, is positive and 
statistically significant both before and after controlling for zero trade. In some cases the 
effect is equal or close to the triple effect predicted by Rose. The size of the effect is 
however significantly reduced after accounting for the dynamic effect of trade (i.e. 
LDV).  The statistical effect remained unaffected even after controlling for CSD.  
With the FE estimator and after controlling for CSD our findings are significantly 
different from the OLS: 
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 Currency union has a negative and significant effect on exports before but negative 
and not significant after controlling for zero trade. 
 Currency union has a negative but not significant effect on imports both before and 
after controlling for zero trade. 
 Currency union has a positive but not significant effect on total trade before 
controlling for zero trade but it becomes negative and statistically significant after. 
What is common in all the three trade measures as a dependent variable is that, there is 
no evidence to support the trade creation argument of currency union in the decades of 
WAEMU existence both before and after controlling for zero trade. This finding does 
not change even after including LDV in the regressors.   
For real exchange rate volatility it has: 
 a negative significant effect on exports and imports before controlling for zero trade 
and negative not significant after wards.  
 a negative significant effect on total trade before but positive not significant effect 
after controlling for zero trade. 
Our findings are similar to Pakko and Wall (2001). They replicated Rose’s data and 
used gravity model and panel data to investigate the impact of common currency and 
free trade agreement on bilateral trade. They found that with pooled cross section 
without controlling for the fixed effects the trade creating effect of currency union is 
very similar to that of Rose i.e. common currency members trade 3.2 times more than 
when they have their separate currencies and for FTA trade is 2.5 times.  With fixed 
effects model that accounts for individual heterogeneity, they found that currency union 
members trade 69% less than when they have their separate currencies (i.e. CU 
coefficient of -0.378) and for FTA trade is 0.08% less. Their conclusion was that CU 
reduces trade rather than increasing it when country-pair fixed effects (heterogeneity) 
are properly controlled for in the model. Another replication of Rose’s data that 
provides similar findings to ours is the study by Persson (2001). He found a much 
smaller effect of currency union on trade ranging from 13 to 65 percent but the 
estimates are not significantly different from zero. Similar to our findings is also a study 
by Fountas and Aristotelous (1999) on the four largest EU economies, (Germany, 
France, Italy and UK). They investigate whether the ERM period coincides with an 
increase in intra-EU exports. They found that the EMS dummy variable is not 
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statistically significant for any of the four countries in the sample. They concluded that 
the creation of the ERM has not led to an increase in intra-EU exports either directly or 
indirectly. Our findings are also similar to Masson (2008), Masson and Patillo (2005) 
although the 2008 paper approached the problem from a welfare perspective.  They 
found intra-African trade to be very low compared to the rest of the world. They also 
found that proposed African currency areas would not be welfare improving for all or 
even most of their potential members.  
A general conclusion from our findings is that the existing currency union (WAEMU) 
in ECOWAS has no significant positive effect on bilateral trade of its members. On a 
specific trade basis the CU has a negative significant effect on exports, negative but not 
significant effect on imports and positive not significant effect on total trade.  
We provide a possible explanation for the lack of trade creating effect of the WAEMU 
currency union. We saw in chapter 3 that Nigeria alone is 70% of ECOWAS economy 
and this country is a non-WAEMU member. When we add the other six non-WAEMU 
members’ GDP to Nigeria the non-members of the existing currency union account for 
80.9% of the ECOWAS GDP leaving only 19.1% for the eight WAEMU countries. 
With such a small market even if the currency union members decide to discriminate by 
diverting trade to members, which is not clearly supported in our trade diversion 
dummy, they can hardly make any significant trade boost for the union. It appears that 
due to the large size of non-WAEMU countries as compared to WAEMU members the 
latter’s trade with the former may be significantly higher than the trade within their 
small market. This explanation reconciles the findings from the gravity model with our 
earlier finding that WAEMU countries’ intra-ECOWAS trade is higher than the 
WAMZ’s. What it really means is that putting ECOWAS as a whole the relative trade 
of WAEMU within ECOWAS is higher but within themselves trade is too small to 
create a positive impact due to the small size of their market.   
8.3.2 Conclusions 
ECOWAS countries’ openness measured by the extent of trade within each other is low 
meaning less benefit could be derived from monetary union. The existing currency 
union in ECOWAS has not created trade for its members. The exports portfolio of all 
ECOWAS countries is made up of largely primary produce either from agriculture or 
mining which indicates a lack of product diversification. The ECOWAS countries 
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exhibit high level of inflation differences and for WAMZ countries their inflation rates 
are virtually all in double digits. While WAEMU countries and Cape Verde have stable 
currencies due to their euro peg the other ECOWAS countries suffered from volatile 
currencies. There is a high degree of dissimilarities in the business cycles and terms of 
trade of ECOWAS countries. The type of migration in ECOWAS may not be relevant to 
the labour mobility expectation of what the theory suggest. The financial systems are 
less developed and perhaps concentrated and not integrated to serve the objective of risk 
sharing and adjustment mechanism in monetary union when shocks occur. ECOWAS 
countries are highly heterogeneous especially WAMZ and therefore lack the economic 
characteristics of belonging to a one-size-fits all monetary policy that operates in a 
monetary union.  
Based on our findings, the thesis therefore concludes firstly that the existing trade flows 
within ECOWAS is inadequate to yield economic benefits that should justify the 
formation of a currency union. Secondly, ECOWAS is not an optimum currency area 
which means that the fifteen countries together do not exhibit the characteristics that 
should qualify them to be good candidates for a currency union.   
8.4 Policy implications 
The findings and conclusion of this thesis have a number of implications for ECOWAS. 
The lack of inflation similarity in ECOWAS means relative prices between countries 
change and therefore a one-size-fit all monetary policy will be inappropriate for these 
countries. Both differences in inflation rates and exchange rate volatility may cause a 
dilemma for the ECOWAS central bank as we discussed in the adjustment mechanisms 
in chapter 4. In the event of a country’s or countries’ specific shock the common central 
bank has no option that will remedy the problem satisfactorily for all the affected and 
unaffected countries. 
The size and the exports structure of Nigeria posed a special problem for ECOWAS. 
Nigeria has the most volatile currency in ECOWAS, it is one of the ECOWAS countries 
with high inflation rates and also over 80% of exports come from a single primary 
commodity, oil, whose price is highly vulnerable in world market. Assuming the 
ECOWAS central bank adopts a no bail out policy similar to the ECB, will Nigeria be 
considered too big to fail? Two possible difficult options are available for ECOWAS. 
First no bail out for Nigeria even the situation gets worse. With 70% of the ECOWAS 
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economy this option will have a negative impact on the ECOWAS currency. The 
second option is to bail out Nigeria either by consent or by using its position to 
influence monetary policy. This will cause discontent to other nations especially the 
smaller ones who may feel marginalised. Such discontentment may be a potential threat 
to the membership of the union and the unity of ECOWAS which subsequently will 
undermine the objectives of ECOWAS. Another serious problem that may face 
ECOWAS is that: can ECOWAS bailout Nigeria at all? These are important issues that 
need consideration.  
If exchange rate volatility and the differences between the ECOWAS countries are 
caused by the use of exchange rate as a policy instrument by all or some of the countries 
to manage economic shocks then losing exchange rates by adopting a common currency 
implies the loss of an important adjustment mechanism which could be costly for these 
countries. In monetary union countries no longer have the flexibility of devaluing their 
currencies to remedy their specific problems. It is the authority of the common central 
bank to devalue the common currency in relation to the rest of the world. Common 
central banks are more willing to do so if the shock affects all or most of its members.  
The current economic structure of ECOWAS especially the high reliance on primary 
produce for exports and the small and undeveloped manufacturing sector is a main 
source for the low trade within the region. ECOWAS countries export primary produce 
at cheap prices and import expensive items such as plant and machinery, equipment 
refined oil and many more leading to persistent trade deficit due to unfavourable terms 
of trade. Each country needs these capital items for development and none of the 
ECOWAS countries can offer them to others through local production. As each country 
looks for better prices and deals for their primary produce ECOWAS countries become 
competitors in industrialised countries who buy their raw materials. Unless there is a 
change in the current state of ECOWAS economic structures the potential to increase 
trade within the sub-region even with a monetary union is very limited. 
Different sources have documented a number of factors hindering Africa’s economic 
integration and development. These include political instability, poor governance and 
mismanagement of resources, lack of political will and commitment, lack of the 
necessary infrastructures (telecommunication, roads, energy, manufacturing etc), lack of 
civil and private sector involvement and others. Monetary union cannot be a substitute 
for these important fundamentals and no monetary union will succeed without them. 
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To improve the quality of research in order to inform policy making, more investment 
and commitment is needed on the compilation, processing and storage of data. Data 
availability and quality is one of the obstacles for research in Africa.  
8.5 Suggestions for further research 
1. One of the limitations of this study is the quality of data especially trade data. There 
are many missing data for both exports and imports for all ECOWAS countries even 
during periods when there are no conflicts. Replication of this study with data 
sources that provide full data or fewer gaps is therefore recommended.  
2. A study on the effectiveness of monetary policy in ECOWAS countries in effecting 
the economy especially the transmission mechanisms. This will help us to know the 
extent of loss by these countries if they are to abandon their national monetary 
policies to join the single currency.  
3. ECOWAS stock markets integration and the composition of security holders. 
Studies of this kind will provide information on the possible existence of capital 
mobility for the risk sharing advocated in the OCA literature.  
4. Our study has not provided any evidence that the current monetary union 
(WAEMU) in ECOWAS has any trade creating effect for its members. There is 
some evidence suggesting that WAEMU members may be benefiting from the 
credibility argument as indicated by their low inflation rates and stable currency. We 
also found high volume of trade between ECOWAS countries and the rest of the 
world. To further examine the trade creating effect of the CFA franc zone monetary 
union as a measure of benefit, we suggest further researches that broaden the sample 
to include the two CFAs, WAEMU and CAEMC, Euro countries and other trading 
partners. Since the CFA is pegged to the euro such studies should consider the CFA 
and euro countries to be in a monetary union. 
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Appendix A. 1   African Integration and solidarity treaties 
Treaty/Year Establishment Objectives 
1963 Organisation of African 
Unity (OAU) 
 
Lagos 
(1980) 
Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) 
and the Final Act of Lagos 
Programmes and strategies for self-reliant development and 
cooperation among African countries  
Nairobi 
(1981) 
The African Charter on 
Human and People’s Rights 
and Human Rights 
Commission 
The promotion of human and people’s rights in the continent. 
1985 Africa’s Priority 
Programme for Economic 
Recovery (APPER)  
Emergence programmes to address the development needs of the 
1980s following protracted drought and famine in the continent 
and the crippling effect of Africa’s external indebtedness 
1990 OAU declaration on the 
Political Socio-Economic 
Situation in Africa and 
global fundamental changes 
Africa’s resolve to determine its destiny and to address the 
challenges to peace, democracy and security. 
1990 The Charter on Popular 
Participation 
Renewed determination of the OAU to place African citizens at 
the centre of development and decision-making. 
Abuja 
(1991) 
African Economic 
Community (AEC) 
Using the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as building 
blocks, the treaty seeks to create the AEC through six stages. The 
treaty came into force in 1994. 
1993 The Mechanism for conflict 
Prevention, Management 
and Resolution  
African leadership determination to find solutions to conflicts, 
promote peace, security and stability in Africa. 
Cairo 
(1995) 
Cairo Agenda for Action The re-launching of Africa’s political, economic and social 
development. 
1997 African common position 
on Africa’s external debt 
crisis 
To address the continent external debt crisis 
Sirte (1999) The Sirte Extraordinary 
session 
The decision to establish an African Union 
Lome 
(2000) 
The Constitutive Act of the 
African Union  
The Act with the aim of changing the OAU into an African union 
was adopted in Lome in 2000 and came into force in 2001. 
Lome 
(2000) 
Lome Declaration on the 
framework for an OAU 
response to unconstitutional 
changes 
To respond to unconstitutional changes of governments in the 
continent. This declaration was triggered by the unconstitutional 
change of government in Algiers in 1999. 
2000 Solemn Declaration on the 
conference on security, 
stability, development and 
cooperation 
The establishment of fundamental principles for the promotion of 
democracy and good governance in Africa. 
Lusaka 
(2001) 
  The Lusaka Summit Drew the road map for the implementation of the AU  
Durban 
(2002) 
The Durban Summit The launch of the AU and convened the first assembly of the 
Heads of States of the AU. 
Source: African Union website, www.au.int/en   
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Appendix A. 2   Membership of African RECS 
SADC Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe.  
COMESA Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe 
CEN-SAD Benin, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Morocco,  
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somali, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia 
  
Source: (AU website, accessed 27/10/12)..  
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Appendix A. 3   Macroeconomic Convergence Programme for ECOWAS 
WAEMU WAMZ ECOWAS 
Criteria Targets Criteria Targets Criteria Targets 
Primary Criteria 
Fiscal balance/GDP ≥ 0% Fiscal balance/GDP ≥ -4% Fiscal balance/GDP ≥ -4% 
Price inflation ≤ 3% Inflation rate (end period) ≤ 10% Inflation rate (end period) ≤ 5% 
Total debt/GDP ≤ 70% Gross reserves in  months of 
imports 
≥3 months Gross reserves in  months of imports ≥6 months 
Change in domestic arrears ≤ 0 Central Bank financing 
of budget deficit in 
 relation to previous 
year’s tax revenue 
 
≤ 10% 
Central Bank financing of budget deficit 
in relation to previous year’s tax revenue 
 
 
≤ 10% 
Change in external arrears ≤ 0 - - - - 
Secondary Criteria 
  Wages and salaries ≤ 35% Change in domestic arrears ≤ 0 by 2003 Change in domestic arrears ≤ 0 by 2003 
Current account balance, excl. grants ≥ -5% Ratio of tax revenue to GDP ≥ 20% Ratio of tax revenue to GDP ≥ 20% 
Fiscal revenue/GDP ≥ 17% Wage bill/Tax revenue ≤ 35% Wage bill/Tax revenue ≤ 35% 
Capital expenditure domestically 
financed/Fiscal rev 
≥ 20% 
 
Domestically financed 
investment/Domestic revenue 
> 20 
 
Domestically financed 
investment/Domestic revenue 
> 20 
 
  Nominal exchange rate Within +/- 15% of WAMZ- 
ERM central rate 
Nominal exchange rate Stable 
exchange rates 
  Real interest rate > 0 Real interest rate > 0 
Source: African Development Bank (2011) 
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Appendix A. 4   ECOWAS Common features 
Country Code Income  
Level1 
Currency Land area 
(Sq km)2 
Indepen- 
dence3 
Coloniser3 Official 
Language3 
Neighbouring  
Countries3 
Capital city3 
Benin BEN LI CFA Franc 110,620 1/8/1960 France French NER, NGA, TGO, BFA  Porto-Novo 
Burkina Faso BFA LI CFA Franc 273,600 5/8/1960 France French MLI, NER, BEN, GHA, CIV, 
TGO 
Ouagadougou 
Cape Verde CPV LMI Escudo 4,030 5/7/1975 Portugal Portuguese Island Praia 
Cote d’Ivoire CIV LMI CFA Franc 318,000 7/8/1960 France French GIN, LBR, GHA, BFA, MLI Yamoussoukro 
Gambia GMB LI Dalasi 10,000 18/2/1965 UK English SEN Banjul 
Ghana GHA LMI Cedi 227,540 6/3/1957 UK English CIV, BFA, TGO Accra 
Guinea GIN LI Guinean franc 254,720  2/10/1958 France French GNB, SEN, MLI, CIV Conakry 
Guinea-Bissau GNB LI CFA Franc 28,120 24/9/1973 
10/9/1974 
Portugal Portuguese SEN, GIN Bissau 
Liberia LBR LI Liberian $ 96,320 26/7/1847 USA English SLE, GIN, CIV Monrovia  
Mali MLI LI CFA Franc 1,220,190 22/9/1960 France French GIN, SEN, MRT, DZA, NER, 
BFA, CIV 
Bamako 
Niger NER LI CFA Franc 1,266,700 3/8/1960 France French BFA, MLI, DZA, LBY, TCD, 
NGA, BEN 
Niamey 
Nigeria NGA LMI Naira 910,770 1/10/60 UK English BEN, NER, TCD, CMR Abuja 
Senegal SEN LMI CFA Franc 192,530 4/4/1960 France French GNB, GIN, MRT, MLI, GMB Dakar 
Sierra Leone SLE LI Leone 71,620 27/4/1961 UK English GIN, LBR Freetown 
Togo TGO LI CFA Franc 54,390 27/4/1960 France French GHA, BFA, BEN Lome 
Mauritania (MRT), Algeria (DZA), Chad (TCD), Libya (LBY), Cameroon (CMR) 
Source: 1. World Bank, Africa Development Indicators (Jan 2009), 2. World Bank, World Development Indicators (April 2012),  
3. CIA website 
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Appendix A. 5   ECOWAS GDP by sector 2006-2011
 
Source: African Economic Outlook (http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/PDF/Regional_Edition/AEO12-West-African-Economies.pdf ) 
GNB
2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2009 2006 2010 2006 2011 2006
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 36 36.1 39.2 35.4 9.4 8.2 25.3 31.2 23.1 28.8 30.4 29.9 23.8 26 43.6
Mining and quarrying 0.3 0.3 0.8 12.6 3.5 3.5 6 4.7 2.4 1.8 2.8 1.8 23.8 17.5 0
Primary sector 36.3 36.4 40 48 12.9 11.7 31.3 35.9 25.5 30.6 33.2 31.7 47.6 43.5 43.6
Secondary sector/Manufacturing 8.4 8.6 11.7 9.3 3.7 3.4 16.4 12.8 7.5 5.7 10.2 6.8 6.2 7.5 12.4
Electricity, gas, and water 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.4 0.2 1.3 2.7 1.2 1.6 2.1 1.5 0.4 0.5 0.5
Construction 4.5 4.7 4.8 5.1 10.5 10.7 2.6 4.4 4.9 3.7 5.7 8.6 9.5 11.7 0.9
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants 14.7 18.4 11.7 12.6 23.7 26 13.1 14.1 33.6 30 11.4 12.3 15.9 17.8 20.8
Transport, storage and communication 8.8 9 4.4 3.7 23.8 23.6 8.1 3.9 13.2 11.1 15.9 12.5 5.6 5.9 4.7
Finance, real estate and business services 11.9 10.4 6.9 4.5 7.6 7.2 14.7 11 7.6 8.9 7.8 9.7 0 0 0.2
General government services 14.1 11.3 19.5 15.6 14.5 13.9 7.3 8.9 2.8 4 4.8 7.0 12 10.2 11.1
Other services 0 0 0 0 2.9 3.3 5.2 6.2 3.8 4.3 8.8 9.9 2.7 2.8 5.8
Tertiary sector 55.3 55.0 48.5 42.6 83.4 84.9 52.3 51.2 67.1 63.6 56.5 61.5 46.1 48.9 44.0
GNB
2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2011 2006 2010 2006 2011 2006 2011
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 40.3 68.6 72 36.7 41.1 46.2 43.1 32 35.2 15 17.4 54.2 61.5 40.3 45.9
Mining and quarrying 0 0.8 1.3 8.3 7.6 2.3 6.8 37.8 33.5 1.2 2.2 4.1 1.8 3.1 3.2
Primary sector 40.3 69.4 73.3 45 48.7 48.5 49.9 69.8 68.7 16.2 19.6 58.3 63.3 43.4 49.1
Secondary sector/Manufacturing 10.7 6.7 6.7 9 5.4 5.8 5.4 2.6 2.2 14.4 14 2.3 2 10.2 8.6
Electricity, gas, and water 0.4 0 0 2.1 2.2 1.4 1.2 0.2 0.2 2.7 3.1 0.3 0.3 3.4 3.4
Construction 1.4 3.1 3.1 5 5.7 2.7 2.8 1.3 1.3 5.5 4.4 1.9 1.5 3.6 3.8
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants 19.3 11.8 6 14.5 15.6 15.5 15.3 15.1 16.4 20.9 19.6 10.1 8.5 12.6 9.7
Transport, storage and communication 5.2 6.3 6.4 5.4 5.9 7 6.4 3.3 2.7 12.4 11.6 7.5 7 6.6 6.9
Finance, real estate and business services 8.4 0 0 0.4 0.3 5.8 5.5 6 6.3 13 12.7 4.5 3 8.5 7.7
General government services 10 2.8 4.5 11.2 9.2 9.4 10.4 0.7 0.8 7 7.1 4.9 3.5 9.2 8.6
Other services 4.2 0 0 7.4 7.1 3.9 3.2 1.1 1.3 7.8 7.9 10 10.8 2.6 2.2
Tertiary sector 48.9 24.0 20.0 46.0 46.0 45.7 44.8 27.7 29 69.3 66.4 39.2 34.6 46.5 42.3
Sector
Sector
SLE TGOLBR MLI NER NGA SEN
GINBEN BFA CPV CIV GMB GHA
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Appendix A. 6  ECOWAS GDP by sector 2006-2014 
 
Source: African Economic Outlook (http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/en/country-notes/) 
GNB
2014 Ave 2014 Ave 2014 Ave 2014 Ave 2013 Ave 2014 Ave 2014 Ave 2014
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 35.7 35.9 34.4 36.3 9.4 9.0 26.1 27.5 24 24.0 20.7 20.7 18.0 34.0 18.0
Mining and quarrying 0.2 0.3 8.4 7.3 0.4 2.5 7.2 6.0 3.5 3.5 9.5 9.5 16.9 5.6 16.9
Primary sector 35.9 36.2 42.8 43.6 9.8 11.5 33.3 33.5 27.5 27.5 30.2 30.2 34.9 39.6 34.9
Secondary sector/Manufacturing 8.2 8.4 5.1 8.7 6.5 4.5 15 14.7 6 6.0 6.2 6.2 8.6 10.6 8.6
Electricity, gas, and water 1.1 1.2 0.9 1.1 2.3 1.0 0.6 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.6
Construction 4.5 4.6 9.1 6.3 10.4 10.5 3.2 3.4 5 5.0 12.8 12.8 15.4 5.9 15.4
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants 17.9 17.0 8.9 11.1 20.8 23.5 13.1 13.4 27.7 27.7 10.3 10.3 23.8 21.3 23.8
Transport, storage and communication 11.5 9.8 3.5 3.9 15.5 21.0 7.1 6.4 16.9 16.9 13.9 13.9 6.2 5.4 6.2
Finance, real estate and business services 10.1 10.8 6.3 5.9 17.9 10.9 17.6 14.4 10.5 10.5 6.7 6.7 4.1 4.2 4.1
General government services 10.7 12.0 23.5 19.5 16.8 15.1 9.8 8.7 2.4 2.4 8.5 8.5 6.5 9.2 6.5
Other services 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 2.1 0.3 3.9 2.8 2.8 10.4 10.4 0.0 3.3 0.0
Tertiary sector 55.8 55.4 52.2 47.8 83.7 84.0 51.7 51.7 66.6 66.6 63.7 63.7 56.6 49.8 56.6
GNB
Ave 2013 Ave 2014 Ave 2013 Ave 2013 Ave 2014 Ave 2014 Ave 2014 Ave
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting 34.0 35.3 58.6 40.7 39.5 40.7 43.3 21.0 29.4 15.9 16.1 50.5 55.4 46.7 44.3
Mining and quarrying 5.6 12.4 4.8 5.9 7.3 10.2 6.4 13.0 28.1 1.9 1.8 20.2 8.7 3.7 3.3
Primary sector 39.6 47.7 63.5 46.6 46.8 50.9 49.8 34.0 57.5 17.8 17.9 70.7 64.1 50.4 47.6
Secondary sector/Manufacturing 10.6 7.3 6.9 5.6 6.7 6.4 5.9 9.0 4.6 12.5 13.6 1.6 2.0 6.7 8.5
Electricity, gas, and water 0.5 0.6 0.2 3.3 2.5 1.1 1.2 0.7 0.4 2.6 2.8 0.3 0.3 3.4 3.4
Construction 5.9 5.3 3.8 3.9 4.9 2.7 2.7 3.3 2.0 5.1 5.0 0.9 1.4 5.9 4.4
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants 21.3 14.1 10.6 17.3 15.8 14.3 15.0 17.9 16.5 19.6 20.0 7.7 8.8 9.2 10.5
Transport, storage and communication 5.4 4.8 5.8 9.1 6.8 6.9 6.8 11.7 5.9 13.1 12.4 3.8 6.1 5.6 6.4
Finance, real estate and business services 4.2 9.6 3.2 5.3 2.0 5.3 5.5 15.2 9.2 13.1 12.9 2.4 3.3 7.7 8.0
General government services 9.2 6.2 4.5 8.9 9.8 9.5 9.8 3.0 1.5 7.8 7.3 4.4 4.3 9.2 9.0
Other services 3.3 4.4 1.5 0 4.8 3 3.4 5.1 2.5 8.4 8.0 8.2 9.7 1.8 2.2
Tertiary sector 49.8 45.0 29.7 47.8 46.6 42.8 44.4 56.9 37.9 69.7 68.5 27.7 33.8 42.8 43.9
Sector
Sector
GHA GIN
LBR MLI NER NGA SEN SLE TGO
BEN BFA CPV CIV GMB
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Appendix A. 7   Intra-ECOWAS Migration- % of total population  
 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
 
 
ECO WAEM WAM ECO WAEM WAM ECO WAEM WAM ECO WAEM WAM ECO WAEM WAM ECO WAEM WAM Ave 
Benin 3.9 2.8 1.1 4.7 3.4 1.3 10.0 3.1 7.0 4.8 2.8 2.1 4.8 2.3 2.5 4.7 1.9 2.7 5.5 
Burkina Faso 9.3 9.3 0.04 13.5 11.6 1.9 12.4 11.8 0.5 10.3 10.0 0.3 11.1 10.8 0.4 8.4 8.3 0.1 10.8 
Cape Verde 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.3 0.1 0.2 1.6 0.1 1.5 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.9 0.2 0.7 2.9 2.0 0.9 1.1 
Cote d'Ivoire 3.3 2.4 0.9 2.2 1.8 0.3 1.7 1.6 0.1 2.0 1.9 0.1 3.1 3.0 0.1 4.7 4.7 0.1 2.8 
Gambia 0.1 0.1 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.04 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.04 0.1 0.03 0.04 0.1 
Ghana 2.0 1.6 0.4 2.7 2.0 0.7 7.3 2.4 4.8 4.6 3.1 1.5 3.5 1.8 1.7 4.1 2.1 2.0 4.0 
Guinea 47.7 23.9 23.9 49.6 24.8 24.8 42.0 21.0 21.0 48.7 24.4 24.4 37.7 18.8 18.8 31.2 15.6 15.6 42.8 
Guinea-Bi 10.4 9.1 1.3 8.5 4.8 3.7 5.8 3.7 2.1 5.6 4.6 1.0 4.5 3.3 1.2 3.1 1.5 1.6 6.3 
Liberia 1.2 0.4 0.8 1.1 0.4 0.7 1.7 0.3 1.4 2.7 0.4 2.3 7.1 1.7 5.4 7.7 1.9 5.8 3.6 
Mali 4.8 4.4 0.4 6.2 5.6 0.6 8.3 6.2 2.1 6.6 5.8 0.8 6.3 5.3 1.0 5.0 3.9 1.1 6.2 
Niger 2.3 1.5 0.9 2.3 1.5 0.7 3.2 1.4 1.8 1.8 1.3 0.5 1.9 1.3 0.6 1.9 1.3 0.6 2.2 
Nigeria 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.003 0.2 
Senegal 1.8 1.1 0.7 1.7 1.0 0.7 1.8 0.9 0.9 1.7 0.7 1.0 1.6 0.5 1.1 2.0 0.4 1.5 1.8 
Sierra Leone 0.5 0.04 0.4 0.4 0.04 0.4 0.7 0.04 0.7 1.2 0.1 1.1 2.8 0.1 2.7 3.0 0.04 3.0 1.4 
Togo 13.0 1.4 11.6 8.5 1.4 7.1 7.1 1.4 5.7 4.0 1.8 2.1 4.5 2.0 2.5 4.4 2.5 2.0 6.9 
Average 6.7 3.9 2.8 6.8 3.9 2.9 6.9 3.6 3.3 6.3 3.8 2.5 6.0 3.4 2.6 5.6 3.1 2.5 6.4 
ECO is ECOWAS, WAEM is WAEMU, WAM is WAMZ, Ave is average 
Source: World Bank data base 
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Appendix A. 8   Intra EU12 Migration- % of total population 
  1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 Average 
Belgium 1.2 2.4 2.5 2.5 1.8 3.0 2.2 
Denmark 0.7 0.5 1.9 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.2 
France 0.5 0.6 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.5 0.9 
Germany 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.0 
Greece 1.1 4.0 4.1 3.3 3.9 4.9 3.5 
Ireland 4.2 25.8 18.8 17.8 22.3 10.7 16.6 
Italy 1.3 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.8 2.5 
Luxembourg 3.7 4.0 6.8 6.1 4.7 9.7 5.8 
Netherlands 1.5 1.6 1.8 1.7 2.0 3.2 2.0 
Portugal 1.7 5.3 9.0 8.1 4.0 12.1 6.7 
Spain 0.7 3.3 2.2 1.8 1.1 1.6 1.8 
UK 0.4 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.1 2.1 1.0 
Average 1.48 4.34 4.38 3.98 3.91 4.53 3.77 
Source: World Bank data base 
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Appendix A. 9   ECOWAS trade with the World as % of GDP 
  Exports Imports Exports + Imports 
  1981 1993 2005 2010 2011 1981 1993 2005 2010 2011 1981 1993 2005 2010 2011 
Benin 2.4 6.5 7.0 10.1 11.8 41.9 16.4 20.8 109.3 139.7 44.3 22.9 27.8 119.4 151.5 
Burkina Faso 4.1 2.7 5.2 7.1 7.7 18.9 18.5 20.2 21.6 21.5 23.0 21.1 25.3 28.7 29.2 
Cape Verde 2.1 2.5 1.8 2.8 3.6 50.9 38.6 44.5 44.8 55.6 53.0 41.1 46.3 47.6 59.2 
Côte d'Ivoire 30.0 24.1 44.3 44.8 46.0 28.4 18.9 35.9 35.5 27.8 58.4 43.0 80.2 80.4 73.9 
Gambia 15.2 12.9 4.4 6.0 11.9 51.5 49.9 98.7 79.6 103.1 66.7 62.7 103.1 85.6 115.0 
Ghana 24.8 19.2 22.6 14.0 21.8 29.9 34.8 55.2 40.0 43.1 54.7 54.0 77.9 53.9 65.0 
Guinea   16.6 45.1 46.1 43.4   22.9 65.2 86.4 103.6   39.4 110.3 132.5 147.0 
Guinea-Bissau 10.2 13.3 19.0 22.7 35.8 33.4 55.2 37.2 32.1 36.2 43.5 68.4 56.2 54.8 72.0 
Liberia 62.5 226.6 198.6 85.8 58.9 56.4 3223.5 1053.0 1771.4 1662.7 118.9 3450.1 1251.6 1857.2 1721.6 
Mali 7.1 8.2 4.8 3.2 4.1 19.2 27.5 39.1 36.8 37.0 26.4 35.7 43.8 40.0 41.1 
Niger 21.4 13.7 8.7 3.9 9.0 24.6 19.2 24.4 29.3 27.0 46.0 33.0 33.2 33.3 36.0 
Nigeria 32.1 54.3 38.8 39.5 45.1 31.1 35.6 21.9 24.2 25.0 63.2 89.9 60.6 63.8 70.2 
Senegal 15.7 11.8 16.6 15.2 16.6 33.9 18.5 36.9 34.0 37.3 49.6 30.3 53.5 49.2 53.9 
Sierra Leone 13.5 15.4 15.8 15.1 16.0 29.4 32.5 49.1 51.9 70.4 42.9 47.8 64.9 67.0 86.4 
Togo 21.6 15.9 17.2 20.1 32.5 45.0 51.6 28.2 31.4 102.1 66.6 67.5 45.4 51.5 134.7 
Min 2.1 2.5 1.8 2.8 3.6 18.9 16.4 20.2 21.6 21.5 23.0 21.1 25.3 28.7 29.2 
Max 62.5 226.6 198.6 85.8 58.9 56.4 3223.5 1053.0 1771.4 1662.7 118.9 3450.1 1251.6 1857.2 1721.6 
Max-Lib 32.1 54.3 45.1 46.1 46.0 51.5 55.2 98.7 109.3 139.7 66.7 89.9 110.3 132.5 151.5 
Source: Author’s computation from IMF DOTS, GDP data from World Bank Data bank (Accessed 02/04/13) 
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Appendix A. 10   EU12 trade with the world as % of GDP  
 
Exports Imports Exports + Imports 
 
1993 1998 2003 2010 2011 1993 1998 2003 2010 2011 1993 1998 2003 2010 2011 
Belgium 56.7 69.8 80.3 85.0 90.0 51.5 63.9 72.2 82.9 90.2 108.2 133.7 152.5 167.9 180.2 
Denmark 25.5 27.6 31.0 29.9 32.3 21.0 26.4 26.5 25.8 28.2 46.5 54.0 57.4 55.8 60.5 
France 16.7 20.7 21.9 20.1 21.1 15.6 19.8 22.2 23.5 25.5 32.4 40.4 44.1 43.6 46.6 
Germany 18.1 24.8 30.6 36.4 38.7 16.4 21.3 24.6 31.7 34.4 34.6 46.1 55.2 68.2 73.2 
Greece 8.8 7.9 6.9 7.3 10.7 19.5 21.3 23.3 21.6 20.8 28.2 29.2 30.2 28.9 31.6 
Ireland 57.4 73.2 58.3 54.6 55.7 42.4 49.9 33.9 29.3 30.5 99.8 123.1 92.2 83.9 86.2 
Italy 16.4 19.8 19.8 21.6 23.5 14.4 17.6 19.7 22.4 24.1 30.8 37.5 39.5 44.0 47.6 
Luxembourg 37.3 40.0 45.7 37.6 36.8 48.7 51.3 55.5 47.7 49.4 86.0 91.3 101.2 85.3 86.3 
Netherlands 39.2 42.0 55.0 73.4 78.4 34.6 39.4 49.2 66.2 71.0 73.8 81.4 104.2 139.6 149.4 
Portugal 16.4 19.7 19.6 21.6 25.0 25.9 30.0 29.2 34.1 34.6 42.4 49.7 48.8 55.7 59.5 
Spain 12.3 17.9 17.6 18.1 20.3 16.1 21.6 23.6 23.5 25.3 28.4 39.5 41.2 41.6 45.6 
UK 18.4 18.3 16.5 17.0 18.9 20.9 21.2 20.7 25.2 26.2 39.3 39.5 37.2 42.2 45.1 
Min 8.8 7.9 6.9 7.3 10.7 14.4 17.6 19.7 21.6 20.8 28.2 29.2 30.2 28.9 31.6 
Max 57.4 73.2 80.3 85.0 90.0 51.5 63.9 72.2 82.9 90.2 108.2 133.7 152.5 167.9 180.2 
Source: as in appendix A.9  
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Appendix A. 11  Intra-ECOWAS trade as a  % of GDP 
  Exports Imports Exports + Imports 
  1981 1993 2005 2010 2011 1981 1993 2005 2010 2011 1981 1993 2005 2010 2011 
Benin 0.5 0.4 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.3 0.8 5.2 6.9 6.6 2.8 1.1 6.7 8.6 8.5 
Burkina Faso 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 4.9 5.2 5.7 7.4 6.8 6.5 6.4 6.9 8.4 7.7 
Cape Verde   0.1       0.9 2.5 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.9 2.6 0.8 0.6 0.5 
Côte d'Ivoire 3.8 5.1 11.0 11.1 9.7 1.8 3.8 9.2 9.6 7.2 5.6 8.9 20.3 20.7 16.9 
Gambia 6.4 1.6 0.4 0.3 0.4 3.4 3.7 20.5 10.5 11.1 9.8 5.3 20.9 10.8 11.5 
Ghana 0.2 2.6 1.5 1.1 1.0 9.3 6.8 11.0 8.2 6.5 9.5 9.4 12.6 9.3 7.5 
Guinea   0.2 0.6 0.6 0.5   3.2 5.1 3.3 4.1   3.3 5.6 3.9 4.6 
Guinea-Bissau 0.8 0.2 3.5 7.1 6.4 2.5 2.1 8.5 6.1 5.9 3.3 2.3 12.0 13.2 12.4 
Liberia 1.2 0.7 2.4 2.3 3.9 1.1 3.8 17.7 7.5 18.7 2.3 4.5 20.0 9.8 22.5 
Mali 2.3 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 7.0 5.8 9.4 9.1 7.4 9.3 6.3 9.4 9.3 7.6 
Niger 3.7 3.4 2.3 3.0 3.1 5.1 5.4 4.6 5.7 6.1 8.8 8.8 6.9 8.7 9.2 
Nigeria 0.8 3.5 2.3 2.0 1.7 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.9 4.3 3.0 2.6 2.2 
Senegal 3.9 1.5 5.6 6.5 5.9 2.0 2.1 5.5 4.5 5.0 6.0 3.6 11.1 11.0 11.0 
Sierra Leone     0.4 0.3 0.3 7.3 5.2 6.8 3.4 4.8 7.3 5.2 7.1 3.7 5.1 
Togo 3.4 3.1 11.7 11.5 10.9 2.2 12.8 3.4 3.5 4.9 5.6 15.9 15.1 15.1 15.8 
Min 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.8 0.6 0.5 
Max 6.4 5.1 11.7 11.5 10.9 9.3 12.8 20.5 10.5 18.7 9.8 15.9 20.9 20.7 22.5 
Source: as in appendix A.9  
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Appendix A. 12  Intra-EU12 trade  as a % of GDP  
  Exports Imports Exports + Imports 
  1993 1998 2003 2010 2011 1993 1998 2003 2010 2011 1993 1998 2003 2010 2011 
Belgium   55.1 62.0 63.5 66.7   46.6 53.2 57.7 61.7   101.7 115.2 121.2 128.4 
Denmark 17.3 19.5 21.4 20.1 21.8 14.7 19.8 19.8 18.5 20.2 31.9 39.2 41.2 38.6 42.0 
France 10.3 13.5 14.5 12.5 13.0 9.8 12.5 15.6 16.4 17.5 20.1 26.0 30.1 28.9 30.5 
Germany 11.3 16.0 19.8 23.0 24.3 9.8 13.2 15.2 20.3 22.1 21.0 29.3 35.1 43.3 46.4 
Greece 6.3 5.3 4.5 4.7 5.5 12.4 14.9 13.5 11.2 10.9 18.7 20.2 18.0 15.8 16.4 
Ireland 41.1 50.7 36.4 32.9 33.4 25.3 27.4 20.7 19.3 20.7 66.5 78.0 57.1 52.2 54.1 
Italy 10.0 12.3 12.3 12.5 13.3 8.9 11.6 12.5 13.1 13.6 19.0 23.9 24.8 25.6 26.9 
Luxembourg   34.3 40.2 31.1 29.6   46.1 42.9 38.4 40.6   80.4 83.1 69.5 70.2 
Netherlands 30.4 33.3 44.2 57.2 61.4 21.9 23.0 26.9 31.0 33.1 52.3 56.3 71.1 88.2 94.5 
Portugal 13.2 16.2 15.9 16.2 18.4 19.3 23.4 23.2 26.1 25.6 32.5 39.6 39.1 42.3 44.0 
Spain 8.8 13.1 13.2 12.5 13.6 10.4 14.9 16.4 14.0 14.5 19.3 27.9 29.5 26.5 28.1 
UK 9.9 10.1 9.3 9.4 10.1 10.7 10.6 11.3 12.6 13.1 20.6 20.8 20.6 22.0 23.2 
Min 6.3 5.3 4.5 4.7 5.5 8.9 10.6 11.3 11.2 10.9 18.7 20.2 18.0 15.8 16.4 
Max 41.1 55.1 62.0 63.5 66.7 25.3 46.6 53.2 57.7 61.7 66.5 101.7 115.2 121.2 128.4 
Source: as in appendix A.9  
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Appendix A. 13  Intra-ECOWAS trade as a % of total trade 
  Exports Imports Exports + Imports 
  1981 1993 2005 2010 2011 1981 1993 2005 2010 2011 1981 1993 2005 2010 2011 
Benin 1.1 1.7 5.5 1.4 1.3 5.2 3.3 18.6 5.8 4.4 6.3 5.0 24.0 7.2 5.6 
Burkina Faso 6.7 5.7 4.8 3.4 3.2 21.4 24.8 22.5 25.9 23.3 28.1 30.5 27.3 29.3 26.5 
Cape Verde   0.3     0.1 1.6 6.1 1.8 1.3 0.8 1.6 6.4 1.8 1.3 0.9 
Côte d'Ivoire 6.4 11.9 13.8 13.9 13.2 3.2 8.8 11.5 11.9 9.8 9.6 20.7 25.3 25.8 22.9 
Gambia 9.5 2.6 0.4 0.4 0.3 5.1 5.8 19.9 12.2 9.6 14.7 8.4 20.3 12.6 10.0 
Ghana 0.4 4.9 2.0 2.0 1.5 16.9 12.6 14.2 15.3 10.0 17.4 17.5 16.2 17.3 11.6 
Guinea   0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4   8.0 4.6 2.5 2.8   8.5 5.1 2.9 3.2 
Guinea-Bissau 1.8 0.3 6.3 12.9 8.9 5.9 3.1 15.1 11.2 8.2 7.7 3.4 21.4 24.1 17.2 
Liberia 1.0   0.2 0.1 0.2 0.9 0.1 1.4 0.4 1.1 1.9 0.1 1.6 0.5 1.3 
Mali 8.5 1.4 0.1 0.4 0.5 26.7 16.2 21.3 22.8 18.0 35.3 17.5 21.5 23.3 18.5 
Niger 8.1 10.3 6.9 9.1 8.7 11.0 16.3 13.8 17.0 16.9 19.2 26.6 20.8 26.1 25.5 
Nigeria 1.3 3.9 3.8 3.2 2.5 0.2 0.8 1.2 0.9 0.7 1.4 4.8 4.9 4.1 3.2 
Senegal 8.0 4.9 10.5 13.2 11.0 4.1 6.8 10.3 9.1 9.4 12.0 11.8 20.8 22.3 20.4 
Sierra Leone     0.5 0.4 0.3 16.9 10.8 10.4 5.1 5.6 16.9 10.8 11.0 5.5 5.9 
Togo 5.1 4.6 25.7 22.4 8.1 3.3 19.0 7.5 6.9 3.6 8.4 23.6 33.2 29.2 11.7 
Min 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.4 0.7 1.4 0.1 1.6 0.5 0.9 
Max 9.5 11.9 25.7 22.4 13.2 26.7 24.8 22.5 25.9 23.3 35.3 30.5 33.2 29.3 26.5 
Source: as in appendix A.9  
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Appendix A. 14  Intra- EU 12 trade as a % of total trade  
  Exports Imports Exports + Imports 
  1993 1998 2003 2010 2011 1993 1998 2003 2010 2011 1993 1998 2003 2010 2011 
Belgium   41.2 40.7 37.8 37.0   34.9 34.9 34.4 34.2   76.1 75.5 72.2 71.3 
Denmark 37.1 36.0 37.2 36.1 36.0 31.5 36.6 34.4 33.2 33.4 68.6 72.6 71.7 69.3 69.3 
France 31.7 33.4 32.9 28.6 28.0 30.4 31.0 35.3 37.6 37.5 62.1 64.4 68.2 66.2 65.5 
Germany 32.6 34.8 35.9 33.8 33.2 28.3 28.7 27.6 29.8 30.2 60.8 63.5 63.5 63.6 63.4 
Greece 22.3 18.1 14.9 16.1 17.3 43.8 51.2 44.8 38.6 34.6 66.1 69.3 59.7 54.7 51.8 
Ireland 41.2 41.2 39.5 39.3 38.8 25.4 22.2 22.4 23.0 24.0 66.6 63.4 61.9 62.2 62.8 
Italy 32.5 32.9 31.3 28.5 28.0 29.0 31.0 31.6 29.7 28.6 61.6 63.8 62.9 58.2 56.6 
Luxembourg   37.5 39.7 36.5 34.4   50.5 42.4 45.0 47.0   88.0 82.1 81.5 81.4 
Netherlands 41.2 40.9 42.4 41.0 41.1 29.7 28.3 25.8 22.2 22.2 71.0 69.1 68.3 63.2 63.2 
Portugal 31.2 32.6 32.6 29.1 30.9 45.5 47.1 47.5 46.9 43.0 76.7 79.7 80.1 76.0 73.9 
Spain 31.1 33.1 31.9 30.1 29.9 36.8 37.6 39.8 33.6 31.8 67.9 70.7 71.7 63.7 61.7 
UK 25.1 25.6 25.1 22.4 22.3 27.2 26.9 30.3 29.8 29.0 52.3 52.5 55.5 52.2 51.4 
Min 22.3 18.1 14.9 16.1 17.3 25.4 22.2 22.4 22.2 22.2 52.3 52.5 55.5 52.2 51.4 
Max 41.2 41.2 42.4 41.0 41.1 45.5 51.2 47.5 46.9 47.0 76.7 88.0 82.1 81.5 81.4 
Source: as in appendix A.9  
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Appendix A. 15  ECOWAS top three exports and their share in  exports 
Country 
Products (percentage share of total exports) in ranking 
order 
Top three 
exports-% 
of total 
exports 
No of exports 
accounting for 
75% of total 
exports 
Benin 
Cashew nuts, in shells (29.5%); Cotton, not carded or 
combed (28.7%); Copper waste and scrap (6%) 
64.2 6 
Burkina 
Faso 
Cotton, not carded or combed (52.1%); Gold, semi 
manufactured (19.6%); Sesame seeds (9.1%) 
80.8 3 
Cape 
Verde 
Tunas, yellow fin (16.4%); Fish, whole or pieces (13.5%); 
Men’s and boys’ trousers and shorts, of cotton not knitted 
(10.4%) 
40.3 9 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted (36.3%); 
Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous, crude (14.6%); 
Cocoa paste, not defatted (8%) 
58.9 7 
Gambia 
Cashew nuts, in shells (44.5%); Petroleum oils and oils 
from bituminous, crude (14.3%); Titanium ores and 
concentrates (12.3%) 
71.1 4 
Ghana 
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted (49.7%); 
Manganese ores and concentrates (8.5%); Cocoa butter, 
fat and oil (5.6%) 
63.8 7 
Guinea 
Aluminium ores and concentrates (62.9%); Aluminium 
oxide (11.2%); Coffee, not roasted, not decaffeinated (4%) 
78.1 3 
Guinea-
Bissau 
Cashew nuts, in shells (92.2%) 
92.2 1 
Liberia 
Cargo vessels and other vessels for transport of goods or 
persons (42.1%); Tankers (19.3%); Petroleum oils and oils 
from bituminous, crude (13.3%); 
74.7 4 
Mali 
Cotton, not carded or combed (39.3%); Mineral or 
chemical fertilizers containing nitrogen, phosphorus, 
potassium (12.5%); Sesame seeds (8.1%) 
59.9 8 
Niger 
Natural uranium and its compounds (70.5%); Light oils 
and preparations (23.8%);  
94.3 2 
Nigeria 
Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous, crude (86.3%); 
Liquefied natural gas (7.5%);  
93.8 1 
Senegal 
Phosphoric and polyphosphoric acids (25.5%); Fish, fresh 
and chilled (6.8%); Fish, frozen (6%) 
38.3 19 
Sierra 
Leone 
Diamonds, nonindustrial, unworked or simply sawn or 
cleaved (21.5%); Titanium ores and concentrates (11.8%); 
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted (8.5%) 
41.8 22 
Togo 
Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted (47.1%); 
Ground [nuts] (8.3%); Gold, unwrought, nonmonetary 
(7.7%) 
63.1 5 
Africa 
Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous, crude (44.8%); 
Liquefied natural gas (3.9%); Natural gas, in gaseous state 
(3.7%) 
52.4 40 
Source: Adapted from World Bank, Africa Development Indicators (ADI) 2011, pp. 70-71 
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Appendix A. 16  ECOWAS Commodity and Industrial Structure 
 
Agricultural 
raw materials 
exports (% of 
merchandise 
exports) 
Agricultural 
raw materials 
imports (% of 
merchandise 
imports) 
Food exports (% 
of merchandise 
exports) 
Food 
imports (% 
of 
merchandise 
imports) 
Manufactures 
exports (% of 
merchandise 
exports) 
Manufactures 
imports (% of 
merchandise 
imports) 
Agricultur
e, value 
added (% 
of GDP 
Manufacturing
, value added 
(% of GDP) 
Fuel imports 
(% of 
merchandise 
imports) 
Benin 44.9 3.2 44.8 24 9 58.7 36.2 8.9 12.9 
Burkina Faso 47.4 1.7 42.2 18 9.5 62.8 31.8 15.6 16.2 
Cape Verde 0.5 1.8 54.9 33.9 36.6 54.2 12.5 9 9.2 
Cote d’Ivoire 15.2 0.7 53.7 16.3 12.7 58.5 28.9 16.8 20.8 
Gambia 1.3 1.4 89.3 31.7 7.3 63.2 29.9 5.2 11.6 
Ghana 7.7 1.7 65.8 14.4 11.9 67.2 43.9 9.9 14.2 
Guinea 2.6 0.8 6.8 20 21.1 39.1 20.3 4.3 13.4 
Guinea-Bissau 4.5 0.3 94.3 39.3 0.7 46 51.4 13.4 13.6 
Liberia 21.4 0.3 5.4 16.5 1.7 64.4 - - 16.5 
Mali 58.5 1.3 31.1 20.6 8.7 55.9 50.2 6.2 21 
Niger 3 3.2 42.3 24.7 9.3 56.7 51.1 5.5 11.8 
Nigeria 1.8 0.9 10 11.9 1.9 82.3 32.8 2.8 2.2 
Senegal 2.4 2.0 46.1 25.8 28.2 51.4 18.5 14.3 19.1 
Sierra Leone 0.8 2.5 21.8 26.5 32 48.5 43.9 5 21 
Togo 9.2 1.6 27.8 18 32.5 64.1 37.4 8.4 14.9 
World 3.3 3.1 10.4 9.6 68.4 64.8 5.4 19.8 15.5 
SSA 5.4 1.5 18.9 10.8 24.9 69.4 16.5 15.3 12.8 
Source: Author’s calculation from World Bank, World Development Indicators and Global Development Finance, 2012. The averages are computed for 9  
years: 1960, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2011. SSA stands for Sub-Saharan Africa
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Appendix A. 17  ECOWAS Consumer price inflation  
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Ave 
Benin 2.5 1.5 0.9 5.4 3.8 1.3 7.9 2.2 2.3 2.7 3.0 
Burkina Fa. 2.2 2.0 -0.4 6.4 2.3 -0.2 10.7 2.6 -0.8 2.8 2.8 
Cape Ver. 1.9 1.2 -1.9 0.4 5.4 4.4 6.8 1.0 2.1 4.5 2.6 
Cote d'Iv 3.1 3.3 1.4 3.9 2.5 1.9 6.3 1.0 1.7 4.9 3.0 
Gambia 8.6 17.0 14.2 4.8 2.1 5.4 4.5 4.6 5.0 4.8 7.1 
Ghana 14.8 26.7 12.6 15.1 10.9 10.7 16.5 19.3 10.7 8.7 14.6 
Guinea 
   
31.4 34.7 22.8 18.4 4.7 15.5 21.4 21.3 
Guinea-B 3.3 -3.5 0.9 3.3 2.0 4.6 10.5 -1.7 2.5 5.0 2.7 
Liberia 14.2 10.3 7.8 10.8 7.3 11.4 17.5 7.4 7.3 8.5 10.3 
Mali 5.0 -1.3 -3.1 6.4 1.5 1.4 9.2 2.2 1.1 2.9 2.5 
Niger 2.6 -1.6 0.3 7.8 0.04 0.1 11.3 4.3 0.8 2.9 2.9 
Nigeria 12.9 14.0 15.0 17.9 8.2 5.4 11.6 11.5 13.7 10.8 12.1 
Senegal 2.2 0.0 0.5 1.7 2.1 5.9 5.8 -1.1 1.3 3.4 2.2 
Sierra Leo  
     
11.6 14.8 9.3 16.6 16.2 13.7 
Togo 3.1 -1.0 0.4 6.8 2.2 1.0 8.7 2.0 1.8 3.6 2.9 
Min 1.9 -3.5 -3.1 0.4 0.04 -0.2 4.5 -1.7 -0.8 2.7 2.2 
Max 14.8 26.7 15.0 31.4 34.7 22.8 18.4 19.3 16.6 21.4 21.3 
Spread 12.9 30.2 18.1 31.0 34.7 23.1 13.9 20.9 17.4 18.6 19.1 
STDEV 4.9 9.0 6.3 8.1 8.8 6.2 4.4 5.4 5.8 5.5 6.0 
Average 5.9 5.3 3.7 8.7 6.1 5.8 10.7 4.6 5.4 6.9 6.9 
Appendix A. 18  EU12 Consumer price inflation (2002-2011) 
Country Name 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Ave 
Belgium 1.6 1.6 2.1 2.8 1.8 1.8 4.5 -0.1 2.2 3.5 2.2 
Denmark 2.4 2.1 1.2 1.8 1.9 1.7 3.4 1.3 2.3 2.8 2.1 
France 1.9 2.1 2.1 1.7 1.7 1.5 2.8 0.1 1.5 2.1 1.8 
Germany 1.4 1.0 1.7 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.6 0.3 1.1 2.3 1.6 
Greece 3.6 3.5 2.9 3.5 3.2 2.9 4.2 1.2 4.7 3.3 3.3 
Ireland 4.7 3.5 2.2 2.4 3.9 4.9 4.1 -4.5 -0.9 2.6 2.3 
Italy 2.5 2.7 2.2 2.0 2.1 1.8 3.4 0.8 1.5 2.7 2.2 
Luxembourg 2.1 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.7 2.3 3.4 0.4 2.3 3.4 2.3 
Netherlands 3.3 2.1 1.2 1.7 1.2 1.6 2.5 1.2 1.3 2.4 1.8 
Portugal 3.5 3.3 2.4 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.6 -0.8 1.4 3.7 2.4 
Spain 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.5 2.8 4.1 -0.3 1.8 3.2 2.8 
UK 1.3 1.4 1.3 2.0 2.3 2.3 3.6 2.2 3.3 4.5 2.4 
Min 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.2 1.5 2.5 -4.5 -0.9 2.1 1.6 
Max 4.7 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.9 4.9 4.5 2.2 4.7 4.5 3.3 
Spread 3.4 2.5 1.9 2.0 2.8 3.4 2.0 6.6 5.7 2.4 1.7 
STDEV 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.7 1.7 1.3 0.7 0.5 
Average 2.6 2.4 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.4 3.4 0.1 1.9 3.0 2.3 
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Appendix A. 19   Sensitivity analysis  results for RERV2 (TIM)    
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdpi 1.11*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.45 0.45 -0.47 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.78) (0.43) (0.81) 
gdpj 0.59*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 2.64*** 1.30*** 0.41 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.72) (0.39) (0.57) 
gdpci -0.13 -0.06 -0.04 -0.14 -0.32 0.61 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.80) (0.44) (0.83) 
gdpcj -0.43*** -0.09** -0.09* -2.47*** -1.23*** -0.34 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.77) (0.41) (0.59) 
dist -0.67*** -0.12*** -0.13***    
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)    
cu 0.83*** 0.20*** 0.19*** -0.69*** -0.21* -0.23* 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) 
rerv2 -1.44*** -0.36* -0.21 -0.52 -0.36* -0.13 
 (0.26) (0.19) (0.23) (0.34) (0.21) (0.22) 
sim -0.20*** -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.05 0.09 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) 
rlf 0.18*** 0.03 0.04* 0.06 0.05* 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
div 0.27*** 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.25 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) 
lang 0.26*** 0.05 0.05*    
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
fta -0.04 0.02 0.12* -0.13* -0.08** 0.15 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.19) 
bor 0.44*** 0.07*** 0.07***    
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)    
lalis -0.46*** -0.11*** -0.11***    
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)    
trade1l  0.81*** 0.82***  0.53*** 0.53*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.03) 
Con 2.07*** 0.40* 0.26 2.05*** 0.70** 2.02** 
 (0.35) (0.22) (0.23) (0.62) (0.31) (0.84) 
No of obs 4,418 3,992 3,992 4,418 3,992 3,992 
R-sq 0.43 0.81 0.81 0.16 0.43 0.44 
Ad R-sq 0.424 0.810 0.812    
F-test 225.3 921.2 351    
No of ind    198 185 185 
Rho    0.853 0.684 0.692 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is logarithm of real exports- trade 1. All other definitions are as 
in table 6.3 
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Appendix A. 20   Sensitivity analysis  results for RERV3 (TIM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdpi 1.10*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.55 0.48 -0.50 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.78) (0.44) (0.82) 
gdpj 0.59*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 2.62*** 1.31*** 0.41 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.73) (0.39) (0.57) 
gdpci -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.21 -0.34 0.64 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.81) (0.44) (0.83) 
gdpcj -0.41*** -0.09* -0.09* -2.43*** -1.23*** -0.34 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.77) (0.41) (0.59) 
dist -0.68*** -0.13*** -0.13***    
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)    
cu 0.85*** 0.20*** 0.19*** -0.69*** -0.21* -0.24** 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) 
rerv3 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
sim -0.21*** -0.02 -0.03 0.03 0.05 0.09 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) 
rlf 0.17*** 0.03 0.04* 0.05 0.04 0.05** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
div 0.28*** 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.24 0.01 -0.02 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) 
lang 0.26*** 0.05 0.05*    
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
fta -0.04 0.02 0.12 -0.14** -0.08** 0.16 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.19) 
bor 0.43*** 0.07*** 0.07***    
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)    
lalis -0.45*** -0.11*** -0.10***    
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)    
trade1l  0.82*** 0.82***  0.53*** 0.53*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.03) 
Con 1.79*** 0.34 0.24 1.85*** 0.55* 2.00** 
 (0.35) (0.22) (0.23) (0.61) (0.30) (0.84) 
No of obs 4,421 3,993 3,993 4,421 3,993 3,993 
R-sq 0.42 0.81 0.81 0.16 0.43 0.44 
Ad R-sq 0.420 0.810 0.812    
F-test 222.2 921.7 352    
No of ind    198 185 185 
Rho    0.849 0.684 0.697 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is logarithm of real exports- trade 1. All other definitions are as 
in table 6.3 
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Appendix A. 21   Sensitivity analysis  results for RERV4 (TIM)        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdpi 1.12*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.36 0.41 -0.52 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.78) (0.43) (0.81) 
gdpj 0.59*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 2.68*** 1.32*** 0.41 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.72) (0.39) (0.57) 
gdpci -0.13 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.27 0.67 
 (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.80) (0.44) (0.82) 
gdpcj -0.44*** -0.10** -0.09* -2.51*** -1.24*** -0.34 
 (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.76) (0.41) (0.59) 
dist -0.67*** -0.12*** -0.13***    
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)    
cu 0.84*** 0.20*** 0.19*** -0.69*** -0.20* -0.23* 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12) 
rerv4 -1.70*** -0.41** -0.28 -0.73* -0.42* -0.24 
 (0.25) (0.19) (0.23) (0.41) (0.24) (0.22) 
sim -0.19*** -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.10 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.08) 
rlf 0.18*** 0.03 0.04* 0.06 0.05* 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
div 0.28*** 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.25 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.09) (0.09) 
lang 0.26*** 0.05 0.05*    
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
fta -0.05 0.02 0.12 -0.12* -0.08** 0.16 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.19) 
bor 0.44*** 0.07*** 0.07***    
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)    
lalis -0.46*** -0.11*** -0.11***    
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)    
trade1l  0.81*** 0.82***  0.53*** 0.53*** 
  (0.01) (0.01)  (0.03) (0.03) 
Con 2.09*** 0.40* 0.25 2.09*** 0.70** 2.05** 
 (0.35) (0.22) (0.23) (0.62) (0.31) (0.84) 
No of obs 4,417 3,991 3,991 4,417 3,991 3,991 
R-sq 0.43 0.81 0.81 0.16 0.43 0.44 
Ad R-sq 0.425 0.810 0.812    
F-test 227.9 922.7 355.1    
No of ind    198 185 185 
Rho    0.857 0.689 0.702 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is logarithm of real exports- trade 1. All other definitions are as 
in table 6.3 
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Appendix A. 22   Sensitivity analysis  results for RERV2 (DIM)        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdp2 0.92*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 1.65*** 0.76*** 1.28** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.12) (0.57) 
gdpc2 -0.17*** -0.04 -0.04 -1.55*** -0.72*** -1.30** 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.19) (0.12) (0.58) 
dist -0.66*** -0.10** -0.09**    
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)    
cu 0.99*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.07 0.07 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.08) (0.09) 
rerv2 -1.28*** -0.45 -0.47 -0.16 -0.33 -0.32 
 (0.38) (0.31) (0.38) (0.24) (0.25) (0.34) 
sim -0.16** -0.00 -0.00 0.15 0.07 0.09 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09) 
rlf 0.12*** 0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
div 0.43*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.06 0.08 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.07) (0.07) 
lang 0.28*** 0.02 0.02    
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)    
fta -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.17** -0.07* -0.51 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.40) 
bor 0.56*** 0.08*** 0.08***    
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)    
lalis -0.47*** -0.07** -0.07**    
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
trade7l  0.84*** 0.84***  0.55*** 0.54*** 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Con 1.30*** 0.30 0.27 3.23*** 1.38*** 1.15 
 (0.42) (0.22) (0.24) (0.86) (0.39) (0.91) 
No of obs 2,534 2,334 2,334 2,534 2,334 2,334 
R-sq 0.53 0.87 0.87 0.21 0.49 0.51 
Ad R-sq 0.527 0.866 0.869    
F-test 225.6 754.2 282.9    
No of ind    103 99 99 
Rho    0.819 0.610 0.767 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is log(real exports + real imports)- trade 7. All other definitions 
are as in table 6.3 
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Appendix A. 23  Sensitivity analysis  results for RERV3 (DIM)       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdp2 0.92*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 1.66*** 0.78*** 1.28** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.16) (0.12) (0.56) 
gdpc2 -0.14** -0.03 -0.03 -1.56*** -0.73*** -1.29** 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.19) (0.12) (0.57) 
dist -0.66*** -0.10** -0.10**    
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)    
cu 1.00*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.06 0.07 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.08) (0.09) 
rerv3 -0.00 -0.02 -0.02* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
sim -0.17** -0.01 -0.01 0.15 0.07 0.09 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09) 
rlf 0.12*** 0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
div 0.43*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.06 0.08 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.07) (0.07) 
lang 0.27*** 0.02 0.02    
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)    
fta -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.17*** -0.07* -0.53 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.41) 
bor 0.55*** 0.07*** 0.07***    
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)    
lalis -0.46*** -0.06** -0.06**    
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
trade7l  0.84*** 0.85***  0.55*** 0.54*** 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Con 1.05** 0.21 0.21 3.19*** 1.28*** 1.10 
 (0.42) (0.21) (0.23) (0.86) (0.37) (0.87) 
No of obs 2,538 2,338 2,338 2,538 2,338 2,338 
R-sq 0.53 0.87 0.87 0.21 0.49 0.51 
Ad R-sq 0.523 0.866 0.869    
F-test 219.6 752.1 282.5    
No of ind    103 99 99 
Rho    0.820 0.615 0.768 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is log(real exports + real imports)- trade 7. All other definitions 
are as in table 6.3 
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Appendix A. 24  Sensitivity analysis  results for RERV4 (DIM)        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_1 OLS_1t FE FE_1 FE_1t 
gdp2 0.92*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 1.63*** 0.76*** 1.27** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.17) (0.12) (0.57) 
gdpc2 -0.17** -0.04 -0.03 -1.54*** -0.71*** -1.28** 
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.20) (0.12) (0.58) 
dist -0.66*** -0.10** -0.09**    
 (0.07) (0.04) (0.04)    
cu 1.00*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.07 0.07 0.08 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.17) (0.09) (0.09) 
rerv4 -1.34*** -0.33 -0.24 -0.34 -0.30 -0.11 
 (0.36) (0.39) (0.49) (0.31) (0.18) (0.24) 
sim -0.15** -0.00 -0.00 0.16 0.08 0.10 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09) 
rlf 0.12*** 0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
div 0.44*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.06 0.08 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.17) (0.07) (0.07) 
lang 0.28*** 0.02 0.02    
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)    
fta -0.06 -0.00 0.00 -0.17** -0.07* -0.50 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.39) 
bor 0.57*** 0.08*** 0.08***    
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)    
lalis -0.47*** -0.07** -0.06**    
 (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)    
trade7l  0.84*** 0.84***  0.55*** 0.54*** 
  (0.02) (0.02)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Con 1.29*** 0.27 0.22 3.27*** 1.35*** 1.11 
 (0.42) (0.23) (0.24) (0.86) (0.37) (0.89) 
No of obs 2,533 2,333 2,333 2,533 2,333 2,333 
R-sq 0.53 0.87 0.87 0.21 0.49 0.51 
Ad R-sq 0.527 0.866 0.868    
F-test 226.6 753.9 283.6    
No of ind    103 99 99 
Rho    0.818 0.609 0.764 
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is log(real exports + real imports)- trade 7. All other definitions 
are as in table 6.3 
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Appendix A. 25   Regression results-country pair (TIM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_CU OLS_1t FE OLS_1CP OLS_1CPT 
gdpi 1.11*** -0.06*** 0.22*** 0.40 0.41 -0.52 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) (0.78) (0.35) (0.59) 
gdpj 0.59*** 0.00 0.11*** 2.68*** 1.33*** 0.42 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.72) (0.33) (0.43) 
gdpci -0.11 0.13*** -0.04 -0.07 -0.28 0.66 
 (0.08) (0.02) (0.05) (0.81) (0.34) (0.59) 
gdpcj -0.43*** 0.03 -0.09* -2.50*** -1.25*** -0.34 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.76) (0.33) (0.44) 
dist -0.67*** 0.07*** -0.13***  5.96*** 2.58 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)  (1.71) (2.03) 
cu 0.83***  0.19*** -0.69*** -0.20* -0.23** 
 (0.05)  (0.03) (0.19) (0.11) (0.11) 
rerv1 -1.66*** -0.17** -0.27 -0.59 -0.42** -0.22 
 (0.25) (0.08) (0.22) (0.37) (0.20) (0.22) 
sim -0.19*** 0.24*** -0.02 0.05 0.06 0.10 
 (0.06) (0.01) (0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) 
rlf 0.18*** -0.04*** 0.04* 0.06 0.05* 0.06** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
div 0.27*** -0.46*** 0.09*** -0.25 0.01 -0.01 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.03) (0.16) (0.07) (0.08) 
lang 0.26*** 0.14*** 0.05*  -0.67* 0.20 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.37) (0.46) 
fta -0.05 0.05*** 0.12 -0.12* -0.08** 0.54* 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.30) 
bor 0.44*** 0.05*** 0.07***  -0.08 -0.11 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.02)  (0.15) (0.15) 
lalis -0.46*** 0.22*** -0.11***  3.29*** 1.78* 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.03)  (0.80) (0.93) 
trade1l   0.82***  0.53*** 0.53*** 
   (0.01)  (0.02) (0.02) 
ltrade1  0.07***     
  (0.00)     
Con 2.05*** -0.29*** 0.25 2.01*** -19.14*** -7.28 
 (0.35) (0.10) (0.23) (0.62) (5.62) (6.85) 
No of obs 4,417 4,263 3,991 4,417 3,991 3,991 
R-sq 0.43 0.60 0.81 0.16 0.85 0.85 
Ad R-sq 0.425 0.603 0.812  0.838 0.839 
F-test 227.1 771.8 354.9    
No of ind    198   
Rho    0.856   
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is logarithm of real exports- trade 1 except for column 2 where 
the dependent variable is the currency union dummy, OLS_1CP means OLS with country pair dummies 
and LDV included as explanatory variables, OLS_1CPT means OLS with country pair, time dummies 
and LDV included. All other definitions are as defined in table 6.3  
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Appendix A. 26   Regression results- country pair (DIM) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VAR OLS OLS_CU OLS_1t FE OLS_1CP OLS_1CPT 
gdp2 0.92*** -0.04*** 0.15*** 1.64*** 0.76*** 1.27*** 
 (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.17) (0.09) (0.41) 
gdpc2 -0.16** 0.05** -0.03 -1.54*** -0.71*** -1.27*** 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.20) (0.10) (0.41) 
dist -0.66*** 0.11*** -0.10**  4.08*** 6.02*** 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.04)  (1.08) (1.85) 
cu 0.99***  0.17*** 0.07 0.07 0.08 
 (0.06)  (0.03) (0.17) (0.07) (0.07) 
rerv1 -1.53*** -0.17* -0.29 -0.30 -0.31 -0.15 
 (0.37) (0.10) (0.50) (0.29) (0.36) (0.44) 
sim -0.15** 0.24*** -0.00 0.16 0.08 0.10 
 (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06) 
rlf 0.12*** -0.05*** 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
div 0.44*** -0.43*** 0.08** 0.06 0.08 0.07 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.04) (0.17) (0.06) (0.06) 
lang 0.28*** 0.10*** 0.02  2.24*** 3.31*** 
 (0.06) (0.02) (0.03)  (0.56) (0.99) 
fta -0.06 0.05*** 0.00 -0.17** -0.07* -0.51* 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.30) 
bor 0.57*** 0.03 0.08***  5.64*** 7.84*** 
 (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)  (1.23) (2.04) 
lalis -0.48*** 0.20*** -0.07**  -6.01*** -8.85*** 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.03)  (1.30) (2.49) 
trade7l   0.84***  0.55*** 0.54*** 
   (0.02)  (0.03) (0.03) 
ltrade7  0.10***     
  (0.01)     
Con 1.28*** -0.31** 0.23 3.24*** -12.50*** -18.86*** 
 (0.42) (0.13) (0.24) (0.86) (3.62) (6.35) 
       
No of obs 2,533 2,446 2,333 2,533 2,333 2,333 
R-sq 0.53 0.56 0.87 0.21 0.89 0.90 
Ad R-sq 0.528 0.553 0.868  0.888 0.891 
F-test 228.4 310.1 283.8    
No of ind    103   
Rho    0.818   
Notes: In this table the dependent variable is log(real exports + real imports)- trade 7 except for column 2 
where the dependent variable is the currency union dummy. All other definitions are as defined in table 
6.3 and appendix A.25  
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Appendix A. 27  Business cycle correlation (BUS) for all periods 
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Appendix A. 28  Terms of trade synchronisation (TOT) for all periods 
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Appendix A. 29  Regional trade integration (RTI) for all periods 
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Appendix A. 30  Real exchange rate (RER) for all periods 
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Appendix A. 31  Convergence in inflation (INF) for all periods 
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Appendix A. 33  Debt service requirement (DSR) for all periods 
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Appendix A. 34  Current account balance (CAB) for all periods 
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Appendix A. 35  Calinski Harabasz and DH cluster stopping rules 
  Average linkage Single linkage Complete linkage Ward’s linkage 
 NoC1  Duda/Hart  Duda/Hart  Duda/Hart  Duda/Hart 
  CHP2 JJ3 PTS4 CHP2 JJ3 PTS4 CHP2 JJ3 PTS4 CHP2 JJ3 PTS4 
1
9
9
8
-2
0
1
2
 a
ll
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
1  0.8105 3.04  0.8105 3.04  0.8105 3.04  0.7636 4.03 
2 3.04 0.7962 3.07 3.04 0.7962 3.07 3.04 0.7962 3.07 4.03 0.6848 2.30 
3 3.33 0.8114 2.56 3.30 0.8114 2.56 3.30 0.6906 4.93 4.22 0.6318 2.33 
4 3.34 0.6652 5.03 3.34 0.8106 2.34 4.56 0.5985 2.01 4.56 0.5985 2.01 
5 4.68 0.5548 1.60 3.39 0.7774 2.58 4.68 0.5548 1.60 4.68 0.6432 3.33 
6 4.54 0.3065 2.26 3.66 0.7707 2.38 4.54 0.6432 3.33 4.73 0.5234 1.82 
7 4.52 0.6432 3.33 3.91 0.7990 1.76 4.98 0.3065 2.26 5.12 0.0000 . 
8 5.44 0.7230 1.53 3.92 0.6432 3.33 5.44 0.7230 1.53 5.44 0.6824 1.86 
9 5.37 0.0000 . 4.99 0.6824 1.86 5.37 0.5803 2.17 5.63 0.5225 1.83 
10 5.13 0.5803 2.17 5.42 0.5225 1.83 5.87 0.3275 2.05 5.87 0.000 . 
1
9
9
8
-2
0
0
2
 a
ll
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
1  0.8534 2.23  0.8534 2.23  0.8520 2.26  0.7896 3.46 
2 2.23 0.7551 3.89 2.23 0.8400 2.29 2.26 0.6629 4.58 3.46 0.7171 1.97 
3 3.31 0.7854 2.46 2.37 0.8480 1.97 3.21 0.4827 2.14 3.51 0.6602 1.54 
4 3.18 0.4173 1.40 2.36 0.8124 2.31 3.41 0.3495 1.86 3.63 0.0000 . 
5 2.99 0.6375 4.55 2.56 0.8051 2.18 3.58 0.1983 4.04 3.88 0.6728 2.92 
6 3.99 0.0000 . 2.73 0.6375 4.55 3.99 0.6832 2.78 3.88 0.4173 1.40 
7 3.93 0.6832 2.78 3.93 0.0000 . 4.25 0.0000 . 4.31 0.0000 . 
8 4.52 0.6319 2.91 3.37 0.6832 2.78 4.52 0.6319 2.91 4.60 0.5559 2.40 
9 5.32 0.4220 2.74 4.05 0.7036 2.11 5.32 0.4220 2.74 5.32 0.4220 2.74 
10 6.09 0.0000 . 4.50 0.4638 3.47 6.09 0.0000 . 6.09 0.1844 4.42 
2
0
0
3
-2
0
0
7
 a
ll
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
1 
     0.8412 2.45  0.8499 2.30  0.7853 3.55  0.7652 3.99 
2 
2.45 0.8272 2.51 2.30 0.8184 2.66 3.55 0.5240 1.82 3.99 0.6036 1.97 
3 
2.62 0.7112 4.47 2.63 0.7660 3.36 3.83 0.3999 1.50 3.89 0.7202 3.11 
4 
3.74 0.0000 . 3.22 0.7845 2.75 3.74 0.7244 3.42 3.60 0.3999 1.50 
5 
3.48 0.7040 3.78 3.48 0.8521 1.56 4.08 0.0000 . 3.93 0.0000 . 
6 
4.32 0.6682 1.99 3.25 0.8600 1.30 4.14 0.5012 1.99 3.97 0.6743 2.42 
7 
4.22 0.6348 1.73 3.02 0.7833 1.94 4.04 0.7460 1.70 4.20 0.4758 2.20 
8 
4.20 0.5374 1.72 3.17 0.6951 2.63 4.02 0.6138 2.52 4.20 0.0000 . 
9 
4.13 0.5245 2.72 3.75 0.5751 2.22 4.48 0.3701 1.70 4.48 0.2276 3.99 
10 
4.90 0.0000 . 4.28 0.4472 1.24 4.55 0.2276 3.39 4.52 0.3701 1.70  
2
0
0
8
-2
0
1
2
 a
ll
 v
ar
ia
b
le
s 
1 
 0.8094 3.06  0.8094 3.06  0.8132 2.99  0.7661 3.97 
2 
3.06 0.7775 3.43 3.06 0.7775 3.43 2.99 0.7739 3.51 3.97 0.6854 4.13 
3 
3.53 0.7894 2.94 3.53 0.7894 2.94 3.53 0.7894 2.94 4.15 0.3035 4.59 
4 
3.71 0.5620 7.79 3.71 0.8541 1.71 3.71 0.5620 7.79 5.20 0.2374 6.42 
5 
6.45 0.6030 4.61 3.39 0.5798 6.52 6.45 0.6030 4.61 7.35 0.5765 3.67 
6 
7.77 0.6964 2.18 5.52 0.6030 4.61 7.77 0.6598 2.58 7.20 0.1516 5.60 
7 
7.57 0.3329 2.00 7.27 0.0000 . 7.86 0.3895 4.70 8.58 0.3329 2.00 
8 
7.59 0.4527 4.84 6.23 0.6964 2.18 8.86 0.3329 2.00 8.87 0.2677 2.74 
9 
10.25 0.0000 . 6.76 0.4527 4.84 10.25 0.0000 . 10.25 0.0000 . 
10 
10.20 0.4470 2.47 10.20 0.0000 . 10.20 0.4470 2.47 10.20 0.4470 2.47 
Notes: 1 Number of cluster, 2 Calinski/Harabasz Pseudo-F indexe, 3 JJ stands for Je(2)/Je(1) index, and  4 stands for 
Pseuda T-Squared, DH stands for Duda Hart 
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Appendix A. 36  H. clustering results-1998-2012(OCA variables) 
Linkage 
method 
Cluster number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Average 
Linkage 
(6 clusters) 
CCC=0.858 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
NER 
TGO 
MLI 
SEN 
GHA 
LIB 
SLE 
CPV GIN NGA 
Single 
Linkage 
(2 clusters) 
CCC=0.814 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
CPV 
GHA 
GIN 
GMB 
GNB 
LIB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
SLE 
TGO 
NGA - - - - 
Complete 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
0.781 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
NER 
TGO 
MLI 
SEN 
CPV 
GIN 
GHA 
LIB 
SLE 
NGA - 
Ward’s 
Linkage 
(2 clusters) 
0.70 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
CPV 
GHA 
GIN 
LIB 
NGA 
SLE 
- - - - 
Centroid 
2&5 clusters 
CCC=0.777 
      
Note: H stands for Hierarchical  
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Appendix A. 37  H. clustering results-1998-2012 Convergence criteria 
Linkage 
method 
Cluster number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Average 
Linkage 
(6 clusters) 
CCC=0.904 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GNB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
GMB 
SLE 
LIB 
GHA 
GIN 
CPV NGA 
Single 
Linkage 
(6 clusters) 
0.847 
LIB CPV 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
SLE 
GHA 
GIN 
NGA 
Complete 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
0.771 
LIB 
MLI 
NER 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GNB 
SEN 
TGO 
CPV 
GMB 
SLE 
GHA 
GIN 
NGA - 
Ward’s 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
0.63 
BEN 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GNB 
MLI 
NER 
TGO 
CPV 
GMB 
SLE 
LIB 
GHA 
GIN 
NGA - 
Centroid  
2 and 3 
clusters 
CCC=0.894 
      
Note: H stands for Hierarchical  
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Appendix A. 38  H. clustering results-1998-2012 Cityblock distance 
Linkage 
method 
Cluster number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Average 
Linkage 
(6 clusters) 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
GIN 
GNB 
GHA 
GMB 
SLE 
LIB CPV NGA  
Single 
Linkage 
(7 clusters) 
GIN 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
GMB 
GNB 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
SLE GHA LIB CPV NGA 
Complete 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
GHA 
GIN 
GMB 
GNB 
SLE 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
LIB CPV NGA   
Ward’s 
Linkage 
(5 clusters) 
BEN 
BFA 
CIV 
MLI 
NER 
SEN 
TGO 
GHA 
GIN 
GMB 
GNB 
SLE 
LIB CPV NGA   
Note: H stands for Hierarchical  
 
 
 
